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4ABSTRACT
Young British South Asian Muslim women: Identities and Marriage
This thesis focuses on young and educated British South Asian Muslim women, and their
negotiations of gendered identities and marriage in multicultural Britain. I conducted 30
in-depth interviews with Muslim women from northern England so as to explore how
educational and employment experiences are altering women’s gender identities and
consequently, their understandings of marriage. Firstly, I look at how Muslim women
develop ‘alternative’ identities as they navigate ‘Islamic’ and ‘British’ ideals. I analyse
whether higher education and paid employment influence women’s perspectives in
constructing ‘new’ identities as they explore boundaries. My analysis is embedded within
theoretical frameworks encompassing racialised, politicised and gendered discourses on
Muslim identities in the UK. In essence, I concentrate on how women manage Muslimness
as they evolve in their socio-political contexts. Secondly, I focus on how marriage is
perceived by British South Asian Muslim women. The debates revolve around the
gendered expectations women face from their communities; for instance, women navigate
‘choice’ and ‘agency’ in cultural practices such as arranged marriages. Furthermore,
marriage, as an institution, remains a ‘religious duty’ in Islam. I raise questions about how
Muslim women frame marriage as they generate new understandings of marriage through
their negotiations of the ‘nikah’ and the civil registry (secular state law). Throughout these
thematic discussions, the tensions engendered by the dichotomy ‘religion’ v/s ‘culture’
remain evident as Muslim women navigate contextual identities. Cultural gendered
‘traditions’ expected from their families are re-worked as they delay marriage so as to gain
degrees and secure careers. Clearly, women are deconstructing stereotypical notions of
‘Muslimness’ as fixed categories so as to express individual definitions of meanings of
British Muslimness. The prioritising of an Islamic identity over other identities (ethnic,
citizenship and national) is evident. However, with education, women are contesting and
interpreting Islam from new angles. They critique gendered practices such as ‘talaq’ and
polygamy, concepts associated with Islamic marriage, in an attempt to embrace a
discourse of equality within marriage, hence leading them to generate new gender
identities.
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9CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
The focus of this thesis is on young and educated British South Asian Muslim
women’s negotiations of gender identities, and their understandings of marriage in Britain. I
started this PhD project as an extension of my Master’s research, which primarily focused
on educated women’s notions and experiences of ‘choice’ and ‘consent’ in marriage, and
how these influenced their gendered identities. More specifically, I looked at arranged and
forced marriages within the South Asian diaspora in Mauritius.1 The aim of my Master’s
research was to establish how marriage, brought about through arrangements between
families, impacted on educated Mauritian women’s gendered identities within their ethnic
and religious, as well as within the broader context of Mauritian society. My PhD thesis
builds on this previous research as it also explores how educated Muslim women of South
Asian diasporas in Britain negotiate marriage. More specifically, in this study, I evaluate the
ways in which the new spaces of higher education and paid employment are leading young
women to not only articulate new gender identities but to also generate new perceptions and
expectations of marriage.
The starting hypothesis for my thesis is that as British South Asian Muslim women
negotiate the spaces of higher education and employment, they develop new gender
identities which shape their attitudes towards marriage as an institution, practice and act.
Existing literature on British South Asian Muslim women and gender identities makes clear
that there is a link between education and agency (Ahmad, 2001; Bagguley and Hussain,
2007). Educated women express greater independence as they navigate life options such as
educational paths and paid employment careers. This link between women’s agency,
education and employment remains significant in enabling women to generate new gender
identities as educated and economically active young women within South Asian Muslim
communities in Britain. However, the crucial issue I investigate in this thesis relates to the
possible impacts this relationship creates upon women’s other future life options such as
marriage. This thesis reveals that even though women are increasingly opting for
educational and employment careers, the institution of marriage still remains the preferred
form of social/sexual relationship for South Asian Muslim women in Britain. The salient
point to note is that while most of these educated young South Asian Muslim women are not
actively resisting or refusing to consider marriage, many of them are attempting to re-work
or re-interpret dominant ethno-religious understandings of marriage. This raises important
questions for my study. Indeed, why is marriage not resisted more by educated and
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independent young women? As women exercise newfound agency over their life options,
how are the challenges faced by these young women leading them to actively navigate
family and community expectations of marriage so as to generate new notions of South
Asian Muslim womanhood within their communities? Consequently, how are their
negotiations leading them to generate new gender identities?
The key research questions I address in this study are:
(a) As young British South Asian Muslim women negotiate spaces like higher education and
employment, are new gendered identities generated?
(b) To what extent do British South Asian Muslim women develop new understandings of
marriage through their experiences of higher education and employment?
(c) How are such understandings shaping the negotiations of marriage expectations of
British South Asian Muslim women?
My study draws on empirical research with thirty educated young British South
Asian Muslim women to look at the possibilities or changes that education or paid
employment might bring to women’s notions and expectations of marriage. I build on the
existing literature on British South Asian Muslim women’s evolving gender identities,
education and employment by not only examining how spaces like higher education and
employment are encouraging women to postpone marriage options, but to also reflect on
how their experiences of education and employment are altering their understandings of
marriage. In this thesis, I therefore focus on marriage as the key site within which I
investigate how young British South Asian Muslim women are juggling the challenges they
face as new gendered identities are embraced. This analysis of women’s navigations of
marriage and gender identities is informed by feminist theoretical frameworks, where I
suggest that postmodern and post-colonial feminist theory aid in the study of women’s
affirmation and articulation of new gender identities. In particular, I argue that concepts
around performativity and difference enable us to understand young British South Asian
Muslim women’s re-workings of their gender identities.
Existing research on young British South Asian women and marriage within South
Asian Muslim communities in Britain shows that current policy debates around marriage
and multiculturalism in Britain are dominated by the issue of arranged and forced marriages
within these communities. The point of contention arising within the ongoing political
discussions on South Asian marriages in the UK relates to the issue of ‘choice’ young South
Asian women have within the marriage process, more specifically, how much choice and
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independence do young women have as their families attempt to arrange their marriages?
The crux of the matter remains: when is a match merely arranged, left to the young woman
to independently decide whether to marry or not, and when is a marriage forced, leaving
women with no choice but to ‘agree’ to marry? After increasingly dealing with cases where
young women have been victims of forced marriages, the British government is enforcing
new legislation so as to criminalise forced marriages in the UK (BBC News, June 2012). In
my analysis of young women’s negotiations of marriage, I reflect on the ways in which
education and employment are leading young British South Asian Muslim women to
formulate and assert new positionings as they engage with the cultural and social processes
of the arranged marriage; how does the independence gained from educational and
employment experiences leading them to develop new expectations of marriage and
consequently, generate new gender identities as the degrees of choice and consent are
negotiated within marriage?
In the following chapter (Chapter Two), I foreground the major theoretical debates
framing my study. First, I focus on the educational and employment contexts of British
South Asian Muslim women and argue that their schooling as well as higher educational
experiences have enforced stereotypical notions and discourses of South Asian womanhood
in Britain. As such, their gender identities are perceived as being fixed within particular
racialised discourses around ethnicity, culture and religion (Brah, 1993; Bhopal, 1997;
Basit, 1997; Afshar, 1994; Dwyer, 2000; Ahmad, 2001; Shain, 2003; Bagguley and Hussain,
2008). These notions revolve around women rejecting educational careers post compulsory
secondary education in the advent of marriage. Ultimately, young women are not viewed as
potential participants within the public spaces of higher education and the labour market. I
attempt to deconstruct such notions in demonstrating that strong motivational factors are
increasingly leading women of diverse social classes and educational backgrounds to
consider educational and employment careers prior to marriage. As British South Asian
Muslim women explore the spaces of education and employment, they are resisting
gendered cultural norms (through family navigations) and formulating new femininities as
they re-work their gender identities through new understandings and expectations of
marriage.
Second, I elaborate on the theoretical strands within feminist theory which I utilise
to conceptualise my analysis of British South Asian Muslim women’s re-workings of their
gender identities. In particular, I reflect on the concept of ‘difference’ and gender identity
politics, brought about by a critique of Eurocentric models of feminist theory by non-
Western feminists. I reiterate how notions of ‘race’, ethnicity and culture must not be
essentialised if women’s experiences are to be understood. Indeed, the construction of ethnic
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minority women’s identities remains embedded within racialised discourses which inform
women’s narratives (Brah, 1993). I rely on Brah’s (1996) concept of culture as ‘reiterative
performance’ and Butler’s (1990) notion of gender identity as ‘performance’ in my analysis
of British South Asian Muslim women’s negotiation and affirmation of their changing
gendered identities. These concepts can be applied to my study in different ways. Firstly,
they enable me to explore the possibilities young British South Asian Muslim women have
for re-working their gendered identities. Secondly, they act as theoretical frameworks which
recognise the discursive, material and geographical contexts within which these young
women’s gendered identities are negotiated.
Third, I focus on marriage as the crux within which British South Asian Muslim
women’s re-workings of their gender identities occur. I contend that marriage and the family
remain gendered organisations within which women contest and construct new gendered
identities. As young women enter the new spaces of higher education and employment, they
re-assess notions of marriage and the family unit; for instance, women develop strategies in
balancing the options of delaying marriage (and family) for educational/work careers, as
well as opting to work after marriage. For Muslims, marriage is also seen as a religious duty
in Islam. I argue that educated Muslim women still view marriage as crucial to their ethnic
and religious identities, even though alternatives to marriage (for example, cohabitation) are
becoming more and more popular in Britain. As such, marriage acts as an important social
institution aiding in the maintenance of ethno-religious identities, hence shaping British
South Asian Muslim women’s gendered identities. For instance, through the customary
cultural custom of arranged marriage, young women illustrate their navigations of marriage
and the affirmation of new gender identities as they actively negotiate consent, agency and
choice within marriage, thus demonstrating their changing perceptions and expectations of
marriage. In also having to negotiate two intertwining legal frameworks – Islamic law and
English law,2 the definitions of marriage for these young women are re-worked, thereby
allowing for the possibilities of redefining the institution of marriage within British South
Asian Muslim communities. Indeed, the status of talaq (Islamic divorce) and polygamy in
British South Asian Muslim women’s lives remain important areas of research as they
indicate how women are engaging with such concepts as they navigate the Islamic marriage
in Britain.
In Chapter Three, I reflect on the methodological approaches I utilised to carry out
my research. I conducted my study in the Yorkshire and Lancashire areas as they are
significant locations of British South Asian Muslim communities. As research strategy, I
relied on snowballing as my main recruitment strategy and through personal contacts and
student societies, I started the recruitment process on university campuses (Leeds, Bradford
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and Manchester). I also contacted South Asian women’s organisations in Leeds so as to
network and make my study known; as such, I made new contacts which helped in
recruiting research participants. I go on to outline the methodological tools (individual in-
depth interviews and participant observation) I used for my research, thereby providing
some reflections on the interview process and the benefits gained from including participant
observation in my research strategy. Furthermore, I focus on the feminist methodologies that
inform my study; in particular, I explain why I find feminist standpoint theory and the
feminist politics of ‘difference’ useful. In essence, I argue that gendered identities and
knowledge production remain fluid and contextual, hence suggesting that women’s differing
experiences shape their diverse gender identities. I also offer some reflections on the
research process. I look at the researcher/researched relationship, issues around
positionality, as well as the ethical considerations involved in doing fieldwork. I also reflect
on how my research strategy produced a particular sample group which has shaped my
findings. For instance, the recruitment sample of research participants from Islamic societies
on university campuses may have generated normative responses attributed to such religious
groups. In addition, I provide a summary relating to the profile of research participants.
Chapter Four reveals how British South Asian Muslim women are exploring
boundaries as they navigate educational and employment settings and in so doing, push
gendered boundaries to produce new gender identities. Here, I focus on the routes and the
motivational factors leading respondents to choose to go to university and into employment;
I analyse their families’ attitudes towards young women’s choices to go into higher
education, and the gender inequalities prevalent within their communities as far as women’s
education and career options are concerned. I evaluate my participants’ decisions to live
‘home or away’ as they negotiate campus life and social activities/norms that come with
university life. Indeed, their university experiences reflect the challenges they face, and the
changes they are gradually bringing about by deconstructing cultural gendered norms such
as their communities’ expectations of them to consider marriage instead of higher education
and paid employment. Chapter Four therefore provides a framework for understanding the
processes of change which are experienced by many young women as they enter higher
education and employment, and how these may shape new gender identities.
In Chapter Five, I extend the theme of identity construction by paying particular
attention to how respondents challenge existing gendered cultural norms to produce new
gender identities as they negotiate educational and paid employment settings. In fact, as they
assert new gender identities due to higher education and employment, British South Asian
Muslim women are re-thinking life options such as professional careers and marriage. In
this chapter, I concentrate on how educated British South Asian Muslim women are
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managing Muslimness as they actively and consciously contest and construct notions of
Muslimness, whilst resisting essentialised depictions or stereotypes of Islam in Britain post
9/11 and 7/7. I argue that for respondents, Muslimness is explored through an array of other
social identities, notably, citizenship, ethnic, and racialised categories which inform their
views and meanings of Islam. Consequently, I demonstrate how they express (define) and
perform (affirm) their identities within spatial environments such as university, the
workplace and home. Indeed, women choose to define and affirm their social identities
through the terms (such as ‘Asian’, ‘Pakistani’, ‘British Muslim’ or ‘British Pakistani’) they
use, through language and food, as well as through dress codes, which remains a significant
factor aiding educated British South Asian Muslim women to navigate across their multiple
but nonetheless, fluid identities. In this chapter, I emphasise that religious identity is
prioritised over notions around citizenship and ethnicity by participants; for instance, the
hijab is increasingly being worn by young Muslim women today as an expression of Islamic
identity, while the term ‘British Muslim’ is utilised by respondents to illustrate that Islam is
given more value than their ethnic identity. Chapter Five explores how spaces of higher
education and employment lead British South Asian Muslim women to generate new gender
identities within the context of these shifting debates.
In Chapter Six, I examine how young Muslim women are re-negotiating marriage in
British South Asian Muslim communities by looking at how women are framing or
outlining the boundaries of marriage. I contend that they navigate marriage firstly, as
institution, secondly, as practice (gender relationships in marriage) and thirdly, through the
act (style of ceremony-‘nikah’ versus registry) of marriage. I look at how the
intergenerational changes in educated women’s perceptions of gendered marital roles are
altering the institution of marriage in their communities. I highlight how they construct new
meanings of marriage by differentiating their positionings on marriage as ‘different’ from
non-Muslim British society. For instance, I examine women’s negotiations of pre-marital
relationships as they review gendered boundaries of appropriate modes of behaviour, which
South Asian Muslim women are expected to uphold prior to marriage. Also, I assess how
respondents’ ‘new’ gender expectations of marriage influence marital relationships as
women demand equality in the household through domestic work and living arrangements.
However, by comparing unmarried respondents’ expectations of marriage to married
women’s experiences of marriage, I reflect on the discrepancies that exist between marital
expectations and marital realities. Furthermore, I demonstrate how women are negotiating
‘choice’ of marriage partners by evaluating practices such as ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’
marriages, where the difficulty of making a clear distinction between them highlights the
problematic issue of consent in marriages arranged by families. I also extend the theme of
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arranged marriage by briefly reviewing women’s perceptions of cousin and transnational
marriages. These levels of analysis are intertwined as the practice of marriage is negotiated
through respondents’ ‘agency’ and ‘choice’ so as to challenge and construct new gender
identities in marriage.
Finally, I focus on how the style of ceremony respondents choose to adopt becomes
a marker which women utilise to further negotiate, and frame marriage in Britain. In
navigating ‘nikah’ and ‘registry’, the ceremony becomes a symbol which represents other
negotiations involved in the marriage process. On one level, I examine how respondents
navigate Islamic law and English law as they consider marriage as Muslims, as well as
British citizens. On a second level, I focus on women’s negotiations of the nikah’s
stipulations from Islamic law; I argue that respondents are aiming for a discourse of gender
equality within the Islamic marriage as they contest talaq and polygamy, Islamic principles
essentially deemed to be patriarchal in nature by feminists. Indeed, this analysis reveals
whether British South Asian Muslim women are re-working Islamic ideals of marriage by
evaluating the possibilities and the limitations of such negotiations.
To conclude, in Chapter Seven, I summarise the main findings of my research and
highlight how this thesis contributes to the existing literature on South Asian Muslim
women’s gender identities and marriage in Britain. Firstly, I suggest that this study
examines how British South Asian Muslim women, within the spaces of higher education
and employment, are deploying agency and independence so as to make autonomous
decisions about their life options. As educated and independent young British South Asian
Muslim women, they are generating new gendered identities as they challenge and alter the
expected gendered norms of South Asian Muslim womanhood within their communities.
Secondly, this study evaluates how the new spaces of education and employment lead young
British South Asian Muslim women to formulate new understandings and expectations of
marriage (as institution, practice and act). As they navigate Islamic and British ideals of
marriage, young women actively negotiate intertwining legal systems so as to re-work their
meanings and expectations of marriage.
I also outline the possibilities for further research in this field of study. I reflect on
the fact that higher university fees may affect young women’s choices of going into higher
education within British South Asian Muslim communities; indeed, to what extent would
financial constraints hinder young women’s options as they attempt to exercise agency over
educational and employment careers? I suggest that longitudinal studies built from my
research sample could also examine whether, in the long-term, respondents have been
successful in having professional careers as well as meet their expectations in marriage.
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Furthermore, I reflect on the policy debates raised for example by The Archbishop of
Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams in February 2008, about the possibilities of recognising
some aspects of Shari’a law in the UK, and the consequences this may have on British
South Asian Muslim women’s negotiations of marriage in multicultural Britain. Finally, I
end by suggesting that the study of British South Asian Muslim women’s gendered
identities can be extended by focusing on the theoretical theme of spatiality and the
construction of identity. In particular, I claim that spaces like higher educational settings
provide interesting spatial locations to conduct additional in-depth studies which focus on
how educated British South Asian women generate gender identities through their
negotiations of place and space. Studies such as these would act as key contributions to the
field of gender studies.
1 I am from Mauritius, a former British colony which is today a Republic. Mauritius is a multicultural
society comprising citizens of different ethnic origin and religion. Most Mauritians are of South
Asian origin (with a Hindu majority and Muslim minority), followed by people of African, European
and Chinese descent (with a Roman Catholic majority and Buddhist minority). The practice of
arranged marriage in Mauritius is still prevalent among South Asian Mauritians. I interviewed
educated women (Hindus and Muslims) who had arranged marriages, and their perceptions of
‘choice’ and ‘consent’ in these marriages so as to establish whether notions of ‘choice’ and ‘consent’
can in fact be used to distinguish arranged from forced marriages, following the Home Office
(2000/2001) report highlighting ‘consent’ as a determining factor differentiating an arranged
marriage from a forced marriage. This research has also shown that their notions and experiences of
marriage influence their gendered identities as they navigate between autonomous choices in
marriage and family/community expectations of marriage.
2 I refer to ‘English law’ in this thesis as there may be slight differences in Scottish legislation.
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CHAPTER TWO
Literature Review: Theoretical Frameworks
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the literature framework and relevant intellectual debates which
frame my research. As more young British South Asian Muslim women get into higher
education and employment, they are re-working new gender identities as they actively
embrace alternative life options such as educational careers and work. Nevertheless, even
though women are increasingly gaining more independence through education and
employment, studies demonstrate that marriage still remains significant for this group of
young women. Here, in exposing young women’s motives for considering higher educational
and employment spaces, I claim that women exercise agency over the possibilities and
limitations involved in embracing alternative life options such as building careers and
attaining financial independence. However, I also emphasise that their negotiations not only
reveal their choices to opt for educational and employment routes but also indicate the ways
in which they envisage marriage post-education. I hence want to highlight that there is a link
to be drawn between women’s agency, education and employment, and the possible impacts
this relationship creates upon women’s other future life options such as marriage. The
literature I explore in this chapter therefore aims to address the following questions: what
effects are education and employment having on young British South Asian Muslim women’s
abilities to re-work their gender identities? How are their re-workings of their gender
identities in turn influencing their understandings and expectations of marriage? How are
such understandings shaping the negotiations of marriage expectations of these young
women?
I have structured this literature review in three main parts. First, I review the
educational and employment contexts of South Asian Muslim women in Britain. I contend
that early research on the schooling of South Asian Muslim girls and the bearings which their
educational experiences have on their gender identities have indicated the ways in which
discourses on ethnicity, culture and religion shape the construction of stereotypical depictions
of South Asian Muslim womanhood within the spaces of education in Britain. The argument I
highlight here is that racialised discourses documented in previous studies on South Asian
girls and educational achievements mostly suggest that young women do not opt for
educational paths post compulsory level due to marriage. This point remains extremely
significant to my study as it shows a direct link between education and marriage. How are
young women’s educational aims affected by marriage? Are they actively navigating their
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options so as to consider both education (and the potential outcome of employment) as well as
marriage? In so doing, are their gender identities evolving?
More recent literature has focused on the new wave of South Asian Muslim women
entering into higher education and ultimately, employment. Within this body of work, the
motivational factors pushing women to consider education and work not only demonstrate the
positive outcomes of education and employment but also reveal that social class and women’s
educational backgrounds, women’s negotiations with their families to consider educational
careers, as well as the expectations placed upon these young women (by families) to uphold
ideals of South Asian womanhood (and consequently, gendered norms) within their
communities all contribute to women’s opportunities of embracing education and work and
hence, be in a position to explore alternative gender identities. More importantly, it also
addresses how marriage could eventually be negotiated by these young women. Questions
such as would education and employment delay marriage, and alter the gendered relationships
within it remain at the forefront of the debates about South Asian Muslim women’s access to
education and work in the UK. How do women’s independence and agency affect the
institution of marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities; for instance, how do
women respond to the practice of arranged marriage? Are they able to exercise more agency
upon the choice of marriage partners?
Second, I identify the theoretical strands within feminist theory which I utilise to
conceptualise my analysis of British South Asian Muslim women’s re-workings of their
gender identities. I begin by examining how women’s experiences of gendered identities have
been documented in feminist literature by interrogating the politics of ‘difference’ within
feminism so as to assess whether ‘difference’ as a concept is useful in the analysis of ethnic
minority women’s experiences in the UK. More specifically, I draw on the concept of
‘difference’ in order to acknowledge the significance which discourses of culture, ethnicity
and ‘race’ have in assessing the positions of South Asian Muslim women, and their re-
negotiations of gendered identities as they explore higher education and the labour market.
Also, in focusing on the feminist postmodernist thinking on gender identity as performance, I
suggest that the language of performativity helps inform and define educated British South
Asian Muslim women’s re-workings of gender identities within the spaces of education,
work, as well as marriage. I contend that through increased agency and independence gained
within educational and employment spaces, British South Asian Muslim women are
empowered to generate and hence ‘perform’ new gendered identities. In this section, I
foreground the ways in which I use this scholarship to inform my study.
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Third, I argue that marriage remains a significant site within which British South
Asian Muslim women’s re-workings of their gender identities occur. I suggest that the
institution of marriage acts as a locus through which it is possible to evaluate and understand
these young women’s navigations of gendered relationships; more specifically, I assert that
marriage and the family remain gendered formations within which gendered identities are
negotiated and contested. As independence, acquired within the spaces of higher education
and employment, are exercised, women’s expectations of marriage and the gendered
relationships within marriage and the family unit alter, hence enabling them to affirm new
gender identities. Throughout this thesis, I use the scholarship on marriage and South Asian
Muslim identities to assess the significance which marriage still has for educated South Asian
Muslim women in Britain. In negotiating two intertwining legal frameworks, Islamic and
English law, the definitions of marriage for British South Asian Muslim women are
constantly being attributed new meanings, thereby creating scope for re-working and
redefining the institution of marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities, as
well as expanding the possibilities for women to navigate new gender identities. In examining
the current state of marriage in Britain, I raise questions regarding the extent to which South
Asian Muslims maintain marriage as a core social institution, as alternatives such as
cohabitation become increasingly popular in Britain. I argue that the cultural and religious
significance which South Asian Muslims attribute to marriage helps to sustain the popularity
of marriage in their communities. As such, marriage acts as an important social institution
aiding in the maintenance of ethno-religious identities and shaping British South Asian
Muslim women’s gendered identities. For instance, through the customary cultural custom of
arranged marriage, young women illustrate their navigations of marriage and the affirmation
of new gender identities as they actively negotiate consent, agency and choice within
marriage, hence demonstrating their changing perceptions and expectations of marriage.
In this introduction, I have highlighted the major aspects of the literature which I will
be reviewing in this chapter. In particular, I focus on the literature on British South Asian
women’s positionings within educational and employment settings, gender identity and
theoretical concepts such as ‘difference’ and performativity within feminist theory, as well as
studies on marriage and the family in the UK. In essence, I outline how these studies ground
my analysis of young British South Asian Muslim women’s development of new gender
identities and new understandings and expectations of marriage as they negotiate educational
and employment settings.
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2.2 BRITISH SOUTH ASIAN MUSLIM WOMEN, EDUCATION AND
EMPLOYMENT
The educational and employment statuses of South Asian Muslims in Britain have
been well documented in the literature (Ghuman, 1994; Bhavnani, 1994; Phizacklea and
Wolkowitz, 1995; Modood et al., 1997; Charles, 2002; Mason, 2003; Anwar, 2005; Clark and
Drinkwater, 2007). Overall, statistics have shown that British South Asian Muslims’ rates of
educational qualifications and unemployment are lower than other ethnic groups in the UK
(Jones 1993; Mason, 2000, Peach, 2006). However, the important point to note is that despite
such unfavourable entry rates into education and employment, the second generation of South
Asian Muslims in Britain, particularly young British South Asian Muslim women, are
gradually altering British South Asian Muslims’ educational and employment patterns, as
opposed to the previous generation of Muslim migrants (Anwar, 2005: 34-36). These
generational changes in educational and employment demographics remain significant for my
study as they highlight that younger generations of South Asian Muslims in Britain are
aiming for alternative life options in choosing educational and employment routes. In the case
of young women, their decisions to enter the new spaces of education and employment lead to
possibilities of generating new gender identities within these spheres.
There has been significant research on the ways in which young South Asian Muslim
women negotiate their gender identities as they navigate their social contexts (Knott and
Khoker, 1993; Basit, 1997; Haw, 1998; Mohammad, 2005; Dwyer, 2000; Kay, 2007; Brown,
2006; Afshar, 2008; Bowlby and Lloyd-Evans, 2009; Phillips, 2009). Of particular relevance
to my study of South Asian Muslim women and their involvement within educational and
employment spaces is the body of early research on South Asian Muslim women and
education, which has concentrated on the schooling of young Muslim girls of Pakistani and
Bangladeshi descent in Britain. The main findings from these studies have tended to suggest
that young South Asian Muslim girls’ gender identities remain embedded within racialised
discourses which promote stereotypical depictions of South Asian Muslim womanhood in the
UK (Haw, 1998; Basit, 1997; Bhatti, 1999; Parker-Jenkins et al., 1997; Shain, 2003). This
literature remains particularly important for my analysis of women’s gendered identities as
the discussions raised on issues such as ethnicity, religion and culture within educational
settings (secondary schooling) reveal the existing link between the definitions of South Asian
gendered identities and the educational performances of South Asian Muslim girls at school.
Ultimately, they highlight how such discourses have affected young women’s gender
identities as they negotiate educational paths. For instance, Basit (1997) discusses the ways in
which stereotypical depictions of young Muslim girls as ‘submissive’ and ‘obedient’
21
contribute to the racialisation of the latter’s gender identities at school. Likewise, Shain’s
work (2003) also epitomises this notion of racialised gender identities of young South Asian
Muslim girls within the media by calling this process the ‘discursive construction of Asian
femininity’. More specifically, Shain (2003: 8) argues that South Asian girls’ identities
remain constructed (by teachers) within set discourses so as to fit stereotypical images such as
school girls being encouraged by family to abandon educational paths so as to consider
arranged marriages.
In terming this process of racialisation of gender identities as ‘cultural pathology’,
Shain (2003, 2-3) rightly claims that it is the notion of ‘difference’ which remains key to the
construction of South Asian Muslim womanhood within settings such as educational
establishments. The salient point to highlight from Shain’s (2003:8) study of South Asian
Muslim girls and schooling remains that even though these racialised discourses of gender
identities indicate that ‘Asian girls are most commonly positioned as the victims of such
practices or actions’, South Asian girls are within processes of re-working cultural and
religious practices to affirm new gender identities. Their navigations signify a positive
approach to constructing their gender identities within the spaces of education and ultimately,
within marriage. Shain’s research has not only exposed the existing link between education
and marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities but has also especially
highlighted the early negotiations of South Asian Muslim girls as they navigate educational
paths and marriage in Britain. As these young women gain wider choices and greater
independence to navigate education beyond compulsory secondary schooling, what impacts
would their negotiations have on their motivations to pursue educational careers and how
would their choices of embarking upon an educational career affect other life options such as
employment and marriage?
The emerging literature on young South Asian Muslim women, higher education and
employment in Britain looks at firstly, why the participation of young South Asian Muslim
women into higher education and paid employment is increasing, and secondly, how
education and paid employment may help these young women to develop alternative gender
identities within British South Asian Muslim communities (Ahmad, 2001; Bagguley and
Hussain, 2008). The main identifiable factors emanating from the literature pertain to
differences in social class; family negotiations of educational aims between daughters and
parents, as well as the expectations families place upon daughters to uphold ideals of South
Asian Muslim womanhood within their communities. As Bagguley and Hussain (2007: 3)
state, ‘for Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, going to university is not considered to be a
‘natural progression from school’ by parents as well as teachers. Research reveals that there is
a definite link between social class and the educational aspirations of young British South
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Asian Muslim women. Differences in social class affect South Asian Muslim women’s intake
into higher education; research demonstrates that it is easier for young British Pakistani and
Bangladeshi women who are from middle-class educated families to enter higher education
and later have a career, than those from working-class backgrounds due to the motivations
and aspirations of middle-class parents (Evans and Bowlby, 2000; Mohammad, 2005). Hence,
studies such as these raise the point that educational backgrounds, advice, and support all
contribute to the promotion of British South Asian Muslim women’s educational aims.
However, the important question which these findings pose for my study pertains to how
young South Asian Muslim women from non-educational backgrounds, and/or working-class
backgrounds negotiate with, and manage to persuade their non-educated parents for chances
to go to university and have better and wider opportunities in terms of paid employment post
study.
Research suggests that within South Asian Muslim families, especially within
working-class families, older siblings or cousins, defined as ‘role models’ or ‘pioneers’, are
seen as having ‘paved the way’ for younger women to enter into higher education. Older
educated family members hence act as a positive influence in helping younger women to
develop aspirations to gain academic qualifications (Ahmad et al., 2003: 19; Bagguley and
Hussain, 2007), thus enabling them to be in a position where they can make informed
decisions on whether to participate into education and eventually, the labour force. As Irving
et al’s. (1999) research on young South Asian Muslim women and career/training
opportunities also maintains, young women’s decisions on their future academic and work
careers depend heavily on the advice/information they may be receiving from either family,
or educational bodies. If women from non-educational social backgrounds are not provided
with guidance, then it is plausible to suggest educational aspirations could remain limited.
Thus, ensuring that these women obtain the right information from the correct
career/educational and community establishments could influence their perspectives of
education and employment (Irving et al, 1999). If not, it is possible that factors such as these
may discourage British South Asian Muslim women from participating more fully into the
public sphere as they may feel isolated, unsupported or excluded within larger British society.
In evaluating the reasons for the lower rates of educational achievements of British
South Asian Muslim women, studies (Irving et al., 1999; Ahmad, 2001; Abbas, 2003) have
also explained that South Asian Muslim women’s limited access to education is due to
parental and community attitudes. These attitudes pertain to the potential effects which
educational experiences may have upon young South Asian Muslim women’s gender
identities. As Irving et al. (1999: 123) put it, South Asian Muslim parents tend to perceive the
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‘aims of education in a secular society’ to be at ‘odds with an Islamic education, which
confines all knowledge within the framework of the Qur’an which perpetuates a strong sense
of community and family solidarity’. However, despite these apparent tensions, it is possible
for women to promote their educational careers if parents are ensured that their daughters’
reputation and honour (izzat) remain safe; young women are offered parental support to aspire
for better job prospects and better education, as long as women agree to conform to their
families’ cultural/religious norms (Ahmad, 2001; Bagguley and Hussain, 2008). It appears
that for women to gain access to educational routes, the key factor in them succeeding to
achieve their goals rests in them bargaining with family, as well as developing strategies to
resist expected gendered norms of South Asian Muslim womanhood within their families and
communities so as to embrace the possibilities of further education.
Active negotiations imply that young women can be astute in juggling their gender
identities; they juggle domestic religious/cultural expectations, as well as educational and
employment roles. For instance, in showing more involvement within their communities and
interest in their religion, women would gain the approval of their families to pursue their
educational goals or career opportunities as parents would be assured that their daughters are
not transgressing normative cultural or gender expectations (Ali, 1992; Macey, 1999), and
hence, not at risk of being ‘morally loose’ through the ‘anglicising’ effects of university
campus life (Ahmad, 2001: 146). Therefore, although research indicates that it is not
straightforward for women to automatically consider tertiary education, studies also support
the fact that young Muslim women’s families do not always impose traditional gendered roles
and ideals upon them, as long as negotiations and compromises between parents and
daughters are reached. These findings suggest the key questions of my thesis: how are
women’s negotiations with their families leading them to actively get into higher education
and employment? As they negotiate educational settings and ultimately, consider
employment, to what extent is it possible for them to re-work their gender identities as
educated and financially independent British South Asian Muslim women? What
consequences would these alternative life options have on women’s expectations of marriage?
Previous studies have documented the link between the ways in which marriage
influences women’s employment careers. More specifically, Lindley et al., (2004: 153-165)
have traced South Asian ethnic minority women’s economic activity in Britain from 1992 to
2002, and the relationship which exists between women’s employment status, family
structures and marriage expectations. Their study highlights the link which exists between
women’s employment and marriage, and demonstrates that South Asian women’s economic
profiles alter when family structure alters; as women marry, women’s employment figures
within British South Asian communities fall. These findings remain indicative of how
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marriage may influence their employment status as British South Asian Muslim women
decide to leave employment once they marry and have children. In highlighting that marriage
and family demographics must be acknowledged whilst reviewing ethnic minority women’s
economic activity, Lindley et al., (2004) rightly stress the possibilities of future research in
denoting whether young British women form South Asian communities will continue, or
contrast the economic standings of women of previous generation in negotiating employment
prospects post marriage. If the second generation of South Asian Muslim women in the UK is
increasingly getting into employment, following tertiary educational paths, as recent research
(Bagguley and Hussain, 2008) has shown, it is probable that women’s marital expectations of
leaving work to look after the family could slowly lose ground as younger women decide to
consider employment before, as well as after marriage. As Dale et al’s work (2002) has
previously noted, educated women develop sound strategies so as to negotiate employment
and family life in order to fulfil their career aspirations; for instance, shifting from full-time to
part-time employment when their children are young provide them with a solution to continue
working. Ultimately, if educated British South Asian Muslim women decide to remain into
paid employment after marriage, they would be re-working and affirming new gender
identities.
Education and economic independence influence young British South Asian Muslim
women’s future life expectations, consequently encouraging them to generate and re-work
new gender identities through their navigations of educational and employment spaces. As the
literature indicates, negotiations towards higher educational and employment routes are
indicative of a few motivational factors pushing British South Asian Muslim women to
consider education and employment as options. Firstly, education and paid employment
appear to improve self-worth in offering these young women degrees of independence and
freedom (Bagguley and Hussain, 2007; Bhopal, 2009). Secondly, Ahmad et al., (2003: 20)
suggest that women are motivated to gain qualifications so as not to have to rely on a man for
financial means and be able ‘to stand on my own feet’; this suggests that women are re-
assessing their future economic standing within their families and communities, hence
demonstrating their attempts to re-work their gender identities as educated and financially
independent women. Linked to this idea of women’s economic autonomy, recent research by
Dwyer and Shah (2009: 63) has shown that some women consider education as a safety
device, or ‘insurance’ in case of unforeseen circumstances such as a divorce.
Thirdly, women hoped to be better mothers and members of their own communities
as in having themselves embraced educational routes, they felt better equipped to teach and
ensure that the next generation follows educational careers (Bagguley and Hussain, 2007);
such emphasis on educational paths and its possible positive outcomes, such as for instance,
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employment, would then influence these women’s positionings and gender identities within
their families, as well as within marriage. This group of young South Asian Muslim women
are hence re-working normative gendered discourses of South Asian womanhood (uneducated
and economically dependent) to not only embrace the feminist ideals of being financially
independent, but to also re-define their gender identities as educated Muslim women capable
of influencing the educational prospects of future generations within British South Asian
Muslim communities. Fourthly, education contributes to women’s status within the nuclear
and extended family, increasing their ‘value’ as daughters in the family, and raising the
family’s reputation and pride within the community (Dale et al., 2002); an ‘educated’
daughter, considered an asset to the family, then obtains considerable leverage and bargaining
power as far as marriage is concerned (Ahmad et al., 2003). Indeed, access to education may
in turn influence women’s decisions of when to get married, as well as their choices of
marriage partners in them potentially considering educated partners as opposed to non-
educated partners. In some cases, education could also provide young women with the
independence and agency to delay or postpone marriage, hence altering British South Asian
Muslim women’s perceptions and expectations of marriage (Khanum, 1995; Ahmad et al.,
2003).
Previous studies which have discussed the bearings that education may have upon
marriage within South Asian Muslim communities in Britain have demonstrated the direct
impacts which women’s educational careers have on the institution of marriage within these
communities. For instance, Bhopal (1997) claims that educated women are more likely to
reject the practice of arranged marriages as opposed to uneducated women. Focusing on
women from diverse South Asian communities in Britain, Bhopal’s (1999) research indicated
that highly educated independent women, irrespective of ethnicity and religion, rejected
arranged marriages and were not likely to arrange their children’s marriage, while women
from less educated backgrounds embraced the practice as being part of their ‘culture’ and
‘Asian identity’. More recently, Bhopal’s (2009) research, which focuses on education,
arranged marriages and dowry practice in British South Asian communities, maintains that
higher education provides women with independence over the degrees of choice they have
over the marriage process. Bhopal (2009) emphasises the significant links between education,
social change and marriage, illustrating how choices around education and marriage are
negotiated, and that the practice of marriage is viewed differently from women of different
social classes as well as educational levels. Bhopal’s (2009) findings suggest that educated
women seem to be successful in affirming an individual identity above, for instance, kinship
identity, hence embracing new gender identities as educated South Asian women. If educated
women have the agency to reject cultural practices such as arranged marriages, it is also
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possible that they will more often be involved in ‘love marriages’ or will choose a partner of
equal educational and economic standing (Ahmad, 2001). However, the distinction between
educated and non-educated women and their choices in marriage prospects are not as
straightforward as marriage within South Asian Muslim communities depends on complex
factors such as family relationships, kinship networks, social and economic class and ethnic
origins (Afshar, 1989; Ahmad, 2001; Dwyer, 2000; Charsley and Shaw, 2006). While higher
education is considered as an asset to young Muslim women’s futures, there is also the
possibility that women become ‘too educated’ and ‘too old’ for marriage, as documented by
Ahmad et al. (2003). Young women therefore also express concerns that it will then be
difficult to find husbands who share similar educational or economic stature (Ahmad et al.,
2003: 20).
It appears that British South Asian Muslim women have to carefully negotiate their
options in order to reach a balance between education, employment and marriage prospects.
As reviewed in this section, British South Asian Muslim women’s access into higher
education and paid employment depend upon factors such as social class and educational
backgrounds, as well as the levels of negotiations (with families) women have to engage with
so as to pursue educational and work careers. Previous research reveals how education and
employment have contributed to women’s financial independence, as well as providing them
with alternative avenues (other than marriage), post compulsory secondary education, thereby
aiding them in promoting new gender identities as young and educated British South Asian
Muslim women. The remaining key questions pertain to the ways in which agency, acquired
through education and employment, impact on these young women’s perceptions and
expectations of marriage; consequently, how are new gender identities developed and
affirmed? In this thesis, I extend these themes in assessing the ways in which access to
educational and employment spaces influence young women’s life options. As women
generate new gender identities, to what extent do their negotiations open up possibilities to re-
work and re-evaluate their marriage options and expectations? In the following section, I
elaborate on the ways in which I use feminist theory to frame my study.
2.3 GENDER IDENTITY AND FEMINIST THEORY: CONCEPTUALISING
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Here, I reflect on how feminist theoretical concepts may be utilised as praxis for my
study of British South Asian Muslim women’s negotiations of gender identities as notions
around education, employment, and marriage are re-worked. For the purpose of my research,
I foreground the importance of two feminist stands which I believe remain the most
significant. Firstly, I draw on the feminist politics of ‘difference’ in order to acknowledge the
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significance which discourses of culture, ethnicity and ‘race’ have in assessing the positions
of ethnic minority women and their re-workings of gender identities as they explore
education, employment and marriage. In particular, I highlight how racialised discourses
around ‘difference’ influence British South Asian Muslim women’s negotiations and
navigations of gender identities as they explore spaces such as education and employment.
How do theoretical frameworks around ‘difference’ and gender identity politics inform my
study of women’s evolving gendered identities: more explicitly, how does the notion of
‘difference’ in feminist theory aid in comprehending the experiences of ethnic minority
women in the UK as they evolve within multicultural Britain? What impacts do
understandings of cultural and ethnic difference have on young women’s re-workings of their
gender identities? Does the concept of ‘difference’ aid in evaluating women’s navigations of
their social contexts as they attempt to generate new gender identities as educated and
financially independent British South Asian Muslim women?
Secondly, I draw on postmodern/poststructuralist feminist theory to provide an
understanding of how gender identities are constructed and performed by women; as an
extension of the feminist politics of ‘difference’, postmodern feminist theory supports the
notion that gender identities are not fixed as they are negotiated along axes of power, agency
and choice. More specifically: how is feminist theory on agency and performance useful in
helping us comprehend and evaluate British South Asian Muslim women’s positionings and
re-workings of their gender identities in multicultural British society? Also, how do theories
of performativity inform and define educated women’s reworkings of marriage? The
dynamicism involved in performing and generating new gender identities in the context of
ethnic minority women’s positionings remains key to the evolution and hence, the re-
workings of gender identities in British South Asian Muslim communities.
2.3.1 Gender identity and the concept of ‘difference’
The concept of ‘difference’ has been utilised within feminist literature to suggest that
‘woman’ should not be homogenised, where a critique of Eurocentric models of feminist
theory by non-Western and post-colonial feminists reiterated the need to embrace the
diversity of women’s experiences and gender identities (Amos and Parmar, 1984; Mohanty et
al., 1991; Spivak, 1988). Non-Western feminists reiterate that women’s experiences of ‘race’,
ethnicity and culture must not be essentialised if their diverse experiences are to be
recognised (Afshar and Maynard, 1994). In defining social experience as ‘cultural
construction’, Brah (1996) suggests that diverse realities are contested and negotiated, thus
giving rise to multiple subjectivities and diverse gendered identities. However, the main point
to note from Brah’s (1996: 234-241) analysis of the relationship between ethnicity and culture
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is that maintaining culture is a process. It is a ‘reiterative performance’ which is then
‘constructed’ as ‘custom’ or ‘tradition’. Brah’s (1996: 234) notion of ‘reiterative
performance’ is significant to my study as Brah’s (1996) argument opens up debates about the
agency involved in negotiating, contesting and performing cultural and ethnic customs. As
young British South Asian Muslim women actively navigate cultural and ethnic identities,
they en-act or ‘perform’ diverse gender identities through individual agency. However, their
negotiations of performative identities are also embedded within social and political
constructs, indicating that the performance of gender identities are contested and constructed
within young women’s social realities.
Previous research on ethnic minority women and their positionings within the labour
market illustrates the ways in which racialised discourses have influenced British South Asian
Muslim women’s evolution of gendered identities. In essence, studies portray how discourses
of ‘race’, ethnicity and ‘difference’ impact on the degrees of agency women may have as they
negotiate education and employment. For instance, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) have
stressed how the interactions of ‘race’, sex and class influence ethnic minority women’s
diverse experiences as they negotiate the labour market. Their sample of ethnic minority
women in the UK has shown that these interactions impact on women’s social realities which
categorise them within specific racialised discourses. Indeed, Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992:
80) account for South Asian Muslim women’s lowest rates of economic activity due to racism
(in employment spaces) and the sexual division of labour at home and outside the home.
Similarly, Brah’s (1993: 441-458) definition of the position of South Asian women within the
labour market as a ‘racialised subject’ - the ‘Other’, denounces the stereotypical depictions of
South Asian womanhood as being ‘different’.
The acknowledgment of racialised discourses remain pertinent in my research as they
address the question of how understandings of ethnicity, culture, ‘race’ and gender impact on
British South Asian Muslim women’s negotiations and re-workings of gendered identities as
they navigate the spaces of education, employment and marriage. As Brah’s (1993) studies
have indicated, ethnic minority women’s experiences of exclusion and subordination,
embedded within the structural and cultural dimensions of paid employment, could be
denoted as racism or racial categorisation perpetuating essentialist discourses. So as to
emphasise the gendered and racialised processes women face in their daily social experiences,
Brah notes two intersecting dimensions which remain useful in understanding women’s social
realities: first, that Muslim woman, as a category, has become the ‘object of social discourse’
in Britain, and second but most importantly, the need for us to go beyond this categorisation
and deconstruct such discourses in order to realise that Muslim women remain ‘concrete
historical subjects’. The latter point remains particularly significant as it highlights Muslim
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women’s multiple positionings in British society, as well as demonstrates their agency in
generating gendered identities through lived social experiences.
In elaborating on the complex social realities of South Asian Muslim women within
employment and education, Brah (1993) enforces how fixed representations of Muslim
woman (by employers, teachers and guidance advisors) within British discourse affect their
gendered identities. For instance, their depictions as ‘dependants who would most likely be
married off’, or their confinement within the patriarchal ‘institution of purdah’ preventing
them from participating fully into public life, indicate the challenges young women face as
they begin to deploy agency so as to resist and overcome these paradigms in order to
articulate new gender identities as educated and economically active British South Asian
Muslim women. Brah’s (1993) findings remain crucial in assessing South Asian women’s
experiences of employment as they not only reflect women’s position in the labour market as
being marked by ‘cultural ideologies’ but more importantly, also highlight the ‘role of
education in mediating job aspirations and racism’ (Brah, 1993: 441). Indeed, Brah’s (1993)
work also hints at the changes which education may generate as more young women decide to
embrace educational avenues; with education, British South Asian Muslim women could be
more equipped to navigate the racialised dimensions of spaces such as employment, as they
attempt to resist essentialist notions of South Asian womanhood.
In response to such claims, in this thesis, I focus on how young British South Asian
Muslim women are effectively challenging and resisting both ‘racialised gendered
boundaries’ and ‘cultural ideologies’, enforced by gender expectations around education and
employment, the family and marriage, so as to comprehend the strategies these young women
employ in order to generate new or alternative gender identities. While Brah’s study (1993)
primarily focuses on the labour market and South Asian Muslim women’s aspirations, in my
research, I aim to firstly, assess how higher education aids women to access the labour market
and secondly, how young women’s paid employment and higher educational experiences
further influence other life options such as marriage. Women’s navigations mirror an
affirmation of new gender identities, which remain indicative of an agency demonstrated
through their negotiations and choices of future life options as they juggle important decisions
revolving around education, employment and marriage. It is against this background of South
Asian women’s social and economic statuses within educational and employment careers, as
well as approaches to marriage in Britain, that I investigate the evolution of British South
Asian Muslim women’s gendered identities: how do young women re-work their gender
identities as they decide to juggle education and work, and how do their decisions impact on
marriage prospects and experiences, hence aiding in the evolution of gendered identities of
South Asian Muslim women in Britain?
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2.3.2 Performing gender identities
Postmodern feminists have attempted to destabilise the concept of identity and gender
by arguing that these principles cannot be regarded as fixed; they remain fluid and unstable.
As such, the category ‘woman’ as a unified subject is deconstructed as a non-unitary and
fixed identity, where ‘gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently within
different historical contexts’ (Butler, 1990: 3). As Butler (1990: 3) maintains, when women’s
positionings are studied, it is important to recognise that gender intersects with ‘racial, class,
ethnic, sexual and regional modalities of discursively constituted identities’ to produce
women’s diverse social realities. Consequently, gender is ‘produced’ and ‘maintained’ within
specific political and cultural structures. Bell (1999: 2) suggests that the concept of
‘performativity’ must not just essentialise the fluidity of identities but must also ‘question
how identities continue to be produced, embodied and performed with social and political
consequence’. This idea can be linked and illustrated through Brah’s (1996) notion of
‘reiterative performance’, which I discussed earlier. As gender is culturally informed and
performed, culture (cultural traditions or customs) can also be viewed as performance through
the invention and creation of new cultural and ethnic identities. In linking these two
theoretical frameworks, in the context of my study, I suggest that young women from South
Asian ethnic minorities in Britain grapple with this idea of performance so as to generate
gendered identities which are constantly being re-worked and re-affirmed within their
dynamic socio-political contexts.
Butler’s (1990) concept that ‘gender is culturally constructed’ remains useful in
promoting the idea that gender identities remain inherently unstable. As femininity and
masculinity become movable concepts, ‘agency’ (from bodies) then renders the fluidity of
gendered identities possible. Linked to the notion that bodies remain movable concepts, in
deconstructing the body, Lockford (2004: 3) further engages with this concept of utilising
agency to affirm gender identity; agency empowers women with the possibilities to exercise
individualised choice over their actions and ultimately, over their identities. Lockford’s
(2004) argument that femininity is always essentialised/stereotyped to represent ‘compulsory’
or ‘appropriate’ versions of ‘female gender performance’ remains vital as it illustrates how
agency and choice, through a process of ‘performance’, aid in producing different
femininities, thus demonstrating diversity in gender identities. This notion of performing
identities expresses the possibilities of challenging essentialised femininities. In challenging
such essentialism, women’s ‘agency and choice butt against political agendas and ideological
constructs’ so as to produce alternative femininities (Lockford, 2004: 3). Therefore, for
Lockford and Butler, following de Beauvoir’s thesis that ‘one is not born a woman but rather
becomes a woman’, gender then becomes a performance, where gender is ‘performatively
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produced’ to ‘constitute an identity it is purported to be; gender is always a doing’ (Butler,
1990: 25).
In the case of young South Asian Muslim women in Britain, it is possible to suggest
that in actively embracing the spaces of higher education and employment, they are inevitably
promoting and asserting new aspects of South Asian Muslim womanhood, and hence,
developing new and diverse femininities. Laurie et al., (1999: 135-151) expresses this notion
of new femininities in their study of young British South Asian Muslim adolescent girls and
their negotiations of gender identities within the different spaces of school and home. More
specifically, Laurie et al., (1999) maintain that the negotiation of feminine identities
demonstrates that through their contestations of dominant discourses on ‘appropriate Muslim
femininity’ (supported by family/community expectations or the media), young women are
empowered to make their own individual choices about which femininity to ‘perform’ as they
engage with the process of re-working their gender identities. This language of
performativity, which is also employed by Werbner (2005) to emphasise how representations
of culture and ethnicity aid in the recreation and evolution of identities within the context of
multiculturalism and identity formation, remains useful to conceptualise my analysis of
British South Asian Muslim women’s negotiations of gendered identities.
Drawing on all these approaches to theorising gender and performativity, I develop a
framework for how young British South Asian Muslim women are negotiating and re-
working their gender identities in response to new educational and employment settings, and
how their newly acquired independence shapes their approach to other life options such as
marriage. I use the idea of ‘performance’ in my analysis because I think this term adequately
captures the possibilities of individual agency and the choices young women make about
how they ‘perform’ different identities. However, the concept of performance, drawing
particularly from Brah (1996) and Butler (1990), also draws attention to the ways in which
gender is a social, cultural and political construct, where women negotiate the parameters of
‘appropriate’ or ‘accepted’ performances of gender within cultural, ethnic or social
frameworks. In the context of South Asian marriages in Britain, in particular, within the
practice of arranged marriage and the Islamic marriage (nikah) in British South Asian Muslim
communities, young women actively negotiate family expectations and individual aspirations
in their navigations of marriage. It is within these frameworks that I position my analysis of
marriage and young women’s performance of new gendered identities within British South
Asian Muslim communities.
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2.4 MARRIAGE IN BRITAIN: NEGOTIATING GENDER, ISLAM AND
CULTURE
Marriage remains an institution which is highly regarded by many ethnic and
religious groups worldwide as it is considered to be the foundation of the family.1 As Basit
(1997) argues, it is important to value marriage as a social institution which binds society as a
whole and ensures the perpetuation of cultural traits or identities within different social
groups. Research conducted on marriage within South Asian communities in Britain strongly
supports this belief, suggesting that marriage, as an institution, aids in the maintenance of
religious and cultural identities within British South Asian Muslim communities (Basit, 1997;
Bhopal, 1997; Shaw, 2000; Shaw and Charlsley, 2006). More importantly, these studies have
also revealed that as the institution of marriage promotes social ties, women’s gendered roles
and identities reflect how gendered norms within South Asian Muslim communities operate.
For instance, existing literature (Basit, 1997; Bhopal, 1999) has highlighted the ways in which
young women are expected by their families to uphold gendered norms around sexual purity
by adhering to cultural and religious codes before marriage. These norms encourage women
to abstain from pre-marital relationships in the name of honour (izzat).
In my research, I have therefore chosen to use marriage as the key site within which I
investigate the ways in which women’s increased agency, gained through education and
employment, influence their re-workings of their gender identities. I do so because as the
literature indicates, although education and paid employment are considered desirable
options, educated British South Asian Muslim women still regard marriage as an extremely
significant institution, notably, the preferred norm of social/sexual relations. In my study, I
attempt to elucidate why young, educated and financially independent South Asian Muslim
women in Britain value marriage, and how does their increased independence affect their
gender roles, their expectations and the meanings they attribute to marriage. What impacts
would these young women’s increased independence have on the nature of the institution of
marriage within their communities? How would educated British South Asian Muslim women
deal with the challenges posed by gendered cultural and religious norms encouraged by the
institution of marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities?
2.4.1 The institution of marriage in Britain and Islam
The institution of marriage in Britain
Recent statistics estimate that three out of five marriages in Britain today are not
religious but secular marriage contracts, known as civil marriages (Hall, 2002; Barlow et al.,
2005).2 The option to marry non-religiously, for instance, outside the Church of England, by
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civil registration, eradicated the need for any particular religious marriage ceremony in the
UK - the formalisation of a marriage, as a socio-legal institution, is nowadays recognised
through the secular marriage contract (Bernardes, 1997; Finch, 2004). Previous studies
conducted on the evolution of the institution of marriage and the family in Britain have
documented the ways in which social changes have influenced the gender relationships within
marriage and the family unit (Bailey, 1992; Lewis, 2001); indeed, social movements such as
the sexual revolution and gay liberation movements have aided in dismantling the fixed
cultural notions of the family as an institution, the social relationships within it, as well as the
historical traditional values associated with it (Elliot, 1996; Staggenborg, 1998; McKie et al.,
1999). The conjugal family hence became representative of an oppressive institution for
women, where gender roles in marriage were then questioned and redefined by feminist
movements. The meanings and structures of ‘family’, marriage and parenthood in Britain
have thus undergone considerable social transformations, hence opening up new possibilities
for women to negotiate new gender identities within the dynamic settings of family or
marriage. In essence, women’s quest for gender equality within marriage highlighted changes
in how gender relationships could be alternatively perceived and negotiated, reflecting on
how gender has been conceptualised in relation to family and marriage in Britain. This debate
highlights how young South Asian Muslim women living in Britain today could possibly
navigate the meanings of marriage and the family as they attempt to generate new gender
identities.
The institution of the Islamic marriage
Previous studies have emphasised that the institution of marriage in Islam (nikah),
originates from diverse nomadic marriage practices (Hekmat, 1997), where concepts
underlying the Islamic marriage follow a patriarchal pattern enforcing unequal gender roles
and relationships between spouses (Nasir, 1990; Pearl and Menski, 1998). Although marriage
by contract remains the standard Muslim marriage norm, it also encourages the fulfilment of a
set of criteria. Contracting the nikah relates to an offer (ijab) of marriage and its acceptance
(qabul) before witnesses, with the full consent of both parties involved (Anderson, 1976;
Singh, 1992). Marriage, recognised as a legal framework, is for legitimate sexual intercourse
and the procreation of children; both spouses have a religious obligation to satisfy one another
sexually, where sexual intercourse outside of marriage is regarded as a sin (haram) (Coulson,
1979; Choueiri, 1990; Dahl, 1997). Nonetheless, despite the contractual nature of the
marriage contract in Islam, it is also considered a religious duty to be fulfilled by Muslims.
Event though Islamic law has undergone reforms within trade/business practices and
inheritance, jurisdiction regarding the institution of marriage, and its related gender issues
around divorce and polygamy3 were not radically altered (Doi, 1992; Hekmat, 1997).4 It is
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therefore important to recognise that Quranic laws surrounding family laws within the
institution of the Islamic marriage are not as inherently static, but infused with cultural
customs, social traditions and political environments present at any point in time, although
some Islamic schools continue to regard Shari’a law as unalterable (Mernissi, 1991; Mir-
Hosseini, 1993).5 As a result, family law and its jurisdiction regarding marriage, divorce,
polygamy, maintenance and the status/treatment of wives in Islam remain central to the
debates of how the Islamic institution of marriage must be understood, formulated, and more
importantly, followed by Muslims (Pearl and Menski, 1998).
The literature on the workings of the Islamic marriage argues that both women and
men enter into a relationship of marriage as two equal partners. However, although
stipulations within Islamic jurisdiction remain clear that wives and husbands enter into the
marriage contract as equals, there is an indication that laws regarding divorce (talaq) and
polygamy within Islam differ considerably for spouses, thereby highlighting the inherent
gender bias within the nikah (Khadduri, 1978; Mernissi, 1987; Ahmed, 1992; Dahl, 1997).
Although a husband and wife may mutually consent to separate amicably, nevertheless,
unlike the husband, a wife can only independently initiate divorce if the husband agrees to
such a divorce (Fyzee, 1964; Bareja, 1988; Nasir, 1990; Doi, 1992; Dahl, 1997; Iqbal, 1997).
The nikah can therefore, according to some Muslim authors, only be annulled if the husband
verbally repudiates the wife by saying the words ‘I divorce you’ three times in immediate
succession (Doi, 1992).6 This apparent male right to unilateral divorce in Islam has led
feminists raise concerns about talaq as epitomising patriarchy, whereby the Muslim wife is
perceived as inferior to her husband, in rights and status (El Saadawi, 1980; Boudhiba, 1985;
Kandiyoti, 1991; Mernissi, 1991; Keddie and Baron, 1991; Ahmed, 1992; El-Solh and Mabro,
1994; Moghissi, 1999; Majid, 2002; Wadud, 2006; Shirazi, 2009). However, this facet of
Islamic law (female repudiation) has been modified in some Muslim communities worldwide
following modern, secular legal intervention and feminist critiques in cases where Muslim
women are abused or forced to accept their husbands’ second marriages to other women, with
the threat of divorce and consequently, of abandonment and economic deprivation.
Within the Islamic marriage, the duty of maintenance by the husband is matched by
the obligation of the wife to reside with her husband unless there is a valid reason for her
refusal to do so; a wife who leaves the matrimonial home is seen by traditional Muslim law as
a ‘rebellious and disobedient’ wife (Pearl and Menski, 1998).7 The institution of marriage
within Islamic law thus appears to draw strict boundaries as far as gender status and the roles
of wives and husbands are concerned. Clearly, marriage in Islam is reflective of controlled
household rules and gendered roles which Muslims are expected to abide to in order to satisfy
the criterion set by the institution of the Islamic marriage. In relation to my study, the
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questions I am interested to highlight here are: how would educated and economically
independent South Asian Muslim women in Britain respond to such gendered expectations,
encompassed within the ethos of the Islamic marriage? Would Islamic concepts of divorce
and polygamy lead young British South Asian Muslim women to actively re-work and re-
formulate more equitable versions of talaq, within the larger framework of Islamic
jurisdiction? Could education and employment spaces, and the independence and agency
gained from their experiences lead these young women to develop new understandings and
expectations of marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities?
2.4.2 Negotiating gender: navigating ‘family’ and marriage
Studies have highlighted the tendency in early research to rely on the dichotomy
‘biological’ versus ‘social’ in order to pinpoint the meaning of gender within social
institutions such as family and marriage (Staggenborg, 1998: 2). Nevertheless, an evolution in
the understanding of gender now supports the claim that ‘gender resides not only in
individuals but also in organisations and institutions within societies (Whittier et al., 1995,
quoted in Staggenborg, 1998: 2), hence raising the questions of why do women and men
adopt particular gendered roles within the institution of marriage and the family unit. Gilbert
(1993: 10) also addresses this conceptual shift from sex to gender by explaining that gender
should instead be viewed as an ‘organiser’ and ‘process’. In relying on Staggenborg’s (1998)
notion of ‘gendered organisation’ and Gilbert’s (1993) theoretical premise of gender as
‘process’, I suggest that the family acts as a dynamic social space, a ‘gendered organisation’,
where gender identities are navigated through the contestation of gender relationships
between women and men. As women engage with their ‘gendered family context’, I argue
that their navigations of their individual contexts lead them to construct new gender identities
within the family and marriage.
There is a depth of research conducted by feminists documenting the inferior and
unequal position of women within the family, whereby studies have examined how the
construction and reinforcement of power, gender and patriarchy have informed women’s
status, and gendered roles and identities/subjectivities within sites such as family unit and the
household (Hartmann, 1987; Pateman, 1988; Coontz, 1992; Perry-Jenkins, 1994; Morgan,
1996; Okin, 1997; McKie et al., 1999). The identification of home, family and the household,
as McKie et al., (1999) claim, has informed the complex distinction of public/private division,
where private spheres such as the family have tended to propagate gendered divisions of
labour encouraging stereotypical notions of women’s work versus men’s work and hence,
reinforcing gender differences within private (home) and public (employment) spheres.
Indeed, radical feminists have also rooted men’s control of sexuality and patriarchal power
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within the gendered nature of the family, more specifically the marriage-based household,
where nevertheless, Bradley (2007) claims that family relationships have been altered by
other spaces such as employment, which remain significant locations of the social ordering of
gender. Ultimately, the most notable change addressed by feminists altering women’s
positionings and identities within the family unit remains women’s access to employment and
education, which have engendered new possibilities for women as they contemplate
alternative spaces such as education and work (Gilbert, 1993; Bradley 2007). In elaborating
on the dual-career family where both spouses are in paid employment, Gilbert (1993)
suggests that the underlying assumptions governing this concept have tended to epitomise the
relationship between women and men within families as being economically equal, hence
promoting the notion of an egalitarian marriage which supposedly enables equality between
spouses.
However, social realities illustrate a different picture, although the gender gap in the
family seems to be closing due to a lift in women’s apparent economic status, nonetheless,
women are inherently still considered as holding the ‘primary responsibility for the family’s
daily functioning and well-being’ (Gilbert, 1993: 8). Research such as Hochschild’s (1989)
Second Shift addressed the exploitation of women as they overworked within paid
employment and within the family simultaneously; as they supposedly achieved freedom
through their earnings, housework within the household still remained within the category of
‘women’s work’, hence signifying that even though gendered identities had progressed in
work spaces, within the family, gendered identities remained the same. As Delphy and
Leonard (1992) claim, women’s daily lives remain heavily founded upon caring work, paid
employment, as well as the provision of domestic labour within the household; shouldering
these diverse responsibilities may hence impact negatively upon women’s physical and
psychological states. Nonetheless, Hartmann (1987) and Ferree (1988, quoted in Perry-
Jenkins, 1994) have argued that the more involved women become in financially supporting
the household, hence becoming economically levelled with their husbands, the more chance
they have in demanding gender equality within the household.
This notion reflects a direct link between women’s economic circumstances, and the
impact these could have upon their gendered identities within the home and family life.
However, as Bradley (2007) points out, men within families retain economic advantage over
women as if one person is expected to stay home so as to mind the children, the family would
be ‘better-off’ if the lower paid earner stayed home; in most cases, this continues to be
women. Currently, in the UK, the continuous rise in the cost of childcare is impacting
negatively on families and as a result, women can no longer afford to stay in employment as it
is financially more viable for families to avoid the cost of childcare in mothers opting to stay
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home instead of continuing with their employment careers (The Independent, 7 August 2011).
These changes remain contributing factors in altering women’s position, status and gender
identities within the institution of the family. Indeed, even though research (Crompton, 1999)
has suggested that the traditional male bread winner image is declining in Britain, Bradley
(2007) maintains that traditional attitudes still persist in promoting the structure of the family
as inherently based upon the sexual division of labour.
There is also the argument that not all women who are in paid employment demand
absolute equality within the household; if women relinquish many of their household task
responsibilities, they could find themselves renouncing an important way of demonstrating
love, care and concern for their family (Hochschild, 1989; Devault, 1991). Perry-Jenkins
(1994: 170) has documented that the family division of labour rests on the fact that the
‘unequal division of labour that persists in families headed by heterosexual couples is not a
function of innate biological differences between men and women; it is a consequence of how
we as a society have come to define what it means to be a “man” or a “woman”. More
importantly, Perry-Jenkins (1994: 170) suggests that this concept of reproducing the social
construction of what woman and man entail within the family is comparable to West and
Zimmerman’s (1987) notion of ‘doing gender’. Indeed, this analysis significantly reiterates
my argument that gendered identities are actively ‘performed’, a notion I previously discussed
(Section 2.3.2) whilst exploring Butler’s (1990: 25) concept that ‘gender is always a doing’.
As Morgan (1999: 30) states: ‘family relationships remain one of the major sites where
gender gets done (my emphasis); gender is not incidental or formally irrelevant to family
practices but is built into these practices and routine understandings of them’.
It is upon this premise that I support my analysis of British South Asian Muslim
women’s negotiations of gender identities within marriage and the family; as the institutions
of marriage and family alter, how do young women navigate social expectations and gendered
roles within marriage, and how do they exercise independence over their options as they
navigate power and gender within the family unit? Indeed, Morgan (1999: 38) maintains that
even though the nature of family and households have considerably altered with single-person
households in Britain, households must still be viewed as ‘contributing to the shaping of
gender, just as gender, seen as part of a flow of life interacting with other social distinctions,
may be seen as shaping the character of households’. So, as the nature of marriage, the
family, and the household alters, how do gendered practices change within them and
consequently, in what ways do women generate new gendered identities and subjectivities in
relation to these changes? How would my research respondents react to the dilemmas of
fulfilling educational and employment careers, as well as ensure that their expectations of
gender relationships are met within marriage and family life?
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2.4.3 British South Asian Muslim marriages: maintaining ethno-religious identities
The literature on marriage in Britain indicates that divorce and cohabiting
relationships are on the rise, where the latter are often regarded as the first step towards
marriage, or even defined as ‘trial marriages’ (Haskey, 2001: 12; National Statistics, March
2004). In the UK, cohabitation is increasingly being viewed as an alternative to marriage,
especially by younger generations who hold more liberal views on marriage and sexuality
(Barlow et al., 2005). People’s choice of family structure is therefore clearly changing to
accommodate alternative household types which include non-married couples and their
children. Nevertheless, despite these social transformations, marriage within British South
Asian Muslim communities remains significant and divorce remains low.8 Here I contend that
the popularity of marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities can be explained
by the fact that marriage becomes an idiom which supports the maintenance and affirmation
of ethno-religious identities. Indeed, religious and cultural affiliations/backgrounds do
influence marriage and divorce patterns in the UK, where research shows that people in
Britain prefer to marry within their own ethnic group (Modood et al., 1994). In fact, inter-
ethnic marriages form a very small proportion (only two percent) of all marriages in the UK
and studies carried out in 2001 suggest that people from South Asian ethnic minorities,
especially Muslims, were the least likely to marry outside their ethnic group, as opposed to
people from Caribbean backgrounds.9 This may be explained by the fact that among South
Asian groups, various cultural and religious differences distinguish them from each other;
marrying within one’s ethnic group hence maintains the ethno-religious identity of the group
by keeping its cultural purity and specificity (Modood et al., 1994; Basit, 1997; Shaw, 2000).
Based on statistics (Home Office Citizenship Survey, 2003), South Asians in the UK
outnumber all other ethnic groups in terms of marriage rates; they also have the largest
household sizes (married spouses with children) starting with Muslims, followed by Sikhs and
Hindus (National Statistics, 2004). In relation to marriage and cohabitation patterns in Britain,
data shows that marriage is most popular among Pakistanis, Bangladeshis (mostly Muslims)
and Indians (mainly Hindus); alternatively, people who consider themselves as not having
‘any religion’ are more likely to cohabit rather than get married (National Statistics, March
2004). This suggests that there is a link between religion and the degree of importance or
value people place upon marriage, cohabitation or family living arrangements. For instance,
as suggested earlier, Muslims regard marriage as a religious duty and living with a partner
outside of marriage is considered a sin as per their Islamic beliefs. Consequently, previous
research has revealed that Muslims, particularly women, who choose to live with partners
without being married could be considered as having brought shame or dishonour to the
family name within their communities (Bhopal, 1997). Children born out of wedlock may
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hence be viewed as stigmas within their specific religious groups. Therefore, as compared to
the ‘white’ British population, British South Asians hold more conservative views about
marriage and children than the former and this may explain the high rates of marriage and low
rates of cohabitation within British Pakistani/ Bangladeshi communities, and other South
Asian communities in Britain.
Nevertheless, Barlow et al’s (2005) studies on cohabitation in British ethnic
minorities also emphasise the fact that young British South Asian Muslims may not totally
reject the idea of cohabitation as a ‘trial marriage’ and claim that there are changes in
attitudes around cohabitation, albeit very small, within South Asian Muslim minorities in the
UK. Still, respondents in Barlow et al’s research (2005) maintain that because of religion and
family, they would not themselves think of cohabiting before marriage. Nevertheless, the
majority of them believe that cohabitation is acceptable for ‘white’ society. My own study
seeks to also look at British South Asian Muslim women’s perceptions of why marriage
remains an important institution for them and for their communities, as well as seek evidence
for some further shifts, like those identified by Barlow et al., (2005), in attitudes towards
cohabitation and alternatives to marriage. Do young and educated British South Asian
Muslim women perceive marriage as an effective institution ensuring the continuity of ethnic
and religious customs? How do they grapple with alternative arrangements, like cohabitation
before marriage? I further explore marriage arrangements in the next section by analysing the
extent to which cultural values influence marriage patterns in South Asian Muslim
communities in Britain; ultimately, I reflect on the possibilities and limitations British South
Asian Muslim women may have in exercising agency as they navigate marriage. More
specifically, I consider the practice of arranged marriages and forced marriages in Britain in
order to illustrate the tensions young women face in their attempts to negotiate marriage so as
to generate new gender identities.
2.4.4 Arranged marriages in Britain: agency, choice and consent
Anthropologists have often suggested that marriage is essentially a relationship
between groups, rather than individuals. In particular, in comparing women to gifts, Levi-
Strauss (1969, quoted in Basit, 1997) suggests that the exchange of women between groups
aid in cementing social relationships between them. Here, I argue that marriage, more
specifically, the arranged marriage practice within British South Asian communities, could be
perceived as a form of cultural transaction, a social signifier promoting specific cultural and
ethnic identities which are negotiated and perpetuated through rituals and customs. Wilson
(2006) supports this claim is pointing out that the arranged marriage helps to mark the
boundaries between communities and castes, where women, in marrying within the
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community, become the bearers of family honour within South Asian societies. Hence, the
maintenance of ethnic traditions and honour (izzat) usually rest on women (Raza, 1991;
Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992); within British South Asian Muslim communities, the
maintenance of traditional gendered roles, prescribed rules on sexuality and a woman’s
gender identity as ‘respectable’ are interwoven within the concept of the arranged marriage.10
The question remains: how do independent young British South Asian Muslim women
navigate the institution of arranged marriage within their communities?
Previous research has demonstrated that the arranged marriage is not a religious
precept, but a cultural phenomenon, hence a tradition that is not imposed in either Islamic or
other religious scriptures (Bradby, 1999). Nevertheless, Alibhai-Brown (1993) and Razack
(2004) argue that the practice of arranged marriage has been stigmatised as oppressive due to
the controversial issue of ‘choice’ in marriage; such stigmatisation of the arranged marriage
practice also erects dichotomies of ‘love marriage’ versus ‘arranged marriage’, which
consequently begs the question of British South Asian Muslim women’s agency within the
marriage process.11 Studies show that arranged marriages in British South Asian communities
are based upon the social and cultural circumstances of the families involved (Fischer &
Lyon, 2000; Shaw, 2000 and 2001; Charsley, 2003).12 For South Asians in Britain, marriage
within the family, especially between cousins (consanguineous marriages), maintains the
‘purity of the blood’, hence strengthening consanguinity with affinity (ties through marriage).
Such marriages, which can also be arranged transnationally (for instance between Britain and
Pakistan), hence appear to offer multiple routes to support, security and trust, all maintained
through the ‘biradari’13 (Bradby, 1999; Lefebvre, 1999; Shaw, 2000; Shaw & Charsley, 2006;
Balzani, 2006).
Indeed, the position of women, and ultimately, their unequal gender status within
such marital arrangements has been documented in the literature. For instance, transnational
brides face particular burdens and constraints. As Yuval-Davis and Anthias observe, women’s
responsibility for a family’s socio-economic progress through migration also entails
promoting the ‘notions of tradition and collective identity’ (1989: 208-24). Indeed, hardships
and immigration problems faced at the hands of foreign husbands bent on deception and
dowry fraud remain strong (Yeoh et al., 2005; Menski, 2002). Nevertheless, transnational
consanguineous marriages still remain popular in the UK. As British Pakistani women
interviewed in Shaw’s and Charsley’s research (2006) maintain, they prefer husbands from
Pakistan as the latter are more likely to respect their culture, practice their religion, and
respect elders, unlike British Pakistani men who are perceived to be ‘too confident’ (Shaw,
2000: 414). Equally, British Pakistani men indicate their preferences for ‘traditional’
Pakistani women as contrasted to the ‘independent, modern, and assertive’ British Pakistani
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woman. In cases such as these, marriage then emerges as a crucial means of producing and
transforming transnational networks; more importantly, the wish to marry someone from
South Asia demonstrates that young South Asian Muslims in Britain aspire to maintain ethno-
religious identities through marriage. Nevertheless, neither Shaw (2006) nor Charsley (2006)
discuss the challenges to such preferred models of marriage, which Ahmad (2001) and others
suggest might be the outcome of greater education and economic independence for women.
This is an important focus of my research since educated British South Asian Muslim women
may have to negotiate such types of marriage proposals. As a result, their negotiations of this
marriage process would indicate how their choices in marriage could generate certain long
term effects upon their individual, as well as collective gendered identities.
Previous studies by Stopes-Roe and Cochrane (1991) have noted that arranged
marriages in South Asian communities have progressed, both in definition and in nature.14
The arranged marriage system is not therefore totally rejected but modified to suit young
people’s contexts. This point is important for my research which investigates how new
generations of South Asian British Muslim women, born in the UK and educated to degree
level, react to and negotiate concepts such as, on the one hand ‘falling in love’ and on the
other hand, ‘arranged marriage’. As Bradby (1999) and Bhopal (1999) claim, the ways in
which marriages are contracted are crucial to how ethnic groups regard the distribution of
gendered roles and as such, women’s manifestation of gendered identities. If the concepts
around marriage are changing, it is possible that gendered expected roles, identities and
expectations will also evolve. Nonetheless, the underlying controversy with the South Asian
arranged marriage in Britain does not inherently lie with the practice per se but with the
related notion of forced marriage – a marriage arranged between two people, with the absence
of consent and choice. Indeed, the concept of arranged marriage is increasingly being defined
today in contrast to the term forced marriage, whereby the former is seen as a distinguishable
cultural practice and the latter, as an abuse of women’s rights due to their inability to exercise
free choice within marriage (Working Group-Home Office report, 2000; Anitha and Gill,
2009).15
These debates expose the current challenges faced by British South Asian Muslim
women as they navigate choice within an arranged marriage; as I argue in Chapter Six, it is
the degrees of choice and agency which draw the boundaries between arranged and forced
marriages and ultimately, depict the realities young British South Asian Muslim women face
as they contemplate marriage. Research has indicated that the complexity surrounding the
notion of arranged and forced marriage practices remains in the definition of the terms itself:
when is a marriage arranged, when is it forced, and could it be both? Central to the legal
conflict arising in English law in recognising the nature of the arranged marriage relates to
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issues around consent; the controversial debate is that of consent of the future spouses.
Academics, government officials and jurists are right in suggesting that rating consent in the
so called ‘arranged/forced marriage’ is problematic. As Gangoli et al’s research (2006)
portrays, within South Asian communities themselves, the overlap between ‘arranged’ and
‘forced’ marriage is in effect recognised. Indeed, the issue highlighted in the arranged/forced
marriage debate is that of ‘free and informed’ consent as opposed to ‘coerced’ consent in a
marriage.
In 2007, the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act was introduced so as to address
the concerns for victims of forced marriages by providing a civil remedy called the Forced
Marriage Protection Order in Britain.16 These orders support victims, although reports from
organisations have suggested that breaches are common (The Independent Online, 21
December 2011). More recently, in October 2011, the British Prime Minister David Cameron
sparked debates about whether a forced marriage should in effect be criminalised and hence,
become ‘a crime in its own right’. This raised the question of whether such a process could
encourage more young women to come forward and disclose the abuse they experienced (The
Guardian Online, 12 October 2011). More importantly, through the protection of the law,
could women finding themselves robbed of agency and choice in marriage benefit from such
legal enforcement? As Wilson (2006) and Gangoli et al (2006) claim, the chances that women
report violence and condemn their families are small; due to ‘izzat’ (family honour), women
may ‘consent’ to marry in order not to stigmatise their families. Nonetheless, according to a
previous study conducted on young South Asian women and forced marriages in the UK, the
majority of victims of forced marriages who were interviewed affirm that had the forced
marriage been a ‘criminal offence’, they would have had more leverage to ‘bargain’ and
‘negotiate’ with their parents and thereby, be in a position to exercise free choice upon their
marriage prospects. These women suggest that emphasis should be placed more on the
welfare of the victims, as opposed to issues related to the stigmatisation of communities
within which forced marriages occur (The Independent Online, 21 December 2011).
Therefore, the application of criminal law could have a direct impact on the nature of
women’s negotiations of the marriage process within their families and communities, hence
influencing their status and gender identities within marriage, through the degrees of choice
and agency they could potentially implement within their negotiations.
As stipulated earlier, Islamic law requires the full consent of both parties to a nikah
(Pearl and Menski, 1998); therefore, a forced marriage is technically invalid within Islamic
jurisdiction. In Britain, however, studies suggest that a combination of persuasion, if not
force, is used by parents and families to bind young Muslims within such arranged matches
(Ahsan, 1995; Dustin and Phillips, 2008). Here, I emphasise the complicated status an
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arranged marriage holds within Islamic law, where I argue that there is an underlying link
between the concept of an arranged marriage and Islamic jurisdiction. Indeed, Islamic family
law allows the arrangement of marriage of young people under proxy (Poulter, 1986). This
begs the question: would this nikah be considered valid under Islamic law if young women
themselves do not consent, but the arranged marriage still goes ahead ‘under proxy’?
As Pearl and Menski (1998) suggest, as far as Islamic law is concerned, as long as all
the Islamic contractual elements are fulfilled, a nikah by proxy is considered as fully valid.
The concern hence relates to the position of the proxy as someone who has the right to give
another person in marriage; the proxy may be acting as guardian and in Islamic law, such a
marriage is legally valid. In English law, however, giving someone in marriage and acting as
proxy is illegal and hence, the marriage viewed as void. This highlights the controversies and
tensions which may arise when English law and Islamic law intertwine and more importantly,
depict the challenges faced by South Asia Muslim women in Britain as they navigate the
tensions brought about by Islamic and British jurisdiction around marriage. As British South
Asian Muslim women, through education and employment, acquire independence and
develop agency to understand Islamic teachings and concepts around marriage on their own
terms, I aim to examine their perceptions and negotiations of arranged and forced marriages
within the context of Islamic and English law, as they attempt to generate new gender
identities. How do young British South Asian Muslim women negotiate the concept of
‘choice’ in arranged and forced marriages; in particular, how does the notion of navigating the
grey areas of consent and choice in marriage, which link the arranged and forced marriage
practice, enable them to exercise agency over their marriage prospects?
2.4.5 Re-workings of the Islamic marriage in multicultural Britain: intersecting
jurisdictions
In the last part of this section, I highlight the existing tensions which British South
Asian Muslims face, as the institution of marriage is negotiated in both Islamic and British
contexts; this throws light on the considerable challenges South Asian Muslim women in
Britain face as they navigate marriage and attempt to actively re-work their gender identities
and positionings within the Islamic marriage. There have been some voices within the
Muslim community in the UK demanding that Shari’a law be adopted for the Muslim
community as a whole, within the area of family law (Nielsen, 1991), hence reaching a
compromise between two different sets of laws – Islamic and English laws. Menski (1998)
has previously defined this process as ‘Angrezi (English) Shari’a law’, which reflects a
combination of Islamic customary laws and secular English laws concurrently.17 More
recently, the controversial debates raised by the Archbishop of Canterbury in February 2008
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demonstrate the conflicts around the possibilities of merging religious Islamic law within
secular British law.18 Such notions have been previously critiqued by Muslim feminists
(Mernissi, 1993; Moghissi, 1999), on the grounds that some tenets would run counter to
international human rights law and could exacerbate gender discrimination within the area of
family law; for instance, polygamy, the right to unilateral male divorce, the practice of wife-
beating if the wife is not obedient to her husband, and under-age marriage could pose
difficulties for British South Asian Muslim women’s gender status and identities in the advent
of such tenets of Islamic law being implemented in Britain.
Although the nikah, like a secular ceremony, is also a legal contract, it is not
recognised as a valid marriage contract in English law (Poulter, 1986; Ahsan, 1995; Bano,
1999; Pearl and Menski, 1998, Bradney, 2000). In fact, the nikah has been declared invalid in
the UK on the grounds that it can lead to ‘potentially polygamous marriages’ (Pearl and
Menski, 1998: 274). Therefore, a Muslim couple who merely goes through a nikah in the UK
would not, in English law, be seen and treated as legally married, although they are viewed as
husband and wife according to Muslim law.19 In cases where Muslims have not gone through
the civil marriage in English law and spouses decide to get divorced (or technically separate
as they are officially ‘unmarried’ under English law), they would then be unable to seek legal
advice as there would not be any legal documents proving their marital status. This may
happen where Muslim women are not British, and are economically dependent on their
husbands and in-laws (Pearl and Menski, 1998). Pearl and Menski’s research (1998)
previously reveals that women are then isolated as they cannot be protected by English law.
In the advent of divorce, women’s tainted reputation leaves them with no status within their
communities.20
Studies have demonstrated that most Muslims in Britain combine the nikah and
English civil marriage so as to satisfy both legal systems in Britain (Bano, 1999); the majority
will consider the nikah to be their legitimate form of marriage, but will first register their
marriage in accordance with English law (Pearl and Menski, 1998). This may mean that the
civil marriage is merely a document which states a status, a piece of paper which is devoid of
any cultural or religious affiliation. Studies by Ahsan (1995) reveal that for Muslims in
Britain, the nikah has more relevance than the English civil registration, even though the
pattern of arranging the registration as closely as possible to the nikah enables the person
conducting the Islamic marriage to be sure that the union is also valid in English law (Pearl
and Menski, 1998).21 New links are therefore drawn between the secular ceremony and the
Muslim contract even though the two are, in theory, kept apart.22 In this case, the civil
marriage is viewed as a mere legal obligation which Muslims in the UK, as British citizens,
need to fulfil, rather than an actual marriage where couples commit to each other spiritually.
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However, the civil marriage is increasingly being viewed as important among the younger
generations of Muslims in the UK, especially those who are in higher education (Ahsan,
1995). Ahsan’s (1995) findings are interesting and significant, especially in the light of my
research as they indicate changes in how young Muslims are progressively accepting or
embracing more secular approaches to marriage. Indeed, if the second generation of South
Asian Muslim women in the UK is likely to enter into higher education or paid employment
and as such, develop agency and choice with regards to how to negotiate marriage, such
processes may lead them to regard gender roles in marriage as different and changing,
particularly those around Muslim women’s roles and status within the Islamic marriage.
Therefore, it is possible that as more young British South Asian Muslim women enter
educational and work spaces, they could come to confer equal status and value to both the
civil marriage and the nikah, hence opening up possibilities for generating new gender
identities as British South Asian Muslim women.
Research on Islamic law in Britain identifies the point of contention between the two
intersecting legal systems as relating to talaq and the husband’s right to unilateral repudiation.
Indeed, the question of the recognition of talaq has been made the subject of considerable
litigation, culminating in the House of Lords.23 The dominant argument exposed the inferior
position of the Muslim wife on the grounds of sex as the male-centred unilateral Muslim
divorce regime discriminates against her gender, and renders her powerless to take any legal
action against him. Any talaq pronounced in the UK is hence void and will only be considered
valid in England only if it is recognised in the parties’ country of domicile.24 Muslim women
in the UK are therefore legally protected from repudiation. However, Muslim husbands in
Britain can still divorce their wives by talaq, even though such a divorce is invalid in the eyes
of the English courts; he could still pronounce talaq and could then behave as though the
couple was instantly and effectively divorced, not in English law, but in Islamic law
(Hamilton, 1995; Pearl and Menski, 1998). Once a talaq is put forward, the wife may feel
pressurised to ‘accept’ it if she believes that in effect, Islamic law requires her to accept the
divorce. Consequently, she may then seek a divorce in English law (which she ‘consents’),
giving the reason that her marriage has broken down irretrievably and that she ‘agrees’ to be
divorced (Pearl and Menski, 1998). As a Muslim wife, she does not have any other alternative
but to accept the divorce due to her husband’s ‘right’ (considered as religious) to unilateral
repudiation. If in turn, a wife wishes to divorce and manages to get one from the English
court, she may still not be free to remarry as without her husband’s talaq (if he does not agree
to grant her talaq), she will still be considered married under Muslim law.25 As a result, she
will be viewed as single in English law but will still be married under Islamic law. Unless
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such issues are taken into account, it is difficult not to see the tensions between English law
and Islamic law, especially in areas such as family law.
Cases such as these hence illustrate the complexity of South Asian Muslim women’s
positionings within marriage in Britain; how does the complex process of merging Islamic
and English ideals of marriage contribute to educated British South Asian Muslim women’s
abilities to navigate both sets of principles? More importantly, the recognition of the tensions
which may arise as they navigate marriage aids in our understandings of the challenges
British South Asian Muslim women face; however, will education and employment equip
them with independence, agency and choice to re-work their perceptions and experiences of
the Islamic marriage and the controversial element of talaq within it?
2.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I reviewed the existing literature on South Asian Muslim women,
identities and marriage in the UK so as to frame my research questions. I began by
elaborating on the current socio-economic contexts in which British South Asian Muslim
women navigate spheres of higher education and employment in Britain. As they increasingly
choose to embrace alternative life options such as building educational and employment
careers, their negotiations reveal women’s independence in not only wanting an education but
also envisaging marriage post-education. In their quests to build on their educational and
employment experiences, young women navigate social class differences and educational
backgrounds, as well as actively bargain with families about altering and re-defining expected
gendered norms (through culture and religion) of South Asian Muslim womanhood. Indeed,
existing literature (Ahmad, 2001; Bagguley and Hussain, 2008; Bhopal, 2009; Dwyer and
Shah, 2009) on educated British South Asian Muslim women has demonstrated that women
are grappling with discourses around culture and religion so as to develop new gender
identities through employment, and the acquisition of financial independence. These studies
have also revealed how higher education and employment influence marriage options. For
example, Ahmad’s study (2001) has hinted how higher education may influence choice of
marriage partners while Dwyer and Shah (2009) have shown that financial security, gained
through employment, act as a safeguard for women if divorce must be contemplated in the
future. However, these studies do not reflect on how the spaces of higher education and
employment impact on young British South Asian Muslim women’s perceptions and
experiences of the institution of marriage as women challenge and re-work the meanings of
marriage within their communities.
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In this thesis, I therefore attempt to address women’s new understandings of marriage
as they explore the spaces of higher education and employment. I hence emphasise that their
navigations of education and employment expose the possibilities and the limitations they
confront as this generation of young British South Asian Muslim women contemplate
different life options in order to re-define the position, status and gender identities of women
within South Asian Muslim communities in Britain. Indeed, their navigations also indicate
that as they exercise increased independence over educational and employment careers, life
options such as marriage are influenced. Therefore, I reiterate that the link between women’s
agency, and their access to education and ultimately, employment, remains potent in the ways
it influences marriage options for this group of educated and economically independent
British South Asian Muslim women.
Secondly, I focussed on how theoretical perspectives emanating from postmodernist
feminist frameworks inform my study. More specifically, I argued that the language of
‘difference’ and the concept of performativity help in the understanding of women’s differing
gender identities. I engaged with the scholarship on feminist theory and ‘difference’ to reflect
on the possibility of recognising women’s diverse experiences; as such, I relied on the
emerging feminist literature that deconstructs the idea of feminism and gender as being
predominantly ‘white’, hence denouncing the Eurocentric bias and acknowledging gender
identity formation as being integral to specific cultural contexts. Through this analysis, I
noted that discourses on ‘race’, ethnicity and culture need to be taken into consideration as
British South Asian Muslim women’s gendered identities are studied. More specifically, I
argued that Brah’s (1996) concept of ‘reiterative performance’ signifies the articulation of
new gendered identities as young women actively exercise agency in negotiating and re-
working existing gendered cultural norms. Nonetheless, throughout this discussion on gender
identity and ‘difference’, I have also highlighted that although women’s gender identities are
flexible and unstable, they remain constructed and contested within racialised discourses.
Hence, I signalled the importance of overcoming the notion of Muslim woman as ‘category’
which Brah (1993) discusses, so as to better evaluate the evolution of women’s gendered
identities as their lived experiences. In relying on the feminist concept of gender as
‘performance’, drawn from Brah (1996) and Butler (1990), I stressed how concepts around
gender and performativity remain useful in analysing young British South Asian Muslim
women’s negotiations and re-workings of new gendered identities. Young women’s newly
acquired independence within educational and employment settings leads them to perform
different identities, in turn shaping their approach to other life options such as marriage.
Nonetheless, I stressed that the concept of performance also highlights the ways in which
gender is a social, cultural and political construct as young women apply individual agency
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over their life options. In applying these two feminist frameworks to my study, I argued that
through active processes of negotiation, British South Asian Muslim women embrace the
diverse possibilities of generating and performing new gender identities through the spaces of
education and employment.
Thirdly, I suggested that marriage remains a significant site within which women’s
gained independence (through education and employment) is mediated. I illustrated this
argument through my analysis of the institution of marriage in both Islamic and British
contexts. The institution of marriage acts as crux for British South Asian Muslim women’s
negotiations of gendered identities; through independence gained through educational and
employment spaces, the possibilities of embracing and performing new gender identities
through the re-evaluation of marriage options denote women’s empowerment. Also, in
building on the feminist theoretical constructs of gender within the institution of marriage, the
family and household, I reviewed how feminist literature has documented the unequal status
and gender rights of women within the family and marriage. Defining the family as a
‘gendered organisation’ (Staggenborg, 1998) which has historically and socially relied upon
the sexual division of labour to function, I argued that the challenges remain potent as
educated and economically active British South Asian Muslim women contest and construct
new positionings and gender identities within the institution of the family, in their attempts to
embrace egalitarian gender roles within it.
Recognising that marriage acts as a site enabling the maintenance of ethno-religious
identities within British South Asian Muslim communities, I reflected on how notions around
agency, choice, and consent inform practices such as arranged and forced marriages within
these communities. Even though young South Asian Muslim women in Britain perceive
marriage to be important, they are in effect contesting its preference by actively negotiating
choice within the marriage process. Although the customary practice of arranged marriage
and cousin marriage are still popular within their communities, they are ready to challenge
fixed cultural gendered norms so as to ensure that personal marital expectations (based on
more equal gender roles) are met. More importantly, in conjunction with the arranged
marriage, the debate about forced marriage in Britain highlights that firstly, the degrees of
choice within arranged matches must be acknowledged and that secondly, a forced marriage
is un-Islamic as consent and choice in marriage remain strict stipulations of the nikah. Young
South Asian Muslim women in Britain remain aware of their Islamic right to choice in
marriage, contesting, and re-working their options in order to affirm new gendered identities
as they navigate the marriage process. Nevertheless, despite such activism, I highlighted the
complex link which exists between arranged marriage, forced marriage and Islamic
jurisdiction as far as ‘marriage by proxy’ (within Islamic family law) is concerned. I reiterated
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that it is problematic to assume that the validity of a nikah rests solely on consent and choice;
indeed, I argued that it is still possible to uncover overlaps between the concept of forced
marriage and ‘marriage by proxy’. If young British South Asian Muslim women’s marriages
are arranged, to what extent do they exercise agency over the marriage process and
consequently, how does this process impact on the evolution of their gender identities?
This thesis, in focusing on educated British South Asian Muslim women, endeavours to
develop new understandings of gendered identities and marriage in Britain. Therefore, the
research questions I aim to cover in this thesis are:
 As young British South Asian Muslim women negotiate spaces like higher education
and employment, are new gendered identities generated?
 To what extent do British South Asian Muslim women develop new understandings
of marriage through their experiences of higher education and employment?
 How are their new understandings of marriage shaping the negotiations of marriage
expectations of British South Asian Muslim women?
 What meanings do these young women attribute to the institution of marriage within
their communities; do their negotiations enable them to generate new gender
identities as they navigate cultural, ethnic and religious gendered norms attributed to
marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities?
 What is the relevance and importance of both the nikah (Islamic marriage) and the
civil marriage for South Asian Muslim women living in Britain as they re-work their
expectations of marriage within Islamic and British frameworks?
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1 Notions around, and meanings of the ‘family’ and ‘household’ have altered considerably across time
(Staggenborg, 1998; McKie et al., 1999; Barlow et al., 2005). I therefore acknowledge that there can be
various forms of family as well variables in household types, for instance, single parent families.
Nonetheless, in this thesis, I use the term ‘family’ and ‘household’ to mean a marriage-based
relationship between heterosexual couples.
2 It was not until 1753 that a civil marriage service became essential in England (Goody, 1983). From
the twelfth to the mid eighteenth century, the Christian Church in England had the power to decide who
could marry and how marriages were to be performed (Ingram, 1981; Gillis, 1986; Brooke, 1981;
Davies, 1981; Outhwaite, 1981; Macfarlane, 1986; Mansfield and Collard, 1998). The fundamental
principle of marriage before the mid-eighteenth century was that provided that no basic impediment to
marriage existed, an indissoluble bond was created between a man and a woman solely by the verbal
expression of consent of the parties. Such verbal consent was accompanied by the giving of a ring and
other rituals. This survived the Reformation in England and was only minimally altered in the post-
Reformation religious canons of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Ingram, 1981).
3 In pre-Islamic tribal societies polygamy and divorce had been in existence for centuries. The Prophet
recognised the difficulty in radically changing the tribes’ social and cultural lifestyle and therefore
allowed polygamy and divorce under certain conditions while trying to increase women’s rights. A
man in Islam is allowed to enter into polygamy as long as he has only four wives at a time, getting rid
of the unwanted one by divorcing her. However, a man can only take a second wife if the first one is
barren or if the husband resides in a geographical location where women greatly outnumber men. But
no matter what the conditions are, under polygamy, no man can marry more than once unless he can
treat all his wives with justice and equality (Eposito, 1982; Singh, 1992). Indeed, But, asserts the
Qur’an pragmatically, “You will not be able to deal equally between your wives, however much you
wish (to do so)” (Q. 4:129); another verse states: “If you fear that you will not be able to do justice then
marry only one” (Q. 4:3) See Ali (1988).
4 The Qur’an has six thousand verses, about seventy of which deal with personal law. Ten verses deal
with marriage, twenty-five with divorce, five with fornication and adultery and ten with the
maintenance of divorced wives and widows (Pickthall, 1985).
5 This explains why the application of Shari’a law around the Muslim marriage (nikah) is so diverse
cross-culturally and internationally (Mernissi, 1991; Moghissi, 1999). Indeed, Islamic law has been
altered in most Islamic countries so as to better serve the needs of contemporary society (for example,
in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and African/ Balkan countries amongst others) (El-Solh and Mabro, 1994; and
Pearl and Menski, 1998). Some countries such as Tunisia and Turkey have gone as far as to abolish
Shari’a law in order to embrace secular law and policies. In European countries like the United
Kingdom, where there is an ethnic Muslim migrant minority, this minority has to negotiate between
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secular law and Islamic law. Indeed, the literature on Shari’a law in the UK surrounding debates about
Muslim minorities being granted multicultural group rights versus democratic/liberal universal laws of
a secular nation shows that British Muslims develop unique ways in negotiating between Muslim law
and secular law (Poulter, 1995/1998).
6 Repudiation must be done in front of witnesses for the divorce to be valid (Minai, 1981; Singh, 1992).
However, this practice started in early Islam and was practised by both men and women, thereby
defining a more equal gender relationship between wives and husbands (Mernissi, 1987). Today, only
husbands are allowed to repudiate their wives. A wife can never be sure that her marriage would last as
she could be repudiated (divorced) without knowing it. Just as she could suddenly learn that her
husband has taken a new wife without her knowledge as he is not obliged to say so.
7 Muslim law requires the obedience of the wife in marriage. However, what exactly constitutes
obedience and disobedience is subject to interpretation and depends to a large extent on the socio-
economic and cultural circumstances of the parties. However, the obligation of the husband to maintain
his wife does not commence immediately after the marriage as certain conditions have to be fulfilled
after which the wife will be entitled to maintenance. The conditions are as follows. The wife must be
(i) be prepared to have conjugal intercourse and must obey all reasonable commands by her husband;
(ii) She must have attained puberty. If a wife gets into debt and the husband is not at fault, she loses her
rights to maintenance. However, she should still be receiving maintenance in cases such as (i) the
failure of the husband to provide mahr/dower on her demand; (ii) when she is not able to cohabit with
her husband due to illness; (iii) when her husband leaves the matrimonial home to establish another
household; (iv) when she goes on pilgrimage to Mecca and (v) when the marriage cannot be
consummated owing to the husband having not attained puberty, or being ill (Diwan, 1982).
8 Divorce in this context means the termination of any civil marriage registered by the state. However,
within British Muslim communities, it is possible that husbands divorce their wives by repudiation
(divorce in Islamic law-talaq), although this practice is not legally recognised in English jurisdiction.
As Pearl and Menski (1998) suggest, there may be numerous cases where Muslim husbands divorce
their wives in Muslim law and these cases would remain unknown. Furthermore, in cases where only a
nikah and no civil marriage registration has occurred, it remains difficult to know about divorce rates in
Muslim communities in the UK.
9 More specifically, only three percent of Bangladeshis, four percent of Pakistanis and six percent of
Indians married a partner outside of their ethnic group (National Statistics, March 2005).
10 Bhopal’s (1999) study on the arranged marriages of women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent in
East London reveals important notions on British South Asian women’s experiences (both educated
and non-educated) in these marriages. She concludes that the arranged marriage remains an oppressive
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and patriarchal practice in which women from ethnic minorities in the UK have no choice but to
conform to their parents’ and communities’ pressures, demands and traditions.
11 Arranged marriages are seen as an ‘alien’ problem by non-South Asian communities in Britain.
Because marriage is based on an ‘arrangement’ between two families of potentially equal social status
and wealth, marriages are rarely labelled as ‘love marriages’ as it is assumed that people do not have
the agency to choose their future life partner, as opposed to the Europeanised concept of ‘falling in
love’ before marriage. The latter celebrates the notion that a personal intimate relationship should exist
before a couple decides to get married, while the former regards marriage as a religious obligation in
which chastity before marriage is important (Ballard, 1978). However, an arranged marriage may be
remembered as a time of love and romance in cases where couples fall in love before the rishta is
arranged by the families, approached ‘along with some trepidation, anticipation and romantic
expectation’ (Mines & Lamb, 2002: 8). Romance, as Shaw and Charsley (2006) stress, is thus
compatible with arranged marriage, even though the relationship between husband and wife is not
generally the primary factor that motivates marriages between transnational cousins.
12 Arranged matches are made through ‘rishtas’. Rishtas usually take place in one’s own caste, in an
attempt to preserve cultural, caste and lineage purity (Rao & Rao, 1982; Donnan, 1985). The traditional
criteria of spouse selection and kinship organisation of South Asians in the UK follows the same
pattern as that in India and Pakistan (Bachu, 1985; Jeffery and Jeffery, 1996). In terms of transnational
consanguineous marriages, Islamic principles, and the Islamic cultural tradition of marrying within the
extended family are taken into consideration (Charsley and Shaw, 2006); often, Muslims in the UK
justify their preferences for close kin marriage by referring to Islam as they suggest that the Prophet
Muhammad’s daughter Fatima was married to Ali, the Prophet’s cousin (Basit, 1997).
13 The concept of the biradari denotes one’s closest relatives living locally. More generally, it may
mean all other relatives in Britain and the homeland, and at its broadest, refers to all caste members,
ties and descent between contemporaries (Alavi, 1972; Shaw, 2000).
14 Indeed, in the ‘traditional’ pattern, the elders of the family and the parents select a spouse for their
children. In the ‘modified traditional’ pattern, the young person has some power to decide on the
outcome of the proposal arranged by the parents, and has the right to decide whether or not to go ahead
with the marriage. The ‘cooperative traditional’ pattern entails that either the parent or the young
person is able to make the selection, with each other’s approval. Basit’s (1997) study also shows that
Muslim women in Britain are given more opportunities to meet their fiancés and go out with them
before the wedding, as compared to women in Pakistan or Bangladesh. My research (Abdool Raman,
2005) on South Asian Mauritian women and arranged marriages in Mauritius demonstrates similar
trends. Women from my study came up with the term ‘semi-arranged marriage’ as opposed to a
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‘typical arranged marriage’ (Abdool Raman, 2005: 54), which also reflects Pilcher’s (2006) use of
‘assisted marriage’ to depict more ‘modern’ versions of the arranged marriage.
15 Research indicates that forced marriage predominantly affects women of South Asian origin (FCO
and Home Office, 2005, quoted in Anitha and Gill, 2009: 167). Also, organisations like Southall Black
Sisters (2001) and Newham Asian Women’s Project (2007) report that there are around 450 to 1,000
cases of forced marriage a year (quoted in Anitha and Gill, 2009: 167).
16 Government officials in the UK had previously made it clear that parents who force their children to
marry will be prosecuted, irrespective of age, gender, ethnicity or religion. The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (2000), with the Home Office (2000), report on forced marriages mentioned
that the British government would be taking action against families who try to involve their children
into marriages they do not consent.
17 I refer here to ‘English’ law as Scottish laws may be slightly different from laws in England.
However, the conflicts that may arise when Islamic law and English law coexist will be similar to those
in Scottish legislation. I concentrate on England as my study is based in England.
18 In 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury suggested that the introduction of certain aspects of Shari’a
law could help in the maintenance of ‘social cohesion’ in Britain, thereby stating that Muslims should
not have to choose between the stark alternatives of cultural loyalty or state loyalty’ (BBC News
Online, February 2008).
19 In English law, a Muslim marriage entered as a nikah can only be recognised as legally valid if it was
entered into outside the UK.
20 Their future then depends on the willingness of the husband to provide for them until they financially
re-established themselves. Indeed, under English law, the husband will not be obliged to support his
wife as their nikah has never been legally valid (see Poulter, 1986). However, under Muslim law, the
husband has to support the wife for a period of three months (iddah) so as to establish pregnancy.
These cases are unofficial and are therefore not given any legal recognition. In situations of disputes
over property and the custody of children, they then have to rely on family members and Muslim
community leaders, or mosques for support (Pearl and Menski, 1998).
21 Some mosques require the married parties’ documentary evidence of their marriage registration
before they are allowed to undergo the nikah.
22 This is in contrast to the experience of other South Asian ethnic groups in Britain. Hindus, Jains and
Sikhs incorporate the secular ceremony within their own religious rituals (Menski, 1987/1988/1993).
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23 In the judgment in Quazi v Quazi (1979). See Poulter (1986).
24 Talaq will be void even if spouses are UK residents or have been in the UK for more than a year,
unless talaq is approved in a third country (not the country of origin).
25 Muslim women may feel bound in conscience to seek effective termination of their Muslim marriage






In this chapter, I highlight the methodological approaches I utilised during
fieldwork so as to answer my research questions. Here, I expand on how feminist
methodologies and research strategies inform my study of British South Asian Muslim
women’s gendered identities as the spaces of education, employment and marriage are
negotiated. More specifically, I reflect on the ways in which the methodological tools I
utilised remain useful in the analysis of my key research questions:
(1) As young British South Asian Muslim women negotiate spaces like higher education
and employment, are new gendered identities generated?
(2) To what extent do British South Asian Muslim women develop new understandings of
marriage through their experiences of higher education and employment?
(3) How are such understandings shaping the negotiations of marriage expectations of
British South Asian Muslim women?
So as to answer these questions, I firstly focus on the theoretical aspects involved in
the feminist methodologies I have chosen for my study. My research is informed by feminist
standpoint theory and the feminist politics of difference. In essence, the recognition that
gendered identities and knowledge production remain fluid and ‘situational’ is the premise
of my methodological approach. I explore the feminist issues which are relevant to my
thesis, where I pay particular attention to the relationship which exists between the
researcher and the researched. For example, concerns of who speaks for whom, boundaries
of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ experienced by interviewers and interviewees, as well as the
power dichotomies which remain imminent to the research process.
Secondly, I reflect on my research design and strategy as I began fieldwork. In this
section, I elaborate on my research sample and my experiences of the recruitment process of
research participants. Thirdly, I look at the methodological tools employed to gather data for
my research including participant observation as well as qualitative in-depth individual
interviews. Here, I focus on my experiences as a participant observer on university
campuses/workplaces as well as the issues I encountered as I carried out my individual
interviews with research participants. Also, I briefly discuss how I tackled the ethical
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considerations I encountered in my research process, with a particular focus on how
sensitive issues may have affected the research process for both the researcher and the
researched. Finally, I provide an overview of the key characteristics of my research
participants.
3.2 FEMINIST METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES
Feminists, although diverse in their beliefs and positions, claim that social theory
has been male dominated. Jackson (1998) argues that social theory and knowledge
production are gendered and gender is a marker of social differentiation in most societies.
Feminists need to therefore build on methodologies that can go beyond the omnipresence of
the masculine subject and the male researcher. Feminism as a concept enables feminists to
understand the gendered lives of women. Since the 1970s, gender, as a term has been used
to explain culturally constructed femininity and masculinity (Jackson, 1998). Hence, to
understand gender relations in women’s lives means to understand how the social reality of
women is conceptualised (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002). Indeed, DeVault (1996: 32)
claims that the purpose of feminist methodology is to ‘reveal both the diversity of actual
women’s lives and the ideological mechanisms that have made so many lives invisible’.
Feminist methodologies should hence involve a number of important aspects. They
should concentrate on the social construction of gender and inequality through theoretical
analysis, social action and observation (Cancian, 1992). They should examine how ‘race’,
gender, economic/social class and sexuality influence women’s lives. Feminist
methodologies should also recognise ‘situated knowledges’ so as to uncover differences
amongst women’s voices and experiences of their gendered social lives (McDowell and
Sharp, 1999: 262). In practice, this means that feminist methodologies must allow for
differences in women’s voices positionalities as they recount their experiences. Thus, the
concept of ‘situated knowledges’ encourages individual women’s circumstances to be
uncovered. For instance, Jackson (2006: 529) claims that feminist methods should be based
on testimonies which question issues such as ‘who is spoken to, how they are spoken to,
what expectations are held about who can speak on behalf of others, what can be voiced and
how meanings are understood’ (Jackson, 2006: 529). Therefore, in listening or observing
women in feminist research, ‘feminists can use any method, but how they use them may be
distinctive’ (Jackson, 2006: 529).
Feminists agree that standpoint theory may be useful to analyse women’s
experiences (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002). Although there are debates about what a
feminist standpoint, as a notion, signifies, Ramazanoglu and Holland (2002: 64) suggest that
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the concept that ‘women speaking their truth results in new knowledge of women’s
gendered social lives, grounded in women’s experience’ remains central to notions of
feminist standpoint. As such, taking a feminist standpoint means ‘women voicing their
experience’ (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 65). According to Jackson (2006: 531), to
have a ‘feminist standpoint is to have that understanding of life which comes through
struggles of being disadvantaged’. Standpoint theory then becomes a useful approach to
understand women’s gender inequalities and gendered identities within the social or
political contexts in which they evolve. Standpoint theory also allows for differences in
women’s positionalities, whereby knowledge can be achieved by ‘starting with women’s
experience’ (Cancian, 1992: 633).1
Concepts of ‘otherness’ explain the differences among women’s identities and
experiences. They have been taken up within both Western and non-Western feminist
discourse (Mohanty; 1991; Spivak, 1988; Khan, 1988). The experiences of ‘otherness’ and
differences encountered by women who live in, or experience different contexts have
highlighted a number of issues. For instance, struggles over who can speak about what may
also involve dominant bodies exerting force to keep ‘others’ silent. In fact, Edward Said’s
‘Orientalism’ (1978) claims that Europeans produced stereotypical depictions of other
cultures as ‘an Other to a Western norm’ (Mills, 1998: 98). Said questions the ethics and
politics of western academics in representing subordinated peoples against the norm of those
in power; these representations have ‘enframed and staged the Orient for Europeans’
(Mohammad, 2001: 103). Indeed, the Orient has been framed as the passive and exoticised
‘Other’ (Parry, 1992) due to such essentialism. In the study of gender, gendered identities
have similarly been essentialised through the assertion of a singular conception of ‘woman’
within the Western feminist movement (hooks, 1984; Mohanty, 1991).
These debates raise the question of how particular social relations of difference have
been constituted and consequently, about what women do have in common across their
differences (Collins, 1990; Mirza, 1997). Feminists therefore recognise that the category
‘woman’ is not universal and hence not a fixed self. Apart from the theoretical definitions of
‘otherness’, researchers also face the complexity of understanding shifting relations of
difference in practice (Hall, 1992; Spivak, 1988). Those who are collectively being seen as
the ‘other’ by the researcher can be divided into multiple power relations which are found
within diverse social/class divisions, ethnic groups, community and religious affiliations
(Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002). For example, in the context of my research, defining the
‘South Asian Muslim’ woman in the UK proved problematic as there are numerous
divisions among South Asian groups (variation by language, ethnicity, class, sexual
orientation, caste, generation). It was also possible that those who were socially located in
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the same category feel differently about similarities or differences that exist between
themselves, and themselves and ‘others’. Indeed, participants had different experiences of
what it feels like to be included/excluded or embraced/subordinated. As such, they could
experience being ‘other’ or ‘same’ in different ways.
This complex intertwining of difference or similarity and definitions of the ‘other’
affect how the researcher and the researched are positioned in dominant or subordinate
positions in relation to varied subjective ‘selves’ and ‘others’ (Bhopal, 1997). These
interrelations of difference and similarity for both the researcher and the researched are
defined by postmodern theory as not fixed but ambivalent. Based on this principle, it may be
possible to navigate between the ‘same’ and the ‘other’ (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002).
Navigating between the ‘same’ and the ‘other’ then creates hybrid identities which
challenge fixed and binary oppositions that in turn define the research process as dynamic.
Power between the researcher and the researched, although unequal, is also given new
meanings in terms of agency (Bhabha, 1996). In the case of ethnic minorities in Europe,
ambivalence encourages the researcher not to view their differences as a static ‘other’, but as
selves negotiating multiple identities across differences and similarities within wider social
and political contexts. In the following section, I elaborate on why I have chosen the two
feminist methodological approaches (standpoint theory and the politics of difference) as
frameworks informing my research.
3.2.1 Using feminist methodological standpoint theory and the politics of difference in
my research: managing difference, sameness and positionality during fieldwork
Approaches in standpoint theory and the politics of difference/‘otherness’ inform
my research in two ways. Firstly, they both focus on the concepts of women’s differing
identities, positionalities and experiences which can be useful in my research. Secondly,
they exemplify the claim in my research that young educated British South Asian Muslim
women’s notions and experiences of the meanings of marriage and identity can be different
to the experiences of young educated non-Muslim British South Asian women from other
ethnic minority groups, or to young educated British white women. Furthermore, these
approaches recognise that ‘womanhood’ as a concept is not universal but diverse, thereby
emphasising that women’s experiences are different.
My research assumes a feminist standpoint of difference so as to look at South
Asian Muslim women’s notions of marriage and identity in the UK. Acknowledging the
claim that Western feminism has had a tendency to define the non-West as the ‘Other’ is
important to my study. Indeed, British South Asian Muslim women, although evolving in a
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western context, are viewed as ‘different’, ‘non-white’ or ‘ethnic’; women, though British,
who are still viewed as belonging to specific cultural ethnic/religious groups ‘outside’ of
British white society. Western feminists have often ignored the differences between women
and are hence guilty of cultural colonialism in silencing non-Western women’s differing
voices (Mills, 1998); in fact, they have been accused of treating ‘woman’ as universal,
hence essentialising them and ignoring differences among women. By the 1980s, ‘third
world women’ were being classified (by western White middle-class feminists) as a unified
category. They were seen as the ‘other’, oppressed, subordinated and powerless, hence
leaving Western feminists with the power to produce feminist knowledge and history
(Mohanty, 1991; Spivak, 1993; Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002). Furthermore, Haggis
(1990) claims that the gendered dimension of the ‘Other’ has either been essentialised or
ignored. In the case of feminist research encompassing Muslim women’s experiences,
Muslim feminists (Mernissi, 1975; Moghissi, 1999) and Islamic feminists (Mojab, 2001)
also claim that positionalities are diverse. Indeed, Khan (1998: 465) suggests that the notion
of the ‘Muslim woman’ must also be seen as grounded within Muslim women’s differences
in experiences, which are not ‘static or definitive’, but dynamic.
In fact, the debate between universalism and cultural relativism with regards to
Muslim women’s rights remains a thorny issue within feminism (Okin, 1998; Macey, 1999).
This point remains relevant to my research as it touches on the ways in which Muslim
women not only experience culture and religion, but also their positionalities in negotiating
between cultural or religious social practices (such as marriage), which are inherent to their
identities. For instance, universalist feminists claim that the granting of certain cultural or
religious groups rights to particular ethnic minorities may be damaging to women.2 In
relation to Muslim women’s rights, some Muslim feminists claim that universal concepts of
women’s rights as human rights must be embraced regardless of individual differences and
contexts (Mernissi, 1975; Ahmed, 1992; Mir-Hosseini, 2006; Moghadam, 2002). Islamic
feminist movements, on their part, argue that cultural relativist attitudes lead Muslim
women to embrace the complementary gender roles between women and men as prescribed
by Islam. Consequently, women who wish to follow Islamic rules claim that Islam provides
them with agency or empowerment to lead fulfilling lives (Hoodfar, 1991; Povey, 2001).
The recognition of varying and differing positionalities informing the expression of religion
and culture hence lies at the core of my research. Acknowledging differences in women’s
perceptions hence shape the methodology of this study as it recognises that gendered
identities are embedded within diversity.
Understandings of gender, sexuality, and gendered identities therefore remain
grounded in religious/cultural beliefs that draw on different axes or understandings of
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culture, religion, ‘race’ and ethnicity. I needed a methodological approach which was
sensitive to how British South Asian Muslim women experience their gendered social
realities in relation to marriage and identity, which are also influenced by particular
political, cultural and religious concepts. Indeed, there would be variables in their
positionings. I was also conscious of the fact that the gendered roles or ‘traditions’
prescribed by Islam, which young women’s families have been practising for generations in
their countries of origins, might themselves be undergoing transformations in a context like
the UK. This perspective shaped my research strategy in the sense that I was aware of the
fact that participants could be experiencing different changes at different times. I hence
thought it appropriate to conduct qualitative interviews, thus giving ample space and time to
interviewees to narrate their perceptions freely.
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND RESEARCH STRATEGY
3.3.1 Fieldwork Context
Research Sample
My fieldwork took place over a year, from August 2009 to August 2010. I based my
fieldwork within the Yorkshire and Lancashire regions. At the beginning of my fieldwork, I
also considered London as part of my research sample as I anticipated that in London, the
range of participants might be more diverse, where different ethnic or social class
backgrounds could be identified. On the other hand, the sample from Yorkshire and
Lancashire could be more homogeneous and less diverse. I contended that a comparative
study between locations such as Yorkshire, Lancashire and London could be interesting in
offering the possibility to explore a broader range of Muslim women’s experiences and
identities. However, as I predominantly relied on the snowballing method to recruit research
participants, it remained more practical to stay within the Yorkshire and Lancashire regions
where I then lived, hence shifting the focus of the research sample on Northern England
instead.
As previously mentioned, Muslims form the largest ethnic minority group in the UK
and the majority of Muslims in the UK are of South Asian origin. They are of Pakistani
descent, followed by Bangladeshi and Indian (Modood et al., 1994).3 Most research
participants were of Pakistani origin, followed by Indian and Bangladeshi descent. This
reflected the demography of recruitment sites. I thought it probable that I encounter African
Asians (possibly Ugandan and Kenyan) while recruiting participants; however, my research
sample does not include women from these ethnic backgrounds.4 I sought respondents who
had all of their education in the UK and were educated to the higher education level. All
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respondents in this study were aged between 18-30 years of age. Although I interviewed
women from different South Asian ethnic backgrounds and diverse social class
milieus/economic backgrounds, the common ground between my research participants
remained access to higher education, paid employment and Islam.
In devising the research strategy, I sought to recruit women who were still in full-
time education and those who finished university and had graduate jobs. I also sought to
recruit unmarried and married respondents so as to understand women’s perceptions and
experiences of marriage and gendered identities. I believed that it could be beneficial to the
study to compare and contrast participants’ opinions from a range of respondents. I thought
that such comparative studies can be useful in three ways. Firstly, they generate
understandings of how married versus unmarried Muslim women experience or view
marriage. Secondly, they help to investigate whether education has really made a difference
in altering young women’s views about the meanings of marriage, gendered roles and
identities. Thirdly, they explore the ways in which views/meanings of marriage and identity
have changed or not changed for participants who have already made the transition from
university and are now either working full-time, part-time or are not working at all.
For those who were still studying, participants’ opinions were based on current
views/aspirations and the future positions they hope to achieve. For those who were already
in paid employment, participants reflected on their views/aspirations they may have had at
the time when they were still studying. They were also in a position to simultaneously draw
on the differences and similarities that they may have experienced during the transition
years (transition from university to employment or unemployment or other). It was therefore
interesting and useful to have these two different sets of participants’ views to compare and
contrast. Such comparative research strategy generated rich and valuable data for valid and
credible analysis of my research topics. In the next section, I recount my experiences of
recruiting research participants for my study.
Recruitment
As I started my fieldwork, one of the most difficult tasks was to find research
participants to interview. Initially, I used university campuses as sites for recruitment.
Participants were busy studying or working; getting people to agree to talk to me for about
two hours proved daunting. Nevertheless, through a few personal contacts, I managed to
meet potential students who agreed to participate in my study. With the help of friends, I
distributed hand-outs about my study on campuses so as to ensure women were made aware
of my study. I started to network with students at The University of Leeds, whereby I was
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introduced to other students from neighbouring universities (The University of Bradford
etc). I spent the first few weeks of fieldwork (2009) speaking to students who were part of
South Asian/Islamic student societies at university. I attended these societies’ meetings
regularly so as to maintain existing contacts as well as build new ones; after weekly
meetings, I developed better rapports with women and I was introduced to their friends.
Nevertheless, recruiting participants who were active members of Islamic societies lead to a
specific group of women who publicly manifest their Islamic faith/affiliations and hence,
their religious identities. These women, for instance, adopted similar dress codes, such as
the hijab (with jeans or salwar kameez), as well as in some cases, the jilbab (full body
covering, including the headscarf). For this group of participants, dress codes represented an
important part of how they performed their gender identities on campus. However, even
though women presented particular trends in clothing, the diversity and differences of
opinions they articulated demonstrate that this group of women are far from being
homogenous and conformist.
However, despite this evidence of diversity, I was concerned about the limitations
of this approach to recruitment. In order to diversify my research sample, I attempted to
recruit participants not only through Islamic societies but also pursued other snowballing
techniques. I used social networking sites as another avenue to recruit research participants;
Facebook.com appeared to be the most popular amongst students so this is where I started.
In fact, I was surprised to see the number of student groups using social media such as
Facebook.com (for example groups such as British Muslims and Bloody Proud of it, British
Asian Sisterhood, Leeds Muslim Youth Forum amongst others) to actively post and blog
views about Islam, women’s rights, identities and the hijab in the UK. More importantly,
‘administrators’ (people responsible to manage these websites) remained university students
from Leeds, Bradford and Manchester. I hence emailed some ‘administrators’, who gladly
accepted to talk to me as they thought that research such as mine would help to promote
positive understandings of Islam in the UK. As a result, ‘administrators’ asked me to write a
summary of my research (Appendix Ten) so as to distribute to other members of their
groups-this proved to be very successful as students emailed me, wishing to express their
perceptions about related issues.
As for the recruitment of women who were already in paid employment, I also
initially relied on the snowballing method. Having a few friends working as medical
practitioners in the Yorkshire and Lancashire medical deaneries helped me enormously in
meeting other women working within the medical profession. However, so as to try and
overcome the bias of having interviewees concentrated solely within the medical profession,
I contacted NGO’s, organisations dealing with ethnic minority groups, as well as local
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South Asian grocery shops/clothes stores in Yorkshire and Lancashire. These were useful in
helping me approach young women for the research. Voluntary organisations working with
South Asian ethnic minority women in Leeds were useful in establishing contacts.
For instance, particularly, Nari Ekta (www.nariekta.org.uk), Asha Neighbourhood
Project (www.aspiretosucceed.org.uk) and Get Away Girls (www.getawaygirls.co.uk)
remained the most responsive. I effectively obtained positive replies from them, whereby
some women who already graduated from university and were working within these
organisations readily agreed to participate in my study. I was invited by Getaway Girls, an
organisation focused on promoting higher education for young ethnic minority women to
talk about my project with young women who were interested to consider higher education
as an option. This provided me with invaluable space to define the contours of my study,
where I answered women’s questions about my academic path, independence as a South
Asian woman, as well as notions about Islam.
Recruiting participants therefore proved to be difficult in the beginning but access
became easier as my fieldwork unfolded. In effect, my recruitment methods impacted on the
nature of my research sample in particular ways. My sample is largely reflective of a group
of British South Asian Muslim women who were part of particular social groups (ISOC-
Islamic Society), were enrolled in science or medical courses, as well as being graduates
practising as medical practitioners and related fields (science fields). Indeed, the profile of
the graduate participants I recruited indicates that my research sample mirrors a particular
segment of professional (working) Muslim women. This sample group reflects the limits of
my research strategy; having a wider variety of Muslim women graduates from different
employment backgrounds could have provided different data for my study. Nevertheless,
having graduates coming from similar employment backgrounds or study courses is an
effect of my research strategy. Indeed, due to snowballing, women recommended to
participate in my research by previous respondents shared similar professional (career) or
study course interests.
My research sample was hence shaped by my recruitment strategy, which affected
the validity of my findings in different ways. Reflecting on the strategies used to recruit my
research sample, it is clear that they shaped my sample in distinctive ways. Using the
Islamic Society meant that ten women from my sample were active members of the Islamic
Society, compared to the remaining twenty participants. However, as I suggested above, the
women I interviewed expressed diverse views and it was clear that those who were active
members of the ISOC were not homogeneous or narrowly conformist in their views.
Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge the possibility that my respondents may have
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been anxious to portray views that were either ‘Islamically normative’, or were cautious not
to depict Islam in a bad light. I recognise this possibility but do not see it as problematic in
the arguments presented here. All respondents were positioned in particular ways. In my
analysis in the following chapters, I show reflexivity in how I deal with the comments from
different respondents.
3.3.2 Research Methodology
I planned to use different methodological tools so as to collect a richer set of data,
ensure a multi-dimensional perspective on the subject and avoid a one-sided view of the
issues. Previous studies of South Asian women in Britain suggest the use of combined
methodological tools. For example, Bhopal’s (1999) study on South Asian women and
arranged marriages in Britain comprises the use of in-depth interviews with participant
observation. Similarly, Dwyer’s (1999) study on British Muslim girls and identities used
interviews and group discussions as methodological tools. In fact, Michell (1999) suggests
that combining individual interviews with focus groups is a good way to research young
people’s experiences of their social worlds. In relation to her research on young people and
social hierarchies, she claims that focus groups can facilitate the exploration of mutual
experiences and identities. They can also be revealing in terms of who is speaking and who
is silenced, and why, during the focus group discussions. She goes on to suggest that it was
individual interviews which allowed the in-depth exploration of young women’s
experiences.
Initially, I intended to use both individual interviews and focus group discussions to
explore women’s differential notions of marriage and their opinions/experiences of
gendered social roles. Combining these two methods might have helped to generate
different types of information. However, as my fieldwork unfolded, I realised that focus
group discussions remained impractical and unrealistic to devise as students and
respondents who were in paid employment had different schedules at university and at
work. Also, the information I obtained from my one-to-one interviews with participants
generated rich data. Furthermore, attempting to discuss sensitive topics like sexuality,
virginity and religion communally could be problematic in large groups of respondents. I
thought that such sensitive issues could perhaps be better explored in individual interviews
where it is possible for participants to feel more at ease to talk about personal aspects of
their lives in full confidentiality. I set up a few pilot interviews with women to test how
participants would respond to my research questions, and whether I could obtain relevant
information within the allocated hours of interviewing. My pilot interviews proved
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successful in generating considerable data and I hence decided to adopt in-depth individual
interviews as my main research methodological tool.
However, as I approached personal contacts to kick-start snowballing, I was invited
to student parties and organisations on university campuses which gave me the opportunity
to network and meet potential interviewees. I attended several Muslim students gathering
both at the University of Leeds and the University of Bradford as they organised talks on
Islam and group discussions about Muslim youth in the UK. This enabled me to be
involved, as a participants’ observer, in young Muslim women’s social activities on campus,
hence making it possible to implement participant observation into my research design. In
effect, I finally explored the possibilities of participant observation as a qualitative
methodological research tool in order to gather data for my study. Below, I elaborate on
how I managed participant observation and qualitative interviews during my fieldwork.
Participant Observation
As a Muslim of South Asian origin, I found that as a researcher, I was easily
accepted by student communities which focused on religion and South Asian culture as
common grounds to form and maintain links on campuses. In attending their gatherings, I
became a participant observer and this helped me gain an understanding of women’s social
realities within higher educational settings. This included participating in cultural and
religious events and functions (Eid Party/Iftaar Parties marking the end of the daily fast
during Ramadan/fundraising for Charity events). This helped me negotiate access to
students coming from diverse educational fields and also facilitate snowballing in the sense
that these students had older siblings and cousins who were either still at university or had
graduated and were working. At the beginning of my fieldwork, being based in Leeds city, I
attended Fresher’s Week at the University of Leeds so as to personally sign up as a member
of the Islamic Society as well as South Asian societies promoting dance, culture and the
Arts. I realised that there were two Islamic societies-the ISOC (Islamic Society) and the
ABSOC (Alhul Bay’t Society), the former a Sunni organisation and the latter a Shi’a based
organisation.
In fact, I signed up for both of them and this gave me the chance to approach both
presidents and get involved as they planned their yearly significant events on campus. The
ISOC yearly organises the ‘Discover Islam Week’ while the ABSOC plans the ‘Ashura
Awareness Week’. Being a participant observer generated interesting data concerning the
promotion and maintenance of Islamic identities on university campuses; activities, games,
charity events and talks about Islam added richness and depth to my understanding of how
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Muslim youth operates on campus, and evolves within higher educational settings. Below, I
include a few examples of the hand outs distributed at the ‘Discover Islam Week’ ‘at the
University of Leeds.
67
Picture 1: Evening Talks, ‘Discover Islam Week’, ISOC, The University of Leeds.
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Picture 2: Women in Islam: Beyond Stereotypes, ‘Discover Islam Week’, ISOC, The University of
Leeds.
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Picture 3: The Hijab, ‘Discover Islam Week’, ISOC, The University of Leeds.
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Participation observation enabled me to find participants for my study, as well as
helped me to contextualise my interview findings. Throughout my fieldwork, and whilst
doing participants observation, I kept a research diary so as to keep a steady record of my
findings. As a result, I came to be known as the ‘PhD researcher’ writing on Muslim
women, education and marriage. Participant observation led me to understand how Islamic
societies from different universities interact with each other and politically mobilise to invite
Muslim scholars from Muslim Councils all over Britain to deliver lectures on Islam,
terrorism and Muslim women’s rights on campus. In fact, the tension between the Islamic
societies (ISOC and ABSOC) at the University of Leeds campus was glaring. They were
kept separate and each organised specific activities to support their members. The president
of the much smaller ABSOC reiterated her concerns to me about how the ISOC
monopolises funding and space on campus for events, which appears to be a pattern on other
university campuses, such as the University of Bradford.
Qualitative interviews
In this section, I reflect on the use of qualitative interviews in my research. In the
research process, ‘a qualitative research interview is literally an inter view, an inter change
of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest’ (Kvale, 1996:
2). An interview is a ‘pseudo-conversation which must have all the warmth and personality
exchange of a conversation with the clarity and guidelines of scientific searching for it to be
successful’ (Goode and Hatt 1952 cited in Letherby, 2003: 82). The interview is also
described as a site in which power relations operate in complex ways, with the social
positioning of interviewers and interviewees based on class, age, status and sexual
orientation influence interview dynamics as well as a study’s theoretical underpinnings
(Nast, 1994). In order to gather reliable and valid knowledge of the social world, the focus
of an interview must be geared towards the interaction between the researcher and the
researched. Although based on the conversations of daily life which may appear to be
informal, the research interview remains a professional conversation where ‘the sharing of
personal information becomes a conscious act’ (Mohammad, 2001: 107).
Therefore, the purpose of any qualitative interview is to obtain qualitative
descriptions of the life world of the subjects with respect to interpretation of their meaning.
However, understanding the nature of conversational realities means understanding the
ways in which meanings are constituted through historical, cultural, social and political
negotiations/ interpretations. Kvale (1996) claims that because we exist in a conversational
circle, our understanding of the human world depends on conversation and our
understanding of conversation is based on our understanding of the human world. In other
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words, research interviews have to be contextualised within specific material social worlds
(usually those of the subjects) so that researchers can make sense of/interpret the narratives
given by research participants that are generated for the production of knowledge. This
claim is mirrored by feminist researchers who affirm that to facilitate access to women’s
lives and subjectivities, researchers have to inquire ‘whose story the interview is asked to
tell, who interprets the story, and with what theoretical frameworks’ (Anderson and Jack,
1991: 11).
In elaborating upon feminist methodologies within social science, Maynes et al
(2008: 16-21) suggest that women’s experiences of their social contexts have often been
analysed through categories such as ‘race’, gender, social class and sexual orientation. As a
result, Maynes et al (2008: 16) argue that these frameworks lead to ‘human agency being
reduced to social position’, where ‘understandings of the relationship between the individual
and the social remain superficial’. Such analyses tend to reduce research participants’ social
experiences as being fixed. In contrast, in-depth interviewing, more specifically, oral
narratives, offer research participants space to relate personal life histories within their
particular socio-cultural contexts, where stories ‘emerge from their lived experiences over
time and in particular social, cultural, and historical settings’. Hence, some feminists claim
that soft qualitative data collected from in-depth interviews are more appropriate for
feminist research as women are able to tell their own stories in their own words. Within
feminist research, the oral narrative process is then viewed as qualitative research ‘on’
women, with a desire to make sense of women’s lives and experiences (Anderson and Jack,
1991). More importantly, narrative interviews and the analysis of written texts in feminist
research have to recognise differences and similarities in women’s life experiences and
identities that are weaved around language, culture, ‘race’ or sexuality (Etter-Lewis, 1991).
They should also be in a position to relate women’s oral narratives within the larger context
of how womanhood is represented in social structures so as to understand how the ‘narrative
self’ describes and defines itself in society (Chanfrault-Duchet, 1991: 78).
The use of oral narratives in research indicates positive outcomes; firstly, it opens
up the wider possibilities for researchers to understand their interviewees’ agency and
positionalities from the ‘inside out’ and secondly, it enables researches to bridge the
analytical gap between the individual and the social by allowing researchers to contextualise
personal experiences within specific social, cultural and historical events (Maynes et al.,
2008: 16). Oral narratives hence comprise two aspects: the self and the social sphere, and
the cultural representations of women as shaped by the societies in which women who are
being interviewed live (Chanfrault-Duchet, 1991). These encourage the researcher to regard
the meanings of oral narratives as not essentially grounded in dialogue but also in social
72
experience. In the context of my study, understanding young British South Asian Muslim
women’s differing personal experiences within their particular socio-cultural contexts
proved vital in my analysis of their evolving gendered identities as the spaces of education,
employment and marriage were negotiated.
I set up one-to-one interviews with all participants. Most interviews were conducted
on university campuses in private seminar rooms, with only a minority conducted at the
participants’ homes. The interviews were semi-structured interviews with open-ended
questions covering the main research topics of my interest (Appendix Three). When
devising my interview questions, I relied on a plan of some main research topics I wanted to
cover in my study (Appendix Two). I intended to keep the interviews as open and as
informal as possible, more like a dialogue than a formal situation. All interviews were
discretely tape recorded (after having obtained the consent of participants to do so); I was
hence able to maintain eye contact with my interviewees instead of having to take notes
throughout the interview process, thereby rendering the interview more like a conversation.
At the end of some interviews, I realised that some participants felt tense or anxious because
they had been open about personal and emotional experiences. I offered them time to reflect
on their situations. However, the majority of participants felt that the interview experience
was quite enriching in them being able to talk freely about their life’s experiences, more
specifically, about Islam and their views on marriage. At the end of each interview, I
therefore allowed a few minutes for debriefing and asked participants whether they would
like to add anything else. Some of them reiterated the questions they found most interesting
and felt free to further discuss the issues they thought needed more clarifications.
Operationalising concepts and analysis
The key themes I focused on in my interviews (Appendix Three) were higher
education, identity, marriage, Islam and gender. I classified my interview questions broadly
along these themes so as to find out why participants are entering into higher education, and
how they position themselves, in terms of identity, within educational and employment
settings. The interviews focused on the ways in which young women perceive their
educational and employment experiences and aspirations, as well as their recount their
expectations of marriage. Instead of asking directly about gendered performance, I was alert
in my analysis to indications of how my respondents articulated and understood
contradictions in the ways in which they presented their own decisions and experiences. I
tried to encourage them to reflect on ways they had made certain choices, and listened
carefully to what they told me about what factors shaped their decisions. Of course, I also
noted when respondents were more specific about the self-conscious ways in which they
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presented themselves, or felt they had to present themselves. My participant observation
notes were also extremely useful in adding to this material, as I noted the ways in which
negotiations were being made, particularly around dress.
The questions I was interested to cover in my interviews were: firstly, how are
young British South Asian Muslim women exercising independence over their options so as
to generate new gender identities within educational and employment spaces? More
specifically, I firstly touched on issues such as the benefits of education, the financial
freedom which comes with being into paid employment, family negotiations to get into
higher education, as well as the motivational factors pushing young women to increasingly
consider educational and employment careers as alternative life options. Secondly, I set out
to evaluate respondents’ new understandings and expectations of marriage as they explore
the spaces of higher education and work; how do the agency and the independence gained at
university and work enable these young women to develop new expectations of marriage
and consequently, aid in the development of their gendered identities? As women negotiate
education and employment, and consequently, develop new meanings of marriage, I sought
out to assess how the active processes of contestation and negotiation impact on their gender
identities. For instance, as young women negotiate ‘choice’ in marriage, in particular, the
arranged marriage, how do their navigations of the marriage process help them to define and
construct new meanings of marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities?
What challenges do young women face as they attempt to re-work new meanings of
marriage as educated and economically independent British South Asian Muslim women?
These were the main areas I covered in my interviews. I taped all the interviews,
each lasting between two to two and a half hours. The interviews were then transcribed by
myself. I summarised each transcript and these summaries provide individual narratives
which help to understand respondents’ social contexts (Appendix Ten). So as to visually
identify the ideas emanating from my key themes and how they relate to each other, I drew
mind maps; one was devised to have a general overview of the thesis, whilst the three others
were drawn to grasp the main threads of my empirical chapters (Appendix Seven). As far as
the coding process is concerned, I initially started to code the data manually. I then utilised
the software Nvivo8, designed for qualitative analysis, where I developed a list of codes
relating to my key themes. I provide a full list of codes, as well as an example of a coded
transcript in Appendices Four, Five and Six.
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Individual interviews in the context of my fieldwork
Using individual interviews as research methodology affected my study in both
positive and negative ways. My research encompasses sensitive issues like family relations,
gendered female roles, sexuality and religion. I suspected that participants would feel more
comfortable in revealing their concerns and notions about marriage (and sexuality) in one-
to-one interviews. My interviews provided me with detailed sketches of women’s narratives
based on their experiences and their perceptions. Open-ended questions also allowed
participants to describe as freely and as precisely as possible what they experience and feel,
and how they act. Starting with straightforward questions around education or work
experiences may put participants more at ease and build up their confidence. Once they felt
comfortable, I moved on to more personal questions around relationships, sexuality and
marriage.
Therefore, semi-structured interviews were an efficient means of collecting
qualitative data as they are focused on specific themes that direct the research while also
providing participants with enough leeway to formulate their opinions. This approach also
attributed some power to the interviewee. It helped maintain a more balanced power
dynamic between the researcher and the researched. I also think that individual interviews
aided me to deconstruct any essentialist/stereotypical or collective views I may have had of
the topic as participants were providing me with unique and individual ‘private’ opinions.
Indeed, Kvale (1996: 33) claims that the in-depth interview attempts to gather descriptions
of the relevant themes of the interviewee’s life world that are ‘rich and presuppositionless as
possible’. Kvale (1996: 33) describes such presuppositionless as a ‘deliberate naïveté’ which
encourages the researcher to be open to new and unexpected phenomena.
However, individual interviewing as a methodological tool also has its
shortcomings (Kvale, 1996). Participants’ statements could sometimes be ambiguous and
this implies several possibilities of interpretation. In such cases, contradictory or different
meanings reflected inconsistencies that I (the researcher) had to deal with. This might have
affected the objectivity of the research. Interviewing is also criticised for being too person-
dependent and explorative and hence, unscientific. A common worry is that different
interviewers will come up with different interviews and therefore eliminate the need for
uniformity in the research process. Individual interviewing is hence claimed to focus too
much on the individual and neglects the person’s embeddedness in social interactions. As a
way to counter this concern, I always ensured that I understood the interviewee’s social and
personal contexts as I conducted the interview. Also, I believe that participation observation
75
of women’s social realities has helped me contextualise and understand the implicit social
maneuverings of daily life.
In researching young British South Asian Muslim women’s notions on marriage and
identity, I intended to look for depth rather than breadth of knowledge. As mentioned
before, doing qualitative research by focusing on women’s experiences and differences has
its pros and cons. However, my research took as standpoint that truth, objectivity and
knowledges may be different and diverse for different women cross-culturally. Furthermore,
the use of oral narratives in my research was beneficial in uncovering women’s
experiences/life histories which were not only revealed in dialogue but which were also
placed within wider social, cultural, political and religious contexts. As such, I think that the
individual in-depth interview remained probably the best option available to look into
women’s opinions and experiences in my research. In the following section, I elaborate on
the research process by reflecting on how I managed issues around positionality during
fieldwork.
3.3.3 Managing power and positionality: the ‘insider/outsider’ dualism in research
Feminist standpoint theory recognises the power dynamics that take place between
the researcher and the researched, and how and why such power dynamics influence the
research process or the production of knowledge within feminist research. Skelton (2001:
90) claims that whilst fieldwork is conducted, it is important to acknowledge the existing
‘differential power relations’ between the researcher and research participants. The differing
positionalities and identities of both the interviewer and research participants highlight the
complexities of the research process, whereby it becomes necessary to identify the power
relations between the former and the latter so as to ensure that strategies are developed (by
researchers) to achieve reflexivity as research is conducted (Ramazanoglu and Holland,
2002). The term ‘reflexivity’ is used to explain attempts to render visible the power relations
that exist in the research process, raising questions about the ethics of who is entitled to
research particular topics (England, 1994; Valentine, 2002; Ramazanoglu and Holland,
2002). As power between researcher and researched is managed whilst participants’ diverse
social experiences are being analysed, reflexivity ‘opens up possibilities for negotiation over
what knowledge claims are made, for whom, why and within what frame of reference’
(Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 119). As Valentine (2002: 118) claims, power relations
between the researcher and the researched are unequal and unethical if the researcher plays
the role of the ‘omnipotent expert extracting information from the passive subject’. Rose
(1997: 113) defines this kind of relationship as a ‘reflexive landscape of power’, claiming
that the ways in which feminist writers have conceptualised power relationships in the
76
research process means that ‘the relationship between the researcher and the researched can
only be mapped in two ways: either as a relationship of difference, articulated through an
objectifying distance, or as a relationship based on sameness, which is understood as the
researcher and the researched being in the same position’. As a result, ‘sameness’ may
become linked to authenticity within the process of knowledge production, thereby
addressing the balance of power relations between the interviewer and interviewee.
Throughout my fieldwork, I felt that the power relationship between myself and my
research participants remained dynamic. Although I was the one with a tape-recorder and a
clip-board, it was also evident that respondents had power in withholding any information
they did not want to share with me, or also had the possibilities of withdrawing from the
interviews altogether. I relied heavily on their genuineness of opinion in order to be in a
position to produce a thesis and it happened that respondents put the same questions to me.
Consequently, because I wanted to maintain a non-hierarchical tone to my interviews, I
answered and revealed, to some extent, personal information to ensure a fair exchange of
views. Indeed, Mullings (1999: 340) argues that the boundary and power relationship
between the researcher and the researched is a dynamic process which creates ‘positional
spaces’ where the researcher and the researched encounter transitory shared spaces. These
spaces are then informed by identity-based differences and similarities between the
researcher and the researched. In other words, their positionalities are not fixed but fluid
identities in the research process. This is because the production of identities must be seen
as relational characters which fashion particular performances of social interaction between
the researcher and the researched.
It is therefore important that I address my positionality in my research. I am a non-
white, partially practising Muslim5, middle-class, non-Western feminist with a Western
education. I am from Mauritius, an ex-French/British colony which is today a republic.
Mauritius is a multicultural, democratic republic, of which the majority of the population is
of South Asian descent. As a Mauritian Muslim woman of South Asian origin, whose
education has been influenced and molded by British/European academia, I was culturally
sensitive to both Western and non-Western feminist literature. This is because firstly, I am
focusing my research on women from a non-white ethnic minority group living in Britain
and secondly, I can identify with both the West (through Western education and exposure)
and the non-West (through South Asian culture and Islam). As such, it was inevitable that I
negotiate ‘positional spaces’ based on sameness and difference during my fieldwork.
A study on identity, ‘othering’ and ‘otherness’ conducted by Mohammad (2001)
involving British Pakistani women highlights a similar conflict in having to navigate
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between the West and the non-West and hence, having to negotiate ‘positional spaces’.6 She
argues that in relation to her research methodology, she confronted her social positioning as
an ‘insider/outsider’ dualism within the research process. Indeed, the relationship of the
researcher and the researched may be mapped by either difference or sameness, or both. She
describes the ‘insider/outsider’ (‘Same’ versus ‘Other’) boundary as ‘marking an inside
from an outside, a boundary that is seen to circumscribe identity, social position and
belonging and as such marks those who do not belong and are hence excluded. I was seen to
be marked by my colour, which set me apart from ‘white’ society, while positioning me
elsewhere, as part of an Asian community’ (Mohammad, 2001: 101). Positionality,
transmitted through the ‘insider/outsider’ border, is therefore fluid, whereby the researcher’s
and research participants’ identities remain dynamic throughout the research process. As
Hopkins (2009: 6) suggests, the ‘inability to fully know our positionalities could encourage
researchers to realise the importance of the research they are carrying out and the methods
they are using’.
I anticipated that while conducting my fieldwork, I would similarly encounter the
‘insider/outsider’ boundary in sharing some common cultural/religious traits with my
research participants. This social positioning can have its advantages and disadvantages. In
experiencing sameness (based on commonality in experiences), the researcher may be better
equipped to understand the researched’s reality and hence ‘produce authentic and moral
authority to personal history’ (Mohammad, 2001: 104). For the researcher, the underlying
assumption of being an ‘insider’ is that the researcher may produce a more accurate
interpretation of informants’ responses. Indeed, many feminists draw on their own
biographies when collecting and analysing data while others acknowledge that the ‘self’ is a
resource for helping to make sense of the lives of others (Letherby, 2003). However, the
researcher’s positionality as an ‘insider’ can also have the effect of making the researcher
appear too close for comfort, hence making women wary of sharing information. The
‘insider’ status of the researcher has also been criticised as a dangerous form of essentialism
as it naively assumes connections between the researcher and the researched based on
physical attributes such as ‘race’ and sex (Kobayashi, 1994).
In contrast, ‘outsiders’ are assumed to have more cultural baggage to deal with
during fieldwork (Valentine, 2002). Notions of the ‘insider/outsider’ dualism may hence
suggest that because the relationship between the researcher and the researched is at risk of
being reduced to social categories such as gender or class, such social identities are then
somehow inevitably seen to be fixed or frozen (Valentine, 2002). Therefore, based on the
notion of fluid ‘positional spaces’, truth claims regarding women’s experiences are not
necessarily universal, objective and neutral (Mohammad, 2001; Mernissi, 1991; Kandiyoti,
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1991). All knowledges remain hence embedded, situated and partial, with the risk of being
biased (Harding, 1991; Bhavnani and Haraway, 1994). As Stanley and Wise (1993, in
DeVault, 1996: 41) suggest, ‘different standpoints will produce different knowledges’.
These differences will therefore influence the ways in which knowledges or
meanings are analysed and interpreted. Given the dynamism of the research field and the
complexity of the researcher’s and the researched’s identities, ‘truth claims can hence only
be grounded in a real recognition of the limitations of vision and knowledge, and the
existence of multiple truths’ (Mohammad, 2001: 113). In carrying out research on young
British South Asian Muslim women, particular attention had to be paid to the politics of
difference so as to understand that knowledge and experience can generate multiple truths
that do not necessarily have the same value. Indeed, instead of asking ‘is this true?’, it is
more useful to ask ‘which/whose truth?’ is being told (Mohammad, 2001: 113).
During fieldwork, as a researcher, I shared positionalities of ‘sameness’ and
‘difference’ with my research participants. In terms of educational qualifications, shared
religion (Islam) and cultural background (‘Asianness’), I was probably viewed by my
research participants as ‘same’. For participants who were still studying at university, I was
not merely viewed as a researcher but also as a Muslim ‘student’ who was conducting
research on other Muslim students. On the other hand, graduate participants who were in
paid employment often expressed the wish to enroll into postgraduate courses so as to
pursue further degrees such as Masters degrees, MBAs and PhDs. In terms of ‘difference’
between me and my research participants, there were language differences. Unlike British
South Asians who may still be speaking ethnic languages at home so as to maintain cultural
traditions, in my generation, Urdu, Hindi or Arabic are no longer spoken within South Asian
communities in Mauritius. The common ground in terms of language and communication
between me and my research participants was hence English only.
Furthermore, differences in dress codes also created spaces of ‘sameness’ and
‘difference’; some Muslim women were dressed like me (jeans/t-shirts/tops), while some
were wearing headscarves with jeans or skirts, and others the ‘salwar kameez’. At all times,
I tried to maintain a somewhat neutral approach to dress codes; as Bhopal (1999: 39)
maintains, the ‘research situation requires the researcher to reflect upon her/his behaviour,
mode of conduct and dress’, hence highlighting the significance of the ‘presentation of self’
within the research process. During fieldwork, it was appropriate for me to wear jeans and
shirts as I thought it important to blend in with students at university. However, I ensured
that I never wore clingy tops/shirts as this would have been considered inappropriate in
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places like interviewees’ homes, or the Green Room (prayer room provided for Muslims) at
Islamic Societies (ISOC) on university campuses.
My own positioning as a Muslim woman is the area where I felt research
participants would relate to the most, whether on a ‘same’ or ‘different’ level, or both. At
the time during which I was conducting my interviews, I was engaged and cohabiting with
my partner, a non-Muslim (Hindu) South Asian Mauritian. To some extent, I felt weary
about research participants enquiring about my status. Indeed, as an unmarried Muslim
woman living with a non-Muslim man, who is writing on marriage and Muslim identities, I
suspected that there might be circumstances where research participants would disapprove
and hence, feel critical of my positioning. I felt that this could affect the research process as
research participants might not be willing to talk about aspects of their personal lives with
someone who ‘looks’ the ‘same’ but is nevertheless, ‘different’, even though we may share
the ‘same’ religious affiliations. However, in the very rare cases where participants did
enquire about my status, relationship or living arrangements, I disclosed this personal
information. While some participants were surprised of my choice of marriage partner (non-
Muslim), others questioned me further about my background and the occurrence of mixed
marriages in my family. I thus remained conscious of my positionality and carefully
managed notions of ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ between my participants and me so as to
avoid representing essentialist or stereotypical notions of women’s opinions, views or
experiences. Furthermore, my perceptions and positionality influenced the research material
and shaped the ways in which I analysed knowledges produced during fieldwork.
For instance, as a participant observer on university campuses, I noticed an obvious
division between Muslim women who wore the hijab and those who did not wear it. Very
often, after having conducted a few interviews, I ‘hung out’ in the Green (The University of
Leeds) so as to meet women and make new contacts. It remained obvious that women
without the hijab were not welcomed by those who chose to wear it. As a participant
observer, I believe that I was able to view the tension -because I was mostly regarded as a
‘researcher’, I felt that students regarded me as ‘neutral’ as they attempted to understand my
positionality. My very presence in the Green Room signified that I was Muslim.
Nevertheless, due to me not wearing the hijab and sitting in the Green Room’s café, I felt I
was being judged by students who did not know me personally. As I raised the question of
the hijab in my interviews, I was not surprised when interviewees without hijabs expressed
that they felt ‘threatened’ and ‘judged’ in entering the Green Room; some of them felt they
could not even use the rooms to pray or socialise as peer pressure to adopt the hijab as dress
code became an issue for these women. In fact, in some of my interviews, I did not even
have to ask these participants about their views on the hijab as respondents would
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themselves initiate discussions, and express their feelings about the hijab on university
campuses.
Interpreting the diverse intersections of identities and biographies through axes of
sameness and difference remain difficult, and the researcher’s positionality and power
imbalances in the research process are controversial issues. As Valentine (2002: 125-6)
claims, despite an emphasis in feminist methodological debates about the importance of
acknowledging our positionality or redistributing power between the researcher and the
researched, in reality, the research process is beyond the understanding of the researcher.
However, this does not mean that researchers should forget the notion of reflexivity. They
should instead realise that knowledge production is not static but is a fusion of different
identities, performances and positionalities weaved around difference and sameness. Indeed,
feminist research does not help to uncover the ‘pure and uncontaminated truth’. However, it
should be respected for what it does do: provide another way of seeing the world’ (Stanley
and Wise, 1993: 158).
3.3.4 Ethical considerations
Informed consent
Before starting any interview with research participants, I obtained consent (verbal
and written) from each and every participant who was willing to take part in the study. They
were all given a consent form with a summary of my study and were given time to read it,
ask questions and sign it (Appendix Nine). I also asked them whether they agreed that the
interview be taped. Participants were told that they had the right to withdraw from the study
at any time. Before starting my interviews, I briefed them about the overall purpose of the
research and the main features of the design, as well as any possible risks and benefits from
participation in the research project.
Sensitive issues
The information I hoped to gather for my research were at times very sensitive. It
happened that some participants found it difficult to talk about issues around marriage,
gender and religion; more specifically, I felt that some participants felt distressed around
issues relating to divorce and polygamy. It happened that after such interview situations, I
started wondering about the effects which my research might have had on these
respondents; in these cases, it is fair to acknowledge that emotional involvement in the
research process cannot be totally avoided, especially when difficult situations are being
described or recounted. Indeed, I suspected that one of the most sensitive research topics
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was to get participants to talk about sexuality, relationships or difficult family relationships.
I was aware that some of the issues uncovered by the research might render participants
emotional and this might give rise to the need for support and advice. Where necessary, I
provided participants with contacts from the university’s counseling support services, or any
other organisation that offers support for women. All participants were also informed of the
strict confidentiality of the research and the fact that they would remain anonymous
throughout the research process. All the names I have used for my research participants are
pseudonyms, utilised to protect the confidentiality of my research participants.
Reciprocity
I was aware that in the process of doing research, participants gave a lot of their
time and goodwill in providing me with information. I believed that it was fair to reciprocate
their compliance and co-operation. As the interviews were conducted at university, I offered
interviewees either coffee or lunch, which in fact, aided in rendering the interview
experience less formal and hence, provided space for flexibility and freedom of expression.
I held the majority of interviews at university cafes, in seminar rooms at university or
workplaces, with a minority held at my interviewees’ homes. Through all my interviews,
participants felt generally at ease and it was very rare that I had to prompt respondents for
more answers or views. Respondents were extremely co-operative and most of them
indicated their genuine interest in my research as they felt they were given the chance to
speak about their personal views on matters they considered important in their lives: Islam,
education, and marriage. More importantly, some of them reiterated that they felt gratified
that their views were in fact considered to be valuable for research, and that the
‘conversation’ made them reflect on pertinent issues they were experiencing daily in more
critical ways. I will therefore send respondents a summary of the research findings and if
they wish to see a copy of the thesis or particular chapters, I will arrange to send them an
electronic copy.
3.4 PROFILE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
For my study, 30 women of South Asian origin were interviewed on a one-to-one basis.
The chart below demonstrates the age ranges of respondents. The majority of women (25)
were single and they were studying, working or doing both. All five married women were in
full-time employment and economically active at the time of interview. From my sample,
16 respondents claimed they were from working-class backgrounds and 14 from middle-
class backgrounds.
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In the bar chart below, I illustrate respondents’ age category:
 10 respondents fell in the category 18-21 years of age
 13 respondents were older than 25 years of age
 7 respondents were aged between 22-25 years of age
Chart 1: Age Group of Respondents.
In this sample, the majority of respondents were not married. 23 respondents were single; 1
respondent was engaged twice and another engaged once. They both broke off their
engagements. 1 respondent was engaged (to British Pakistani) and 1 respondent was in a
relationship. 5 respondents were married, 2 of whom had transnational marriages to
Pakistani nationals.
Ethnic origin





Table 1: Respondents’ ethnic origin.
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Respondents in my research sample were of South Asian descent, namely from
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 25 respondents were of Pakistani origin and came from
different regions, both rural and urban in Pakistan (Mirpur, Kashmir, Punjab, Lahore and
Islamabad). 5 of them came to the UK when they were five or below the age of five. 2
respondents were of Indian origin (Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh). 2 respondents were of
Bangladeshi descent (Dhaka) where one respondent came to the UK aged 5. Only 1
respondent was of mixed origin-Pakistani and Indian. As I expected, the majority of my
research respondents’ ethnic origin was of Pakistani origin due to the concentration of
Pakistani ethnic minorities in the Yorkshire and Lancashire regions.
Locality
My research was carried out in Northern England and most participants were born
and grew up in the Yorkshire (Leeds and Bradford area, and suburbs like Harrogate,
Keighley, and Batley) and Lancashire (Manchester, Halifax and suburbs like Oldham,




Glasgow, 3 London, 2
Chart 2: Locality of Respondents.
As the pie chart above indicates, from my sample, 13 were from the Leeds area, 8
respondents were from the Manchester area and 4 were from Bradford. 3 respondents grew
up in Glasgow but settled in Leeds for study and work and 2 respondents moved from
London to Leeds for study and research. Respondents were recruited mostly on university
campuses rather than the localities they were from and this demonstrated the movement of
young women in between areas such as Leeds, Manchester and Bradford for the purpose of
higher education. As for respondents who were working, they were acquaintances /friends /
relatives of women who were studying.
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Occupation
Respondents in my sample can be classified in two groups. They were either
studying fulltime or working fulltime when fieldwork was conducted. However, at the time
of interview, only one respondent was looking for employment whilst doing voluntary
placements. Respondents who finished their university degrees were either enrolled on a
postgraduate course or working within their chosen professional fields. The chart below
shows respondents’ occupation when the research was conducted:
Chart 3: Occupation of Respondents.
In my research sample, 14 respondents were studying fulltime and 1 respondent
studied part-time (Masters Degree) whilst working full-time. 14 respondents were in paid
employment; 1 participant was looking for a job but was involved in voluntary work at the
time of interview
University attended
In this sample, women have mostly studied at the University of Leeds (13) and the
University of Bradford (7), where foundation ‘access courses’ are offered at the University
of Bradford for people who want to enrol into science degrees at the University of Leeds at
a later stage. Others have studied at University of Manchester (1), Manchester Metropolitan
University (2), Leeds Metropolitan University (1), University of St Andrews (1), University
of Aberdeen (1), London School of Economics (1), Dundee University (1), University of
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Glasgow (1), and University of York (1). Among the respondents studying, 3 were post-
graduate students. Most students in this research were enrolled in science related courses.
The tendency for South Asian students to enrol in science degrees such as medicine
(Bagguley and Hussain, 2007) appears to be well-founded as my sample reflects the
popularity of science based degrees.
Chart 4: Respondents in Full-Time Courses.
The doughnut chart above shows what university courses respondents were enrolled
in. More specifically, this research sample comprised 7 medical students, 1 Radiology
student, 2 Optometry students, 2 Biomedical Science students and 2 Psychology students. 2
respondents were studying Counselling and Behavioural Therapy. Others studied Graphic
Design, Law, Information Technology, Consumer Protection and Sociology.
86
The chart below illustrates respondents’ employment fields:
Chart 5: Fields of Employment of Respondents.
Those who were employed and were economically active at the time of interviewing
worked as medical practitioners (5), lawyers (1), teachers (1), graphic designers (1),
psychologists (1), IT technicians (1), Counsellors (1), Family Support Workers (1), and
Youth Support Workers (2).
3.5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have outlined the major methodological feminist approaches
(feminist standpoint theory and the feminist politics of difference) which I find useful and
which also underline my research. Indeed, in the context of my study, British South Asian
Muslim women’s lives remain embedded in diverse social, cultural, religious and political
experiences. Such experiences could be informed by ‘difference’ or ‘sameness’;
acknowledging axes of intersection between these boundaries enables the researcher to have
better insight of the relationship that exists between interviewers and interviewees. In terms
of the power relationship between the researcher and the researched, I have argued that the
researcher needs to remain aware of her/his positionality during the research process so as to
ensure a stable power balance through the research process. I have also thought it important
to elaborate on my research methodologies (participant observation and qualitative
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interviews) so as to provide a clear outline of how I went about accumulating relevant
information for this thesis.
Nonetheless, I am also aware of the limitations of my methodology. In terms of my
research sample, it is representative of a particular group of educated South Asian Muslim
women in Britain. For instance, even though I have tried to keep the recruiting process as
open as possible, due to snowballing, I have met most students through student societies
such as Islamic societies on university campuses. The majority of women from these
societies manifest their Islamic identities publicly and politically by being involved in the
management of these societies, and the organisation of Islamic events for their members. It
would be interesting if more attention was paid to the dynamics involved as young women
negotiate strategies and identities as they navigate faith based societies such as the ISOCs;
however, due to lack of space, I did not venture into further investigation. Also, my study is
based in Northern England and hence, presents a limited geographical sample; as mentioned
previously, my initial plan was to attempt a recruitment process in London so as to benefit
from a wider range of interviewees’ backgrounds but this proved impractical in terms of
logistics and planning. Furthermore, as far as married respondents are concerned, at the time
of my fieldwork, I did not encounter women who had studied and got married, but chose not
to go into paid employment. Due to my recruitment methods, I met respondents who were
either studying or working at the time of interviewing. Hence, my research sample remains
limited in the sense that I have not interviewed this group of Muslim women who are
graduates but who are not working.
The data I have gathered for my study now constitutes the following three empirical
chapters of my thesis. Chapter Four looks at how young British South Asian Muslim women
are exploring boundaries in negotiating gendered identities as they evolve within settings
such as higher education and paid employment. Chapter Five highlights how these women
are contesting and constructing Islamic identities in Britain, thereby generating notions of
Muslimness. Chapter Six focuses on Muslim women’s navigations of marriage as they
negotiate Islamic and European concepts of marriage in Britain.
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1 Approaches to taking a feminist standpoint vary because there is more than one feminist theory and
more than one feminist epistemological position (Harding, 1997; Hartsock, 1997).
2 See Susan Moller Okin’s (1998) ‘Is multiculturalism bad for women?’
3 As Peach (2006: 650), on Muslims and their geographical distribution in the UK maintains, ‘moving
northwards, the Muslim population tends to be more exclusively South Asian and Pakistani’. In
effect, the concentration of South Asian Muslims in northern England lies within the West Yorkshire
(Leeds-Bradford area) and Greater Manchester.
4 In fact, the BBC News Channel (Live Online) provides an ‘immigration map’ of Britain and locates
the distribution of African Asian migration in the East Midlands, more specifically, in Leicester.
5 I am a believing Muslim but I do not fully practise the rites and rituals prescribed by Islam. I believe
in Islam as spiritual force (faith/personal/private) rather than religion (cultural/political/global).
6 Robina Mohammad identifies herself as a British, non-practising Muslim of Pakistani ethnic origin.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Exploring Boundaries: British South Asian Muslim Women
in Higher Education and Employment
4.1 INTRODUCTION
British South Asian Muslim women are entering into higher education at an
increasing rate (Tyrer and Ahmad, 2006; Bagguley and Hussain, 2007). Whilst young
women actively pursue higher educational interests, as well as professional work options,
the roles and expectations that Muslim women have in their communities are changing. As
young women’s visibility increases on university campuses and consequently in the
workforce, women’s evolving gender identities are becoming more apparent. In this chapter,
I argue that higher education and paid employment are opening up new spaces for Muslim
women in Britain for them to develop new gender identities through diverse experiences
gained in public (education) as opposed to private (home) social contexts; in the process,
women are pushing gendered boundaries and re-working gendered identities. The focus on
higher education, and consequently paid employment, remains important as it shows how
spaces such as educational and work settings lead women to develop new gender identities.
Consequently, through independence gained from educational and employment paths,
young women generate new expectations of marriage.
Ahmad’s (2001: 137-152) study on British Muslim women and higher education in
London, although published a decade ago, remains relevant to my work as similar issues
about Muslim women’s educational careers are raised. Women’s motivations to study, the
impacts of higher education on women’s cultural, religious and ‘personal identities’, and
how these evolve within their social contexts are issues that Ahmad (2001) discusses,
finding that women have an agency to negotiate expected gender norms to form new ones,
thereby developing ‘modern traditions’. Other relevant studies remain helpful in framing my
research look at the statistical rates of South Asian women’s intake into higher education
and their disadvantaged positions in the labour market, mainly through the lens of gender,
class and ethnicity (Evans & Bowlby, 2000; Berthoud, 2000; Dale et al., 2002/2006; EOC,
2007; Bagguley and Hussain, 2007). For these authors, class backgrounds, university
acceptance rates and subject choices remain prominent factors that affect South Asian
Muslim women’s educational careers and employment options. Previous literature also
demonstrates the considerable emphasis placed by mothers and fathers on women’s
education as being a valuable asset for a better lifestyle in the future; women would acquire
status and prestige in their community, as well as financial security (Bhopal, 2009). For
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many, the area of contention is not therefore going to university and acquiring a degree for
potential future benefits, but lies in the fact of whether women should be exposed to
university culture and what university life entails.
For many parents, the questions remain: should women be allowed to leave home
and experience university life for the purpose of studying and should they do it at home or
away? This reflects considerable issues relating to women’s gendered identities within
British South Asian Muslim communities. The danger in girls leaving home to go to
university lies in the range of experiences they will inevitably be exposed to on campus;
hence university life, which involves meeting people from a range of cultures and
nationalities. The tendency to ‘shelter’ daughters from the greater freedom one acquires at
university starts from a young age. This has been discussed by a number of researchers in
the late 1990s. Expected gendered norms of behaviour, sexual purity and adherence to
cultural and religious customs of teenage daughters are closely monitored by their families
and local communities, whereby the community constructs acceptable gendered modes of
behaviour for young Muslim women. Such policing is thought to be necessary by families
and communities so that daughters are able to benefit from marriage proposals when it is
time for them to settle down (Basit, 1997, Haw 1998, Dwyer, 1999, Shain, 2003,
Mohammad, 2005). Indeed, if women are known to have had previous relationships, their
marriage options may be affected as potential husbands’ families could feel wary of being
associated with them. In fact, university presents a space where women can engage in
activities that their parents would not necessarily approve and condone. There is also the
risk that after completion of their studies, women seize opportunities to move out of the
community for good, due to employment prospects. These options raise a number of
questions around the positions of Muslim women in their community. After finishing their
degrees, would women go back to the family home and work in their locality, or would
alternative living arrangements be considered? Would women be willing to consider
marriage options as soon as they complete their studies?
This chapter aims to address the strategies employed by British South Asian
Muslim women to enter the domains of education and employment. It reveals how young
women are exploring boundaries as they navigate educational and employment settings and
in so doing, push gendered boundaries to produce new gender identities. Their early
negotiations of education and work prefigure later negotiations of marriage; as they acquire
independence and freedom, their expectations of marriage are re-worked, ultimately leading
them to articulate new gender identities. The findings in this chapter demonstrate that even
though my research sample includes a range of women from different socio-economic
backgrounds, hence of diverse experiences, they have all had to negotiate parental
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expectations about higher education and employment. If for some women negotiations are
about going to university at all, for others, they pertain to questions of whether to live away
from home during university years. This chapter therefore provides a framework for
understanding and emphasising the ways in which gender attitudes about education,
employment and marriage are changing, and how these changes are impacting on young
women’s lives.
The chapter comprises four levels of analysis. Firstly, I examine the routes taken by
participants to go to university. I investigate whether there are gender inequalities in how
families respond to Muslim women’s and men’s wishes to pursue educational goals. This
reflects women’s access to education within their communities, hence highlighting whether
Muslim women are in effect benefiting from opportunities that help break traditional
gendered concepts of Muslim womanhood in British South Asian Muslim communities.
Furthermore, I look at parents’ and siblings’ support and involvement as participants’
planned to go into higher education. This indicates the levels of encouragement experienced
by participants as far as family and community members are concerned. Secondly, I focus
on the reasons motivating respondents to study and work. I look at questions around why
Muslim women are entering into higher education, and how their parents and communities
adapt to their choices of achieving educational and employment goals. An insight into the
motivational factors leading them to participate into higher education and employment
reveals how their navigations of study and work impact on other life options such as
marriage. Thirdly, I consider how participants decided on whether to move away or stay
home, hence their choice of university. This highlights the degrees of independence they
have or acquire as they negotiate university options with their families. This is important as
it helps us understand the multiple social contexts in which young women find themselves;
the cultural and religious spheres of simultaneously being South Asian Muslim, as well as
British, and wanting the education, emancipation, independence and liberation that other
women aspire to. Fourthly, I reflect on how participants are pushing gendered boundaries as
they navigate higher educational and paid employment settings. In particular, I assess how
respondents negotiate educational aims as opposed to marriage plans; I discuss how
educational aspirations influence marriage prospects and marriage time-frames for British
South Asian Muslim women. This reveals how participants are using educational goals and
career motivations so as to challenge parental or community expectations; consequently,
these contestations enable participants to develop alternative gender identities.
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4.2 ROUTES TO UNIVERSITY
4.2.1 Gender differences in higher education: Muslim women’s unequal footing
I start this section by analysing whether Muslim women and men are given equal
opportunities/chances to go into higher education in British South Asian Muslim
communities. Determining whether women are given similar opportunities as men in terms
of educational options helps us understand if firstly, young women’s education is perceived
as valuable in their communities and secondly, whether families and communities are ready
to allow young women to embrace new gender identities as educated and eventually,
professional Muslim women. All participants responded negatively, thinking that it is harder
for women to go to university, with the exception of one respondent. As Rashida suggests:
‘They are given equal chances but girls are more hard-working than boys and are
definitely into higher education so as to improve their chances to work…more and
more girls are studying…for now, our generation most girls are being educated,
more than guys definitely’ (Rashida).
Indeed, participants give different reasons as to why girls are treated differently
when it comes to education. The older generation still promotes strict gender role
attributions, promoting ‘culturalist’ notions of womanhood, where the community acts as a
space allowing such attitudes to prosper. Nevertheless, as Nuzranah maintains, if girls are
socialised in such a way that marriage is seen as their sole option, then it is inevitable that
such mindsets remain unchallenged by the younger generation:
‘I’d blame the older generation who are stuck to their views and refusing to budge
from their ways…it works both ways, maybe we should change the view of the girls
as well because they’re like ‘oh I’m getting married by the time I’m 20 or 21 so why
bother?’ Cause if parents are saying to you ‘you are going to get married when you
are 21 and have a family when you’re about 25 or 26’, a girl who is 16 years old,
why would they think of going to university? If you’re gonna have to quit and gonna
have to be a housewife, what’s the point?’ (Nuzranah)
‘Muslim men tend to go more to university than Muslim women maybe because
women want to settle down earlier and I know women who have settled down and
then gone to university later and that can happen, that’s ok but definitely I think
men go more than women, most likely family commitments might be the reason, so
the men maybe go for the degree and earn for the family and women stay at home
or find a part time job’ (Aisha).
As Aisha maintains, women may be given the choice but men tend to consider
university more than women as the latter have to think about marriage and family
commitments as well as educational endeavours. However, participants in my study do not
reflect this attitude; marriage is definitely to be considered once they settle in a career and
they all hope to be successful in their career choices, as well as get married and raise a
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family in the future. Parents are not inherently against women having an education per se
but remain concerned about the ‘freedom’ or ‘independence’ they may acquire when
exposed within a space where parental supervision is limited. Nonetheless, social class and
locality account for differences in the ways people think about women and education. Equal
chances for women to gain further education vary across communities and families:
‘Not wanting girls to go to university…like is it culture? Is it traditional? Is it
religion? Sometimes they use religion as an excuse but it’s tradition or culture and
they play the religion card saying oh Islam says this but it doesn’t...I don’t know
any religion that doesn’t promote equality’ (Sonia).
According to participants like Sonia, gender inequality between women and men
within higher education is because of ‘culture’ and not ‘religion’ as the community conflates
the two, hence impacting on women’s educational chances. For respondents, there is no
contradiction in following educational norms or work options, and be devout Muslims
simultaneously:
‘As a Muslim I do agree that that’s what our roles are if we are…responsibility is
not the right word for it….that is what God is asking you to do. But in the same way,
I also don’t agree that if you do want to study and work as well, it’s wrong.
Obviously I go out to work and earn money for the family, for the household.
Although that is my husband’s responsibility, but I do also share his responsibility.
He should also share mine in that whenever we do have a family, then he needs to
also spend time and do the kinds of things that traditionally would have been left
just for the mothers to do’ (Sabina).
Sabina, following Islamic principles, acknowledges the existing gender differences in Islam
but also suggests that these should instead be evaluated as complementary instead of the
clear-cut binary opposition of marriage and women, versus men and work. Interestingly, she
justifies the need for women to educate themselves as there should be scope for
interchangeable gender roles in marriage; it is a Muslim man’s duty to provide for his wife
but Sabina maintains that sharing responsibilities must be recognised as a viable alternative
where both genders have the options to negotiate identities on an equal footing.
It is also clear that community influence over South Asian Muslim families should
not be ignored when it comes to gender differences experienced by Muslim women in their
communities. Sonia highlights the fact that even educated parents maintain this gender bias
as they do not question the cultural factors informing their decisions, which are usually
collective and in the spirit of community-living. In the process, ‘Asian women’s potential is
damaged’ (Lubaina). Clearly, women express their frustration at the level of control which
the community upholds on perceptions about gender rights:
‘Men have more rights, women have to fight for their rights and what they want, I
had to fight to go to university, not even rebel but fight and if my mum didn’t side
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with me, I don’t think I would be here today but if my brothers wanted to go to
university, there would not have been any problem’ (Rahila).
Indeed, the community plays a huge role in parents’ decisions as to whether to agree to
daughters going to university. Nevertheless, women hope to radically change these views
when they have their own children, opting for a fairer way to treat girls and boys:
‘My friend’s nephew had a party and invited his boyfriends and that’s fine but the
girl cannot invite her friends over and the parents are educated, one of them is
doing a PhD and the mother is a teacher and you’d think ok, we’ll give them equal
rights but no they don’t because of the traditional culture it’s so embedded in them,
deep inside them... when I have kids, no matter what my husband says my kids are
going to be treated the same, if my son has a night out well my daughter too cause
there needs to be a fine balance’ (Sonia).
Even though respondents maintain that there are gender differences in the value attributed to
the education of women and men within their communities, respondents maintain that they
will alter this discrepancy when they have their own children. Eventually, this will impact
on Muslim women’s gender identities as daughters’ access to higher education becomes
easier. In the following section, I focus on how parental support encourages respondents to
get into higher education as young women explore educational avenues.
4.2.2 Parental support for daughters’ educational goals
In this section, I highlight how parents’ involvement in their daughters’ educational
careers have influenced positively on their educational outcomes. Indeed, despite parental
concerns about women going into a higher educational setting, parental support in women’s
educational achievements remains a significant reason why women are entering into higher
education. This also indicates the intergenerational changes in educational access occurring
between the first and second generations of British South Asian migrants. In my research,
fathers and mothers had similar and at times, different motivations in supporting their
daughters to study at tertiary level. Both fathers and mothers viewed financial stability as a
highly favourable outcome of higher education. For instance, Yasmin talks about the joint
and complementary roles that mothers and fathers have played in them going to university:
‘In different ways, my parents were both there for moral support, complementary…
my dad’s very good if I’m having stress attacks, like calm down and my mum will
tell me to calm down but because she’s been through the process herself, she knows
how to organise stuff and check my essays for me whereas my dad would drop me
and so on so they both helped in different ways’ (Yasmin).
According to respondents, fathers’ primary wish was that their daughters achieved economic
security in the future; higher education was mostly seen as an investment, especially for
women of working-class backgrounds. Some women suggest that their fathers have been
more supportive of their educational paths than their mothers. For instance, Saeema’s father
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was more supportive than her mother, who would much ‘rather see us at home’. Her mother
was ‘worried’ about them living away as opposed to her father who ‘got more used to the
idea of us going away and being independent’:
‘Both trusted us but I think the reason they let us was because there was always that
trust there, they’re always trusting us like when we say ‘we’re not doing that’ they
know that we’re not...so I think they trusted us to go away and obviously we
couldn’t betray that trust cause at the back of our mind, we know that our parents
have trusted us so we can’t let them down in a sense’ (Saeema).
Some fathers are resisting the pressure that the community may exert on individual
choices, especially when it comes to daughters’ wishes to pursue education instead of
marriage. As Faiza states:
‘They all had different values and different priorities and whilst they value marriage
and children and having children more than they value education...they’re quite
tight-knit but also insular kind of community and everything stays within and they
don’t want their children going out and especially the girls, the boys are fine but the
boys they are not really bothered’ (Faiza).
Faiza’s father did not succumb to the extended family’s tendencies to prioritise marriage
over education for women. Indeed, in some families, marriage is still viewed as the primary
role of women. As my research shows, some fathers are breaking these barriers and are
embracing other avenues, more so than mothers. Even though it was Abida’s choice to aim
for higher studies, her father encouraged her:
‘My father was much more supportive than my mum…I think mothers when it comes
to daughters are a bit too protective…like ‘oh they’re going to go astray, they’re
going to disappear, we don’t know what they’re doing’ (Abida).
Indeed, mothers tend to feel responsible for their daughters’ behaviour and if they are away
from home, it is difficult for them to maintain control over their daughters. However, most
mothers remain supportive of their daughters’ educational endeavours, albeit the concern of
a few who believe that girls ‘living away’ could potentially be problematic. This said,
fathers are still encouraging their daughters to go into higher education.
Respondents also draw on the importance of having role models as inspiration for
them to be successful in education as well as in employment. They cite older siblings, aunts
and mothers as having influenced their choices. Similarly, Ahmad’s (2001) and Bagguley
and Hussain’s study (2007) demonstrate the principle that women are aided and encouraged
by their sisters, cousins and other family members to pursue their educational goals. In this
research, women who had elder siblings at university found it easier to go into higher
education as negotiating with parents was easier. Alia recalls how difficult it was for her
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sister to go to university. Siblings therefore act as pioneers to set the trend and do act as role
models for younger siblings:
‘There were reservations not necessarily from the immediate family but from the
extended family…about girls going to university and you know, sort of them going
astray…but my sister stood her ground and said she was going to go university and
at the end of the day, my parents accepted that…when I came along and it was time
for me to go to university, it was just a natural route…there wasn’t any of this
barrier’ (Alia).
An elder sister who has been to university is hence a positive influence on younger siblings’
chances and opportunities to study. As Nazia says:
‘My older sister graduated in law...and she made it easier because she moved out
but she had to fight for everything… once my younger sister moves out, it’s a matter
of time, you look up to the eldest so, hopefully they see us as successful and I’ll be
there to support them if they say ‘mum and dad won’t let me do this’... you think you
can’t stand on your own feet but you can, you will struggle but you will do it, even
though you’ll have the financial burden but then you do it for your independence’
(Nazia).
In my research, however, nine participants were the first to be going into higher
education in their immediate and extended families. They view themselves as ‘pioneers’
who will set the example for the coming generation, ‘where girls won’t have to fight to go to
university’. In their family, Nazia and her elder sister were the first women going ‘against
tradition of women staying at home’:
‘We were the first girls ever to take education beyond 16 in our family’. No other
women or cousins in the family have thought of going to university but our parents
wanted us to get an education at some point but it was a bit difficult as we were the
first ones’ (Nazia).
Daughters are also making informed decisions about their life options. Indeed, some women
may choose to deliberately refrain from pursuing educational goals in order to settle down.
As Alia suggests, a few women in her family have been to university, but the majority of her
female cousins have stopped at college:
‘My female cousins just went to college and then started work
straightaway…haven’t really gone down academic routes…but that’s not because
there’s been barriers to go to university but because they chose not to pursue
academic routes themselves…so more their choice’ (Alia).
Furthermore, Sanaa makes an interesting comparison between her female cousins in Britain
and those in Pakistan, where women in her community reach up to college and do not aim
for further education:
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‘My female cousins in Pakistan have got degrees, they’ve studied as they’ve got
money one’s a teacher and she’s got a great job but my British cousins, females are
and women in the community, they all go to college, the majority I mean so till
they’re 18 and then after, they probably go straight to work or they get
married...can also go to work and get married’ (Sanaa).
In Sanaa’s family, going for a university degree is not a natural progression from school or
college for women, whereas in Pakistan, women have progressed on the educational level
by more and more women opting for higher education. However, in Britain, marriage after
school is still viewed as the preferred option for girls.
I also asked participants why their mothers encourage them to go into higher
education. A common reason is that mothers were never given the options themselves to
chose between studies and marriage. The main expectation that their own mothers
(respondents’ grandmothers) had of them was for them to get married and have children.
This is reflective of Afshar’s research (1989, 1994) which showed that women delay
independent and individual goals in order to care for their home and children. Looking after
the home, their husbands and their children was the norm. In my research, only two mothers
out of thirty were educated up to university level. One of them trained as a medical
practitioner but stopped working when she had children, while the other is currently
working as a researcher at The University of Leeds. Most mothers went to school up to 16
years old and are either homemakers or working part-time.
Most mothers married in their early twenties, a time when their daughters are
actually enrolled into courses at university. They hence support and in some cases, fight, for
their daughters to have the choice to study. In the process, mothers are redefining gender
roles for their daughters, hence giving them the space to develop new gender identities. As
Zainab points out, her mother ‘did everything after marriage, some courses, driving’.
Participants suggest that their mothers have been active in providing them with the
emotional and in some cases, even financial support. Mothers’ educational backgrounds also
make a difference in terms of them thinking about the importance of higher education and
the opportunities it creates in the future. Although some women maintain that their mother
and father have been equally influential and supportive of their going to university, there are
cases where mothers have been the distinctive role models and agents encouraging their
daughters to study. Mothers intervene in cases where fathers maintain that marriage is a
better option for women. As Rahila points out, her mother insisted that she was not ready for
marriage but instead, encouraged her to enroll for a medical degree, even if that meant
living away from home. This did not seem to be problematic for her mother, as compared to
her father, who wished her to be closer to the family after having completed her secondary
schooling:
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‘She encouraged me a lot whereas my dad not really, he chose the easy option and
he said get a job here close to home, he wasn’t disheartened but he was more
disheartened that I was going to leave home and live by myself at a young age, but
my mum pushed me to do medicine. If my mum hadn’t put her foot down, he would
have got me married at the age of 18, my mum said ‘No, she’s going to university
and she wants to be a doctor, it’s not the time for her to get married’...then my dad
backed down and now they’re glad I did it’ (Rahila).
For Rahila’s father, the concern was not about education per se, but more about the
consequences of going into higher education, such as living away on her own. For some
mothers, however, the priority is for daughters to embrace the educational opportunities they
were never given, rather than accepting potential marriage proposals.
Nevertheless, in spite of being supportive, mothers also present their daughters with
contrasting options, which they are expected to choose from. Marriage, though delayed due
to educational purposes, is always viewed as a viable alternative for young women who do
not wish to go for further studies. For example, Yasmin was expected to make a decision
between higher education and marriage:
‘Initially the reason I thought of going to university was because my mum said ‘if
you don’t want to go to university, you might as well just get married’ cause what
else are you gonna do? Sit at home and be bored and waste time and I thought I
definitely don’t want to get married (Laugh) so I went through all the courses that
they could possibly have’ (Yasmin).
Interestingly, Yasmin makes a link between higher education and marriage. In her family,
there are two groups of women, those who marry and those who study; stark choices are
made between the two, whereby women in her family do not seem to do both. Often,
education is not seen as a priority for girls, whilst marriage is:
‘It seems to be the one that do pursue education that don’t get married and the ones
that don’t go for education are the ones who have kids so like they don’t do both but
for me I’m hoping I don’t end up in either like I’d like to have both really and that’s
yeah, I do hope so’ (Yasmin).
Indeed, Yasmin does not want to be tied up to either career, or marriage. She would like to
be able to bring the two together without having to choose:
‘There’s pockets like the girls who have pursued education have done really well...I
think in our own house, there’s me, my mum and my sister we’ve all pursued
education to a high level, in the rest of the family there’s kind of a divide, people
who have not bothered at all because they’ve had other priorities in life or people
have done a degree and not done anything with it and had children afterwards and
my female cousin has been to uni, she’s done a degree and a Masters and she’s
looking to be doing a PhD next and then on my dad’s side one of them did a degree
and the rest didn’t, they just got married’ (Yasmin).
Such active negotiations between educational and marital choices demonstrate that
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young women are developing new gendered identities as they redefine Muslim women’s
roles and aspirations in British South Asian communities. In this section, I have underlined
how women are re-defining their aspirations through their educational routes; as
demonstrated, participants’ experiences of the types of schools attended, their contestations
of community beliefs that girls must not go to university, and their navigations of their
parents’ concerns and trust so as to gain approval/permission to go into higher education are
all reflective of how respondents are dealing with the challenges they face as they consider
educational options. In the following section, I look at the motivations informing
participants’ choices to go into higher education as this throws light on the value
respondents attribute to their educational careers, and as such, their determination to re-work
gender identities within their communities.
4.3 CHOOSING TO GO TO UNIVERSITY
Respondents place tremendous importance upon higher education and have chosen
higher education as an option due to the future benefits that come out of it. Previous
research conducted by Ahmad et al., (2003) and Connor et al., (2004) on ethnic minority
and their rates into higher education in the UK suggest that young South Asian women enter
into higher education for improved employment prospects, and consequently, for acquiring
better financial gains. Indeed, the reasons for different ethnic minority groups to consider
higher education as an option rests on family support as well as improved employment
prospects (Connor et al., 2004). Another significant issue raised in previous studies about
South Asian women and education relates to social class. In effect, Modood et al., (1997)
claim that educational experiences are different for South Asian groups who are from
different social classes. In fact, in my sample, social class or locality appears to be
inconsequent when it came to the importance and emphasis placed on daughters’ education.
Indeed, the intrinsic value of education and the prestige it entails is recognised by women
from both middle-class and working-class backgrounds. Nevertheless, I stress that from my
research, the noticeable difference between women from middle-class and working- class
backgrounds is that moving away to study remained an issue for working-class parents
whilst middle-class parents were readier to allow daughters to live away from home.
Women from working-class backgrounds were therefore encouraged to study, but some
degree of negotiation occurred when it came to decide where to study, as compared to
respondents from middle-class backgrounds, who demonstrated more agency in choosing
their tertiary institution. Indeed, unlike Reay et al., (2005), who suggest that middle-class
parents tend to play a bigger part when it comes to choice of university, my research
demonstrates that women from middle-class backgrounds were predominantly involved in
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their choice of institution as compared to women from working class backgrounds, whose
parents were more active in their daughters’ choice of university.
As Ahmad’s (2001: 144) study has shown, acquiring an education is ‘not simply a
middle-class strategy’, where it is expected that women graduates are inherently from
middle-class homes. In such environments, it is more likely that parents are graduates
themselves, and hence, are academically and professionally prominent. However, in my
study, women of working-class backgrounds are being encouraged by their parents to enter
into higher education, thereby deconstructing the notion that higher education remains a
middle-class venture. In my research, the majority of respondents view education as being
‘very important’. They give different reasons as to why they think that having a degree is
worth it; higher education brings changes in women’s identities, lifestyles, future work
options and marriage plans. The primary interest for most women I interviewed to get into
higher education is to be able to work and be economically independent so as not to have to
rely on men in the family, like for instance, their fathers, brothers or husbands for a
livelihood.
More recent research by Dwyer and Shah (2009), similarly, found that young
Muslim women link the gain of higher educational qualifications to better employment
prospects, where women aspire to more professional rather than vocational jobs.
Participants in my research express additional reasons why they are going to university.
Firstly, their motives revolve around the support network (family, friends) they have to
study. Secondly, the desire to become financially independent remains a significant issue for
participants. Thirdly, respondents mention the benefits gained from university life as
opposed to immediately considering marriage after compulsory schooling. Fourthly, it is
important for participants to fulfil the Islamic notion of gaining knowledge as Muslims.
Finally, being educated provides them with the opportunity to become ‘educated mothers’
which in turn, helps the future generation to embrace the benefits of higher education. These
outcomes of higher education will in fact provide new spaces for Muslim women to redefine
their future life options, such as, for instance, marriage. As such, this opens up possibilities
for women to assert new gender identities. In the next section, I look more closely at why
respondents have considered higher education as an option after secondary schooling and
hence, provide an insight into the explorations of their educational paths.
4.3.1 ‘Defining who you are’
For half of my respondents, going to university was considered a ‘natural’ and an
‘obvious’ progression from secondary schooling. Not going to university appears to be an
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almost unthinkable move for most participants. There were expectations from themselves
and their families that they would progress in their educational endeavours after post-
compulsory schooling. Bagguley and Hussain (2007: 17) found that women of Indian origin
tended to have a more ‘natural progression’ to considering university after school, as
opposed to Pakistani and Bangladeshi women. Comparatively, the women I interviewed are
predominantly of Pakistani origin and my sample demonstrates that they were expected to
go to university, regardless of ethnic background. Alia (Indian origin) ‘never ever imagined
not going to university’:
‘I’ve always been very academic. And because I’ve always scored high…I’d always
get the encouragement… both from home and family…so as far as I can remember I
never ever imagined not going to university you know (Alia).
In being always ‘highly academic’, Alia was encouraged by her parents to study.
Alia mentions the role that teachers also played in encouraging her to study. Previous
research by Haw (1998) and Basit (1997) have looked at the roles that teachers and the
school environment/careers guidance have played in young South Asian women’s access to
information about further education. Their findings reveal the stereotypical cultural and
religious assumptions that adolescent girls faced at school. Teachers and staff hold views
such as educational prospects of Muslim girls being hindered due to them agreeing to
arranged marriages in their late teens. Consequently, South Asian girls do not benefit from
adequate support or encouragement from teachers and advisers. However, with more
women entering into higher education, such stereotypical notions of the ‘Asian girl
undergoing an arranged marriage instead of studying’ might be expected to change; South
Asian girls will then be at par with girls from other ethnic backgrounds.
In entering into higher education, participants argue that they will be able to develop
their potential and achieve what they want out of life. Farha thinks that education ‘changes
everything’ and ‘defines who you are’. For Nuzranah, education helps to equalise status
within marital relationships:
‘In our culture, if you’re the same standard as your partner, you get the same
respect. So I don’t want to be a burden for anybody later on in life so it is important
in that way…being on the same level as your partner in our culture means you have
the same respect’ (Nuzranah).
Indeed, gendered power relations between husband and wife are reassessed due to women’s
educational achievements. For Sabina, education provides a space where she develops scope
for lifestyle improvements and personal achievements:
‘I want to do better at everything and I want to progress myself and move on to the
next place. And that’s the difference. I know a lot of people would say ‘Yeah, yeah
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I’ve got a comfortable 9 to 5, I can sit and do this job for the next 20 years and that
would be fine by me’, but it’s not…without education, no way you can do that’
(Sabina).
Linking education and work, she talks about the possibilities of continually improving one’s
future employment prospects. Moreover, Sabina says that education has given her a set of
‘morals and principles, a desire to progress yourself’. Since finishing university, she has
been looking for her fourth job and says that this progression is made easy because of her
education. Abida suggests that ‘education is the starting point to independence and a career,
experience and stability come with work’. Higher education provides women with avenues
that allow them to be more liberal with their work options in the future; they have the
agency to strategically think about career moves and career fields as they gain practical
experience at work, backed by technical knowledge gained at university:
‘If I had not gone to university, I won’t be doing what I’m doing now...I wouldn’t
have gone to uni, I would have still been that sheltered little girl living with my mum
and dad and not knowing any better and the crowd I was hanging around during my
teenage years, I’m glad I moved away... cause I see them now and I see myself and I
think...I know it sounds snobbish but I don’t care, I did what I had to do’ (Saeema).
For Saeema, education has helped her redefine her life options. She compares her
experiences with her friends who have not been to university and is pleased that she
persevered through her years of studying. With education, the world is viewed differently.
As Sanaa states:
‘I’m different to people back in Oldham, my family who haven’t been to uni, I feel
that they’re so close-minded and their life is the same, closed but I’m different, I
want to do new things and travel and by studying and going to uni, I feel the world
is a bigger world for me than it is for somebody who hasn’t gone out’(Sanaa).
In suggesting that ‘education makes a person’, Haleema claims that there is a noticeable
difference between people who have studied and those who have not been to university:
‘Education makes a person because I’ve seen people who are not educated and
compared to people who are educated, there’s such a difference in personality, I
mean talking to an educated person, you can talk about anything, they can give you
their opinion and education to me, it’s a whole way of life, it’s not only having a
degree but it moulds the person through the interactions. For me not having an
education would mean not having a life really so it’s really important to me. I
cannot imagine myself without it, can’t imagine myself as a housewife, sitting at
home and just raising kids and not doing much, I’m not saying they don’t do much
but getting out into the world, I’ve always wanted to study’ (Haleema).
The extra-curricular activities that one engages in whilst at university also help in
molding one’s character. Education is not only about having a degree but also about
networking and meeting people in the process, hence broadening one’s horizons. University
campuses thus offer women a space where they not only reach educational goals but also
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develop their personalities and gender identities. Haleema is convinced that she would be
unhappy ‘staying at home and not doing much’; according to her, ‘getting out into the
world’ is what women should aim for. Indeed, women are contesting traditional gender roles
of being essentially the homemaker. Alternative identities such as ‘educated woman’ and
‘working woman’ are embraced. Having just the role of raising a family is not fulfilling
enough and when comparing herself to women who ‘just sit at home and raise kids’,
Haleema does not condemn, but categorises women’s lifestyles into two groups: those who
study and work, and those who stay home and raise children. The distinction here relies
heavily on women’s attitudes towards higher education. Such distinctions made by
respondents demonstrate that British South Asian Muslim women are using education and
employment as reliable benchmarks to define new gender identities for women of their
generation, further highlighting the dichotomy ‘homemaker’ versus ‘working woman’. In
the following section, I elaborate on respondents’ emphasis on economic security as an
important outcome of higher education, and the role this plays in helping Muslim women to
assert new gender identities.
4.3.2 Economic security and financial independence
Respondents view higher education as a means of improving their employment
prospects; likewise, Bagguley and Hussain’s (2007) study demonstrates that young women
consider higher education as a stepping stone to career progression and improved
employment options. As previous research by Dale et al., (2002) indicates, the participation
rates for South Asian Muslim women in employment are lowest where women have
children. Indeed, all the students interviewed for this study were determined to go into paid
work after graduation. Those who finished their studies were working full-time except for
one respondent who was undergoing training. For women in my research, higher education
was evidently a means to better their economic prospects and consequently, improve their
standards of living, whether they decide to live on their own or have their own families in
the future. Young women also remain aware of the economic advantage a couple acquires if
both partners are in paid employment. The role that education plays in achieving and
maintaining this aim is highlighted by respondents:
‘Even if you don’t want to have a massive career, you do need good education and
if anything happens, you can earn money and especially in the UK, living here on
one’s person salary is very difficult...such a small percentage here earn more than
40, 000 pounds a year, only 10 per cent!...I’m comfortable now but imagine if there
was one other person’ (Bushra).
Bushra considers education to be a ‘necessity’ nowadays. She talks about the
difficulty of raising a family on one income in the UK and thinks that lifestyle improves
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with both the wife and husband earning. Some women persevere in acquiring education
even in the advent of difficulties such as lack of parental support. The reasons given for
such insistence in reaching educational goals reflect women’s motivations and desires to
become financially independent, and depend on themselves for a livelihood:
‘It’s top priority, it makes you a good person, gives you freedom, independence, you
can stand on your own two feet to support yourself... being able to have your wage
…so for me it’s given such a high priority because of the way I was brought up...if
education was part of the normal thing, maybe I wouldn’t have studied as hard but I
was a complete bookworm...if it was normal then my parents would be supportive of
me, I probably wouldn’t have been as stressed, like having an exam, you can rely on
your parents and they make you feel better but...everything is on me, there’s a lot of
pressure... I’m alone’ (Nazia).
Nazia claims that education is her ‘priority’ as this will lead to her independence.
She is struggling with her degree due to lack of parental understanding and support. She
studies twice as hard because education for her is not a considered ‘normal’ as women in her
family do not consider the educational route over marriage. In fact, the educational path for
women in Nazia’s family is not considered as being ‘normal’. Nazia, in studying, challenges
this notion and is determined to have a professional career after terminating her medical
degree, thereby re-defining her gender identity as an ‘educated’ Muslim woman. In the next
section, I focus on why respondents think that education may help women in their future
roles as mothers; their reliance on education to alter the notion of motherhood within their
communities is indicative of the role which education plays in altering Muslim women’s
gender identities.
4.3.3 An educated mother: setting the example for the next generation
Participants consider education to be important as it will help them become better
mothers in the future. Their interests in promoting the benefits of education to the next
generation suggest that respondents consider education to be a significant aspect
contributing to the re-workings of gender identities within British South Asian Muslim
communities. Indeed, respondents portray enthusiasm in ensuring that the need for
education is understood and valued by the younger generation. As Bagguley and Hussain’s
(2007) research also notes, women wanted to become better parents and members of their
community and in effect, used education as a platform to achieve their goals. This may be a
way for young women to reconcile the competing discourses that hinder women to enter
into education as they negotiate parental and community approval. As they increasingly
consider higher education as an option, they are altering perceptions about women and
education within their communities, thereby embracing the notion that eventually, they
would be perceived as an ‘educated’ mother. For instance, Aisha maintains that education is
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an asset that can be passed on to the next generation, where children can also develop
ambitious plans to better their lifestyles. This reflects the inter-generational differences
amongst respondents’ grandmothers, mothers and themselves that arise when comparing
women’s access to education and work:
‘It gives you a broader sense of what’s going on in the world, extra qualifications
and you’re gaining something for yourself which you can pass on to the next
generation as well so it’s very important to excel in that rather than working in a
dead-end job’ (Aisha).
Likewise, Bushra and Yasmin draw on the importance of the role of mothers in their
children’s education; they situate mothers as being the primary educators of their children.
For them, higher education provides women with better abilities to fulfil this role:
‘It’s important because education gives you a sense of awareness and if you’ve got
it, then you’ve got a better chance of understanding what’s going on in life...for
your children as well, if you are educated then you will be able to instill in
them...mothers who teach their kids from a young age, even traditionally in Asian
families, it’s the mother that does a lot of the stuff so if she’s not educated, when
the kids come home from school, you can’t help them, you want to be an educated
mother’ (Bushra).
‘I thought of going to university because my mum said ‘if you don’t want to go to
university, you might as well just get married’ cause what else are you gonna do?
Sit at home and be bored and waste time and I thought I definitely don’t want to get
married (Laugh)…it’s very important for women to be educated as one day we’ll
have our own children and not only to be able to help them in terms of their
homework but just the life experiences that you get through university, it helps you
in your marriage, it helps you in bringing your children up and there’s that saying:
if you educate a man you educate one person and if you educate a woman, you
educate many more’ (Yasmin) .
Yasmin went into higher education because she had to choose between studying and
marriage as soon as she completed secondary school. For her, university life experiences
gained at university provide women with the necessary skills that contribute to not only
fulfil their future roles as mothers but to also have a good marriage. Indeed, Yasmin’s quote
clearly illustrates that young women are using education spaces such as university to
develop skills which would ultimately help them shape their understandings and experiences
of marriage. Next, I focus on how respondents rate the importance of education as being
Islamic, thereby relying on arguments informed by religion in order to justify their
educational endeavours.
4.3.4 Education: an integral part of my Islamic faith
Respondents draw on their Islamic beliefs to justify the importance of education in
their lives, arguing that gaining knowledge is part of the Islamic ethos; indeed, Lubaina
suggests that it is both women’s and men’s responsibility to ‘seek knowledge’. Backed by
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this argument, Lubaina explains that this has helped her convince her parents to let her go
into higher education and hence, claiming her religious right, as a practising Muslim, to
acquire knowledge. For these women, Islam is not only being used as a medium for spiritual
fulfillment but is also being utilised as an empowering tool to help them define their future
life options:
‘The first thing that was revealed to the Prophet was the word ikram, meaning
‘read’…I had that against them, I could use that against my dad and he couldn’t
say anything against it. For both men and women...that was explicitly said’
(Lubaina).
‘The Prophet peace be upon him emphasised education so much, so much so that if
you have to go to China to seek knowledge then go, learning is a process, cradle to
the grave and so it’s part of my faith and that’s why it’s really important’
(Haleema).
Haleema also argues that knowledge must be actively sought after as Islam emphasises the
value of education for Muslims; for her, it remains a duty which requires considerable
attention. Fatimah looks at the importance of education in Islam by relating to the gender
equality encouraged by her religion when it comes to Muslim women’s rights and duty they
owe to their family:
‘Education allows me to have a professional job and earn for myself, total
independence but actually not being independent but being non-dependent, instead
of me depending on my father for my whole life, where he will retire soon and most
families who have elder sons, they go out and earn and become the head of the
family but because I’m the eldest, I feel it’s my responsibility to go and do what a
son would do, because Islam doesn’t differentiate between female doing this and
that, and male doing this and this, it’s equal opportunity’ (Fatimah).
Fatimah does not want to be financially dependent on her parents; as I argued
previously (section 4.3.2), financial independence remains a priority for young women in
my study. Deconstructing the cultural notions that Muslim women’s roles should strictly be
defined as homemakers, Fatimah is convinced of her religious approaches to women’s roles.
These indicate an egalitarian ethos encouraging equality in roles between women and men
within Islam. For her, practising Islam and wearing the hijab are not barriers that prevent her
from studying and thinking of pursuing a career. On the contrary, Fatima reflects on the fact
that Islam gives her equal rights with men to fulfil her potential as well as uphold the
financial duties that sons are expected to carry on as soon as they are in a position to help
the family. Indeed, higher education provides women with the necessary tools and
requirements to build up careers which will help them fulfil responsibilities that are in
essence promoting gender equality between Muslim daughters and sons within Muslim
households, thereby encouraging the progression of women’s identities as financially
independent working women. Indeed, such changes in respondents’ perceptions may have a
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bearing on the ways in which they understand their roles within marriage and consequently,
lead them to generate new gender identities as they evaluate their options along more
egalitarian notions surrounding gender roles within their communities. In the following
section, I elaborate on participants’ educational and employment endeavours within
discourses of social class and mobility. This discussion demonstrates how differences in
social milieu impacts on respondents’ educational careers, as well as highlights their
positionings within their social contexts. More importantly, their assessments of where and
how they situate themselves on the social ladder portrays the ways in which higher
education and employment are utilised as benchmarks informing their negotiations of social
class. As such, their navigations demonstrate how respondents are actively constructing new
gender identities as they aspire for social mobility.
4.3.5 Education, work and social mobility
Respondents who rate their social status as ‘middle-class’ do so with respect to their
parents’ occupation and income, their educational levels and their geographical locations
(where they live). These women are from educational backgrounds where fathers are
educated to university level and occasionally, mothers. Their parents are therefore
professionals or successful businessmen, and hence, economically affluent. For women who
maintain that they are from ‘working-class backgrounds’, parents are usually involved in
manual jobs. However, they tend to suggest that although their parents are working-class,
they would think of themselves as middle-class due to their education levels, employment
and financial status. This shows that spaces such as higher education and work are having an
impact on how women are negotiating and redefining their positions and gender identities
within their local communities by climbing up the social ladder. Linked to the existing
literature (Connor et al., 2004) on ethnic minorities and social mobility acquired through
education in the UK, my research also supports the notion that education and social class
remain inextricably joint:
‘I think it’s difficult to define…I would say working class obviously. But if you’re
talking about finances, that’s a middle…definitely fluid’ (Sabina).
‘I am middle-class but my family is working class and the difference is in the things
that I have and the things I want, education is one thing but I also think your
interests, your views and career’ (Sanaa).
‘My family...working class and me, I’d probably be middle class and it’s because of
profession, if you’re a doctor then you’re gonna have a better social background
than someone who’s a cleaner, I know that sounds bad but social backgrounds, like
you’re more eligible to do different things cause you have the means to do it’
(Rubina).
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These quotes illustrate how higher education provides opportunities for social
mobility. Higher education, employment, and social class influence women’s options and
lifestyles and hence, their identities; for women from working-class backgrounds, education
offers a platform where standards of living change for the better. In fact, respondents
perceive social class, an aspect of their identity, as being contingent and contextual, and
hence, fluid, thereby denoting a progression in how they perceive gender identities. More
importantly, they highlight how social class, through education, is different for them and
their parents; intergenerational changes can further be understood as young women express
how they socially move from working-class backgrounds to a middle-class environment
through university and employment. However, women do not rate money per se as a
marker of social status but instead, view the lifestyle that people benefit through income
gained due to higher education as being more important.
‘I’m glad I’ve got the degree that I have, nursing diploma and then medical degree
from St Andrews and it’s important, but if I had a rich husband (Laugh), education
wouldn’t bother me but you do need education to have that status in the community
and to move forward in life’ (Rahila).
Rahila, of a working-class background, suggests that education would not ‘bother’ her if her
husband could fully provide for her; education is somehow important for her because she
has been able to ‘move forward in life’. Since getting married, her priorities have changed
and she would have preferred not to work but she cannot afford to stay home. Rahila is on a
higher income than her husband and the financial running of the household depends heavily
on her. For Rahila, education provides her with not only financial security, but status in her
community. As her words describe, higher education is a means to an end, although she still
views her educational achievements as ‘important’.
Tasneem, who is from a middle-class background, thinks that higher education
becomes a marker of social status, where one’s success and achievements, and consequently
social class, are understood due to one’s willingness to go through the educational route:
‘You need education to be able to have a respectful life and to not have to worry
about money and be secure in life then education plays a big role whereas obviously
if you don’t need the financial support, you do ok and you have a business ahead of
you, not to say it’s not important because for you to run that business you still need
to be educated but in your life it might not have such a big impact…at the end of the
day, social class is about how you have achieved what you have, how intelligent you
are’ (Tasneem).
Participants maintain that due to a lack of education and exposure, people who are ‘not
educated’ tend to stick to traditional values and as a result, do not move up the social ladder.
For example, Haleema (middle-class) suggests that the attitudes that people hold from
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working-class Muslim communities that women should not study perpetuate themselves into
‘cycles’, hence preventing them from improving educational levels and social class:
‘I think people who are not as high like in terms of income or education, like the
working-class, they tend to maintain tradition more because they are not as exposed
to other environments and other cultures because for them it’s work and home, this
cycle whereas the upper-classes, education contributes to what class you are so
people are more educated then they tend to be upper-class and they are more
exposed to other cultures because they are more well traveled and meet wider
range of people so they tend to have a more mixed cultural values rather than
people who are working class who have blinkers and are more narrow-minded
about things...like the views they have about women studying’ (Haleema).
However, respondents from working-class backgrounds are contesting and
questioning such ‘traditions’ that hinder Muslim women’s participatory rates into higher
education. They remain aware of how exposure at university and ‘meeting a range of people
of different cultures’ are beneficial in terms of developing skills and awareness to be better
equipped for the future. Clearly, women are maximising their chances to move up the social
ladder through educational achievements, hence attributing much importance to improved
social status, which is becoming a significant strategy for Muslim women to alter their
gender identities.
As such, this section has highlighted how participants are engaging with the
motivational factors pushing them to go to university or into paid employment; in so doing,
they develop new gender identities as they navigate their options of educational and
professional careers. Gaining a sense of achievement, financial security and upward social
mobility, fulfilling the Islamic emphasis on acquiring knowledge, as well as ensuring that
women are better equipped as ‘educated mothers’ for the next generation demonstrate how
education has influenced respondents’ prospects and future life options. My findings
correlate with previous studies conducted by Ahmad (2001) and Bagguley and Hussain
(2008), which also reveal that higher education generates positive outcomes such as
economic security, as well as ensures that future generations benefit from the skills of
‘educated’ mothers. However, from my study, I also stress that respondents’ educational
achievements bring into question their positions on marriage, where education and
employment influence their perceptions of marriage, and the roles within it, as they navigate
educational and work spaces. Indeed, respondents have already expressed the changes that
may occur in their roles as ‘educated’ mothers as more women gain education and
encourage their children to follow educational routes in the future. Women are therefore
altering notions of motherhood within their communities. What is important about my
findings is that through educational and work settings, women are clearly finding new
spaces to assert new gender identities which encompass notions around financial
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independence, upward social mobility and a duty to fulfil an Islamic precept and
motherhood. In the following section, I analyse how respondents’ university experiences
influence their gender identities; this enlightens us on how participants grapple with changes
brought about by their educational experiences as they embark on their educational careers.
4.4 UNIVERSITY EXPERIENCES
How participants perceive their experiences at university is an important area in my
study as it reveals how Muslim women participate in university life so as to develop or
embrace new gender identities within new spaces which are not essentially monitored by
community norms. All describe their university experiences as ‘enjoyable’. Indeed, apart
from the fact that they will be gaining academic qualifications, university campuses are
spaces where research participants assess and negotiate who they want to be, and who to
befriend. Such interactions lead them to decide how they want to affirm their Muslim
identities within the larger context of British society. Women talk about a range of
experiences on campus, which demonstrates that experiences remain subjective and varied.
They also describe their lifestyles and discuss their involvement in social groups within
university settings, where their experiences are affected by whether they live on campus or
at home. Some participants are extremely active and involved in social, cultural and
religious groups, whilst others prefer to concentrate fully on the academic experiences, as
opposed to the more social aspects of university life. Because of my sampling strategy,
many respondents who were studying at the time of interviewing were members of the
Islamic Societies (ISOC) at their respective universities, and all those who were working
reflect on their involvement within the ISOC.
In this section, the key questions I raise relate to whether university experiences
lead respondents to develop and assert new gender identities as they negotiate ‘cultural’ and
‘religious’ boundaries encountered at university. Firstly, I focus on the living arrangements
of participants at university. Secondly, I concentrate on how women are exploring the
boundaries of ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ through exposure at university. Thirdly, I review the
extent to which campus activities and peer groups influence respondents’ identities, with a
particular focus on the role which Islamic societies play in respondents’ experiences of
university life. In effect, this reflects how Islamic identities are felt, managed and expressed
on campus. Recently, work by Hopkins (2010) has focused on the construction and
contestation of Muslim identities on university campuses in the UK. Indeed, Hopkins (2010)
study suggests that university, as a space, encourages the ways in which Muslim students
shape politics and power relations on campus. Hopkins’ research (2010: 160) demonstrates
that students perceive the campus as a ‘tolerant and liberal place’, where there is a ‘shared
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sense of identity’. Nevertheless, as Muslim students negotiate the campus, it is also possible
that through student societies and groups, others experience ‘peer pressure and bullying’ in
the sense that not all students need or want to conform to specific modes of behaviour,
thereby denoting spaces of inclusion and exclusion. This section concentrates on my
research participants’ social experiences at university, and how these influence their gender
identities.
4.4.1 Moving or not moving: women’s options of university life
I start this section by discussing the possibilities respondents have in terms of living
or moving away from home as they study. This aspect of university life remains significant
as participants engage in processes of negotiations with their families to acquire the
independence required to live away from home; as such, changes such as living
independently encourage the evolution of gender identities. Despite the unequal status that
women face with university options, half of my respondents moved away from home to go
to university whilst the rest stayed at home during their study years. Studying in one’s
community/city has shown to be more typical for Muslim women but my study reflects that
young women have been able to negotiate with their parents so as to gain permission to
leave home for further studies. Ahmad’s research (2001) also mentions the difficulty that
women may experience in the advent of them deciding to study away from home; parents
remain wary of women’s reputation out of their community context.
In my study, women who have moved away from home to study have found it
easier to still live away to find work after studying. Whilst studying, they have lived in halls
of residence or have shared apartments with housemates or friends. As Ahmad (2001) also
found, it was easier for women of middle-class backgrounds to move out of home to study
as compared to women from working-class backgrounds; women whose parents were
educated themselves had no problems with the possibility of girls moving away for studies.
If a member of the family, especially a woman (elder sister or cousin) has moved out to
study, then it is generally easier for parents to accept that daughters move away to go to
university. Respondents who have moved away from home have done so out of choice.
Those who have not moved out have either stayed due to parental restrictions or have done
so out of choice, so as to save money and be better off financially during their study years.
Parental restrictions, as mentioned earlier, revolve around women’s families’ fear of
their daughters’ reputation being tarnished whilst living away from their communities;
parents are wary of ‘daughters having a social life at university’ (Shazia). The patriarchal
structure of the South Asian family is evident as women are kept in sight and their freedom
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restricted (Brah, 1993); they are not prevented from studying but they are not allowed to do
it without supervision. In effect, women hence face a gender bias as opposed to men in their
communities, who are given the liberty to study, home or away. As Asma mentions, there
are obvious gender differences in the ways parents respond to girls and boys moving away
to study:
‘My little brother moved away at the exact same time as me, but for my mum it was
a big deal to let me go… it’s because I’m a girl…definitely, culturally it was always
the guys could go away to uni…I don’t know if it’s a case of trust or if it’s just a
case of ‘Will they be ok? It’s scary for a woman to move away, you’re alone, and
you don’t have that protection’ (Asma).
This is echoed by Alia and Rubina:
‘Parents make you feel that you are different from boys who have more freedom’
(Alia).
‘It is always because you’re a girl and there’s not even a proper reason, it’s what
they think, I’m like ‘so what if I’m a girl?’ I don’t understand, because I’m a girl I
can’t handle university life?’ (Rubina)
Women also maintain that traditionally, marriage is the legitimate reason for women
to leave the family home. Nevertheless, as more Muslim women decide to live
independently during their university years, parents are ‘becoming more liberal’ and
accepting of this trend, especially with the younger generation, who are forging ‘new’
gender identities for themselves.
‘Everybody’s at home. In my family you cannot move away until you’re married or
have a reason to move away. Nobody moves out until they marry’ (Sabina).
Indeed, Sabina stayed home whilst studying at university and left home after she got
married. Faiza studied at home for her first degree but moved out to study on campus for her
Master’s degree:
‘Traditionally girls in my family had lived at home and it would have been an issue
if I left to study at that time, It was just based on what people did at the time, and
then I did my Masters and then moved away…my parents are much more liberal
now, like my sister after me, she moved out fast and obviously she’s younger than
me and I was like ‘wow’...if she can move out, then I can as well’ (Faiza).
Moreover, parents’ restrictive measures are highlighted by participants, whereby such
limitations influence their gender identities. Indeed, women feel that parental control can
sometimes become overbearing when it comes to university experiences, where parents
have different degree levels of maintaining ‘control’ over their daughters. For instance,
Lubaina lives at home and is dropped and picked up from university by her father:
‘I’m a girl, I do follow Islamic guidelines, I want to do it properly… my dad at one
point said ‘Go to Scotland, you’ve got family there’ and then I thought ‘No I can’t
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live there without you guys’. If you’re used to living with your immediate family
and your extended family, it’s like you’re an outsider if you don’t have family, I
knew it would be hard’ (Lubaina).
Lubaina is not allowed to commute from Bradford to Leeds by train but is happy to comply
with her parents’ wishes as she is personally concerned about Islamic propriety and
behaviour. On the other hand, Yasmin was disappointed not to have been able to live
independently during her medical degree. As she explains:
‘I felt in the beginning that I was a bit disadvantaged, I wasn’t living on campus
but I got to know loads of people cause I got involved in heaps of students’
activities…I applied to four medical schools and I got in everywhere and I would
have gone to Manchester but then there were issues like moving away would have to
be like taking a student loan or have my parents pay and it would have been very
expensive so the advantage of living at home was Leeds University is nearby and
I’m debt-free which is really good, for a medical student… part of me wanted to
move away and I would have been happy to have a fresh start but when it came to
filling in forms for other universities my parents didn’t help but when it came to
Leeds then yeah’ (Yasmin).
Moving away would have put a financial strain on her parents. As an alternative, she got
fully involved in societies (Medical, Islamic) so that she could ‘have the university
experience’ that she hoped for. Her parents were not supportive of her moving out of home
but Yasmin is today thankful to be ‘debt-free’ before starting her medical career.
As Rubina puts it, at university:
‘Women can literally do anything and they want to keep their daughters in check
because they need to marry you off and they need you to have a clean slate’
(Rubina).
Rubina talks about the difficulty that women face in persuading their parents for them to
stay on campus and hence experience the non-academic side of university life. Parents are
not bothered about women’s education per se ‘they don’t mind you going somewhere close
to home’ (Rubina), but are more concerned about what kind of lifestyle their daughters are
living. Parents are worried about ‘what people are going to say’ and they don’t want to be
giving women scope to live independently, away from the family’s gaze. Women having
boyfriends, drinking, going clubbing or getting pregnant would have an impact on their
family’s status in the community and ‘these would affect their chances of making a good
marriage’. Keeping the cultural, and not the religious tradition of ensuring that girls’
reputation remain unblemished results in parents having more bargaining power when it
comes to their daughters’ marriage prospects.
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Moral discourses about ‘respectability’ directly influence women’s social realities,
where the honour of the family (izzat), remains an important factor in British South Asian
Muslim families. As Rubina, Nadia and Haleema state:
‘I think it’s got a lot to do with marriage and honour’ (Rubina).
‘A cultural thing, it’s not Islamic where families are forcing you to get married
because of the family’s status, what are people going to say? About your daughter
who’s been living away from home, get her married, they do that a lot’ (Nadia).
‘ It’s a cultural thing, they always have this fear of if a girl gets raped or if she runs
off with somebody then she’s never going to get married and she’s going to be an
outcast from the community, it’s the community belief whereas boys even if they are
badly behaved and sleep around, they are not seen with the same eyes’ (Haleema).
Respecting community norms and not allowing women to move out for the purpose of
education is linked to women’s marriage prospects. Exposure to the bigger world remains a
concern for parents as it may influence women to review their options, especially when it
comes to marriage. For instance, Habibah was not allowed to move out from the parental
home to go to university as:
‘A lot of parents think that if you study, it widens your horizons and your mind and
you think a lot of things that maybe you wouldn’t if you just went to say college and
then get married but obviously they’re my parents and you have to listen to them if
you’re living under their roof and I respect them’ (Habibah).
Fatimah had to negotiate, even argue with her parents so as to obtain permission to
live independently; gaining her parents’ trust proved key to them agreeing:
‘My parents fear but not because I’m young but I’m still exploring, there was a
compromise, I had to agree to their wishes...for example during my first year, I
wasn’t allowed to go to a friend’s house, like on campuses it’s fine as long as they
were nearby… especially me being a woman and coming from an all girls’ school, I
said that I was going to be fine and to just give me a chance to prove that, so it was
that little chance, the nudge that you had to push a bit with the parents for your
arguments and that is by showing them how you’re going to manage yourself and
managing myself was tough but I’m doing well’ (Fatimah).
Because Fatimah attended a Muslim school, her parents were concerned about her adapting
to university life where males and females interact with each other on a regular basis.
Having ‘reasoned’ with them, Fatimah managed to obtain parental permission to live away
from home; bargaining for her independence, Fatimah constructs a platform where she
manages personal freedom so as not to abuse it. On the other hand, Nazia rebelled against
her parents’ wishes and moved out from the family home to live on campus. Although from
a middle-class background, she expresses her frustration at their lack of understanding:
‘Moving out has created a rift between me and my parents...cultural barriers and
they make it difficult. They make you choose…you’re stuck then….I wear the hijab,
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but it’s not about that, it’s about who you are...I’m actually Pakistani Muslim and
I’m British…I might not be as cultural as them but I have my own standards but
what it was with my parents, they didn’t let us be individuals, like let us be who we
wanted to be’ (Nazia).
Indeed, Nazia stresses the fact that she is Pakistani Muslim but she is also British. However,
as she suggests, ‘Pakistani parents forget that you are British’. Since moving out, ‘the
control stopped’ and Nazia went away on holidays, without her parents knowing. This said,
Nazia still wears the hijab, does not drink alcohol, eats halal food, fasts during Ramadan and
ensures that she only has female housemates. Pushing her ‘cultural barriers’ as she terms it,
she is now free to affirm a British Muslim identity that is closer to her religion, rather than
to the Pakistani culture imposed and practised by her parents. Nazia is not unusual in her
approach. Indeed, her concerns about parental pressures imposed by family and community
are expressed by others in my sample, whereby negotiating to go to university appears to be
one of the main areas of contention between parents and daughters.
In deciding whether to move away from home or not for studying, respondents are
very subtly negotiating power relationships with their parents, and as a result, re-working
their positions as Muslim women in their local communities. Some express the difficulties
that may arise if they decide to move out of the family home to study, something that is
considered normal and inevitable for non-South Asians in British society. Sabina makes an
interesting comparison between parental attitudes to women’s independence, highlighting
the opposing ends that South Asians and non-South Asians (the term she uses is ‘western’)
assume when it comes to women’s freedom:
‘Had I got to move into my own place tomorrow, I could be financially
independent…but I’m not allowed…I understand and appreciate why the western
families do it …with their women…when you’re independent, modern…you are
being forced to learn…But you learn from your own lessons rather than learning
from your parents’ lessons because at the moment if I ever express a wish to have a
place of my own…my parents, Asian parents, traditional… would be ‘Oh why do
you need to?’, ‘Oh it’s so hard!’ Sometimes I say ‘But you have never let me
experience it being so hard’…you just need to do it for yourself’ (Sabina).
For Sabina, there is a contrast in being an ‘Asian’ and a ‘western’ student in Britain.
Although born here, what she understands as university life on campus/living independently
is ‘modern’ and hence, ‘western’, as opposed to living at home, which is ‘traditional’ and
hence, ‘Asian’. As this quote below illustrates, the dichotomy between two cultural
traditions ‘Asian’ and ‘western’ reflects the tension that some women may face. In agreeing
with Sabina, Asma comments on the generational differences that crop up between parents
and children in British South Asian Muslim communities, where parents are determined to
keep control over daughters:
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‘Big generation gap, there’s a lot of clashes because our parents don’t understand
that it would be good for me to move away for a year to, like a different country and
learn a different language. They just don’t’ (Asma).
‘I moved away from home…my choice… they were hesitant at first… my big sister
she stayed at home for uni… my mum’s family they were pretty chilled but my dad’s
family they’re fairly backward …the girls get educated and then they get married
off after…when I needed money I usually went home (laugh)…And it was quite nice
just to be able to go home…to have that option’ (Sadia).
Sadia was happy to be close enough to home, whereby she lived independently
during weekdays and visited the family on alternative weekends. Likewise, Bushra opted for
an institution where she could drive home. However, coming from an educational
background, she claims that in her family, women who move out for educational purposes
are not condemned but are encouraged:
‘Moving out to go to university is quite accepted and dad went to university
himself...and you learn a lot living on your own...I think because my dad went to
university so it was fine’ (Bushra).
Even though Sadia and Bushra both consider themselves to be from middle-class
backgrounds, Sadia experienced some concerns on her parents’ part when it came for her to
move to university. Her parents are not university educated but have prosperous businesses,
as opposed to Bushra, whose parents are both medical practitioners. This is indicative of the
fact that there are nuances even in social classes’ attitudes towards women and education.
Here, it is clear that women’s educational backgrounds influence their positions when
negotiating their living arrangements for university purposes.
Other participants, however, maintain that they consciously chose to stay home
whilst studying. Indeed, unlike women who were not given the option to decide where to
live, others benefitted from personal circumstances that offered enough room and scope for
them to navigate. They come up with motivational factors that demonstrate agency in them
thinking about their future. Financial savings, comfort, moral and emotional support remain
the main reasons why women do not wish to live away from the family home during their
university years. More importantly, these women were given the options and freewill to
decide on their accommodation options. For instance, Haleema was encouraged by her
parents to move out but chose to stay home, opting to consider living in a different city or
even abroad for postgraduate opportunities:
‘Dad suggested Liverpool and I was like ‘no way’ that would be too much of a
distraction and I didn’t want to leave, like if I was doing a Masters or a PhD, I
might have thought of going quite far but for my Bachelor I didn’t want to move.
I’m the eldest, I’m really close to my parents so I do get a bit homesick at times but
there’s a lot of people who don’t want to go out of the country for their electives
because they don’t want to leave home and I’m like ‘come on it’s just for 10 weeks’,
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but I’m definitely leaving!’ (Haleema).
Aisha, who just finished her degree after having stayed home throughout her study years, is
not looking forward to moving away from home for her future hospital placements; she
would have to support and look after herself:
‘I commute everyday…I lived down in first year and I hated it cause I missed home
and I like commuting and when I go home there’s food on the table but I’m moving
out soon because of placements in West Yorkshire, can be Dewsbury, Leeds,
Wakefield, I won’t be far but living again in student accommodation’ (Aisha).
Likewise, Nuzranah opted to stay at home to study as she would be catered for; the
prospect of working part-time whilst studying was not appealing to her:
‘I applied close by, I’m not a person who could live away from home...I can’t do my
own washing and I’ve never done it …even work part-time...if it meant a very good
university further away then that would be ok and I would come back during the
weekends...but my first choice was Leeds and close by unis like Sheffield,
Manchester’ (Nuzranah).
In choosing to stay home, women are able to better motivate themselves and concentrate on
their academic needs, without having to compromise on family and community life. Due to
financial advantages of not having to support themselves by living independently, some
decide not to work, as opposed to others, who take up part-time employment opportunities
for extra-pocket money. This flexibility in deciding on their living arrangements is in stark
contrast to respondents’ mothers and grandmothers, whose life experiences were almost
inevitably shaped by marriage, instead of university experiences, academic challenges and
work opportunities. For this generation of South Asian Muslim women in Britain, going to
university will shape alternative attitudes towards marriage. Indeed, higher education and
building a career are considered prior to marriage, denoting that respondents have begun to
alter the gender norm that marriage should automatically follow post compulsory schooling.
In the next section, I look more closely at how women are ‘negotiating boundaries’ at
university, and how these processes of negotiations are contributing to the development of
new gender identities.
4.4.2 Evolving identities at university: negotiating boundaries
University experiences, as participants claim, have altered their perceptions about
themselves, their communities and families. Finding a comfortable space to express their
identities without feeling the need to conform to fixed notions of ‘race,’ culture, ethnicity,
gender and religion remains a pertinent issue for respondents. Whether they have moved
away or stayed home to study for their degrees, the majority think that they have to navigate
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between cultural and religious identities, contested stereotypical racialised and ethnic
‘labels’ so as to generate new gendered identities:
‘Asians here, like my family and family friends, are saying ‘you are being whoever
you want’ and I say ‘it’s not about being whoever I want to be’ but I’ve got my
identity, I’m happy with who I am and just because I don’t hold the cultural belief
that we should all go to Pakistan at 16 and get married doesn’t mean I can’t be
independent, cause I’ve got my morals and values, which are more religious’
(Saeema).
Some women reflected that the beginning of university life brought up ‘confusing states’,
where they found themselves questioning and assessing their identities to eventually reach a
stage of acceptance, hence embracing their new gender positioning. In this process, they
develop alternative identities which become contextual, depending on where they are and
what they are involved in. Previous research conducted by Knott and Khokher (1993) also
reveals how young South Asian Muslim women in Bradford express changing values and
attitudes through negotiations of ethnic and religious factors that define their everyday
experiences. Indeed, Tasneem reiterates how university culture highlights differences,
whereby clashing lifestyles are apparent:
‘At uni it just makes things clear and it highlights the differences more than the
similarities, for example not drinking, before it was never such an issue cause the
friends you had, like under-aged, no one was actually drinking but even if they do,
they’ll offer you orange juice but uni culture is basically drinking, your social life is
about drinking and it’s quite a big barrier I would say, clubbing...the differences for
me, it was more of a shock...and yes you might want to go to the cinema and
bowling but I completely understand why someone would spend the night out
clubbing or having a drink as that’s what they enjoy more, and why not? So it
shows the differences a lot more’ (Tasneem).
Participants feel the pressure to embrace university culture but are somehow
constrained by their religious convictions or cultural upbringing. For instance, Habibah
suggests that peer pressure of ‘trying to fit in’ at university resulted in her neglecting her
cultural identity; being Muslim prevented her from involving herself fully in university life.
However, a trip to India during a university placement acted positively on her perceptions,
leading her to re-evaluate her social context and recognise that she still values her ethnic
identity:
‘I wasn’t happy to be from…not Muslim background but some of the constraints
that you have in being an Asian woman, wasn’t happy about that cause you can’t be
out too late and I wasn’t happy and I lost a bit of my cultural identity as I was
trying to fit in with everybody and that’s what happens if you’re working in an
environment where people who aren’t from ethnic minorities and then when I went
to India I realised that actually, I’m proud of my culture, it’s different from
everybody else’s culture and I’m more in touch with my culture now’ (Habibah).
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To ‘live the full university life’, Alia moved from Manchester to study in Aberdeen. For her,
gaining the experience and skills to live alone and independently, without having to feel the
need to go home every weekend and be part of her community, was crucial. Alia hence
learned to manage on her own, throughout medical school so that she ‘would not have to
report to anyone what I’m doing’. On the other hand, Saeema was ‘shocked’ in moving to
York to study:
‘I live in a community where there are mostly South Asians and in York, you’re the
only Asian there! And you’re like ‘Right, what is happening!?’ (Laugh)...but I just
learnt so much about myself, about other people...and just about life and now I
know... if anything happened with my family, I know I can be independent myself’
(Saeema).
Having lived in a close-knit Asian community in Leeds, she describes the exposure
she encountered at university, and how this has moulded her personality. Setting out to
university, she recounts how she expected to mingle with South Asians but found herself in
a totally unexpected setting, where ‘whiteness’, as opposed to ‘Asianess’ was the norm;
managing differences proved to be a challenge in the beginning. University experiences
have given her the opportunity to appreciate multiculturalism within an academic setting,
where she evaluates her identity. Women maintain that it is up to them to decide how to
behave at university and they make conscious choices of how to integrate amongst diverse
cultures, societies and groups. They reiterate the do’s and don’ts of university life, which for
Muslims, encompass the non-consumption of alcohol, the consumption of halal food and the
prohibition of engaging into non-marital relationships i.e. having boyfriends and engaging
in sexual activities. Indeed, Shazia talks about the range of options that exist at university,
and ‘one has to choose between what’s right and what’s wrong’ and ‘everybody has a
choice’.
Not betraying parents’ trust seems to be an important notion for respondents. Even
though Shazia goes out socialising with friends in the evenings, her parents are not aware of
her activities as she tries to keep those undercover. This is a strategy that women adopt so as
to, on the one hand, juggle individual desires and wishes, and on the other, fulfil parental
expectations. As Shazia explains, her parents do not know her entire whereabouts but at the
same time, there are limits that she imposes on herself when it comes to lifestyle choices
such as drinking alcohol. Indeed, Hanah claims that she did not set out to have ‘the typical
student lifestyle’ but was more concerned about getting her degree and ensuring that she had
her choice of lifestyle at university. Investing in the future was her priority:
‘I don’t know about independence, has my education given me independence? It has
certainly given me confidence….in terms of being free and doing what you want yes,
in a way my chosen career was what I wanted to do but independence in terms of
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what goes on today, at university and university life that you go, you have that
lifestyle and no, that’s not what I got and it wasn’t something that I set out to do
neither, it was just that I went, did my thing and came back’ (Hanah).
Similarly, Faiza reflects on her university experiences. Labelling herself as ‘the
good Asian girl’, she claims that she mainly befriended South Asian girls because they
shared similar levels of understandings and like Saeema, talks about her university space as
being essentially ‘white’:
‘I was a good Asian girl in the sense that I did not go out clubbing, drinking and so
on and then did my Mphil and most of my friends have been Asian but the university
I went to was predominantly white’ (Faiza).
In a space which is predominantly white, women pick up on racialised identities and make
deliberate moves to associate with other ‘Asian girls’. Indeed, unlike Saeema, who
embraced cultural differences and diversity in friendships, Faiza consciously chose to
socialise with ‘Asian’ girls as she found it easier to communicate and contextualise her
sense of ‘self’ within the South Asian community at university. However, some women are
also determined to enjoy university life fully until it is time for them to ‘settle down’.
Breaking the ‘good Asian girl’ stereotype, Rahila enjoyed clubbing and socialising whilst at
university; once married, she no longer goes out clubbing and is now working full-time and
looking after the family.
As for Nadia, she lives at home due to her parents’ wishes. However she negotiated
with them that she would be allowed to occasionally socialise with friends outside of
university campus and course schedules, conditions which her parents agreed to. That said,
her parents are not aware that she drinks and goes out clubbing as this would mean
restrictions upon Nadia’s social life in the future:
‘Well I go out! I’ve got mates in Sheffield and Nottingham and I go and I can stay
over, I mean not all the time but I’m allowed to but obviously they won’t know that
I’m out clubbing and all no! Just because of the negative things that I do with it, it’s
true, if they find out but I’ve done it now, the whole drinking thing…that’s the
western thing’ (Nadia).
Some participants are consciously following prescribed parental rules while others ‘play the
system’. Nadia, nevertheless, makes compromises in ensuring that she lives the ‘western’
and the ‘Muslim’ lifestyles simultaneously. Going ‘halfway’, she has two groups of friends,
non-South Asian friends and South Asian friends. With her non-South Asian friends and
some South Asian friends, she finds it comfortable and also non-contradictory to ‘go out
clubbing’ and consume alcohol. However, with a group of South Asian Muslim girls, she
can also share cultural and religious affinities:
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‘I’ve made friends where I can embrace both sides because it would have been
difficult if my uni friends didn’t embrace both sides like we go to mosque and I don’t
think if my uni friends didn’t all go do it together, I don’t think I’d do it on my own
but it’s an experience we share every week, it’s something that keeps us together
and we might not see each other for the whole week but that day we will and we will
all go together and it’s a good feeling, we all feel close’ (Nadia).
Having shared cultural and religious experiences on a regular basis at university remain
important to respondents. Once a week, Nadia and her Muslim friends go to the mosque to
pray. University allows her the possibility to reflect on her individual needs outside the
family and community settings that she is used to. She deliberately chooses to maintain a
balance in fulfilling her academic and spiritual goals, hence affirming an independent
Islamic identity, where she navigates between ‘the west’ and ‘the east’ with ease and
composure. However, despite negotiation strategies, some women still feel constrained and
unable to fully get involved in options that they would essentially be willing to explore
whilst at university. For example, Sanaa suggests that she was ‘stuck at university’. Sanaa
‘was respectful to her parents’ when she was still at school but felt that:
‘I was missing out, couldn’t do what the other girls were doing, so I felt I did
nothing and everybody else did everything at university’ (Sanaa).
By ‘everything’, Sanaa means drinking, clubbing, and having boyfriends. So, whilst
at university, she rebelled against parental restrictions and experienced all of these. She had
relationships at university, with ‘English’ (White) guys but suggests that she kept them
‘casual’ so that problems would not arise at a later stage where parents would get involved:
‘With boys, going out, staying out all night, drinking, I never did drugs but I do
drink so basically that lifestyle, but then I wasn’t happy with that, that wasn’t me
and actually for a while, I didn’t want a boyfriend because I thought ‘Oh no, what if
I fall in love with somebody and he’s English?’ I’ll have to choose between him and
my family, back then I really thought it was a big issue so I would go out, mess
about but nothing serious’ (Sanaa).
There were instances where relationships could have developed but Sanaa felt it was
impossible to take them further due to cultural and religious barriers; her parents would
never accept that she considers a non-Muslim and non-Asian British boyfriend as marriage
material. Today, Sanaa still dates ‘English’ guys with no intention of settling down with
them. University hence provides women with spaces where contestations occur. As they
navigate ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ boundaries, respondents demonstrate agency in the
choices they make with regards to which social activities to embrace at university, and
which ones to reject. Indeed, decisions about drinking alcohol, socialising and having
relationships are very carefully negotiated by young women. Their negotiations are
informed by personal choices, as well as family and community ethos that promote cultural
gendered norms which prescribe particular modes of behaviour which respondents are
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expected to honour. As such, participants develop strategies to negotiate their social
experiences at university, thereby generating new gender identities as they decide how to
position themselves within the wider context of university life. In my study, participants
also maintain that peer pressure at university influences the ways in which they decide to
affirm their identities as they learn to navigate the ‘differences’ and the ‘similarities’
(amongst students) they encounter on university campuses. All these factors influence how
women decide to affirm their identities on campus. In the next section, I explore
respondents’ involvement in university student societies, with a particular focus on Islamic
Societies at university. This discussion reveals how respondents, through student societal
groups, negotiate their ways around activities, thereby further highlighting the impact that
social experiences have in generating women’s gender identities.
4.4.3 Student societies at university: Islamic societies (ISOC) on campus
Many respondents were involved in student societies (extra-curricular activities)
that allowed them to meet fellow students who shared similar interests. Social
groups/organisations at university provide university students with resources to form
associations which contribute greatly to the social aspects of university life. These offer
opportunities for Muslim women to get involved and be exposed to possible avenues
(activities/outings/friendships/relationships) which family and community do not essentially
want respondents to experience. Social groups therefore provide respondents with the
freedom and agency to decide how to manage their university life; such power enables them
to develop links out of their community or family circle, hence opening up spaces to
produce new identities. In my study, women who moved away from home to go to
university find societies useful as they provide the necessary network and support system
that students need to adapt to university life, especially to those enrolled in their first
academic year (‘freshers’).
The most common groups in which women tend to participate more remains the
South Asian societies (Pakistani/Indian/Bengali) and respondents rely on them to maintain
cultural identity through parties, movies and organised outings. Others, though a minority,
signed up for sporting activities (badminton, volleyball, netball), societies which enable
women to meet other students of both genders; medical students find these particularly
appealing as they befriend non-medical students, hence taking off the pressure and the
competition among medical students for a while. However, women like Aisha, once active,
re-adjust their social life according to lifestyle changes and changes in their religious
inclinations or beliefs. Indeed, since adopting the jilbab, Aisha modified her social activities
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on campus to better suit her needs. Clearly, her religious needs and religious identity take
precedence over any other social identities:
‘I used to play when I didn’t wear the jilbab but not anymore because it’s not
practical... I used to play squash, cricket and basketball, a bit of a tomboy but I like
male sports but had to give a lot of that up since I started wearing the jilbab but
Alhamdulillah I still do it at home. I just finished my Arabic course, I did that in
Bradford and I picked up a sewing course as well’ (Aisha).
‘Because I didn’t come from a traditional medicine background, I didn’t go to a
grammar school or anything, I kind of work for a thing called WAMS in Leeds
Uni…it’s for medical students, run by medical students, to encourage people from
non privileged backgrounds to get into medicine, apply to uni. It just gives them a
different perspective, and just like encouraging them as their parents might not have
gone to university’ (Zainab).
Women also signed up for non-campus activities and voluntarily work for organisations that
help young people. For instance, Zainab, reflecting on her own experiences, explains that
her work is important as it will enable more and more students to consider higher education
as a viable option after compulsory schooling. As for Yasmin, despite her workload, she is
extremely active in extra-curricular activities; she is part of the ISOC as well as a Students’
Union Representative as she believes that university life is not merely about acquiring a
degree but also about participating in social groups so as to make a difference:
‘I do a lot of things apart from medicine...it doesn’t define entirely who I am and
I’m involved in Islamic work at the local mosque…got involved in inter-faith
activities, with non-Muslim societies, as they promote cohesion on campus, like we
are different but we can co-exist, I’m also involved in the Leeds marrow society,
encouraging people to get involved into registering for the marrow register and this
year I was in the like, women in surgery representative, there’s a society for that
and union representative as well, representing students. I can’t just stay at home
and if I don’t like something I will try and change it, just being pro-active about
things and so there’s a lot of opportunity on campus to do’ (Yasmin).
Yasmin, a practising Muslim wearing the hijab, encourages other women to join inter-faith
societies as she believes that inter-faith programs maintain ‘cohesion’; even though Yasmin
affirms a religious identity by being active in the ISOC, she also recognises the importance
of working with non-Muslim societies so as to signal the positive recognition of ‘difference’
on campus. In my study, all respondents were formal members of the Islamic societies
(ISOC), with the exception of one respondent who made it clear that she had no intention of
joining the society. A few of my respondents were part of the Islamic Society committee
board, and hence, extremely active on campus (Leeds University campus) whilst others
remained passive members and attended events such as Eid or iftar (breaking of fast) parties
during the month of Ramadan. Indeed, the varying degrees in which respondents decide to
get involved within the ISOC reflect the differences that exist in how women decide to
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express their religious affiliations and religious identities on campus. As Tasneem and Asma
maintain:
‘I am part of the Islamic society but then when interesting things come up then you
go, but it’s more like belonging to the society rather than really regular sort of
involvement and attendance’ (Tasneem).
‘There was an Islamic society. It wasn’t anything big, it was just like…it had a
prayer room, and you could go as you wanted, you could come and go as you
pleased, and in Ramadan they used to do iftar. But apart from that, there was, I
mean, nothing else really. And because I was living at home as well, I didn’t have a
lot of time after university, so I couldn’t commit to anything’ (Asma).
For Fatimah, an active member of the ISOC in Bradford and the events’ organiser
on the board, doing voluntary work is necessary and useful on one’s CV. Her involvement
as a board member of the ISOC is a conscious effort for her to improve her chances when it
comes to future employment. Furthermore, every member is given a ‘fair chance’ of getting
involved and Fatimah seized the opportunity:
‘For a CV it’s necessary so that’s voluntary work, it is very highlighted in the
working environment, people really enjoy somebody’s CV if they’ve got something
to offer because time is money and giving up your time is valued’ (Fatimah).
My study shows that Islamic Societies on campus act as a terrain for identity formation and
negotiation for young women exploring the spaces of educational settings. They are also
spheres where women not only express their religious identities, but become spheres for
politicised Islamic identities. Such environments therefore encourage the construction and
contestation of British South Asian Muslim identities. As I mentioned in Chapter Three,
within the student societies funded by Student Unions (The University of Leeds) the two
Islamic societies, the ISOC and the ABSOC, remain separate. Comparing experiences of
Islamic societies from her local mosque and the one at university for which she is an active
fundraiser, Nazia reiterates the differences in their approaches, whereby at university,
women may adopt individual modes of behaviour and clothing, and hence, express
individualistic expressions of their religious identities:
‘My parents wanted me to go to the mosque every Sunday, and I was like ‘I don’t
want to go’...I’m 19 years old and it’s like the old Islamic society, all these women
and so many restrictions when going, like don’t wear make-up, don’t wear jackets,
wear long cardigans, most people there wear jilbabs, so they are fully covered, not
the niqab necessarily but they’re fully covered and I cannot wear what I want, not
everybody covers their face but they generally wear loose clothes whereas me I’m
never fully covered, you can see my sleeves they’re not fully down, I cover to the
extent where I feel it’s possible for me to cover, but I don’t find it necessary to fully
go in’ (Nazia).
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Likewise, Saeema formally founded the Islamic society at her university and reformed some
of the activities which the previous society offered. Instead of focusing inherently on
religious talks, organising activities as a group helped gather more members:
‘I was the only Muslim there at the time so it was really hard and I joined the
Islamic society which because it was in York, it didn’t really exist...I mean there
were just 3 people there and I know there are more Muslims in York and I said well,
we have to do something about this cause people, especially in their first year, they
need help, so in my second year I became part of the committee and we organised
loads of stuff and I think because of the religious meetings, I think this used to stop
people because every week they used to have religious talks...there are people who
don’t want a religious talk every evening...so we did other things, I don’t mean we
went clubbing but we went to movies and bowling getting to know each other for
meals and more members stared coming...at the same time we had the religious
talks and all that cause some people want that but it’s just that people have that
choice and then there’s an alternative for them’ (Saeema).
Due to her experiences, Fawzia, quoted below, states how she was made to feel
‘different’, and abused as an ‘infidel’ by a male member of the ABSOC at Bradford
University. As a Sunni Muslim, her presence was not welcomed for that event (talk). This
exemplifies the tensions that exist amongst Muslim identities on university campuses,
whereby the radicalisation of faith manifests itself within extreme and separatist notions
begging the question of what it means to be Muslim in Britain. Indeed, experiences of
Islamic societies on campus generate a diversity of perceptions for different people:
‘I went to that event and I was asked ‘what kind of a Muslim are you?’ and I was
like ‘what do you mean what kind? I’m not a breed you know’ and there was this
random guy standing in the entrance as I was coming in and all the women were
taking off their shoes and everyone was and I was going in and I put a duppata over
my head for respect, but obviously that wasn’t good enough and that guy he
stopped me and he said ‘what kind of Muslim are you sister?’, and I was like ‘what’
and he said ‘what kind?’ and I was like ‘oh do you mean Sunni and Shia?’ and the
thing is my mum always told me not to differentiate and she just said ‘you’re
Muslim that’s it’ and you don’t need to think further than that and I know about it
and I just said ‘well I’m Sunni’ and he said ‘what kind of Sunni?’ and I didn’t know,
I just have my own belief and it’s my own interpretation of everything, my parents’
interpretation of everything and he was like ‘oh how do you pray, can I ask you?’
and I was like ‘what?’ and he said ‘let me just clarify things, I’m from Alhulbay’t
Society’, never heard of it before and he said ‘we are a special type of Muslims and
I laughed actually, I thought he was joking and I told him ‘yeah I think I’m a special
type of Muslim as well’ and he was so serious when I was just laughing and I
stopped and said ‘don’t actually understand what your point is’ and he said ‘thing
is, it’s our job to preserve our people from the people who endanger us’ (Fawzia).
Fawzia was also chastised for not wearing the hijab and this put into question her allegiance
to Islam:
‘I remember him saying ‘you obviously don’t wear hijab so you don’t pray do you?’
and I was like ‘what, this is none of your business’ and he was like ‘ok say that you
have recited this surah once in your life, do you know that you should keep safe
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from people who lead you astray?’ and I told him ‘are you insinuating that I am
leading people astray by being a Muslim? And he said ‘no sister, I’m not
insinuating, I’m saying’ and he suddenly shouting ‘kafir’ (infidel) in my face and
everyone just stopped and stared at him and I was so humiliated by everything and I
just picked out my shoes and ran out of there’ (Fawzia).
Clearly, for some students and members of these societies, the hijab is considered to
be compulsory for Muslim women. Again, the pressure to conform is evident in these
circumstances. More importantly, some students belonging to groups such as these feel
threatened by Muslims like Fawzia. Indeed, Fawzia manifests different allegiances to her
faith and is comfortable expressing alternative versions of her faith. It is evident, from her
quote, that the expression of Muslim identities in the context of Islamic societies encourages
a collective approach, bordering religious dogma, to their members who would feel a sense
of belonging only if they abide by what is perceived as appropriate in order to fit in with a
‘type of Muslim’. Social groups such as Islamic identities may lead respondents to think
about how they position themselves as Muslim women within their educational spaces.
More importantly, they portray the existing differences among participants as women
challenge and contest fixed notions of Muslimness on campus, as they get involved in
Islamic societies at university. The differences experienced by respondents through the
Islamic societies highlight the tensions and contradictions they encounter as they generate
Islamic identities on campus.
In this section, in focusing on respondents’ university experiences, I highlighted the
various ways in which young women in my study are participating in university life so as to
develop new gender identities. Firstly, as they negotiate whether to live at home or away
during their studies, respondents illustrate how they are bargaining with their parents so as
to challenge gendered cultural norms within their communities; in effect, for this generation
of Muslim women, their university experiences and the independence gained from living
independently may shape different attitudes they have about life options such as having
professional careers and marriage. Secondly, in encountering diverse social experiences on
university campuses, respondents are ‘negotiating boundaries’ by learning to navigate
‘religious’ and cultural’ boundaries. For instance, social activities such as drinking alcohol
and having relationships as they engage with Muslims and non-Muslims on campus remain
terrains where participants consciously and actively decide what mode of behavior to adopt.
Thirdly, through respondents’ involvement within student societies, in particular the ISOC,
respondents’ motives to be either active or passive members of such religious organisations
demonstrate the multiple ways in which women exhibit their religious identities at
university. Their experiences of Islamic societies reflect instances where women may feel
included through events such as gatherings held during Ramadan, whilst also feel excluded
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if they do not adhere to specific dress codes such as the hijab, as epitomised by Fawzia’s
experience. In the concluding section of this chapter, I examine how respondents are
‘pushing gendered’ boundaries within the spaces of higher education as they assert new
gender identities; as such, I look at how their notions around marriage are changing as they
consider educational and professional careers.
4.5 PUSHING GENDERED BOUNDARIES
With Muslim women’s apparent visibility on university campuses, Muslim women
are pushing gendered boundaries by navigating new educational and employment options.
In so doing, women remain aware that they are setting new trends for Muslim women in
Britain, as they navigate options to choose university degrees, career paths, live at home or
away and get involved in university life. To further comprehend women’s agency to form
new gender boundaries, I wanted to analyse the intergenerational shifts that educated
Muslim women are currently experiencing in Britain in relation to education and
employment. This remains important as it demonstrates that through these intergenerational
changes, respondents’ gender identities are evolving as they assert new ones. I therefore
asked respondents whether they thought there were differences in the ways women in their
family (grandmothers and mother) perceive education and work. All of them claim that the
differences are noticeable; women then had limited or no other option but to get married.
Most importantly, when respondents were asked whether changes in educational
achievements or work were apparent for men in their family across the generations
(grandfathers, father, brothers), they all maintain that they cannot perceive massive
differences as men are more likely to inherit businesses or go straight into employment.
Indeed, as many respondents suggest, their male cousins or brothers were not heavily
concerned with university degrees, although some had degrees. Nevertheless, for men in the
family, not going to university was considered an option, as opposed to my respondents,
who would not compromise on attending university. This portrays women’s aspirations as
fully geared towards education rather than non-professional employment or marriage.
‘For sure…my grandmother was married at 13, and had her first child at 16. My
mum went to school for a year and then married at 16. And I often talk to my mum
and she always says ‘when I was your age I had 4 kids’ and I’m like ‘Oh God’...I’m
still a child you can just see the difference and we don’t plan on getting married for
a few years yet...and my mum could speak English, like broken, and she can read a
bit but that’s just a year at school, not educated at all’ (Saeema).
The changes in women’s lifestyles are hence apparent. Women’s grandmothers had
no or extremely limited education, while many of my respondents’ mothers had basic levels
of education (compulsory education), with the exception of five mothers who had university
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degrees. If mothers were interested in work or studying for courses, these were usually done
after marriage and in some cases, after migration to the UK from India, Pakistan and
Bangladesh. Women’s grandmothers tended to get married at around 13 to 16 years of age
on average, while their mothers married in their late teens and early twenties, between 16 to
23 years of age. Married women in this research got married in their mid to late twenties,
between 24 to 28 years of age; they all had university degrees before their marriages and
they are all currently working. This in itself portrays that Muslim women in Britain are
nowadays marrying a decade later than their grandmothers did.
‘My mum is such an intelligent woman and she never got the chance. She got
married and she had kids. Her husband was from Pakistan and they all had that
mentality which means that she missed out on so much…She knew that she’d have
to stay at home, have kids, and take care of her husband, cook, clean and that’s it.
She knew she was going to be a housewife, and two of my aunties, they went to
school in Scotland, but they stopped at high school, they didn’t go to university. And
that’s because they never had the option… taking my parents into consideration and
my aunties and uncles, their lives, going from that…ours in completely different.
And it’s such a big generation gap…Even to the way we are, the way we dress, and
the fact that we’ve all gone to university, and we’ve got careers’ (Asma).
Indeed, Asma highlights that women of her mother’s generation were not given another
option apart from ‘becoming a housewife’; for her, ‘Pakistani mentality’, meaning cultural
tradition, acted as hurdle for women like her mother. Likewise, other respondents agree with
this principle, adding that financial constraints contributed heavily to their lack of resources
to follow educational routes. Nowadays, students, like most respondents in my study,
depend on student loans and weekly allowances to survive their university years.
‘Mum went to uni, and school in Pakistan and then got married to Dad so that’s
evolved...like my granddad was well educated for his time and made sure my Mum
and her sisters all went to uni and stuff, if they had brothers or husbands
encouraging education then they had more chances of education’ (Sadia).
In contrast, for participants’ mothers who went to university, women view it as an
uncommon phenomenon of their time. As Sadia expresses, having a male figure, mothers’
own fathers, brothers or husbands in the family who approved of and encouraged their
mothers to study made all the difference. Fawzia describes her mother as a ‘radical mother’,
who transgressed all expectations to be able to get a degree:
‘My mother thought that she was unmarriageable because she was the first in her
generation to want to do a degree and she went against her parents to do it and her
eldest brother financed everything for her because my mum’s dad died when she
was like 13 and she was the youngest daughter and my grandmother wanted to see
her settled but she finished her degree and then she married my dad at 24…she did
really well for herself but for us, I think it’s more of an expectation to do it whereas
for her it was the expectation of not to do it, so it was the complete
opposite’(Fawzia).
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All unmarried women in my research want to finish their studies and get a job before
thinking of getting married. Gaining financial independence before marriage to them
remains important. Women like Haleema and Tasneem have also suggested that in this day
and age, it is important that both partners work in a couple so that the family can be better
off economically. This may hence explain the intergenerational shifts relating to more
Muslim women opting to pursue educational and work careers; respondents’ evolution in
perceptions about education and work challenge marriage and children as being the sole life
ambition of women. In some cases, even though grandmothers were not encouraging of
their daughters’ choices to study, they remain extremely proud of the fact that their
granddaughters have got degrees and are working. As Yasmin states:
‘Because women have been challenged in the past, like for example my grandma
she would never have been able to go to university and I know that so for me I’m
more motivated to push myself’. …the weird thing is my grandma loves the fact that
I’m at university and I guess it’s because her approach to education has changed
and I mean she can read Urdu and I think she realised over time that if you’ve got
a grand-daughter who is a doctor you don’t question that (Laugh)’.
Aisha also understands the progression of women’s educational and professional
careers as a movement:
‘I’ve seen that people have become more and more driven to go to university and
studying good degrees and that’s amazing, like 10 years ago, hardly anyone was
going to university and it’s the same with the hijab, 10 years ago nobody was
wearing the hijab and I think in that sense it has changed so much and people have
become more aware that education has become important’ (Aisha).
Bringing it to a more personal level, Aisha, who wears the jilbab, makes an interesting
comparison between women going to university and women wearing the hijab in the UK.
Here, Aisha equates the rate of Muslim women entering into higher education with the rate
of Muslim women wearing the hijab. For her, women’s freedom to have access to
educational opportunities as well as freedom to publicise their Islamic faith in Britain are
inter-related. Even if higher education is regarded as important and is encouraged by
themselves and their families, women may still feel constrained when assessing their
educational aspirations. Indeed, in desiring to fulfil educational aims, women’s re-assertion
of a new gender identity might not always play in their favour.
Indeed, they express their concerns about the limits of educational achievements, as
opposed to Singh’s (1990) study, which suggests that higher education improves women’s
chances in the ‘marriage market’. My research findings tally with Ahmad’s (2001) study,
where the contradiction of ‘being too educated’ is highlighted by my respondents.
Describing it as ‘conflicting interests, a double-bind situation’, Ahmad’s (2001: 147) study
also shows the predicament faced by Muslim daughters as far as degree levels are concerned
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when it comes to their marriage prospects. Ahmad (2001) mentions cases of women ‘being
too educated’, a situation that hinders the flow of marriage proposals or the interest of
families to approach women with higher educational status. Indeed, from my research,
although Farha (quoted below) reiterates the importance that higher education has in
opening up options for women, she also mentions the potential risks that education may
entail in relation to women’s marriage options. Being ‘too educated’ means being labelled
and categorised as a woman who has rejected marriage for education. On the other hand,
Fawzia maintains that having an education remains extremely important when it comes to
marriage:
‘I mean you can’t go anywhere without education...for your career and for your
marriage prospects as well, shouldn’t be but you know it does come in’ (Fawzia).
Interestingly, women have to also think about the extent to which they want to be
educated so as to find the right balance and a degree of acceptance in their communities.
The degree of education a woman acquires seems to always be juxtaposed with her marriage
options; too little education can limit one’s options and too much education can put people
off:
‘There’s someone who came to see me last year, he came with his daughter who
wanted to do her bar and he wanted some advice. So basically he wanted to hear
from me that it wasn’t worth it. That’s what he really wanted me to say to his
daughter. She had just finished her LLB and wanted to go abroad for a year. He
was a civil servant, well educated himself…she was twenty-one. I asked her whether
she wanted to come back to do her pupilage and she kept saying ‘depending on my
situation’. And I said ‘what do you mean your situation?’– which basically meant
‘whether I’m married or not’ (Farha).
As Farha suggests, being ‘in a situation’ means not being married yet. This ‘situation’
signifies that a woman needs to make a choice between education and marriage. Farha
recounts an episode where her advice about higher education and consequently, her position
as an unmarried woman in employment was sought. Hanah, quoted below, also illustrates
the tension that exists between education and marriage, where the decision to carry on with
further studies such as postgraduate qualifications must be weighed against marriage
options. As this shows, too much education is not encouraged as marriage must be
considered alongside educational aspirations. Women think that a compromise has to be
reached between study and family life. Indeed, Hanah suggests:
‘I’m going down that route, that path of education, education, education and work
for money but there are other areas of my life that I need to fulfil so it’s that path
that I’m kind of concerned about going on too focused and then lose interest in
other areas and I think we need to have a balance, especially with Asian women’
(Hanah).
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When asked about what she means when she talks about ‘Asian women’ with
respect to education and work, Hanah draws on the cultural expectations that families and
communities have when it comes to women; getting married and raising children still
remains a priority in British South Asian Muslim communities and in some cases, educated
unmarried women feel the pressure to settle down and have children. As she exclaims ‘the
culture is such that this is what they want you to do’. Hanah’s views can be perceived as
renegotiating gender norms so as to fit her personal expectations (individual needs) as well
as fulfil normative gender roles (community expectations). Becoming wives and mothers
has precedence over acquiring education, and the independence that comes with it. She
categorises ‘Asian women’ and subtly adheres and perpetuates constructed notions of Asian
womanhood. Indeed, for unmarried women in this research, marriage is inevitable as they
expect it to happen in the coming years, once they settle in their careers. Dwyer and Shah’s
(2009) sample also demonstrates similar notions around marital expectations, where
marriage remains a reality.
‘There are a lot of girls out there who are looking to get married and they just
cannot find anyone because guys want somebody who is a convenience and a
woman with ambition is not always a convenience. I come from a family where the
mum has always worked and that’s normal and my brother doesn’t have a problem
marrying a working wife, but most boys my age have not had a working mother and
had a mum who has doted on them and that’s what they expect in a wife so there’s a
big mismatch between boys’ expectations in my generation and girls’ expectations,
and that’s why the number of Muslim women who are approaching their 30s are
still not married and it’s just increasing’ (Yasmin).
Yasmin exemplifies how generational changes in women’s roles in South Asian Muslim
communities may affect their marriage options. It appears that in households whereby men
are used to women working, the former would find it easier to contemplate having a
‘working wife’. However, according to Yasmin, with regarding her generation, men’s
expectations follow the pattern of women as homemakers. Nevertheless, respondents are not
ready to comply with this notion that gender roles in marriage are fixed; consequently, this
gender gap and differences in respondents’ marital expectations may result in women
struggling to find marriageable partners who would be agreeable to their future wives’
educational achievements:
‘What annoys me the most is that it’s easy to listen to those religious people saying
these women are wasting time with education and they’re putting marriage on the
back seat and they’re becoming all ambitious…but they’re not thinking that
marriage is between two people coming together, not one person doing whatever
they want and the other person straying along’ (Yasmin).
Moreover, Yasmin points out the role of ‘religious people’ in perpetuating such gendered
expectations in her community. In questioning the discrimination that women encounter,
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Yasmin is also redefining meanings of marriage for Muslim women of her generation as
their educational interests rise. As women are choosing higher education over marriage, and
ultimately, pushing the gendered norms in their communities, I asked them whether their
choices to go into higher education have affected any plans to marry. The majority of
respondents maintain that marriage has been delayed as they opted to go to university; two
respondents suggest that this has not been the case as they met their husbands at university,
and married just after having finished their degrees.
I also asked participants if higher education has influenced marriage prospects for
them. Most respondents reiterate that the choice of marriage partners is an area where they
think they have more power to express an authority in terms of who they wish marry.
Marrying an ‘educated’ partner seems to be an extremely important factor for participants,
demonstrating that young women are ready to exercise freewill when it comes to marriage
partners. Their views highlight that access to higher education, paid employment, upward
social mobility and choice of marriage partners remain significant factors that work together
to alter the gendered identities of British South Asian Muslim women.
‘I think it will... I know this sounds wrong but I wouldn’t want to marry a
cleaner...not because I think they’re lower but I’m thinking of the future, especially
in the society we are living now, how am I going to support my kids? I need
someone who is on a similar wavelength and wage so we can be comfortable’
(Saeema).
Indeed, Saeema talks about the benefits of marrying someone who has also been to
university. In not only looking at the practical financial gains, Saeema is convinced that to
be able to better provide for the future generation, being on a ‘similar wavelength’ with
one’s partner is important. This means that in having more or less the same status between
wife and husband, respondents expect a more equitable gender relationship between
spouses, hence definitely accounting for women’s evolving gender identities:
‘I would not like to marry somebody who would be uneducated because I would like
my husband to want our kids to go to university and push them’ (Shazia).
‘I know girls who have really liked a guy and then said no because he doesn’t have
a degree which I think is stupid, what you need in somebody more than anything is
that firstly their religion is important to them and secondly that they understand you
for who you are, if you have a degree it helps cause you have been through the same
experiences but it’s not the most important thing, my dad doesn’t have a degree and
my mum’s done a PhD so that’s a huge gap isn’t it? But they have so much in
common so that’s what makes a marriage work’ (Yasmin).
As opposed to Shazia, Yasmin does not think that education should be a pre-
requisite when considering marriage. For her, marriage prospects are not considerably
affected by the fact that she now practices medicine. Yasmin’s parents have different
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educational levels and taking that as an example, Yasmin maintains that religion should take
priority over educational achievements when considering marriage. Other respondents
acknowledge the importance of Islam when considering marriage but nevertheless, consider
higher education as an extremely important attribute to have in a partner. Going back to the
strategy of women using education and work so as to encourage upward social mobility,
Shazia reiterates that an educated partner will also provide considerable support to her
children in ensuring that the latter develop an interest for education, thereby showing that
women have clear expectations they hope to fulfill when considering marriage.
‘For girls, it’s impressive to be able to say ‘this is what my daughter or daughter-
in-law does’, there’s a bit of a token for it. At the end of the day it’s the guy’s
responsibility to earn and provide and it is the girl’s responsibility to look after the
home but you have to be able to cross over and education gives you that’ (Sabina).
Interestingly, Sabina still believes in the traditional gendered concepts of the male as
breadwinner and female as homemaker even though women with an education appear to be
highly regarded in her community. However, having the option to ‘cross over’ provides
women with possible ways to maneuver gender roles so as to adjust to their subjective
beliefs and needs. Ultimately, education provides women with the necessary bargaining
power to embrace joint responsibilities. Indeed, as this section demonstrates, young Muslim
women are pushing gendered boundaries as they actively evaluate their options of higher
education and employment. As a result, their experiences of educational and professional
careers impact on their expectations of marriage. As respondents reveal, issues around
ensuring a career before marriage, having agency in the choice of marriage partner, and
being able to have the option to navigate gender roles in marriage are all indicators of how
British South Asian Muslim women are developing and asserting new gender identities.
4.6 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how respondents’ gender identities are evolving
through the spheres of higher education and paid employment. This chapter has shown how
young British South Asian Muslim women are exploring boundaries as they navigate
educational and employment settings and in so doing, push gendered boundaries to produce
new gender identities. As respondents decide to challenge community concerns about
women going into higher education, young women are in effect breaking the ‘traditional’
gendered concepts of Muslim womanhood within their communities so as to assert new
gender identities. Their early negotiations of gender identities within educational and paid
employment settings therefore prefigure later negotiations, for example, the marriage
process. Educational and employment settings shape new contexts for these young women
as they attempt to negotiate new gender identities. As young women progress through
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education and employment, they gain greater independence which may not necessarily lead
them to reject marriage but may impact on how they formulate new expectations of
marriage, for example, their choice of marriage partners or their decisions about when to
marry. An insight into why young women are increasingly considering education and paid
employment as viable paths remains indicative of the active ways in which gender identities
are being re-worked and generated within South Asian Muslim communities in Britain.
First, I have explored the routes taken by respondents as they negotiate their
educational careers. More specifically, I highlighted the early negotiations of young women
to enter educational spaces as they negotiate the existing gendered differences in parental
and community attitudes towards education for women and men within British South Asian
Muslim communities. My findings have shown that the gender inequalities in how families
respond to Muslim women’s and men’s wishes to pursue educational goals remain potent;
this indicates that women do not benefit from equal access to education within their
communities, thereby suggesting that they have to actively negotiate with their families so
as to be able to embrace educational careers. However, even though my research shows
gender inequalities in parental views about education, it also reveals that in cases where
women benefit from parents’ and siblings’ support, achieving educational and career goals
proved easier. Also, although respondents are from diverse socio-economic backgrounds
and have different experiences of study and work, my study demonstrates that all young
women still have to negotiate parental expectations so as to embrace educational and
employment careers. Indeed, as some women’s priority is to negotiate going to university in
the first place, others reach compromises about living home or away during university years.
Second, in exploring why respondents are choosing to go into higher education and
ultimately, employment, the motivational factors encouraging participants to consider
higher education and paid employment reveal how respondents are actively evaluating and
balancing their options so as to develop new gender identities as British South Asian
Muslim women. In maintaining that education provides economic security, respondents
reiterate the importance of being financially independent and ultimately, be in a position to
move up the social ladder. For some respondents, it is expressed as fulfilling their Islamic
duty in seeking knowledge, eventually helping the future generations to recognise the
importance of education due to their roles as ‘educated mothers’.
Third, I focused on how respondents’ university experiences are shaping and
altering their gender identities. In particular, I looked at participants’ choices of
accommodation whilst studying as this remains an area which reveals women’s negotiations
of university options. In fact, their navigations of university life indicate how respondents
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are evolving within their educational social contexts. As they decide how to manage social
activities such as drinking alcohol or having relationships at university, respondents
demonstrate that they remain very careful in negotiating ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’
boundaries. As such, they reveal that peer pressure may impact on their modes of behaviour
at university as they navigate social activity options to partake in, and who to befriend.
Indeed, while some participants do not cross boundaries imposed by community cultural
norms, others choose to experience activities such as drinking alcohol and socialising (for
example ‘clubbing’) without their parents knowing. In effect, respondents’ involvement in
social groups at university demonstrates that they juggle multiple identities as they
encounter spaces where they meet students from different backgrounds, Muslims and non-
Muslims alike. In fact, my focus on participants’ involvement in student societies such as
Islamic societies on campus reveals the diversity in the range of experiences felt by
respondents. As they negotiate peer groups, perceptions remain subjective, whereby women
may generate individual as well as collective identities. Indeed, as some respondents
maintain that Islamic societies help them feel included as they adhere to an Islamic identity
on campus due to shared events/activities organised by these societies, others reflect on how
such societies may act as a space of exclusion due to the differences they portray in the
ways in which they choose to depict their faith; as Fawzia has described, to attend an event
organised by an Islamic society and not wearing the hijab results in her being judged by
some Muslim students on campus. These contestations encourage respondents to develop
new gender identities as they make decisions and choices informing their university
experiences.
Finally, I elaborated on how participants are pushing gendered boundaries through
education and paid employment and as such, generate new gender identities. In reflecting
upon the intergenerational differences that participants experience when they compare their
educational/work achievements to that of their mothers and grandmothers, respondents
reiterate how gendered roles have dramatically altered. Ultimately, these changes lead
women to assert new gender identities. Indeed, respondents illustrate how women of the
previous generations had limited options, whereby marriage remained the primary route for
women in their families. On the contrary, as respondents delay marriage, gendered
boundaries are being pushed and questioned as they decide to move into higher education
and employment. In fact, young women in my study portray their motives and enthusiasm to
contest cultural ideologies so as to open up new spaces which allow them to embrace
university education and employment. Cultural constraints that hinder educational
aspirations are questioned by respondents, while Islamic concepts about the importance of
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education for Muslims are embraced as participants manifest an array of ways in which their
Muslim identities are sustained at university.
As young women gain the confidence to challenge expected cultural norms through
university and work experiences, they assert new gender identities which are impacting in
the ways in which they understand marriage, and the gender roles within it; respondents’
aspirations of marriage seem to indicate that their expectations of marriage revolve around
more egalitarian notions of gender roles in marriage. For instance, respondents reiterate how
having the option to pursue professional careers after marriage remains important to them,
thereby showing how respondents are re-working marital gender roles within British South
Asian Muslim communities. Individual efforts made by women to develop new gender
identities show differences amongst them, hence portraying the heterogeneity of Muslim
identities generated by respondents in this study. Participants are re-evaluating their
positioning and manifest awareness for Islamic principles that would not prevent them from
achieving academic aspirations and career choices. Through higher education and
employment, respondents are therefore redefining spaces where ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’
boundaries are evaluated and re-negotiated. Indeed, through the spaces of higher education
and employment, they are exploring boundaries, leading them to develop new gender
identities which impacts on other life options such as marriage. In the next chapter, I focus
on how educated British South Asian Muslim women contest and construct their Muslim
identities within the wider context of British society.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Managing ‘Muslimness’: Contesting and Constructing
South Asian Muslim Identities in Britain
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on how British South Asian Muslim women contest and
construct their identities in the context of their daily experiences of higher education and
work. It provides a platform to extend the themes around Muslim women’s evolving
identities, which I developed in the previous chapter; I look at how the experiences of higher
education and work are opening up questions about identity in new ways for Muslim women
as they evaluate their own gendered identities, and the possible impacts this process may
have on their future life options. Indeed, as they reshape their identities and become
assertive in affirming these identities, they ultimately develop new attitudes towards the
meanings they attribute to marriage. In fact, in this chapter, I contend that educational
settings are leading respondents to rethink the meanings of ‘Muslim’ and ‘South Asian’,
different aspects of their gender identities, as they encounter a wider range of people at
university. Indeed, spaces such as university or work lead participants to develop critical
frameworks where they negotiate, contest, construct and assert new gender identities. Here,
in particular, I analyse how research participants manage their Muslim identities, hence
drawing on the boundaries involved in managing Muslimness.
By ‘manage’, I refer to the ways in which respondents consciously and actively
handle the different aspects of their Muslim identities. Based on Hall’s (1992) theoretical
concept of identity as being relational and contextual, I frame my argument within this
notion that identities are not fixed categories; they can be manipulated through negotiations
of different social spaces. This idea of negotiating identities in context is exemplified
through the ways in which young Muslims in the UK navigate the different strands of their
identities. More specifically, the notion of hybrid, hyphenated or multiple identities, as
stipulated in previous studies (Stopes-Roe and Cochrane, 1991; Modood et al., 1994;
Dwyer, 2000; Kawale, 2003; Werbner, 2004, Geaves, 2005; Robinson, 2005; Hopkins,
2007), are indicative of the ways in which Muslims in Britain manoeuvre their social
contexts so as to manage different aspects of their social identities. In effect, Pieterse (1995:
45, quoted in Caglar 1997: 172) explains this concept of hybridisation of identities as ‘the
ways in which forms become separated from existing practices and recombine with new
forms in new practices’. This notion that identity formation is dynamic and changing
reflects the agency involved as Muslim women cope with the diverse aspects of their
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identities so as to produce ‘new’ ones. In this chapter, I therefore argue that Muslim women
are actively managing ideas of Muslimness in order to define and affirm their Muslim
identities as they explore educational and work spaces. Yet, I also point out that
Muslimness, for respondents, is explored through an array of other inter-twining social
identities, notably, citizenship, ethnic, and racialised categories which inform their views
and meanings of Muslimness in multicultural Britain. In essence, through these interactions,
I assess how participants navigate their identities so as to generate new gender identities as
British South Asian Muslim women.
This study explores the evolution of ethnic minority women’s experiences and their
gender identities as they negotiate their social contexts; indeed, this thesis focuses on how
British born Muslim women of South Asian origin navigate multicultural British society so
as to produce new identities. In being the second-generation of South Asian Muslim
migrants in Britain, respondents’ notions of belonging are informed by South Asia culture
(inherited from their parents) as well as British culture (as British citizens). I therefore think
it is important here to briefly outline the core concepts around citizenship so as to provide a
framework on which to found my analysis of respondents’ identities in relation to notions of
citizenship and national belonging. Citizenship, as a concept, is complex and unstable.
Indeed, notions around citizenship remain contingent to nation-states’ positions on issues
around inclusion and exclusion from membership of a nation-state, whereby processes of
migration and globalisation influence policies around who must be included and excluded as
‘citizen’ of a nation-state (Marston and Mitchell, 2004; Brubaker, 1992). Nonetheless,
citizenship is most often defined as an individual benefiting from certain rights and duties
from a political community; citizenship then epitomises a legal aspect (for instance
obligations and rights), as well as a cultural and social construct (for instance who belongs)
(Isin, 2002). Here, I therefore use the term ‘citizenship’ to refer to participants’ status as
British citizens sharing legal, social and political rights as formal members of the British
nation-state. In effect, I employ the term ‘citizenship identity’ to denote respondents’
depiction of their nationality status as British citizens. As for ‘ethnic identity’, as I
stipulated in Chapter Two, I rely on Brah’s (1996) notion that interconnecting concepts such
as ethnicity and culture remain embedded within racialised discourses; I therefore
emphasise that respondents’ definitions of themselves as, for instance, ‘Pakistani’ or ‘Asian’
may be reflective of identities which are ‘racialised’. As Brah (1993: 443) highlights, the
need to deconstruct the racialised category ‘Muslim woman’ as ‘it has been constituted in
British discourse’ is important as it helps us to understand South Asian women’s ‘personal
and social identities’ which are informed by social, cultural and political constructs.
Nevertheless, it is clear that as some participants interrogate this process of racialisation by
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questioning the stereotypical connotations of terms such as ‘Asian’, others are ready to
adopt these terms fully and therefore, participate in their own constructions of ethnic
identity in British South Asian Muslim communities.
Navigating citizenship, ethnic and religious identities proves that Muslims in Britain
are making conscious moves so as to construct multiple, or ‘compound’ (Dwyer, 2000: 475)
identities in Britain. Within the context of multicultural politics in Britain, such agency from
Muslims can be viewed as ‘Muslim assertiveness’, which emanates not from Islamic ideals
but from contemporary European concepts of equality and egalitarianism (Modood, 2006:
46). Respondents make sense of their social identities in different ways, overcoming
essentialised meanings of ‘race’, ethnicity and citizenship so as to produce ‘new’
constructions of Islamic identities. Based on the complexity and evolutionary nature of
ethnic minority groups portrayed by previous studies, I consider whether it is important for
respondents to maintain ethnic identity. For instance, does the maintenance of customary
cultural customs such as adherence to clothing, language or food, as well as adherence to
Islam, influence women’s positions in how they view themselves and how their
communities perceive them? Indeed, as Werbner (2004: 896) indicates, ‘Diasporas cannot
exist outside representation’; likewise, women’s gender identities must be understood as
firstly, lived experience and secondly, as how these identities are ‘represented’, hence
perceived by others.
I develop my argument in two stages so as to analytically draw out Muslim
women’s strategies to contest and construct ideas of Muslimness within the larger context of
citizenship, ethnic and racialised frameworks. Firstly, I concentrate on how respondents
identify themselves and what terms they use to do so; respondents illustrate their definitions
by reiterating the ways in which they affirm their identities. The analysis of how women
identify themselves therefore comprises on one level, the formal terms they use to express
who they are (for example ‘British’, ‘Muslim’, ‘Asian’) and on another level, how they
perform who they are (their identities) through affirmation and actions encountered in daily
experiences. More specifically, I focus on the strategies employed by respondents to affirm
their identities while they struggle to manage inter-generational tensions and community
pressure. The major intergenerational tension which emanates from my discussions relates
to the dichotomy ‘religion’ versus ‘culture’, whereby participants actively contest the older
generations’ intertwining interpretations of Islam and South Asian culture so as to develop
more individualistic versions of what it means to be Muslim in Britain. Such processes
reflect the choices which women make so as to affirm their ‘chosen’ (individual) or
‘imposed’ (cultural legacy) identities. With social class, geographical mobility and rising
educational levels, South Asian communities are evolving, becoming more ‘complex and
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heterogeneous’ as younger generations explore new avenues and forge a new group identity,
belonging neither to their parents’ category nor to the majority’s culture as they get
influenced by the dominant culture (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008: 148). Educated Muslim
women in my research are hence pushed to consider how they view themselves in terms of
citizenship, ethnic and religious identities, and how they come to assess the importance
these hold in their lives, within the broader context of British South Asian Muslimness. In
so doing, I draw on the existing notions around hyphenated (hybrid) and multiple identities
so as to illustrate the instability of identities, and the possibility of embracing more than one
identity simultaneously, hence deconstructing the notion of identities as being fixed
categories.
Secondly, I explore the importance of Islam in the lives of participants so as to
evaluate the extent to which religious identity influences their daily experiences.
Considerable research (Jacobson, 1997, Abbas, 2003, Akhtar, 2005, Robinson, 2005, Dwyer
and Shah, 2009) has highlighted the centrality that Islam has in the lives of British South
Asian Muslims. Research also suggests that Muslim women in the UK are embracing Islam
in different ways; adopting clothing such as the hijab/jilbab, as well as reading and
understanding the Qur’an, and learning about their religion are ways to maintain religious
identity (Brown, 2006). Indeed, respondents also clearly profess a religious identity (Muslim
identities) that helps bridge their intertwined ethnic and citizenship identities (South Asian
and British), hence attributing huge significance to the term, and the notion, of being
‘British Muslim’. I therefore highlight the emerging British Muslim identities in the UK,
where participants portray their meanings of Islam in a context in which Muslim identities
have been racialised and politicised post the terrorist attacks of September 11 and July 07. In
the advent of these controversial events, Muslims resist stereotypical depictions of Islam so
as to assert their own versions of Muslimness, hence supporting the argument that Muslim
identities are not fixed categories. I illustrate the diversity in the manifestation of Islamic
identities by firstly, analysing why the term ‘British Muslim’ is increasingly being used by
young Muslims in the UK and secondly, by looking at respondents’ perceptions and
experiences of the hijab.
More importantly, through my analysis, I emphasise that processes of negotiations
allow respondents to develop, construct and contest expressions of ‘Muslimness’ which
enable them to manage Muslimness. This begs questions such as: what does it mean to be
Muslim in Britain and what makes me Muslim in multicultural spaces where citizenship,
ethnicity, ‘race’ and gender intersect? Such debates, as indicated by respondents, are
commonly articulated and contested through clothing, where the visibility of the hijab on
university campuses and workplaces becomes an area of contention and negotiation for
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Muslim women in the UK. As Dwyer’s (1999: 7) work on the construction and the
articulation of alternative Muslim femininities and identities through the reworking of the
meanings of dress has revealed, the veil, as a form of dress, has become a ‘dominant
signifier for Islam’. In my study, it is clear that active motives on the part of educated
Muslim women to contest and construct ideals of Muslimness in Britain are leading them to
engage within processes of negotiations of their identities. Indeed, Bagguley and Hussain
(2008: 151) maintain that diasporic identities cannot remain ‘uncontaminated’ or ‘essential’
as change is inevitable. This point remains important to my study as it reflects the
possibilities for identities to develop and evolve, thereby deconstructing the notion that
identities are fixed; young Muslim women’s negotiations of their social identities indicate
the dynamic nature of identities and as such, demonstrate the potential for the assertion of
new gender identities.
5.2 EXPRESSING WHO I AM
I start this section by looking at how participants define themselves. Firstly, I look
at how they express (by definition) their identities. By ‘express’, I mean how respondents
formally define themselves by using terms such as ‘Asian’, ‘Muslim’ or ‘Pakistani’. In this
analysis, I aim to find out whether respondents prioritise one identity over another. This
demonstrates respondents’ negotiations of identities in signifying their agency to decide
which identity to embrace and which identity to reject. I also highlight the dynamic nature
of identities as participants contest and construct ethnic and religious identities as they
reflect on their sense of ‘self’; this reveals the shifting nature of identities as respondents
navigate their social contexts. Secondly, I discuss participants’ feelings about how external
perceptions from South Asians and Muslims, as well as non-South Asians and non-Muslims
in Britain influence and determine women’s own views on how they define themselves.
More specifically, I focus on respondents’ responses to what they feel remain ‘stereotypes’
and ‘labels’ of their social identities. This highlights the ways in which respondents evaluate
their identities and develop new gender identities as they explore higher educational and
work settings.
5.2.1 Processes of identification
Defining myself
Participants use a number of terms to formally define themselves. This is
demonstrative of the fact that young women are actively thinking about how to define
themselves as they use different terms, thereby reflecting the agency involved in shaping
their decisions. More explicitly, the differences among them rate from identifying
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themselves along citizenship (British), ethnic (Pakistani, Kashmiri, Bangladeshi, Gujarati,
Indian) and religious (Muslim) lines. Women seem to manifest an array of identities
whereby they are potentially able to make conscious decisions and choices to adopt
individual identities which they think to be more important to them; this demonstrates the
fluidity of subjective identities that young women employ to convey meanings as to how
they view themselves, hence constructing and contesting new identities for themselves. As
Werbner (2004) indicates, this is a voluntary process where young South Asian people
combine different identities to produce diverse spheres of diasporic identities suiting
situational contexts.
‘The South Asian category, there’s so many differences in that category and gender
differences as well but I want to, like I do, recognise myself as British...some people
would say Pakistani and I am a Pakistani but I also want to be known as British,
British South Asian, again these categories they’re way too broad, it’s like the
notion of black, in the 1990s...there was the term black associated with anybody
who was Asian and African Caribbean and we were all put under the same
umbrella, nowadays, it’s fused, through music and so on’ (Sonia).
A salient point is evident from my discussion with Sonia; her expressions of identity are
contextualised within broader political and racialised discourses which have dominated the
politics of ethnicity in the UK. Sonia is the only participant to express a politicised view of
South Asian identities; other participants express more individual and personal notions of
being ‘South Asian’ in Britain. Sonia, who recognises the shifts that have occurred in
discourses of South Asian identities in Britain, suggests that British South Asian identities
come with variations that have been essentialised, the same way in which Black identities
were stereotyped in the 1990s. Her response, as opposed to other participants, is reflective
of the fact that her educational background influences her perceptions and alters her mindset
about multicultural politics in the UK; her Master’s degree in Sociology, focussing on South
Asian identities in Britain, equips her with different analytical tools to comprehend how
identities are differentiated or fused through racialised discourses. Here, Sonia explains that
the term ‘black’, historically, has hindered the recognition of individual identities.
This political perspective tallies with Modood’s (2006: 42) argument, which
explains that through the black identity movement, questions about difference and how
white society should make space for the expression of non-white identities led to South
Asians in Britain to adopt a ‘plural ethnic assertiveness’, hence encouraging the
manifestation of public pluralist identities. Likewise, Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 149) use
the term ‘hybridised Asianess’ to suggest that following the influx of black culture (hip
hop/rap music) and concepts such as ‘black pride’, South Asians in Britain have similarly
generated concepts of British South Asianess through specific types of music (western
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dance/ bhangra) that help to contain meanings of Asianess, ‘symbolically representing a
hybrid of both cultures’. This point has similarly been raised by Sonia, who identifies fusion
of identities through popular culture (music).
In the opening section of my interviews, I asked respondents how they ‘define’
themselves so as to get a general overview of how they choose to express their ‘sense of
self’, and why they believe that the terms they use are appropriate. Previous research
(Dwyer, 2000; Ahmad et al., 2003; Afshar et al., 2005) has also shown that young South
Asians profess hyphenated, hybrid or multiple identities. Indeed, the second generation of
South Asian migrants in Britain articulate distinctive values by acknowledging Britain as
their home (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008), hence participating in the notion that celebrates
‘cultures of hybridity’, (Gilroy, 1993) blending East and West. There has been considerable
research on how women of British South Asian ethnic minorities navigate between ethnic
and citizenship identities to define themselves. Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 143), drawing
on Benedict Anderson’s (1983) ‘imagined communities’, and focusing on citizenship rights
and identity discourses, suggest that it is important to ‘rethink citizenship from the
perspective of collective identity conceptualised as an imaginary community’ when
assessing South Asian communities in Britain. As they point out, issues around citizenship
must be understood as a ‘significant dimension of hybridised ethnic identities’ (Bagguley
and Hussain, 2008: 145). This notion is supported by my study as it is evident that my
respondents also affix citizenship identity to other social identities such as ethnic or
religious identity; in fact, the large majority of participants affix ‘British’ to either ethnic or
religious identity.
Hyphenated (hybrid) identities
Most respondents express themselves by using hyphenated identities. Eleven
women call themselves ‘British Muslim’, whereby ethnic identity for these respondents is
not prioritised over Islamic and citizenship identities. However, one participant suggests that
she prefers the term ‘Muslim British’ instead. Seven respondents identify themselves as
‘British Pakistani’, hence hyphenating their citizenship and ethnic backgrounds. Only three
respondents determine their identities using ethnicity, alternating between ‘British Asian’
and ‘British South Asian’. Three respondents view themselves merely along ethnic origin -
‘Pakistani’ and ‘Bangladeshi’, while only two identify solely as ‘British’. Three respondents
manifest complex and multiple identities, such as ‘British Asian Muslim’. Out of this
research sample, only one young woman professed her identity as being simply ‘Muslim’:
‘I prefer to just call myself Muslim because it’s simpler…I wouldn’t say to other
people that I’m British and by the way a person talks you can know whether they’re
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British. Pakistani, I don’t like telling people that I am cause there’s so much
rubbish associated with the culture…it’s the culture that Pakistanis impose on
others’ (Aisha).
As I argue later on in this chapter, religious identity is a prominent facet of women’s
definitions of their ‘sense of self’. Here, Aisha reveals that her Muslimness provides her
with enough scope to encompass other aspects of her identity; in effect, she expresses her
inability to embrace ‘Pakistani culture’ and the prioritising of her Muslim identity aids in
articulating a more comfortable aspect of herself, in her adherence to Islam. In deciding to
deny aspects such as ‘British’ and ‘Pakistani’, Aisha finds an easy solution to the problem of
‘choosing’ or ‘picking’ an identity over another. Indeed, participants claim that it is
extremely hard to dissociate the various strands of their social identities. In my research, just
two respondents maintain that they could literally pick one identity over another when asked
whether they could prioritise between their citizenship, ethnic and religious identities. As
the quote below echoes, negotiating identities by epitomising the joint realities of being ‘all
of them’ positions women within a framework where identities cannot be viewed as fixed,
but fluid:
‘When people come up to me and say… what are you? I can get quite defensive
about that as not only am I a private person …I find it strange that people who
don’t know me just out of the blue… I tend to say well…what do you mean? Do you
mean where I was born? My background? Or where my parents are from? To be
honest, I’d say I’m all of them. I’m Asian, I’m British, I’m Muslim and I’m
Gujarati’ (Alia).
For Hanah, ‘being comfortable’ in her identity is what matters to her; categorising her
‘sense of self’ is not helpful and remains unnecessary:
‘I’ve embraced my culture a lot more now…when you’re young, you want to be
British…peer pressure…to be told in my early 20s ‘oh you don’t look like an Asian’
or Pakistani, I’d be like ‘thank you’ and now I actually feel like no, I’m proud to be
who I am because that’s part of me but I’m very comfortable because I don’t like to
be put in a box, I like to be awkward hence ‘other’’ (Hanah).
Hanah’s awareness to recognise a shift in how she positions herself now, as opposed
to succumbing to ‘peer pressure’ which previously encouraged her to reject her ‘religion’
and ‘culture’, highlights the possibilities for identities to be re-worked in a more positive
light as women gain educational and work experiences. Hanah’s reflection demonstrates that
women’s perceptions of who they are evolve by noting the transitions they go through as
they grow older. Such progress in understandings leads Hanah to become reluctant to accept
the notion of fixed categories as she utters her refusal to ‘be put in a box’. While some
women would prioritise religious identity over ethnic identity, others would link citizenship
and religious identity. This process of identification therefore reveals that participants
project carefully articulated identities. Respondents portray the ambivalence and also the
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complexities of having to ‘deal’ with multiple aspects of their identities. These mark the
tensions that arise when racialised discourses, seen through ‘ethnicity’, impact on how
young women are perceived, and consequently, on how they define themselves. For
instance, although Sadia suggests that she would pick ‘British’ to define herself, she reflects
on the difficulty of adhering solely to being British and interestingly, comments on the fact
that although she was brought up in a Pakistani culture in England, her upbringing does not
make her Pakistani:
‘British... always...no doubt about that…but it’s difficult to say...like Pakistani,
we’ve never lived there except when we go back on holidays and so on, our parents
are from there but we go there, we’re treated as foreigners, like you’re not from
here… although we’ve been brought up in like a Pakistani culture, we are not
Pakistani ourselves we are British born Muslims of Pakistani descent if that makes
sense’ (Sadia).
I here reflect specifically on Sadia’s perspective on ‘belonging’ to emphasise the articulation
of her identities; she suggests that her cultural heritage is not perceived by Pakistani
nationals as authentic as she is treated ‘like foreigners’. Nevertheless, her ‘British’ identity
is infused by her Pakistani upbringing, which also remits into question her ‘Britishness’.
‘No, not one will take precedence over the other…If someone is being completely
accepting of both my backgrounds, then that’s fine. I’ll say they’re equal, British,
Indian, Pakistani and Muslim…multiple and I cannot tell you that I’m one more
than the other’ (Sabina, of Pakistani and Indian heritage).
‘It’s not a problem but it’s about being in between and it’s not even conscious like
I’m fine with it but I’m all of them and I can’t pick one, I think that’s the hardest
thing for me’ (Rashida).
Likewise, Sabina and Rashida find it hard to choose among their multiple identities.
For Sabina, they are all ‘equal’ while for Rashida, being ‘all of them’ is natural as she does
not consciously think that she finds herself in between cultures. Rashida does not, in effect,
feel the need to negotiate identities so as to prioritise one identity over another. Here, I
highlight the differences I encountered among participants in the ways in which they
manage Muslimness through their negotiations of, for instance, clothing. For some
respondents, clothing becomes a visual illustration of one’s identity and comes to define and
direct the ways in which they engage into negotiating identities. As an example, Nazia’s
quote demonstrates how individuality and subjectivity influence the expression of identities
through clothing:
‘I’m British and I’m religious, like I wear jeans and tops with the hijab as I am
both. But I don’t think I would choose one over the other, the two are
interchangeable, I couldn’t live without one or the other, I couldn’t be entirely
British because it would go against my rules of being Muslim and I couldn’t live
being completely Muslim because it would be difficult, a lot of things come from my
146
British culture, the two are mixed and I could never separate the two, ever...I live
my religion, but I couldn’t follow it entirely because it’s so hard to follow, I mean
according to Islamic values, I shouldn’t be too familiar with boys but it’s not
possible here’ (Nazia).
Nazia wears ‘jeans and tops with the hijab’; she describes this style as being ‘both’. It is her
way of visually saying that she is both Muslim and British. For her, it is impossible to
choose between her British and Muslim identity. Nevertheless, navigation encompasses a
framework for contradiction, which young women like Nazia epitomise; ‘British culture’
and ‘Islamic values’ may contradict each other, thereby resulting into the realisation that
adaptation to contextual environments remains important if one wants to embrace ‘both’.
This tension is further exemplified through gender relationships that women have to
cope with as they explore educational or work spaces. More specifically, Nazia, a practising
Muslim, is faced with contradicting attitudes with respect to Muslim codes prohibiting the
casual inter-mingling of sexes, which, in the British context, is normalised. Yet, Nazia finds
ways to adapt to situations. Here, Nazia mentions that geographical location influences how
one chooses to embrace identities; processes of identification are therefore closely
interlinked to geographical context:
‘If I was living in a Muslim country that would be the norm and you accept that but
you have to change in a different society, people say ‘you are who you are and you
shouldn’t change’ but no, you have to, because you are in different surroundings,
different society and you have to mingle into that society, not think that you have
rules and regulations and then stamp your foot and think ‘this is how I’m going to
be because my religion makes me an individual’ You live in a society where you
study and work with other people and you have to adapt with what’s around you
and this is what makes me who I am’ (Nazia).
For Nazia, ‘British culture’ cannot and should not be sidelined so that an individual can
fully embrace what he or she thinks Islam prescribes. In essence, choice remains a
significant aspect on women’s agendas, where Nazia manages her Muslim identity by
exercising agency in the ways in which they understand the meanings of Islam within their
social contexts.
Having looked broadly at the complexities involved in defining, hence expressing
one’s identity, I extend this discussion further by concentrating on women’s adoption of
hyphenated (or hybrid) identities. I do so because the majority of respondents have
expressed their identities using hyphenated terms, where ethnic and citizenship identities
remain deeply embedded within racialised discourses on ‘Asianess’ and ‘Britishness’:
‘I just see myself as a young British South Asian. And it’s hard sometimes because
there are certain things that Western society does, and that I don’t do, but there are
a lot of things that I do...it’s the same with the Asian side, there are some things that
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I don’t believe in and others I do...so sometimes it’s a bit like ‘Oh where do I fit?
Am I here? Am I there?’ But now I’ve just come to think of it as...like I’ve got my
own identity, I’ve got my views and traditions from my Asian community and also
from Western society, so I’ve got an individual identity… I’m not going to say I’m
Western or completely South Asian but a mixture of both’ (Saeema).
Respondents provide reasons why they use certain terms such as ‘British Pakistani’, ‘British
Asian’ or ‘South Asian’, all hybridised terms, to identify themselves. Their citizenship
status as British is almost always juxtaposed to an ethnic or religious identity; in effect, even
though they see themselves as ‘British’, ethnic (for example ‘Pakistani’) or religious (for
example ‘Muslim’) is added to the prefix ‘British’. However, it is also possible for them to
fluctuate between terms and notions as perceptions and meanings about their identities
change. Constructing personal identities and versions of Britishness and Asianess lead
women to find a space where they are able to express ‘individual’ identities:
‘My little sister came from Pakistan, she was born there and she came with this
culture, two of my sisters were born in Pakistan and they brought the culture with
them, one was six when she came and she says this is how we do it in Pakistan and I
say no! We have different nationalities... I was born here and she grew up there
with my auntie and she says she’s British Pakistani straight but my cousin who
comes from Pakistan will say ‘I’m British and’ she doesn’t even have a British
passport and that’s just bizarre’ (Aisha).
Aisha draws on the differences that erupt when siblings have ‘different nationalities’, hence
different versions of citizenship identity. Her two sisters came to England from Pakistan and
will always define themselves as ‘British Pakistani’, as opposed to a cousin, who does not
have a British passport, but feels confident to define herself as British. As Aisha defines
how ‘bizarre’ these experiences can be, she subtly highlights the fluidity, and even, the ease
with which members of her family can interchangeably utilise such terms, irrespective of
place of birth and country of origin. This indicates how processes of identification remain
subjective as women choose to articulate their identities in their individual ways.
Sabina is of mixed ethnic heritage; her father is Indian and her mother is Pakistani.
Sabina was born in Britain and married someone of Pakistani origin. Throughout our
discussion, she has expressed her frustration at the fact that her ‘Indian’ identity is
considerably brushed aside by her husband’s family:
‘I’d say that probably I would be Indian more than Pakistani because I get annoyed
with people who are Pakistani. It’s like ‘Oh I thought you were Hindu’, they can’t
believe it my father-in-law has been saying, since I got married that whenever we
go we have to get your Pakistani passport made…I go like ‘I’m not really
Pakistani’, what’s the point? I’ve got a British passport…why bother? It really,
really bothers me…my husband’s family…they want me to forget I’m half
Indian…that’s why I just say Asian cause I am both Pakistani and Indian…my
parents-in-law’s parents are 100% Indian, so they are 100% Indian as well
although they may have been born on Pakistani soil, they have Indian heritage as
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well, there is nothing to be ashamed of about it’ (Sabina, of Pakistani and Indian
origin).
I here want to suggest that although identities appear to be fluid, they can also be competing
and hence, generate tensions for individuals. Indeed, for respondents of mixed descent like
Sabina, the use of hyphenated identities is, not surprisingly, particularly important. For this
reason, Sabina prefers to use ‘British Asian’. It is evident that her citizenship identity is of
upmost importance to her, while the term ‘Asian’ helps her manage the complexities of
being of mixed ethnic heritage. A link between ethnicity and religion can also be drawn as
in being of Indian origin, Sabina reflects on the fact that she is automatically labelled as
‘Hindu’ instead of Muslim, by the Pakistani community; in effect, being Pakistani is then
often equated with being Muslim in British South Asian Muslim communities.
‘When people say ‘What are you?’ and I say ‘Pakistani’ and I think the only time I
started referring to ‘South Asian’ was when I went to uni and I did my own
research, that’s when my perceptions changed and I think that’s why I’m saying
‘South Asian’ now because before that I’d always used ‘British Pakistani’...it makes
more sense as people know I am British when I speak right’ (Saeema).
Saeema, since going to university and studying multicultural identities in the UK as
part of her course, reiterates that using ‘South Asian’ became more appropriate in a context
where people of diverse cultures and nationality meet and mix (university). By using the
term ‘South Asian’ instead of ‘British Pakistani’, Saeema highlights not her ethnic
background (Pakistani) but her cultural heritage (South Asian). Indeed, she assumes that her
‘Britishness’ is evident when she speaks English with a northern accent. In the discussion
below, I further elaborate on notions of ‘Britishness’, as reiterated by respondents.
Meanings of ‘Britishness’
Bushra, on her part, attempts to assume a position within racialised discourses
which essentialise Britishness as whiteness. She unequivocally believes that her ‘Asianess’,
expressed though her ethnic origin, does not make her ‘just’ British:
‘I always say Asian! But if you have to tick boxes, then I tick British Indian
(Laugh)...you don’t hear that actually…if it’s non-specific then it’s British
Asian…yes I’m both. I’m definitely not only Asian cause I’ve never lived there and
my passport is not Asian and I have to get a visa to go back there...so the link I have
got is through my parents who are Asians but my passport is British so I am British,
but I guess ethnicity always comes into it. I’m not white Caucasian British so yeah,
probably British Asian...I am British but I’m not White, not English...I think
Americans have a better concept of that, they’re all Americans, they don’t have this’
(Bushra).
In this discussion I stress how inclusionary and exclusionary political discourses on ethnic
minorities, which root ethnic origin as a premise for identification, results in divisive
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frameworks which encourage the notion of fixed categories. This ultimately affects women
in how they define themselves when thinking about citizenship identity. Bushra
differentiates the notions of ‘Britishness’ from ‘Americaness’. Indeed, Bagguley and
Hussain (2008), in considering ‘Americaness’ as reference, reflect on the fact that
Americans understand ethnic identity within the broader concept of national identity, as
opposed to Britons, who affix ‘whiteness’ to Britishness. The recognition of racism
therefore affects young women’s sense of identity as their feelings of belonging are heavily
influenced by racialised and politicised discourses around citizenship, inclusion and
exclusion. Raising questions about citizenship and definitions of Englishness and
Britishness, Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 146) note that national identity is being perceived
as a ‘white ethnic’ unified group by the far right, whereby ‘Englishness continues to
reproduce blackness as it’s other’; ‘Britishness constitutes white ethnic groups such as the
English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish who do not share similar language or culture’.
This arguably is what frames Bushra’s notion of ‘Britishness’, although she explains
the differences between Britishness with Englishness, and ultimately, citizenship with
ethnicity. Bushra, born in England, a non-white and therefore excluded from ‘Englishness’
equates ‘whiteness’ with ‘Britishness’. Dwyer (2000: 476) argues that ‘Britishness’ is often
synonymous with an essentialised construction of ‘Englishness’, which is subtly related to
‘whiteness’. Bushra’s ‘Asianess’ cannot account for her being accepted as inherently
‘British’ and hence, feels the need to hyphenate ‘Asian’ to ‘British’. For that reason, she
expresses the difficulty in identifying herself solely as ‘British’, although she is officially a
British citizen by law. As Cesarani (1996, quoted in Bagguley and Hussain, 2008: 146)
claims, ‘Britishness is a political construct while Englishness is a cultural concept that
racialises the politics of citizenship’. Indeed, Shazia explains:
‘You’re not white so…even if you see a white Muslim sometimes and they have a
headscarf on, somebody would shout ‘Paki’ to her…I was born in Britain….bloody
hell…even some of the people of Middle Eastern origin do look Asian, my friend
from Oman she looks Asian and people would yell ‘Paki! Asian-Paki’…you’re
Asian, you’re Bengali or whatever, and you’re all the same. If you’re black you’re
just Negro…but you’re not seen as British’ (Shazia).
From this, I emphasise how processes of identification remain embedded in cultural racism
governed by stereotypical depictions of ‘Asianess’. Here, Shazia talks about the
impossibility of using the term ‘British’ due to racialised stereotyping. Indeed, making an
interesting link between citizenship, Islam and racialised identities, she suggests that
assumptions about non-Britishness are always defined through non-whiteness, just like
Muslimness (here marked by the headscarf) is never associated with whiteness but with
Asianess.
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Yasmin reinforces this argument; in being from a ‘non-white background’, her
identity as ‘British’ is not given full approval. However, the way she defines herself
changed with her trip to Pakistan, where the cultural differences encountered during her stay
led to a recognition and acknowledgment of her citizenship identity, with which she finds
herself ‘comfortable’ with:
‘I never really thought of myself as British until I went abroad and realised that I
don’t fit in anywhere else...I feel more at home here like when we were growing up,
always thought of ourselves as Pakistanis or Kashmiris but when we went there, we
didn’t fit in at all and I was 14 so I feel more comfortable with my British identity
than anything else but I do put British Kashmiri and the reasons they put down
these terms, it’s discrimination and I know that I am disadvantaged in being from a
non-white background so I put British Kashmiri but I do think of myself as a British
more than anything’ (Yasmin).
Furthermore, Yasmin has gone beyond ‘Pakistani’ in the way that she defines her ethnic
identity. She is now readier to embrace a more specific ethnic affiliation, which is
‘Kashmiri’. Her quote suggests that it is a self-conscious political act to re-evaluate the way
in which she identifies herself in order to challenge the discrimination she experiences. For
ethnic communities, religious or cultural allegiances contribute in defining their
communities as ethnic minorities. For these communities, ‘citizenship identity’ will
therefore always work in conjunction with how national identity is perceived by
communities themselves (Bagguley and Hussain, 2008: 147). Indeed, Bagguley and Hussain
(2008) suggest that young South Asians in the UK generate the idea of ‘multiple identities’
(British/Pakistani/Muslim), thereby engaging with their own definitions of citizenship.
For instance, participants demonstrate links between culture (South Asian) and
citizenship (British), whereby individually negotiating between these two concepts
determines how respondents perceive themselves. For example, Rashida reflects on her
experiences at university, which acts as a site for the contestation of identities; in contesting
identities, respondents encounter the possibilities of shifting identities over time and space.
This is a key point in this analysis of Muslim women’s identities as it illustrates how
university experiences are contributing to respondents’ evolving gender identities:
‘I would never have thought of these things before like those experiences and people
ask you questions and it’s like, it makes you think actually, like do I not look it
(South Asian)? Or you know, I was asked once ‘are you Persian?’ and I was like
‘what?’ and all this makes you think and you have cases of ‘are you British?’ It
makes you think because I look Pakistani and at the same time you’re here and
these two identities just overlap, I’m both’ (Rashida).
Talking about her physical appearance, Rashida questions the assumptions that in being
non-white, people would automatically know that she is ‘Pakistani’ and hence, South Asian.
Here, Rashida feels that her citizenship and ethic identities overlap when her identities are
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publicly scrutinised, whereby demonstrating that she is ‘both’ remains important to her.
Ultimately, Rashida is unconsciously participating in the racialisation of her identities by
reading her ethnicity ‘from the body’- in asking the question ‘do I not look it?’, Rashida
self-ascribes a ‘South Asian’ or ‘Pakistani’ identity to her body and being.
‘British Pakistani…I do use it, that’s where my grandparents came from and my
mum and whenever we talk about back home, we talk about Pakistan, like you never
say back home England, you call back home Pakistan and for some reason that’s
what you do…but I was born here’ (Nadia).
In using ‘British Pakistani’, Nadia maintains the balance of acknowledging her
citizenship as well as her ethnic and cultural heritage. Indeed, ‘home’ in Nadia’s context is
always Pakistan and never England, although her parents and grandparents live in England.
Identity is therefore evoked through notions and meanings of home, whereby geographical
distance does not hinder young women from constructing and articulating ethnic and
national identities of their grandparents’ and parents’ generations. This analysis is supported
by previous research (Afshar, 1989), who has also demonstrated the ‘mythical haven’
evoked through notions of the homeland by South Asian migrants. Abida agrees:
‘I would say I’m a Pakistani. That’s my identity, even though I was born in Britain.
I’m not ashamed of it and I will say I’m a Pakistani because it is the homeland, but
I can’t say I’m a British for some reason…I go out, I explore the shopping, I wear
jeans…I do everything as is done in this country, education… I speak with a
Northern accent but when I go home I live the life with my parents, their culture,
their ways, and I feel in myself…being a bit more British with my accent, but why I
say I’m Pakistani is because I feel that the way I do it is more like a Pakistani
person’ (Abida).
Although born and bred in the UK, Abida maintains that she is unable to say that she is
‘British’. Her insight into her definition of ‘British’ is not through the legal/civic rights she
obtains as a British citizen, or the status she gains from being a British national, but more
through language and her ‘accent’. Clearly, her way of life ‘at home’ (cultural customs in
the private sphere) takes priority over her citizenship status, whereby her citizenship identity
is sidelined; the ‘British’ culture for Abida resumes itself to education, shopping and eating
out, activities carried out in public spheres. However, in defining who she is, her allegiance
remains predominantly linked to her parents’ Pakistani cultural heritage, their national
culture, which Abida adopts as her own.
Such diverging opinions on definitions of what it means to be ‘British’ for young
Muslim women of South Asian origin have exposed not only the fluid nature of evolving
identities but also the controversies and tensions which emanate from such processes of
active negotiations. I believe that this debate has also thrown light on women’s expressions
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of identities, through inclusionary and exclusionary racialised discourses. As Alia illustrates:
‘I am British but not totally, I am not white, like English’ (Alia).
This concept adopts and encourages the biased and racialised equation of British is equal to
English, which is in turn, epitomised through whiteness. As respondents navigate these
notions, they raise discussions about what it means to be ‘Muslim’, ‘South Asian’ and
‘British’. In contextualising their debates within the wider discourses of multiculturalism
and national belonging, respondents demonstrate that their negotiations are having an
impact on the ways in which they think, and project their identities. This section has
revealed the multiple ways in which respondents choose to define themselves. It has
demonstrated that whilst some prefer to prioritise citizenship and ethnic identities (for
example British Pakistani), others choose to affix citizenship with religious identity (British
Muslim). Indeed, participants also manifest other options by using terms such as ‘British
South Asian’. Women’s carefully articulated and contextualised identities reflect their
agency in manifesting their identities. Nevertheless, their negotiations occur within
racialised discourses of South Asian Muslim identities in Britain; what constitutes
Britishness, South Asianess and Muslimness for respondents influences how and why they
define themselves as they do. Their perceptions are leading them to formulate new gender
identities as they navigate educational and work settings. In the next part of this analysis, I
highlight the contours of such debates by reviewing how participants think that they are
perceived by non-South Asians and non-Muslims in Britain so as to determine how external
perceptions impact on participants’ views of their identities. As they evaluate external
perceptions of identities, young women engage with discourses about gendered identities,
leading them to question, contest, and construct new identities.
5.2.2 Labels and stereotypes
During the interviews, respondents suggested that external perceptions contribute
significantly to how they view themselves. In particular, they claim that public perceptions
rest upon how non-Asians and non-Muslims understand, accept or critique notions of being
British, South Asian or Muslim in multicultural Britain. From women’s responses,
‘labelling’ and ‘stereotyping’ of their identities seem evident. These lead them to experience
different reactions in various social contexts, hence participating in constructing Muslim
women’s gendered identities within the broader context of British society. As Bushra states:
‘At university, everyone is like ‘who are you? Where are you from?’ So much of
that, like ‘oh you’re Indian Muslim, so you must be Gujarati’, and I’m like ‘no’, I’m
just Indian Muslim, I’m not part of anything in India, from Bombay, like when
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you’re Muslim, they want to know what sect and so on, a lot of that happening at
university…labelling’ (Bushra).
Bushra, in stressing how ‘university’ becomes a significant social space where contestations
occur, expresses her frustration about assumptions that equate religion to ethnicity, whereby
being ‘Indian Muslim’ does not necessarily mean that she is of Gujarati origin. Bushra’s
frustration indicates not a denial of ethnic identity but a resistance to stereotypical labelling.
Indeed, essentialist notions of women’s ethnic and Muslim identities contribute to ‘labels’,
hence developing fixed notions of women’s social identities. Nevertheless, Haleema
acknowledges the diversity of views from non-Asian and non-Muslim groups, highlighting
the variations in the ways people think about their British identities:
‘I have encountered different types of non-Asian and non-Muslim people and they
all behave in a different way, some of them would be fine talking to me but some of
them are unsure as of how to talk to me. In Britain, and the western world, the
media has such a strong hold on everything and a lot of people get influenced by the
media and then coming back to education again, I find the more educated people
behave differently towards me cause they’ll be more tolerant… people who are not
educated will be more influenced by the media because they haven’t got that scope
on things so that’s why education is so important’ (Haleema).
The media’s role in constructing Asianess and Muslimness, as well as educational
levels, influence people’s perceptions of South Asian identities in Britain; recognising and
accepting difference remains an issue whereby education encourages diversity in how
multiple identities are understood, articulated and manifested. The degree to which people
‘mix’ with those from ethnic minorities also contribute to their notions of nationality and
citizenship, hence shaping ideas and notions of Britishness. Racialised, ethnic and religious
affiliations are viewed as manifestations that prevent British society from potentially
regarding British born Muslims of South Asian descent as fully British:
‘Perceptions depend on people’s political beliefs, their religious belief and their
affections towards Muslims depends on individuals’ thinking, if they’re very liberal
about their views, they’re going to accept everyone on the base that they are
humans just like them but if somebody is patriotic then they’ll probably be a little
fiery, like be protective and self-centred about their identity and they would use the
term ‘pure blood’ so pure British, like white’ (Fatimah).
Fatimah, who thinks that this question is also debatable, suggests that a stronger sense of
nationality on people’s part may influence their reactions and beliefs that Muslim women of
South Asian origin are British; not being considered ‘of pure blood’, or viewed as
‘immigrants’, will impact on how perceptions are constructed and affirmed, further
reinforcing this concept of ‘othering’. Fatimah maintains that the more ‘liberal’ they are, the
easier it is for people to accept others on the basis of humanity, as opposed to identities
defined through racialised, ethnic or religious principles. More specifically, research
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participants denounce how language (accent), skin colour and dress remain significant
identity markers in framing difference within racialised boundaries that women socially
experience:
‘When they speak to me, they probably assume that I’m British and whether they
feel I belong here, that’s a totally different matter, I’m judged that’s for sure, my
culture says it all’ (Faiza).
Faiza describes a discourse of marginalisation which is based on both ‘assumption’
about belonging (from external perception based on accent) and having the right to claim a
space of ‘belonging’ (having the right to belong). This suggests that to gain full acceptance
as ‘British’ is thorny as her ‘culture’ demarcates her as different, hence defining her as
‘other’; her citizenship identity is brought into question as Faiza expresses her awareness of
being ‘judged’ by people of non-South Asian backgrounds. If cultural identity marks the
differential boundaries of who ‘belongs’ and who ‘does not’ for Faiza, for Nazia, racialised
identity and the dichotomy white versus non-white is ultimately what defines her as ‘other’
and hence, not ‘British’:
‘At the end of the day, I have dark skin, I don’t have white skin...but I was born
here’ (Nazia).
Shabana raises issues about her ‘nationality’ and suggests that context determines how
identities are assessed and perceived:
‘If I don’t agree with something in Pakistan, I can stand up and say this is wrong
and nobody will say anything but if I say something here, first thing that’s going to
come up here is my nationality, no one thinks that I can think because of my
nationality...it’s easy for me to say I am Pakistani but if you can’t deal with it, that’s
your problem because I am British, but I am still Pakistani and wherever I go,
people at work for example, they don’t refer to me as ‘that girl’ but as ‘that Asian
girl’…it’s who I am, my skin colour is different and it’s easy for others to say ‘that
Asian girl’, it’s just a word but it means ‘she’s not British’ when I say I’m Pakistani
it makes my life a lot easier as white people are not accepting me, I am Pakistani
and I am not trying to be like them’ (Shabana).
Shabana’s dual allegiances to being Pakistani and British are not acknowledged as her
Asianess sets her apart from British ‘white’ society. Denouncing prejudices, she highlights
that she is labelled ‘the Asian girl’ by non-South Asians in Britain, and hence, is not seen as
being fully capable of embracing British values due to her Pakistani heritage. From
respondents’ views reiterated in this section, it is clear that the external perceptions of their
identities, generated through ‘labels’ and ‘stereotypes’ at university or work, demonstrate
the ways in which young women are engaging with the wider discourses around South
Asianess and Muslimness in Britain. As they navigate meanings of South Asianness,
Muslimness and Britishness, respondents rework their understandings of identities so as to
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formulate new ones. In the following section, I extend this theme of ‘labelling’ and
‘stereotyping’ by focussing on dress codes; I discuss how the aspect of dressing acts as a
code contributing to the process of labelling and stereotyping of British South Asian
identities within spaces such as education and work.
5.2.3 Dress code: a marker of identity
In this section, I focus on how dress codes, in spaces such as university and work,
help to signify respondents’ identities. Indeed, questions such as ‘does it matter what I
wear?’ raise debates about the extent to which clothing embodies notions of ascribed
identities. Here, I reflect on how dress codes are being re-negotiated by young women as
they navigate new spaces of university and work. This analysis, in effect, further
demonstrates how young Muslim women negotiate their social contexts at university and
work so as to construct and assert new gender identities. Indeed, all participants in this study
suggest that clothing aids in signifying ethnic identities:
‘I think it’s clothing more than anything else that makes you bring out the culture, if
anything it’s a label’ (Rashida).
‘Once I start speaking they know but more the way I dress and look, that’s why they
see me as British and not Pakistani’ (Sanaa).
‘They always see me as British...but I wear salwar kameez and I speak in a northern
accent…so they know, but what they see first is the outfit’ (Rahila).
These examples demonstrate that participants recognise dress codes not only as an important
facet marking their identities but also as contributing to the labelling of their ethnic
identities. For instance, for Sanaa, her Britishness is not epitomised through her ‘accent’ but
through her dress style (jeans, dress and tops); in wearing jeans, Sanaa maintains that she is
not viewed as ‘Pakistani’. However, unlike Sanaa, Rahila is convinced that her physical
appearance does not matter, as opposed to others, who perceive dress to be a significant
marker of difference influencing people’s notions of Britishness. Rahila establishes the fact
that she is British and is convinced that due to her accent, she is regarded as British, despite
her Pakistani outfit (salwar kameez).
Participants also reiterate how religious identity, perceived through the use of the
hijab or jilbab, influences notions about their ‘Britishness’. As Nazia and Mushira explain:
‘I was born here but I think it’s more prominent with me because I wear the hijab,
and it’s such a big part of my identity, I may be British or Pakistani but it doesn’t
matter, cause I am Muslim, cause my hijab is so obvious, that it represents my
religion before anything, so I don’t think they really would say that I’m not British
but the question is ‘she’s Muslim as she wears the hijab’, and it’s being more
Muslim than British Pakistani’ (Nazia).
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‘No...I think if I wasn’t wearing the headscarf they would see me as British and I
don’t know why I think this but they don’t’ (Mushirah).
Although her Muslim identity remains the primary marker for Nazia, the pertinent comment
she makes is in wearing the hijab, she reveals that her Muslimness takes precedence over
her citizenship identity; her hijab symbolises that she is Muslim and this influences how she
is perceived, and the degrees of importance which she attributes to her religious, ethnic and
citizenship identities. As for Mushirah, she categorically utters that her hijab is the reason
why she is not considered ‘British’.
For Saeema, assumptions about her gendered and racialised identity as ‘the Asian
girl’ become the medium where people assess her identity and subjectivity:
‘You’re not British, you’re Asian…the Asian girl...I think they perceive me with like
no headscarf, western clothes, educated, and they, like white blokes think ‘oh she’s
like that’ and they could make you do whatever they want you to do, like you’re
available and you’re going to go out and have sex, like you’re loose’ (Saeema).
Recounting her experiences with ‘white’ men, Saeema maintains that Asian girls are
categorised within groups where clothing (‘headscarves’ and ‘western clothes’) will
differentiate how they are perceived by the public. Indeed, their gendered modes of
behaviour are assessed through the lifestyle they choose to adopt. For them, an Asian girl
wearing jeans and no headscarf signals that she is ‘available’. The stereotype is such that
Asian girls who adopt a more ‘British’ lifestyle of going out in ‘western clothes’, albeit with
limitations (Saeema does not drink and covers her legs), suggests that she is regarded as
being ‘loose’ by non-South Asian men. From this, her individuality and position as a British
South Asian Muslim woman is essentialised and depicted as non- South Asian due to the
non-traditional look she presents.
Abida strengthens this argument when she recounts that public perceptions change
as soon as she started, out of choice, to wear the hijab:
‘I started wearing the hijab…you start becoming more paranoid about the way you
look when you wear a scarf…because of the way people see you, they change…as a
Muslim, from a non-Muslim to a Muslim….then they start asking why is she
wearing a scarf? All of a sudden, all the prejudice that you get...the typical ‘she’s
probably wearing it because of her parents’ (Abida).
In fact, she describes her experience as ‘paranoia’, whereby prejudice governs assumptions
that Abida, as an Asian girl, succumbed to parental pressure to wear the hijab. Indeed, her
Muslimness is obvious through the adoption of a dress code associated with Islam; she
immediately turns from ‘a non-Muslim to a Muslim’ as she adopts the scarf. Clothing
therefore affects how people perceive respondents’ identities. The British versus Asian dress
style dichotomy is reiterated, whereby dress codes mark, label and define one’s identity as
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British or non-British, hence as Asian and Muslim. Yet, Aisha, who wears the hijab and the
jilbab, does not agree with Mushirah’s Saeema’s and Abida’s views that dress ‘excludes’
them from being ‘British’:
‘People here are very accepting mashallah, very good response from non-Muslims
cause I wear the jilbab and I work in retail, in Next and they’re really good. They
see me as being British even with the jilbab. They accept the jilbab and even non-
Muslims were telling me that it looks nice and that I dress modestly and that they
just went into Primark and saw that girl trying revealing jeans on and it was
absolutely hideous and people are wearing the hijab more, even the jilbab so people
are getting used to seeing it’ (Aisha).
Alternatively, Aisha claims that her jilbab does not prevent members of the public from
acknowledging her as British. On the contrary, she is complimented on her style of dress,
which she adopts at the workplace. Interestingly, Aisha thinks that the jilbab is not
negatively viewed by non-Muslims as a marker of ‘difference’ but as a garment signifying
the Islamic ethos of being ‘modest’. This underlines a religious (Islamic) interpretation
instead of a political (difference/ ‘other’) interpretation on the part of non-Muslims. For
Aisha, non-Muslims’ attitudes towards her dress code appear to be more inclusionary than
exclusionary. In effect, Aisha does not feel that she is being ‘labelled’ or ‘stereotyped’
through her choice of dress codes.
Dwyer’s (1999: 5-26) study on the role of clothing and its effects on Muslim
women’s identities reflect the ‘Asian/English’ dichotomy whereby, depending on context,
‘Asian clothes’ have associations with ‘tradition’ and ‘ethnic culture’ while ‘English
clothes’ are used as signifiers for ‘Westernisation’ and ‘modernity’. My respondents portray
similar understandings of dress codes, where dress styles inform women’s bodies through
oppositional identities, which are reflective of ‘ethnic’ versus ‘Western’ ideals:
‘I go home, I put on Asian clothes and then I become Asian, once I saw a friend in
Oldham town, not at uni, and I had a salwar kameez on and she jeans on and I was
like ‘why didn’t you tell me you’re wearing jeans?’ And I went really quiet, like I
lost my confidence because it wasn’t right, it wasn’t the right outfit, it was not like
western...the Asian girls, they wear Asian clothes not English clothes but she turned
up in jeans and I felt that she was better than me or more confident and I went quiet
and shy, I just felt awkward because the clothes are wrong, like Pakistani, and
that’s weird’ (Sanaa).
For instance, Sanaa exemplifies how her identities are lived through clothing but
simultaneously, clash with each other. Not having the right dress code on to suit particular
contexts can lead to embarrassment and confusion. Here, Sanaa lost confidence and face in
front of a friend who wore jeans, immediately feeling conscious that she was ‘Asian’ (shy
and quiet) when she could have worn jeans and depict a ‘western’ (confident) image of
herself; place and space therefore influence respondents’ positions as to how they negotiate
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being ‘western’ and ‘Pakistani’. Indeed, Sanaa’s words demonstrate the extent to which
dress codes inform respondents’ ‘sense of self’; dress becomes the marker of participants’
identities as they construct the meanings of their social realities. As young women reiterate
their feelings about the ways in which dress codes (salwar kameez, hijab or jilbab) aid to
attribute ‘stereotypical’ notions around their ethnic, religious or citizenship identities, they
also demonstrate their awareness in how and why such labelling of their identities take
place. Indeed, their encounters at university and work lead them to question and re-negotiate
their use of clothing. Clothing is not therefore merely reduced to ‘clothes’ but also to the
varied meanings they convey within respondents’ social contexts. In re-working identities
through dress codes, participants are exploring new identities as they strategically employ
dress codes so as to signify particular strands of their gender identities. In the following
section, I focus on how respondents think they affirm, and hence, perform their identities. In
essence, I outline their thoughts about what makes them who they are, thereby exploring
how respondents contest and construct their identities so as to generate new gender
identities. Through this analysis, I further highlight the significance of dress as not only a
marker of identity, but also as a core concept aiding respondents to construct and hence,
affirm their gender identities within the spaces of education and employment.
5.3 AFFIRMING WHO I AM
5.3.1 Performing ‘Britishness’ and ‘South Asianess’
In this section, I look at how participants perform (by affirmation) their identities so
as to illustrate the ways in which young Muslim women are generating new identities
through their engagements with discourses around meanings of ‘Britishness’ and ‘South
Asianess’. By ‘perform’, I refer to the reasons and the agency involved in making
respondents think: ‘what makes me British and South Asian’? As I argued in Chapter Two,
the construction of gender identities remains a performance (Butler, 1990: 25).
Consequently, the active negotiation of identities by women reflects the possibility of
embracing alternative femininities and hence, subjective (and diverse) performances. Here, I
therefore concentrate on how participants affirm their gender identities through this notion
of performance, which conveys choice and agency. This analysis hence throws light on how
respondents, as they actively negotiate social contexts and decide to perform particular
aspects of their identities (Nadia’s emphasis):
‘Well British...being born here and the westernised culture I’ve embraced,
Pakistani...my parents, I don’t think I’ve made myself Pakistani if that makes sense,
so I don’t make myself Pakistani, there’s nothing Pakistani about me, I can’t
become Pakistani but my parents and my grandparents keep bringing me back’
(Nadia).
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Nadia claims that although she inherited her parents’ South Asian culture, she ‘can’t
become’ Pakistani as she is ‘British’ and has embraced British culture; for her, her Pakistani
identity is ‘brought back’ to her through her family. Her choice of words (emphasised
words) epitomises this idea of performance, and the levels of agency women may have in
affirming contextual identities.
‘I think British is the part that I know how to interact with other people…my mum,
she doesn’t say anything, she was brought up in Pakistan, she was brought up to
think that way…submit. Whereas I wasn’t, I went to an English school…I’ve had
British values instilled in me…women are free here, independent’ (Lubaina).
‘What makes me British? It’s the jeans that I wear and I think it’s more about the
opportunities here, independence and freedom and I was going out with an Afghani
boy and they’re different and that makes you aware of obviously, women don’t have
freedom everywhere and here, I’m living on my own and just being able to do what
I’m doing’ (Sanaa).
For both Sanaa and Lubaina, being ‘British’ means to have the ability and the freedom to
express their views as women. Lubaina compares her mother’s attitudes to her own,
whereby she states that wanting to be ‘independent’ is part of her British identity. Likewise,
Sanaa mentions the opportunities that are available to women in Britain; her ‘jeans’ and her
lifestyle is what makes her ‘British’. She demonstrates an autonomy which reflects the
importance of clothes as a signifier of identity, as well as denotes a gendered identity
informed by ‘freedom’ and having the choice to embrace ‘opportunities’. While my
respondents recognise that identities intertwine and it is difficult to separate them,
nevertheless, in the process of reflecting on their negotiation of identities, they also
formulate individual interpretations of what it means to be British, South Asian and Muslim.
Rashida separates her Muslim identity from her ethnic and citizenship identities.
She suggests that ‘culture’ is the context, the ‘environment’ she finds herself in and
therefore, will promote an aspect of her identity she sees fit, according to time and space:
‘Well Muslim, that’s my religion and my belief right and it’s personal, and British I
would say is the culture I’m in, like the environment like you kind of merge in with
it, when you come to uni, you don’t come in wearing salwar kameez, like I wear it at
home like in summer, we think twice like me and my friends we do, we think twice
before coming in to uni wearing it and we’re like ‘oh my God what will everyone
think?’ that you’re not British… because it’s like you want to merge in with
everyone so I think that’s British and Pakistani it’s like I’m around my Pakistani
culture, I think it’s like with people you’re around, what makes you comfortable’
(Rashida).
Such active effort on her part denotes an acknowledgement to ‘respect’ ethnic boundaries;
her embarrassment at the thought of being perceived as ‘Pakistani’ at university was
apparent as she spoke about how she navigates ‘clothing’ as signifying factor whereby she
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can be ‘read’ accordingly, with respect to context. Indeed, at university, a space seen as non-
South Asian and therefore ‘British’, Rashida claims that wearing traditional South Asian
clothing (salwar kameez) within educational settings would signify ‘difference’ and hence,
for her, the inability to show that she is in effect, British. The affirmation of identities can
therefore be contextual; at university Rashida, out of choice, wears jeans and tops so that her
Pakistani identity is not perceived as obvious through clothing. In this process, Rashida
makes herself ‘British’ and ‘Pakistani’ through dress codes. Sonia agrees and states:
‘I’m British because I was born here and as long as they converge with Islam, like I
wouldn’t say I’m a practising Muslim but I wouldn’t walk around wearing a mini-
skirt in England, I could it’s Britain but I don’t...I do it on holiday but not here, it’s
different…Pakistani communities you can’t…I get my culture and my traditions
from them’ (Sonia).
Sonia suggests that in affirming her British identity, her adherence to Islam should
not be compromised. As such, as a Muslim who is part of a South Asian Muslim community
in England, Sonia would not wear a mini-skirt as although her British context allows for it,
her Pakistani context does not; yet, Sonia does not mind wearing it when she goes to Spain.
Her affirmation of a Muslim identity must hence be understood through her cultural context
(Pakistani community), whereby cultural standards (here female modesty by dressing
appropriately) influence women’s negotiations and perceptions of their identities. Clearly,
respondents, although comfortable with using hyphenated identities, show that in separating
‘British’ and ‘Pakistani’ through contextual behaviour (adopting appropriate clothing), they
consciously create, and make the British and Asian dichotomy. Yet, what is evident is that
clothing can also have the adverse effects of participants feeling constrained and restricted
in freely choosing what to wear, how to behave, and which path, British or Asian, to adopt.
As Rahila explains:
‘I’m Asian, it’s mostly Asian people in Dewsbury so you have to be careful and it’s
a close-knit community, for me to wear a short skirt people would talk even though
I’m a doctor, I have to be careful of what I wear...I wear cropped trousers, used to
have jeans but I’ve thrown them all out cause I used to wear them to university. I’ve
got like trousers but even then my husband is like ‘don’t wear that’ and tops full-
neck and half sleeves that’s the thing about being British and Pakistani, in an
English area, would have been different, a lot of people down here are Pakistani
and every way you look at, it’s Pakistani! Because I live here, I feel like I have to
dress in a certain way or do things the way Pakistanis do, it’s the culture, you have
to wear things that are appropriate’ (Rahila).
Rahila claims that her dress code is governed by the community norms of her locality,
where as an ‘Asian woman’, she feels the need to respect certain codes, albeit imposed. In
effect, Rahila is negotiating identity in ‘place’ (context) so as to fulfil her community’s
expectations of what would be considered ‘appropriate’; indeed, she stopped wearing jeans
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as she does not attend university anymore. In switching dress codes, Rahila demonstrates
the apparent changes in how she presents herself and ultimately, reflects an aspect of her
gender identity which is informed by community expectations. In Chapter Four, I reiterated
how prescribed norms of behaviour for women around for instance, daughters’ social
activities at university, influence respondents’ positionings within educational or work
settings. Dwyer’s research (2000: 59) demonstrates similar trends, whereby ‘young women
become boundary markers for a community whose collective identity is embodied in their
‘authentic’ ethnic dress and its signification for moral propriety’. ‘Ethnic’ dressing styles
therefore act as indicators which frame the contours of ethnic identification for respondents.
As the quote below reveals, women’s appearances reflect the community’s rules of how
women’s bodies must be perceived, hence evoking discourses around the construction of
ethnic identities through dress codes, which participants remain acutely aware of:
‘Depending on the community you come from, if it’s a really Asian community
you’ll be influenced in more Asian way, like culture, the community expects you to
behave or dress in certain ways whereas if you live in a white area you won’t have
as much Asian ways, cause if you live in an Asian community, as hard as you try to
be British, you’ll always have some Asian things about you’ (Rubina).
Rubina’s stark contrast between ‘British’ and ‘Asian’ cultural standards is
prominent as she explains how women’s localities and geographical residential areas’
distribution of racialised and ethnic identities could influence the maintenance of cultural
traditions. Locality and geography therefore remain important in negotiating ‘British’ and
‘Asian’ identities, and Rubina’s words demonstrate the ambivalence which exists when
navigating Britishness and Asianess. Nevertheless, at the same time, some respondents
reiterate that there can be common grounds between them as they consider multiculturalism
as a space bridging cultural ‘differences’:
‘My way of living is that I’m British and I’ve got my friends and everyone is the
same and the only difference comes in with your religion and your culture, so it
doesn’t have an impact on anything you do socially, you can still go out even
though you don’t drink and also the fact that it is multicultural and people
understand, it’s not like they’re ‘oh what’s that?’... you are Muslim and they
understand Eid and they may even wish you, so they appreciate the differences and
the similarities and you usually have more similarities with them because the
cultural aspect, that’s more family and more private than public’ (Tasneem).
For Tasneem, her British identity is used to act as a leveller in ‘multicultural’ Britain, where
similarities with wider British society are more evident than ‘differences’; for Tasneem,
multiculturalism in Britain enables non-South Asians and non-Muslims to understand her
ethnic and religious background and heritage. Tasneem’s ethnic and religious identities are
manifested in the ‘private’ sphere of the home; her citizenship identity remains her primary
and ‘public’ identity, a strategy which provides Tasneem with the power to get fully
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involved in British society. This discourse about ‘multiculturalism’ is also explored by
Haleema, who assumes that Britishness and ‘multiculturalism’ are mutually inclusive,
thereby providing a space which celebrates the diversity of experiences:
‘Being Pakistani doesn’t really matter because we are so multicultural, being
Pakistani is just a part of it, it makes it more interesting and a bit different from
other people but it doesn’t influence me as much because I don’t feel that I’ve got
too many Pakistani values, as in cultural values, if I compare my family to other
Pakistani families where they are typical’ families’ who marry off their daughters,
arrange their marriage when they’re young and give them no education’
(Haleema).
Haleema affirms that her Pakistani identity resolves itself merely to cultural
heritage, whereby she celebrates the options of being ‘multicultural’ simultaneously,
maintains a distance from what she perceives Pakistani ‘culture’ to be. The term ‘typical’,
used by Haleema, denotes a difference which indicates that for her, ‘typical’ reflects norms
such as arranged marriages and limited education for girls. For her, ‘cultural values’ are
encouraged by ‘typical families’, who perpetuate customs such as arranged marriages that
may infringe on women’s educational achievements; a custom that Haleema does not
consider as part of her Pakistani identity as she remains unaffected by it. Hence, although
Haleema is keen to acknowledge her South Asian background, she demarcates herself from
stereotypical depictions of what Pakistani families (‘typical’) stand for.
‘I think what makes me Pakistani is my parents. But everything I do or say, the way
I am is because of my British upbringing, I don’t think it has anything to do with
being Pakistani but then some things do cause you have to have like a Paki
mentality to understand things like you can’t be 18 and just mess around with a boy,
that’s where the Paki mentality comes in…messing around means getting into a
relationship that has no future, you have to start thinking of the future and marriage
although you’re just 18…unlike Caucasians, non-Asians like white society they
don’t usually, they have relationships yes but the marriage thing not really, it
doesn’t matter to them’ (Rubina).
Again, Rubina highlights that her British upbringing and the Pakistani cultural
influence she inherited from her parents both ‘make’ her; she reflects on how her
understandings are nevertheless tainted by a ‘Paki mentality’. Here, she particularly relates
to attitudes towards relationships (boyfriends), where the community’s cultural standards
demand that young women behave in expected ways; in Rubina’s context, at 18 years old,
having casual relationships is not acceptable, whereas comparatively, in British ‘white
society’, according to Rubina, marriage and serious relationships may not be viewed as
primordial at such a young age. Although Rubina claims that ‘everything’ about her is
because of her ‘British upbringing’, her ethnic background still has a bearing on the ways in
which she perceives and interprets her social world. This further reinforces the notion that
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ethnic and racialised boundaries are structured within unstable categories, thereby remaining
subject to how individuals re-work, contest, and construct their identities.
This section has therefore focused on the ways in which respondents affirm their
gender identities through educational and work spaces. I have demonstrated that through
their agency, participants choose which identity to perform, according to time and space
(context). For instance, this is epitomised through the dress codes and the modes of
behaviour women choose to adopt as they strive to remain culturally sensitive in negotiating
the Britishness versus Asianess dichotomy. Drawing on the theoretical premise that
gendered identities remain embedded in performances, it is clear that respondents are
actively affirming their distinct identities as they negotiate boundaries. In the following
section, I focus on how respondents maintain ethnic and religious customs so as to further
analyse how participants affirm their gender identities. In paying particular attention to
practices such as weddings, food and language, I focus on how respondents illustrate their
performances of identities through their negotiations of such practices. As they engage with
cultural and religious practices, respondents navigate cultural and religious boundaries
which aid in the construction of their gender identities.
5.3.2 Maintaining South Asian ethnic and religious traditions
In this section, I reflect on whether South Asian Muslim women in Britain think that
participating in ethnic and religious traditions is important for their generation; I do so
because I believe that the maintenance of ethnic and Islamic customs reflect the ways in
which participants affirm their identities. As they navigate ethnic and religious traditions,
they develop spaces so as to generate new gender identities as Muslim women. More
specifically, respondents emphasise that fasting periods (Ramadan), and Eid (Muslim
festival marking the end of Ramadan) remain religious events which help them affirm their
identities as Muslims. As for the maintenance of ethnic identity, language, food and
weddings act as significant conduits for cultural transmission across generations. Indeed, my
study demonstrates that respondents’ willingness to promote South Asian languages, food
and wedding traditions remain potent, thereby signifying that even though participants
embrace ‘British’ ideals, they are also ready to retain South Asian traditions.
The majority of respondents believe that young people in their generation are
upholding ethnic and religious traditions in the UK. Others reflect on the fact that cultural
traditions are gradually fading away as generations grow and develop in a British context.
As for religion, the majority of respondents believe that young people are actively involved
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in promoting their Muslim identities, except for one respondent, who thinks that even
religion is eroding in a ‘secular’ society:
‘Even though we’re trying to all re-affirm our culture, we’re all losing our cultural
touch and traditions and values and we’re fitting in more with the western culture
and I think sometimes we lose perspectives on what we see is a good way to be
brought up even on the religious side, I don’t know many people that pray five times
a day, not many young women who were brought up here that pray five times a day
and quite religious I mean even if they pray they’re not that religious so I think we
are more and more becoming secular’ (Habibah).
Habibah reflects that ‘religiosity’ among young Muslims is being heavily influenced by
secularism, which for her, is indomitably a ‘western’ lifestyle that Muslims are increasingly
adopting; the loss of religious values such as praying is due to ‘western culture’, which for
Habibah, probably encourages more liberal and less rigid frameworks that could help the
maintenance of religious values. Yet, young women suggest that there are various ways in
which ethnic and religious customs are being maintained. Marriage ties and Asian style
wedding celebrations, encouraged by the older generation, are mentioned by respondents as
effective ways to protect cultural and religious continuity in South Asian Muslim families
and communities in the UK. Nevertheless, differences in how generations affirm ethnic and
religious traditions are noted by my research participants; young people are more in tune
with religion as opposed to culture.
The observance of Ramadan and Eid remain important traditions for respondents to
keep in touch and affirm their Muslim identities, as claimed by the vast majority of
respondents. As Bushra suggests, getting involved in activities promoted by parents, and
maintaining contact with cultural traditions inherited from their parents is what helps to
define and set apart a ‘British Muslim Asian identity’:
‘I think people tend to follow what their parents do I suppose and it’s a way of
getting an identity, it’s a way of saying you’re different and you are a British
Muslim Asian, it’s a way to maintain that identity and that’s a way to do that’
(Bushra).
Tasneem agrees, stating:
‘My parents have taught me, I would do the same like maintain your religion and
your cultural values and you would actually transfer them to your children…right
now, if someone hasn’t had a big cultural input in their life and they let it go and
they don’t celebrate Eid anymore or fasting isn’t such a big thing, if our generation
goes by that, it will die out at some point so with me, if I don’t make sure that my
kids know what I want them to know about Islam and my culture there is no reason
why they’d know otherwise if you don’t teach it to them here’ (Tasneem).
As such, Tasneem thinks that the future generation should be taught about South Asian
culture and Islam, where if no effort is made, values get lost. Nonetheless, respondents
165
maintain that periods such as Ramadan and Eid encourage Muslims to get together and carry
on religious customs within university or work environments. As Sadia and Faiza explain:
‘Festivities, like Eid and Ramadan, I went home, I was like I really need to make an
effort...last year, I went out and got hammered and it was a disgrace...but it’s really
difficult on your own like there is no community spirit and you need that...I’ve got a
few friends here but managed to do it, it was pretty tough to get up, sleep and go to
work, even at university if there are a few of us then you can do it... then I went
home for the last six Ramadans and it was so much nicer, much more sociable’
(Sadia).
‘Parents do engage on cultural and religious traditions, very regular basis, it’s a
way of life for them so things like Ramadan and so on...but we do it still, so it’s
more or less the same really, it’s harder at university yes but it’s not impossible if
you have friends who are the same as you’ (Faiza).
Indeed, Sadia and Faiza suggest that the family makes it easier for young people to
regularly uphold an interest in practising Islam; family and community spirit do influence
young women to fast despite the difficulty of juggling work and studies, which is reflected
in Fawzia’s account:
‘Eid is important but here it clashes, it’s always on a school day… I know that it’s
not as important for me as it is for my parents, it’s extremely important for them
and there was quite a big argument in my family because my sister wanted to work
on Eid and it was a big deal for mum she said it’s not something that she could ever
imagine and the thing is for me, Eid has always been to wake up ridiculously early,
get dressed and eat, families come over but it’s just the excitement like Christmas
and even I, I do get excited for Christmas and you feel it because everyone is exited
but no one is excited around you and you feel stupid for feeling excited for nothing
and firstly it inconveniences you and secondly, no one is feeling excited so you just
feel kind of mediocre and that’s how I’ve always been and my mum doesn’t like that
and she doesn’t want to accept it and she’s like ‘no it is an important thing’ and I
know it’s important but I do think that certain things are a lot more important to her
culturally and you know people come with sweets’ (Fawzia).
From my research sample, she is the only respondent to very honestly express that the
British context has had a bearing on the way she feels about how Eid must be celebrated.
Unsurprisingly, Fawzia, in her current context, does not feel comfortable to manifest her
Muslim identity and celebrate Eid by demonstrating ‘excitement’ for an event which for her,
remains an ‘inconvenience’. Interestingly, Fawzia defines herself as a ‘practising Muslim’
but as her comments reflect, her attitudes towards a major Muslim festival do not signify
considerable attachment, as she doesn’t separate culture from religion.
The majority of respondents also claim that in British South Asian Muslim
communities, ethnic identity is kept alive, on a daily basis, through food. For them, food
seems to contribute significantly to the ways in which participants affirm their identities:
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‘Food maintains the culture! (Laugh) especially food like I mean which Pakistani
would be cooking fish and chips? They do it around food and festival’ (Rashida).
‘I noticed when I moved to Bradford the culture here is so much more evident, like,
even things like in the restaurants here, you know, halal meat, you get catered for,
there are mosques everywhere…In that sense, definitely, Bradford is a lot more
cultured, in Asian style anyway, than Glasgow’ (Asma).
As Asma claims, locality also makes a difference as to how young people are able to
maintain cultural and religious traditions. Recounting her experiences, she highlights that
Bradford and Glasgow do not provide the same space where identities can be expressed;
talking about halal food, Asma suggests that the availability of halal meat, a simple practical
fact, would influence and make it easier for Muslims to be able to maintain the religious
tradition of consuming halal food.
Participants also view language as a potent way to maintain and affirm ethnic
identity. Bagguley and Hussain (2008: 154) have highlighted the importance of language in
British South Asian communities. Their research shows that for young British South Asian
Muslims, bilingualism (in speaking English and a South Asian language) helps them
develop new relationships with the majority culture by speaking two languages fluently, as
compared to the previous generation of South Asians in Britain, who rely heavily on South
Asian languages to communicate. The latter hence find it difficult to fully integrate due to
language barriers. From my sample, all respondents spoke English and most respondents
spoke Urdu, Punjabi, Gujarati, Kashmiri or Bengali fluently at home, particularly within
family gatherings, in their private spheres. A minority could understand ethnic languages
but had difficulty in speaking them. Within public spheres such as work or university,
English remained their primary mode of communication. Nevertheless, making an effort to
speak South Asian languages remains important to respondents in order to promote their
continuity:
‘I will speak Urdu definitely to my children... it’s really important as it reinforces
culture, it’s a way of reminding you that you’re, not different but just to remember
that you have this culture kind of thing and it sets you apart from other people,
language is important to me’ (Fawzia).
‘I feel so proud that my parents have taught me Urdu and I will do the same for my
children. I know families who have taught their children just English and the
relationship, you just lose it because the parents they don’t know good English in
the first place but they should have kept the other language and I think comparing
me to them, it’s totally different cause I can talk to anyone but they’re basically fully
British’ (Tasneem).
Indeed, when I asked respondents whether they would want their children to speak and
understand South Asian languages, most respondents answered ‘Yes’. Being able to
communicate easily when they go to South Asia, and upholding cultural heritage were
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reasons given to explain why young women depict an interest to maintain ethnic languages.
Again, going back to drawing the boundaries of ‘Britishness’ and ‘Asianess’, Tasneem
highlights that if the next generation is not taught Urdu by their parents, they will be like
some children (in her community) who are ‘fully British’, thereby suggesting that some
children could be too British if they speak just English. Echoing Tasneem’s concerns,
Haleema suggests that South Asians are already increasingly manifesting British values and
this is primarily epitomised through language; although she speaks Urdu with her parents,
English remains the primary language adopted with siblings and friends:
‘With the younger generation I think a lot has changed because with my generation,
Muslims are more British than they used to be and with every aspect of life, with
food, with dressing...like my parents’ generation would use their own languages
more, but I speak Urdu at home with my parents, with my dad if we’re talking on an
academic basis, then we talk in English, especially political stuff, with my friends I
speak in English, with my brother and sister English and with my parents we speak
in Urdu if necessary’ (Haleema).
Yasmin is the only respondent who explains why Punjabi would not be an important
issue when it comes to her children; she wants the latter to be in a position to understand
Islam primarily through personal capabilities rather than from ‘other people’ or second hand
sources. Indeed, Yasmin prefers that her children learn Arabic, instead of Punjabi:
‘The priority for my kids would be Arabic and English...Punjabi is not the most
important thing...I think my children will be more the definition of British Muslim
than I will be cause I’ve still got some cultural stuff in me but for them I’d like them
to be more comfortable in Arabic and English more than anything…because of
religion, to help them understand the Qur’an because to me religion is the most
important thing that you can pass on to your children and if you understand Arabic
it gives you an entirely new dimension to your understanding of religion. What
we’re living now is very two-dimensional, we’re having to learn it from other
people and when you read the Qur’an you have to read it in English and you don’t
always get the full meaning so I’d like to learn Arabic myself’ (Yasmin).
For Yasmin, Arabic would be a priority so that children are able to understand Islam and
read the Qur’an without resorting to English as medium of understanding. The concept of
‘British Muslimness’, for Yasmin, will come with the next generation; according to her,
they will have less of a cultural influence and more of an Islamic identity. Clearly, Yasmin’s
Islamic identity takes priority over ethnic identity, where her citizenship identity is also
considered as more valuable than ethnic heritage for the oncoming generation. Affirming
‘Muslimness’, through Arabic, rather than affirming ‘South Asianess’ through Punjabi,
becomes a strategy for Yasmin to clearly separate religion from culture. In the following
section, I attempt to further explore how participants affirm their identities as they navigate
Islam and South Asian culture. I concentrate on how participants negotiate the dichotomy
‘religion’ versus ‘culture’ into more detail. Analysing why respondents make this significant
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distinction is vital as it illustrates the active negotiations encouraging educated Muslim
women to firmly draw boundaries between what they understand as ‘culture’ and what they
perceive as ‘religion’. Through their negotiations of ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’ boundaries,
they find spaces to affirm and assert new gender identities.
5.3.3 Negotiating ‘religion’ versus ‘culture’
As participants maintain ethnic and religious traditions, it is evident that they are
negotiating the dichotomy ‘religion’ versus ‘culture’. In this section, I focus on how they
explore the boundaries of this dichotomy; participants are increasingly separating ‘religion’
from ‘culture’ as they consider the ways in which they perform identities and ultimately,
through this process, develop new gender identities. In particular, respondents maintain how
social events such as weddings, as well as social environment, here communities, outline the
blurry line which defines the ‘religion’ versus ‘culture’ dichotomy. Below, a discussion of
weddings and marriage brings these distinctions into focus. In fact, they illustrate how
young educated Muslim women are actively negotiating ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ so as to
form new understandings of marriage and weddings. Through their negotiations, women are
able to exert independent choices as to how they navigate cultural and religious precepts
associated with weddings within their communities. As such, this process of exploration
encourages respondents to develop new gender identities. As Rubina reflects:
‘Weddings help to preserve those traditions, if you go to a traditional wedding, they
do so much cultural stuff and I like it, and you do keep culture alive and it’s not
even a Muslim thing, the Muslim bit, the marriage, is the nikah and everything else,
that’s culture and I wouldn’t want a one day wedding and that’s my Asian side
talking, I know the difference and I have the options and I decide to do both the
culture and the religion bit, this is it with us now, we go into it like knowing why we
are doing it, we are educated about it, we are not like our mothers or grandmothers,
they just got on with it but we don’t’ (Rubina).
Rubina exposes the tension ‘religion’ versus ‘culture’ as she considers how weddings help
in the promotion of cultural identity; engaging in ‘cultural stuff’ during weddings informs
her definition of ‘traditional’, which as she reveals, is ‘not a Muslim thing’ but is informed
by ‘culture’. Although Rubina demonstrates an awareness of how closely these two remain,
she is willing, and also expects, to not have a ‘one-day wedding’. As she claims ‘we are
educated about it’ and Rubina demonstrates that she is very keen on negotiating her
‘options’. This is put in sharp contrast to the levels of involvement women of the previous
generation had as far as weddings or marriage was concerned. This difference indicates the
extent to which choice, independence and agency, gained through educational and work
experiences, influences respondents’ redefinition and understandings of marriage and
weddings within their communities.
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I develop the theme of marriage and the role it plays in young British South Asian
Muslim women’s lives in the next chapter (Chapter Six) of the thesis. For now, I look at
how social milieu and communities’ influence also determine the extent to which South
Asian Muslims in Britain ‘affirm’ cultural identities. As some respondents stress, the role
which communities play in respondents’ lives influence the extent to which cultural and
religious identities are affirmed. An insight into how communities affect respondents’
negotiations of their identities remains important to my study as it reveals how social
environments impact on women’s evolution of gender identities. Haleema links the
maintenance of ethnic traditions with education and social class, arguing that people from
working-class backgrounds are less reluctant to give up customs as opposed to middle and
upper social classes, who according to her, are more ‘liberal’:
‘I think people who are high like in terms of income or education, tradition is not so
important, like the working-class, they tend to maintain tradition more because I
don’t think they are as exposed to other environments and other cultures because
for them it’s work and home, this sort of cycle whereas the upper-classes because
they are more well travelled, more liberal’ (Haleema).
It seems that ‘lifestyle’ opportunities such as ‘travelling’ and exposure to the wider world
leads to a re-evaluation of ‘tradition’, which conveys different meanings for people of
different social milieus. This is a significant point for British South Asian Muslim women
who enter educational and work spaces. As I previously argued in Chapter Four, through
higher education and paid employment, respondents are negotiating boundaries in order to
encourage upward social mobility and hence, promote the evolution of their gender
identities. However, their negotiations also reflect the tensions which Haleema defines as
‘traditional’ versus ‘liberal’.
‘It’s about promoting religion in a decent manner, in mosques you have people
come in to talk to others about it and there is a general awareness in society that
you have to let some things go if you want to move ahead with your time but also
you don’t want a complete rebellion with your children and then you’re just gonna
have to accept it and obviously there are boundaries which are drawn still so it
works out it’s about how narrow-minded or open you are’ (Tasneem).
Similarly, Tasneem also highlights ‘open-mindedness’ and maintains that it is about
keeping a balance so that the next generation finds it possible to carry on traditions.
‘At the end of the day it’s personal choice and the new generations, like I think that
depends on the family you come from cause some families and communities are still
like backwards cause they want to keep their kids close and not let them be free, be
their own person, the community sets the rules...but some families are do what you
want as long as it makes you happy otherwise you don’t really get the chance to be
you so you can’t break out’ (Rubina).
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Rubina suggests that maintenance of culture and religion should be ‘personal’, thereby
denying that the family and community must ‘aid’ in the continuity of customs. For young
people who feel familial pressure to conform to set community ideals, which she defines as
‘backwards’, Rubina opposes conformity to agency. From this, she articulates how
individual perceptions about identities can also be submerged by collective identity (through
communities) which conspires to prevent young Muslims from being ‘free’ to express
individuality; women are hence expected to conform to community ideals. Again, Rubina’s
thoughts demonstrate that higher education gives respondents a strong sense of agency and
individualism in order to push boundaries enforced by their communities. The role of
community is hence important in drawing Muslim women to adhere to cultural traditions.
Dwyer’s (2000: 53-68) research portrays the ways in which ‘the politics of community’
impact on young women’s construction and contestation of identities. Drawing on Hall’s
concept of generating ‘new ethnicities’ whereby communities become the medium for
contestation, Dwyer (2000) maintains that spaces for personal negotiation are created. In
essence, she maintains that constructions of community, through the ‘imaginations of a
Muslim community’, can therefore reveal how an ‘understanding of identities as
positionings’ may reflect active political negotiations in context. Echoing Dwyer’s (2000)
findings of communities monitoring women’s behaviour, my research similarly shows that
communities act as a medium where participants feel that one’s deeds are policed, and
where younger generations learn about cultural values and standards such as ‘respecting
elders’ of the community.
‘They take the kids back to make sure you feel your culture, go and visit your
village…This is what your grandpa used to do, They make sure you’re taught the
language at home, and cook food, watch a film, send you to madrassa, which is
essentially being done for culture, not religion, there’s the tension you see’
(Sabina).
Respondents also talk about the parental strategy of planning family trips to the sub-
continent so that young people are exposed to South Asian culture and remain aware of their
ethnic and cultural heritage. The tradition of young people going to madrassas to learn about
Islam is still being kept, whereby in this research, the majority of women went to their local
madrassas when they were young. However, Mushirah disagrees with these set principles,
suggesting that communities and families are too focused on promoting cultural values that
remain ‘outdated’, thereby losing touch with reality and hence, ignoring younger
generations’ real pleas. In fact, as Sabina suggests, the pressure exerted by parents and
communities on young people to uphold cultural traditions demonstrates the ‘tension’
emanating from the ‘religion’ versus ‘culture’ dichotomy.
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‘Families or communities do not help at all, they mix culture and religion...if a boy
does something wrong they hide it, if a girl does something wrong it’s all over the
place, that’s where they go wrong…outdated cultural stuff, discrimination between
the sexes, there’s no role models for these boys, their fathers are sat in the mosque
and they don’t have a clue that their sons are selling drugs in the corner but
pretending everything is fine and it’s not; real issues are not seen’ (Mushirah).
Indeed, for Mushirah, gender discrimination is evident in how girls’ and boys’ behaviour is
monitored. This contributes to a lack of understanding of the current context that young
British South Asian Muslims find themselves in, hence further widening the gap between
how generations perceive ‘religion’ and ‘culture’. ‘Sitting at the mosque’, as Mushirah
reiterates, does not allow fathers to fully grasp the ‘real issues’ affecting young Muslims in
her community. I further discuss the ‘tensions’ that Mushirah expresses in framing how
families and communities generate conflictive relationships as these lead to differences in
how young British South Asian Muslim women affirm their religious versus cultural
identities, in comparison to their parents’/grandparents’ generations. Indeed, Bagguley and
Hussain (2008: 147-149) in focusing on ‘generational difference, suggest that differences
can be accounted for by the fact that the first generation of South Asian migrants ‘were
strategic in a geographical and economic sense, while the second, in the cultural and
political arenas’. This implies that in negotiating ‘cultural and political’ arenas, young
Muslims in Britain are re-affirming ‘different’ identities. They do so more efficiently by
denouncing that the previous generations still mix culture and religion, as opposed to the
younger generations. As Sabina states:
‘It’s blurred for the old generation, culture and religion…a good example is for
wedding ceremonies, especially like the mehendi, why do you put oil on, why do you
do this, and why do you do that… though there were elements in our culture that
conflicted with the religion’ (Sabina).
Respondents make it clear that generational relations between themselves and their
parents, grandparents or other relatives/friends of previous generations can be conflictive as
the latter tries hard to impose kinship values upon their children:
‘We’re talking about identity and the Pakistani identity, we’re changing that cause
we’re integrating and it’s so simple, what we’re doing is working at it, integrating
and still keeping the culture…by integrating means we actually meet new people
and that does not mean that we forget who we are when it comes to Ramadan…I’m
happy to tell them cause it’s something I’m proud of...I advertise the good things
and the bad bits I can hold my hands up and say I know and that’s the old
generation’ (Mushirah).
‘They try and live a Pakistani lifestyle within their own four walls, they try to bring
the kids up within that’ (Sabina).
Older and younger generations perceive, react and embrace ethnic and religious
traditions differently, hence bringing about social change in their communities. Previous
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research (Wade and Souter, 1992; Goodey, 2001; Webster, 2003) has demonstrated that
South Asian communities are experiencing a ‘break-down’ as ethnic traditions are
beginning to be re-worked by younger generations. However, Bagguley and Hussain (2008:
149) maintain that intergenerational conflict must be viewed as ‘the product of cultural
hybridisation, higher levels of educational attainment, class mobility and the related
emergence of new ethnicities among young South Asian people’. Indeed, this reflects
respondents’ attitudes towards the challenging intergenerational relationships and
community pressures they face; nevertheless, they are re-making and hence, managing
‘new’ identities in the process of re-evaluating what ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ entail. In this
section, I have therefore demonstrated how respondents are actively affirming their gender
identities as they negotiate the dichotomy ‘religion’ versus ‘culture’. Through dress codes,
language, food, and religious events such as Ramadan and Eid, participants strategically
handle their different social identities, where they actively demarcate which practice is
‘cultural’ and which practice is ‘religious’. Their negotiations nevertheless reflect the
tension which exists between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ as they navigate these two concepts so
as to affirm their ethnic and religious identities. As respondents make this important
distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘culture’, young women are re-negotiating their
perceptions of gender identities by formulating new understandings of what ethnic and
religious traditions entail. As such, differences in their understandings indicate an evolution
in Muslim women’s gender identities, whereby participants deploy the confidence and
independence gained at university and work so as to challenge ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’
boundaries, which are often imposed upon them by the previous generations. In the last
section of this chapter, I concentrate on the ways in which participants manage Muslimness;
more specifically, I reflect on how educated British South Asian Muslim women negotiate
gender identities as they contest and construct meanings of Muslimness in their social
contexts.
5.4 MANAGING MUSLIMNESS
In this last section of this chapter, I illustrate how respondents manage Muslimness
and ultimately, generate new gender identities as they explore educational and work
settings. Throughout this chapter, I have argued that experiences of higher education and
employment are leading young Muslim women to evaluate their gendered identities, and
acknowledge the possible impacts this process may have on their future life options. As they
reshape their identities and become assertive in affirming their new gender identities,
respondents demonstrate agency and choice in generating new perceptions of their
identities. I begin this section by questioning the use of the term ‘British Muslim’, which
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comprises the affixation of citizenship identity with religious identity. These strands of
respondents’ identities, as revealed earlier in this chapter, remain contested notions leading
participants to actively engage with discourses around Islam, national belonging and
citizenship in order to articulate their distinctive identities in multicultural Britain. Indeed, a
term such as ‘British Muslim’, employed by respondents, is not only used to define
themselves, but to also portray how they choose to prioritise their identities (discussed in
Section 5.4.1), thereby indicating agency as in how they decide to affirm their identities. In
fact, I reflect on whether religious identity for Muslim women is gaining ground in Britain
and I also raise debates about how participants express their Islamic identities through their
understandings and interpretations of Islam; as participants explore their perceptions of
Islam, they re-work their gender identities as Muslim women as they begin to embrace new
meanings of religion.
Also, throughout this chapter, I have emphasised the role which dress codes play in
aiding young women to express and perform their identities as they explore new spaces such
as higher education and work. In this section, I elaborate on respondents’ notions of the
hijab and the ways in which the hijab, as clothing, contributes to the construction of Islamic
identities in the UK. I further reiterate the role of dress as being a contested signifier of
identity, more specifically, the signifier of a religious identity for participants. These
analyses highlight how respondents are engaging with discourses on Islam and Islamic
identities in Britain so as to develop and articulate new gender identities as British South
Asian Muslim women. As young Muslim women reflect on their positionings, their
negotiations of Islam as educated Muslim women not only demonstrate the changes women
are experiencing as they navigate educational and work options, but also indicate how
respondents manage their evolving gender identities.
5.4.1 Framing British Muslimness
Parekh (2006: 199), in focusing on Muslim identities in the European context of
liberalism and integration, underlines that the term ‘British Muslim’ offers a range of
meanings. For some, it could merely convey the physical presence of Muslims in Britain
who pay full allegiance to the Ummah and remain ‘unattached’ to the country of adoption
(Britain). Or for others, it could mean that Britain is perceived as home and they feel loyal;
in that case, being ‘British’ reflects their political involvement and ‘Muslim’, their religious
affiliations. More importantly, ‘British Muslim’ may also indicate the possibility that
Muslims express not only loyalty to Britain but also adopt cultural values ‘shaped by the
British way of life’; ‘Britichised Muslims’ as Parekh (2006: 199) puts forward, may yet be
another term suitable to express this idea where Muslims’ understandings of Islam, the
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Qur’an and Islamic history are shaped by British values/attitudes, hence producing a
‘distinct British form of Islam’. This is relevant to my research as Muslim women, with
increased educational achievements, actively and independently understand ‘Muslimness’
on their own terms, thereby creating scope for developing new gender identities which
remain embedded within a discourse of choice, agency and independence. As Parekh (2006:
181) maintains, different from their parents’ Islam, young Muslims’ Islam is a ‘self-
conscious public statement, not a quietly held personal faith, but a matter of identity’.
I asked respondents about their views on the term ‘British Muslim’, and whether
they believe that the term existed some fifty years ago. All respondents answered ‘No’ to
this question, agreeing that it is a ‘new’ or ‘modern’ term. Respondents illustrate why
‘British Muslim’, as a term, is increasingly being used in the UK by the younger
generations, denoting generational changes in approaches to Muslim identities, political
stances following local and global events, media stereotypes of Muslimness as well as
debates about integration and multiculturalism. Haleema explains:
‘I’m Muslim British. I’d put it that way as people would say British Muslim but for
me being British is really important but being Muslim, my faith is first, Islam says
that your identity is really important so being British is linked to being a Muslim for
me...some people would say British first but being British doesn’t encompass all of
the values that to being a Muslim does whereas being Muslim upholds the values of
being British and being a Muslim so for me, it is about being Muslim British’
(Haleema).
Interestingly, Haleema is the only respondent who claims that ‘Muslim British’ is a more
appropriate term, explaining that Islamic values encompass British values and not vice-
versa. In saying that ‘faith’ comes first as an identity, Haleema reiterates the concept of the
Muslim Ummah, a universal Muslim community that cuts across ‘race’, ethnicity, culture
and gender. Indeed, the manifestation of an Islamic identity through the Ummah aids in
constructing a universal Islamic identity which aids Muslims in Britain to remain connected
across local communities (Brown, 2006: 419). Similarly, Dwyer’s study (2000: 477)
demonstrates that the idea of the Ummah, offering scope for pan-Islamic discourses,
contributes to young Muslim women negotiating ‘new’ ways of dealing with diasporic
identities. As Afshar et al’s (2005: 11) research on Muslim women in Britain also shows-
‘faith supersedes nationality, race and ethnicity’, hence defining the ‘trans-nationality’
character of the Ummah. Their turn to religion, according to Afshar et al., (2005), reflects
political activism on the part of Muslim women to unite as ‘Muslim women’, where
ethnicity and nationality are not prioritised over Islam.
I also highlight the political stance adopted by participants as they explain why the
term ‘British Muslim’ is increasing in its popularity. Mushirah, classing herself as ‘second
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generation’, illustrates how her generation is fighting gender inequalities in their
communities so as to epitomise the idea of ‘British Muslim’, which inherently for her,
expresses the idea of Muslim women as being independent in Britain:
‘There are three generations now, the first generation didn’t have that title, second
generation started to introduce themselves into British society and I class myself as
second generation so I had to fight the struggle so I still have to cook and clean in
my house whereas the boys don’t and the third generation, the younger ones, the
label ‘British Muslim’ is theirs, their mums have already lived through that
transition so my child will be the third generation. I’m going to introduce chores
but introduce them equally and discipline and education, equal again, not the
cultural Pakistani notion of women not participating in society’ (Mushirah).
In using a discourse of women’s rights, Mushirah reflects that the third generation of
Muslims in Britain will represent the notion of ‘British Muslim’ wholeheartedly when she
maintains that ‘the label is theirs’. Her use of the term ‘British Muslim’ indicates the
‘struggle’ that South Asian Muslim women are enduring so as to make the ‘transition’ to
‘equal’ gender rights. Also comparing generations, Sonia explains that migration status had
more importance than Islam in the lives of first generation South Asian migrants:
‘I’m not sure if Islam played such a big role, when my parents came with all this
migration and immigration laws, if you look at multiculturalism back in those days
it was more about immigration as opposed to religion, I think religion is more the
new thing, the new identity’ (Sonia).
Islam, for young people of her generation, is a ‘new thing’; if older generations were
inherently concerned with political positionings, young Muslims are readier to proclaim
religious adherence as Sonia believes that it is established that they are ‘British’, through
their citizenship rights. Sabina agrees:
‘They’ve been here for 40 or 50 years...there’s been a shift my Mum will definitely
say she’s Pakistani...it was more ‘Pakis’...it was more like Pakistanis, Bengalis and
so on...now it’s more British and something else...like trying to get the right mix…
people have different priorities like what they feel is important to them, or that
should be my identity... Pakistani, Bengali or Indian, that’s kind of lost in our
generation cause we can’t really identify with it, saying look I’m not Pakistani but
I’m British and I’m Muslim, and this is why I’m different...it’s a category’ (Sabina).
Sabina further indicates that there are generational differences in the prioritising of
identities as she explains the shift from ‘Pakistani’, ‘Bengali’ or ‘Indian’ to ‘British Muslim’
by emphasising that racialised identity, for the previous generation, remained the primary
marker. As she maintains, ‘you were brown then’, Sabina’s parents’ experiences of Britain
reflect a time where racialised and ethnic identity took precedence over religious identity, as
opposed to now. The younger generation of South Asian migrants want to ‘get the right
mix’ to express differences, now negotiated through Islam. For Fatimah, ‘British Muslim’ as
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a concept developed after the racial tension which erupted during the Bradford (June 2001)
and Oldham (May 2001) riots:
‘The Bradford and Oldham riots and that’s what it means to be British Muslim, with
people realising that they’re British but they’re Muslims too, young people, a small
thing becomes a big thing and to some, that term is about passion and because of
being born and bred here, its affiliations to the British culture cause I would call it
culture, being British is a culture and it is a way of saying ‘we know who we are
and you don’t need to challenge it’ because it’s all due to politicians when they
stereotype you, saying ‘You’re Asian’ and you turn around you say ‘No, I’m British,
British Muslim’ (Fatimah).
Fatimah highlights that Muslims must not be denied or excluded from ‘British culture’,
which encompasses citizenship rights as well as cultural (here British) rights. Furthermore,
Saeema emphasises a political approach to explain the use of that term, a product of
‘modern’ times, where post September 11 has raised an interest or even curiosity from
people who ‘want’ to know someone’s religion, hence highlighting a Muslim presence in
Britain:
‘No. I think it is quite a modern term... since 9/11, I think it escalated, we’ve had
more tension...saying we’re British and then emphasising the fact that we are
Muslim...I started associating myself with ‘British Muslim’ was when I started
uni…people say ‘what are you?’ and I say ‘well I’m Asian’ but then they ask for the
religion, then I say ‘British Muslim’...so ‘British Muslim’ goes more than ‘British
Pakistani’ cause people they want to know if you’re Muslim’ (Saeema).
Bushra emphasises the fact that Muslims in Britain want to feel ‘included’ in British society
and not be stigmatised as ‘backward’ or ‘bombers’. Reflecting on discourses surrounding
inclusionary and exclusionary politics, she maintains that citizenship and religious identities
epitomised by ‘British Muslim’ signifies that her allegiances are both towards Britain and
Islam, hence deconstructing the concept that ‘Muslim’ means ‘backwards’ and therefore
‘non-British’. For Bushra, to say ‘British Muslim’ is a political statement signifying her
right to live in British society:
‘The media hype of Muslims as being backward, people saying things like ‘Muslims
are backwards, Muslims can’t be British’, saying well ‘I’m Muslim and I am British
too’, there’s this whole idea that Muslims don’t want to be part of British society,
they don’t want to integrate but much rather follow the Saudis...but to say ‘British
Muslim’ means ‘I’m part of this country cause people think that when you’re
Muslim you can’t be British, like you don’t care about England, you just care about
you religion, but you are paying taxes but people don’t see that, just that you are
Muslim and that you’re bombing...they don’t see that we are on their side we don’t
agree to that, and I think that’s why the term ‘British Muslim’ is popular now’
(Bushra).
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Alternatively, Tasneem does not see the use or validity of the term ‘British
Muslim’; if anything it self-labels Muslims as ‘different’ and therefore encourages division
instead of integration:
‘There’s no reason to say British Muslim…with British Pakistani it comes with
ethnic origin like you don’t hear people say ‘British Jews’ or ‘British Catholics’ so
what does it like, what’s the need for ‘British Muslim’? I don’t think you should
bring religion into it, it’s a personal thing so for me it’s a new identity just to be
different after 9/11, why can’t you be normal, part of a society you don’t need to do
that, if you want to integrate, why label yourself?’(Tasneem).
Indeed, disagreeing with the politicised nature of the term ‘British Muslim’, Tasneem
prefers the prioritisation of an ethnic identity over a Muslim identity, which for her, should
remain ‘personal’ and therefore, private. Likewise, Rahila explains her apprehension, even
fear, of using ‘British Muslim’ post 9/11. Rahila explains why she prefers to use the term
‘British Pakistani’:
‘I don’t ever use the term Muslim…I always say British Pakistani and I never ever
use the term British Muslim…I’m scared to use that because of what’s happened,
after September 11 and all these terrorist things and they blame Muslims...most
Pakistanis are Muslims anyway so if I say British Pakistani it’s assumed that I’m
British Muslim’ (Rahila).
As Parekh (2000) claims, Muslims in Britain have faced racist antagonism due to their
cultural differences since the 9/11 attacks. In fact, Rahila expresses her Muslimness through
her ethnic heritage. She deliberately avoids mentioning she is Muslim in her attempts to
display a more ‘toned down’ aspect of her religious identity. Sonia analyses the relevance of
Islam in her life and as a non-practising Muslim, does not feel comfortable to use ‘British
Muslim’:
‘I don’t use that term... if I was a practising Muslim I would but I don’t because
there are a lot of things I do that Muslims shouldn’t do and that’s the truth...there
are many things that Islam condemns like alcohol, like wearing a T-Shirt and
wearing tight clothes revealing my figure…I know there are certain boundaries that
you need to follow which I haven’t so how can I say I am a proper Muslim?’
(Sonia).
For her, the degrees to which young women adhere to Islamic principles (levels of
religiosity) may influence their decisions as to whether they should publicly define
themselves as Muslims or not. In acknowledging that she is not a ‘proper Muslim’ and
hence not fit to use ‘British Muslim’ as a term, Sonia categorises notions of Muslimness;
she maintains that her ‘tight clothes’ do not give her the right to affirm, albeit publicly, that
she is Muslim. This section has therefore demonstrated that respondents are politicising a
religious identity through the use of the term ‘British Muslim’ as they explain why they
choose or do not choose to define themselves as ‘British Muslims’. In the following section,
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I focus on the ‘meanings’ that respondents attribute to Islam as they reflect on the ways in
which they value religion. In assessing the importance that religious identity may have in
their lives, respondents demonstrate their negotiations of Islamic identities and hence, an
evolution in their gender identities.
5.4.2 Meanings of Islam
‘I don’t want to pray but I’m just lazy but I believe Islam is more to do with
respecting the values of the religion so it’s respecting the elders, I wouldn’t do
something that I know my parents won’t be happy about so no going out clubbing or
drinking or having meat that isn’t halal so it’s values rather than the beliefs, the
core ones like Ramadan I always keep my fast, and give money to charity’
(Habibah).
I asked respondents what Islam means to them, and how they rate the importance of Islam in
their lives. The ways in which participants understand Islam and the value they attribute to
religion provides an insight into how diverse respondents’ perceptions about Islam are; their
varied views indicate the apparent diversity in which respondents choose to affirm their
Islamic identities. The majority of them define themselves as ‘practising Muslims’, two
respondents consider themselves as ‘non-practising believing Muslims’. Only one
respondent defines herself as a ‘liberal Muslim’. For Sadia, ‘liberal’ is equated with ‘having
broken all barriers’. The only link she maintains with Islam, according to her, is the fact that
she eats halal food:
‘I’d say a very liberal Muslim. I’ve broken all barriers except for one thing-like I
always eat halal meat...that’s the only thing I stick to! one night we were
somewhere and I asked whether the meat was halal and they were like yeah and
then carried on to order a glass of red wine and my friends were like ‘What are you
doing?!’ To me, it’s the only one link I’ve got and I have not broken but if I break
that, then I’ve lost it all’ (Sadia).
Most respondents describe Islam as ‘a way of life’ while some maintain that it acts
‘as a set of rules and guidelines for you to live by’. A minority chooses to see Islam as ‘a
spiritual path’, hence adopting a more personal or philosophical approach to the practise of
Islam. Indeed, young women profess their Islamic faith in diverse ways, relying on their
own understandings, experiences and interpretations of Islam, hence demonstrating the
scope they have to contest and construct Muslimness in the UK. Respondents also raise the
possibility of interpretations of Islam, thereby further stretching the roles played by Islam in
the lives of young British South Asian Muslim women. Women are hence choosing
individual lifestyles by negotiating religious Islamic principles. Amongst respondents in this
research, the majority do not drink alcohol; four respondents have tried drinking for a while,
whilst two respondents drink alcohol on a regular basis. Most of them eat nothing but halal
meat except for one respondent, who eats non-halal meat as well as pork. For most
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respondents, it appears that the practice of religion is defined by specific food, drink and
behaviour.
However, for Alia and Sadia, Islam is not about food or physical presentation, but
about the good deeds (charity) one endeavours to achieve, while remembering that God is
ever present:
‘People on the outside look and say she’s religious, she’s done well for herself, its
more what’s in their heart…It’s about day-to-day actions, like charity … I just don’t
see religion as being about clothing, about prayer, food… it’s not just how I present
myself…it’s about the way I think, the way I treat other people… I tend to not see it
as: Oh you must do this or you must not do that, not eat this or drink this but more
practical than ritual...I’d like to pray as much as I can, I do fast… it really annoys
me when I see other people passing judgments on how religious they perceive me to
be as I dress in English clothes’ (Alia).
‘Religion to me should be a very personal thing... not the mosque or doing x, y and
z... it’s more a spiritual thing, what you believe and what you think and do, not a
case of following that matters...doesn’t mean if that person is reading this and that
means that he or she is religious...it is actually humanity and being a good person’
(Sadia).
Likewise, Farha maintains that Islam is ‘personal’ and however one wishes to practise must
be left open:
‘I’m a very spiritual person… I fast, I do the namaz, I went for umrah a few years
ago and I plan to go to hajj at some point… but then I don’t have any rigid views on
stuff like how each person relates to God, I think it’s very personal, I find it very
satisfying to read namaz, so I do it for myself. And if somebody doesn’t, then that’s
nothing to judge them on…it’s a purely personal thing’ (Farha).
Interestingly, Fawzia suggests that Islam gives room to be ‘non-conformist’,
therefore providing a space for individualism. Improving the self is a priority, rather than
wearing the hijab:
‘Islam teaches you not conform to what everyone else is saying and to just be a
better person, improve myself and then think about praying and hijab, than to do it
the other way round but people here don’t seem to do that, parents expect them to
wear hijab and they betray people at the first drop of the hat and they find no
problems in lying to their parents while my parents know exactly what I’m doing’
(Fawzia).
Nonetheless, she highlights the irony in women being ‘expected’ to wear the hijab by their
parents, thereby denoting an extremely conformist view of Islam. Echoing Fawzia’s
arguments, Yasmin, although comparing two different social contexts (Britain versus Saudi
Arabia) in relation to the practice of Islam, reiterates that in Britain, she has the ‘freedom’ to
express her beliefs, where the ‘UK becomes the best place to be Muslim’:
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‘I think because I live in a country where most people are non-Muslims, giving a
good message around me about what Islam stands for…when I was younger, I was
very idealistic about Saudi Arabia and that’s the place to be if you want to be
religious and wear black and be super holy but the more I travel, the more I realise
that the UK is the best place to be a Muslim...you have the freedom to practise your
religion so you can take it seriously because you’ve got that freedom, you don’t
have to be religious if you don’t want to whereas if you do, you tend to do it
properly and you understand it more whereas in the middle-east and south-Asia you
would just go with the flow’ (Yasmin).
Yasmin suggests that it is possible to combine a religious lifestyle to the ‘modern’ world
where it is up to the individual to have an agency as to the extent to which one wants to
practise. Yasmin compares the UK to Saudi Arabia, and maintains that Britain, a non-
Muslim country, provides the ideal environment for her to practise and understand Islam
freely as there is no pressure for her to ‘go with the flow’, like middle-eastern countries do.
Here, she navigates, negotiates and constructs a personal view of her Islamic faith.
‘I think it’s mainly around making time to pray, and the way you dress up of course
makes a big difference…show your modesty. But I also have to make sure that I
carry on something Islamic’ (Abida).
Opposing Alia’s and Fawzia’s view that the physical is not significant, Abida, who
wears the hijab, maintains that dress is an important aspect of Islam, whereby ‘modesty’
must be viewed on the outside and made public, hence differing from the ‘personal’ attitude
emphasised by other respondents. Furthermore, propagating the teachings of Islam is also
encouraged so as to carry on the Islamic legacy. As Haleema maintains:
‘Other religions, which may be on and off or part-time things, like going to church
on Sunday or reading the Bible in the mornings, for me Islam is a way of life and it
is me in a way because it is my identity. When I walk into a room I see Muslim
people I say ‘Assalamualaikum’ and I’m always conscious ‘is my religion going to
accept what I’m doing now?’ ...the concept of taqwa, always be conscious that God
exists and that’s why I chose the medical profession because it upholds Islamic
values, like caring, honesty, confidentiality, everything that is at the core of Islam is
at the core of my career so it’s so compatible to me as a Muslim, every step of my
life my religion is my criterion’ (Haleema).
Likewise, Haleema, comparing and contrasting Islam to Christianity, draws ‘on the way of
life’ concept which Islam prescribes. She claims that Islam is constant in governing her
everyday actions. Interestingly, Haleema explains that the medical profession offers her a
space where she can practise the inherent principles of Islam without contradictions; indeed,
she is given scope by her chosen field of profession to honour concepts such as ‘honesty’,
‘confidentiality’ and ‘care’ which as a Muslim, are ‘core’ to her beliefs. As such, Haleema’s
quote illustrates the ways in which her educational aspirations (medical degree) and
ultimately, a professional career (medical profession) directly impact on how she generates
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her understandings of Islam. Indeed, experiences of educational and work are influencing
women’s identities and ultimately, they ways in which they manage Muslimness.
‘I’m not a proper Muslim…it is to follow the guidelines, the separation of the sexes,
to cover yourself, not to eat certain foods or drink, or gambling, I don’t gamble but
I do drink and I love bacon and I eat chicken that’s not halal...I’m not a Muslim
because I’m not praying five times a day and I’m not reading the Qur’an, but then
recently, I’ve viewed some of the readings and I kind of agree with a lot of the stuff
but then there are other things that make me think I can’t be Muslim but then
talking to other people, I feel like ok, I am and I do believe but I just don’t practise’
(Sanaa).
Sanaa, whose father is a religious leader in her community, lives away from home, drinks
alcohol and eats pork. Indeed, she expresses her confusion when she suggests that she
cannot be Muslim as she does not pray while, at the same time, she recognises that Islamic
readings have scope for different understandings. However, despite living a contrasting
lifestyle to that prescribed by Islam, Sanaa claims that she does believe in God, hence
raising the question of what it means to be Muslim. The diversity of respondents’ views
around ‘meanings’ of Islam demonstrate that Muslimness, like all religions, cannot be
homogenised or essentialised. The differences in views reflect multiple Islamic identities as
participants contest and construct their perceptions of Islam. Next, I briefly look at how
women contextualise the meanings they attribute to Islam and hence focus on how and why
interpretations of Islam by respondents contribute to the ways in which they manage
Muslimness.
5.4.3 Interpreting Islam
In this section, I look at how active participants are critically engaging with the
meanings they attribute to Islam. More specifically, I reflect on how they interpret their
meanings of religion as they generate diverse understandings and hence, different Islamic
practice modes or codes. I began by asking respondents the extent to which they read
Quranic scriptures so as to determine how involved they are in understanding and promoting
their ‘individual’ notions of Islam. Most respondents from my study read the Qur’an. From
this, however, the majority do not understand Arabic and hence, either read it phonetically
(recitations) or read English translations, with the exception of two respondents who
understand Arabic. Women give their views on the Qur’an and Islamic law (Shari’a law),
thus portraying divergent opinions about Islam. Here, I emphasise that participants take an
active interest in Islamic precepts, where being ‘Muslim in Britain’ denotes a variety of
contestations, constructions, affirmations and actions of how Islam is perceived and
approached by the women I interviewed. Indeed, Bushra and Sonia talk about the
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problematic issue of interpretation, where language, as well as limited knowledge of the
Qur’an generates multiple views which may create confusion of what is credible:
‘There should only be one way to interpret the Qur’an but because of words, it can
be seen in different ways but it should only be in one way. I think it’s interpreted in
one way but you can say one thing, you can write one sentence but everybody can
understand it differently can’t they? So that’s how problems arise don’t they?’
(Bushra).
‘When we were younger we were reading and we couldn’t understand but you need
to be aware of what you’re reading otherwise why are you doing it? What does it
mean? I think there needs to be awareness, knowledge of exactly what you’re
reading and you’re doing for the right reasons, that’s really important’ (Sonia).
Two respondents, Yasmin and Farha, stress an extremely important discourse about
Islam and patriarchy. It is evident from their expressions that a critique of Islam and its
‘masculinised’ interpretations need to be acknowledged as being divisive; in Yasmin’s
words, ‘isolated’:
‘I went to an Islamic conference but there was a gap…he asked the question who
here is doing medicine and he started having a go, saying girls shouldn’t be doing
medicine, we should be getting non-Muslims provide for the services for our Muslim
community and girls are not thinking about their families and prioritising married
life…I just thought you’re just making me feel so isolated… I want to be educated
and practise as a doctor, and this is not un-Islamic...don’t agree to his view at
all...I’m going to be a working wife and mother...his Islam was so masculinised,
which Islam is not (My emphasis)... it’s a fair religion and if you look at the time of
the Prophet, his first wife Khadija was his boss, older, first convert to Islam, a
successful business woman and she had more money than him probably so how can
you tell me that I shouldn’t be a doctor?
I sound like a feminist (Laugh)...but Islam...God is a feminist …The balance is so
unfair at the moment... I hope when I have a daughter that she becomes a scholar
who is respected from a classical sense and a modern sense, that she understands
her religion inside out, understands why all the male scholars think the way they
do... because somebody has to fix this problem…
people tend to forget that the Prophet’s wife Aisha was one of the best female
scholars and men would go to her to learn…how can this be forgotten? We do need
more female scholars to keep the balance and the important thing is that women
don’t become too ridiculous and go too far to the western model of what feminism
is...feminism is not about wanting to be a man, it’s about women having their rights
and being empowered and that’s important for Muslim women to recognise... I
don’t want to be a man...I just want to be treated fairly’ (Yasmin).
Yasmin’s concerns about how Islam is ‘masculinised’ can be linked back to the point made
earlier by Fawzia (Chapter Four, page 160) about the ways in which women are categorised
due to them adopting certain modes of behaviour; in Fawzia’s case, her not wearing the
hijab is indicative that she does not pray. Raising issues about patriarchal interpretations of
the Qur’an, Yasmin reflects on her experiences in attending an Islamic conference.
According to Yasmin, Muslim women are presently unable to situate themselves within the
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broader frameworks of Islamic debates and discussions. Yasmin feels that she is being
denied access and right to express her opinions, even within scholarly domains like for
instance, conferences. In denouncing that fact, Yasmin wants to reclaim authority, which for
her, is granted to her by Islam. The wish expressed is that there should be more female
scholars involved in interpreting the Qur’an. Yasmin supports her argument by reverting to
the significant role played by historical Muslim female figures such as Khadija and Aisha,
Prophet Mohammad’s wives, in the evolution of Islamic teachings. These role models were
extremely active Muslim women in their communities, but have now been ‘forgotten’.
Similarly, Brown’s study (2006: 417-430) on Muslim women in Britain, in the context of
women’s rights to education, employment and marriage options, also shows that young
women are increasingly using the examples of female historical figures from early Islam,
and personal understandings of the hadith and sunna to challenge dominant views held
about Islam. Challenging ‘cultural baggage’, Yasmin maintains that Muslim women should
embrace their rights, albeit not to fall into the trap of ‘western’ feminism. Her understanding
of Islamic feminism is informed through her faith, which Yasmin believes provides her with
power and agency to interpret Islam in fairness. Indeed, Afshar et al., (2005, 1-31) suggest
that the ‘British education’ that Muslim women are benefiting from is resulting into the
latter grasping new knowledge about their faith, hence following the Islamic feminists’
‘political and intellectual development’ that came about in the past centuries (Abu-Lughod,
1998; Ahmed, 1992, quoted in Afshar et al., 2005: 12).
As I previously argued in Chapter Four, education provides a space and acts as a
tool where Muslim women feel empowered to critically reflect upon their faith, and their
positionings within the dominant discourses of Islam. This point remains crucial to this
thesis. Indeed, as education and ultimately, paid employment, lead women to assert their
identities as independent Muslim women, the skills and experiences gained at university and
at work may influence respondents’ positionings as in how they want to assert their rights as
Muslim women, not only within their communities but also within institutions such as
marriage. As her quote indicates, Yasmin disagrees with the fact that she was being lectured
by a man about marriage, and Muslim women’s roles within it. She expresses how
important her aims of being educated are so as to later be in a position to work as a medical
practitioner. More importantly, her wishes and choices of wanting to be a ‘working wife and
mother’ strongly indicate that Yasmin is challenging existing notions of South Asian
Muslim womanhood in Britain so as to re-work a more equitable notion of Muslim woman’s
status and gender identity within marriage and family life. Indeed, this illustrates how
spaces of higher education and employment are impacting on women’s gender identities, as
well as women’s understandings of marriage. Farha, a lawyer, also reflects:
184
‘Like the question of modesty for women in Islam…it is men who’ve been
interpreting these verses and it’s not even in the Qur’an…they’ve taken it from
hadiths which some of them have doubtful origins and the Shari’a itself…the
development of a legal system which was to administer different areas of the empire
and it was developed for that society, Arabian society. It didn’t come from the
Prophet and it didn’t come from God and the Prophet never told anyone to write
anything down. And a lot of anti-woman things come from hadiths which are very
doubtful because he was so progressive. In his time, women and men used to read
namaz (prayer) together’ (Farha).
Likewise, Farha expresses her concerns about patriarchal interpretations of Islam, raising
the issue of the legitimacy of the hadiths, and the irony of Islamic teachings as being
‘progressive’ instead of reductive. In addition, Farha stipulates that the concept of Shari’a
law was inherently developed to suit particular cultural and political contexts, thereby
highlighting its specificity to suit and support particular legal and societal frameworks, more
specifically, Arabian society.
Alternatively, some respondents suggest that the Qur’an is fixed and cannot have
diverse interpretations, even though Islam is practised differently according to different
schools of thought. As Lubaina says:
‘We should take the Qur’an as a commitment, it’s not to be interpreted, it’s the true
word of God, we can’t go around interpreting the word of God because we believe
that all other holy books are a distortion of that over generations, but the Qur’an
has stayed the same over all these years. Obviously there are schools of thought and
they interpret their own way. But it’s the same as long as we have the core meaning
of it. The hadith is the Sunna while the Qur’an is the word’ (Lubaina).
However, Saeema suggests that in getting more education about Islam and learning Arabic
so as to understand the Qur’an, cultural myths can be deconstructed:
‘With the Qur’an, all we’ve ever been taught is how to read it...it’s never what it
means, you don’t understand a word you’re reading you assume things but that’s
not religion but I have started learning about Islam because if anyone had asked me
before what religion was I’d just say culture like the old generation, one of the
biggest problems is because we’re not educated about it...but now when I say yes
I’m religious, it’s my own interpretation of what I see religion as’ (Saeema).
With education, Saeema is able to transcend ‘culture’ so as to come up with ‘my own
interpretation’ of Islam. However, some respondents see the challenges of this approach. As
Nazia says:
‘True knowledge is when you question something even though it’s completely right
sometimes I fear, like you don’t question God, but sometimes I fear that my faith in
religion is not as strong because I’m questioning and that can move me away from
my religion and that’s wrong’ (Nazia).
Previous research by Abbas (2003: 423) also portrays similar trends, whereby Muslim
women criticise their parents’ tendencies to read Islam imbibed with ‘cultural tendencies’.
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Nazia goes as far as to maintain that understandings of Islam must be ‘questioned’, even
though she personally feels that questioning God is ‘wrong’. In challenging parental
interpretations, young women develop different approaches as to how Islam can, and must
be understood.
‘It’s manipulating the religion, leave it as original as you can and I do believe that
our religion has a large part to do with intention, like the hijab thing, wear it
properly, to not want to wear it and just wear it half way and then make a disgrace
out of the religion in front of everyone, irritate other people who don’t wear hijab
and have to constantly answer questions to fit in with their own people, it just
creates problems for everyone. Just take it off and shave your hair, it’s much better’
(Fawzia).
For Fawzia, her Islamic beliefs lead her to suggest that interpretation and intention go hand
in hand. For example, for Fawzia, the hijab, instead of acting as a personal choice, becomes
an area of contention whereby women who do not wear it wholeheartedly generate debates
that ‘confuse’ non-Muslims about why it is worn, and why others do not wear it, hence
creating unnecessary polemics about Islamic concepts.
Respondents also talk about certain extreme aspects of Islamic law and assess their
validity in the twenty-first century. Indeed, context must not be disregarded as laws must be
contextualised and made practical to fit specific cultural and social contexts. In so doing,
respondents assess some core concepts of Shari’a law in order to demonstrate their
engagements with certain aspects of Islamic law. Farha explains:
‘I have a lot of problems with the Shari’a as a lawyer…all these punishments, these
are extreme levels only meant to be used in extreme cases and in the Prophet’s time,
they were never used, some of the punishments which are currently in vogue…like
they were trying to use them in Afghanistan…like stoning a woman to
death…(sigh)…in those times even it was meant to be just to show how bad
something was…it was never implemented’ (Farha).
‘It’s not if you steal one thing you get your hands chopped off but if you repetitively
steal, and they hardly do that nowadays…it seems like a harsh rule but back in the
day maybe it made sense…another example, adultery and stoning to death
obviously God put that for a reason, quite a bad sin to commit and it’s becoming so
acceptable to do that when it’s a huge major thing, wait till you’re divorced to carry
on…the amount of messed up people that walk around, they go to jail, get bailed out
but if you had scary laws here, maybe people wouldn’t commit as much crime, quite
logical’ (Bushra).
Farha reflects on the fact that stoning to death (punishment for adultery) was just a scare
tactic that was not practised in Arabian society, while Bushra maintains that if British
society had ‘scary laws’, levels of crime would be lower. Indeed, for her, context is not an
issue as she sees the logic of having such deterrents. It is therefore evident that young
Muslim women in the UK understand and profess a variety of opinions about Islam,
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highlighting the possibilities of taking individualistic stands on religious or theological
concepts. Clearly, respondents are challenging ‘what has been taught when we were young’.
They hence manifest an awareness to embrace newly discovered views of Islam by
attending conferences and talks organised by university union societies and community
youth organisations, and by also getting involved in other spheres of media such as Muslim
magazines, as well as learning Arabic so that they are able to understand the Qur’an on their
own accord. As respondents reflect upon how they engage with Islamic precepts, and the
ways in which they decide to practise Islam through their contestations and constructions of
Islam, they develop agency and independence in managing Muslimness. Indeed, their
contestations and constructions remain linked to the fact that higher education provides
them with the necessary space to explore alternative meanings of Islam and therefore, be in
a position to develop new gender identities through their navigations.
In the concluding section of this chapter, I focus on how the hijab remains an area
of contestation and construction for my participants. Their explorations of hijab as dress
code, which is reflective of an Islamic identity, further demonstrate the negotiations
respondents are involved in as they navigate notions of Muslimness. Indeed, an analysis of
the role which hijab plays in respondents’ contestations and constructions of Islamic
identities in Britain remains important to my study as it demonstrates how women are
actively engaging with the debates around hijab, religious rights, and multiculturalism in the
UK; respondents’ perceptions and experiences of hijab highlight their negotiations and as
such, illustrate how educated Muslim women are developing new gender identities through
their understandings of Muslim women’s status, agency and choice, within wider discourses
of Islam and the hijab.
5.4.4 Unveiling the hijab
‘It is a response to events, a strong symbol…you wear hijab, people know she’s
Muslim, there’s no confusion there…they see it. I don’t wear hijab and people don’t
see it, they question me ‘What’s your faith?’ ‘You’re not Muslim?’ It’s become
quite, not popular, but normal now. For example, my year at university, more than
half the girls in my year wear hijab. There’s been quite an increase’ (Asma).
Throughout this chapter, I have argued that clothing plays a definite role in influencing
Muslim women’s views on their intersecting multiple identities. In this final section of the
chapter, I discuss how the hijab, as Asma states, has become a ‘symbol’ of Islamic identity,
whereby women portray agency and choice of whether or not to adopt the hijab as a means
to proclaim an Islamic identity in Britain. As such, their decisions to adopt or reject the hijab
enable participants to negotiate notions of Muslimness in Britain; in not wearing the hijab,
Asma recounts that her Muslimness is ‘not seen’. As Winter (2008: 2) suggests, the hijab
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‘sends messages concerning the social and political presence of certain conceptions of
Islam’, which encourage diverse reactions about the meanings of hijab from Muslims and
non-Muslims alike. More recently, Tarlo (2010), in Visibly Muslim, highlights the contours
of how Muslims in multicultural Britain are choosing to express their identities and faith
through dress, whether they choose to wear colourful hijabs, plain black jilbabs, or niqabs.
Tarlo (2010) argues that issues around Islamic female modesty, faith, fashion and
politics remain enmeshed with one another, where ‘Islamic fashion’, generated and accessed
through particular retail shops and websites in the UK, provides space for Muslim women to
express different styles of hijabs/jilbabs and hence, new spaces to express their identities.
Tarlo (2010: 2) states that: meaning (about clothes) is above all about interpretation, is often
contested and is always contingent on particular circumstances. She (2010: 13) argues that
the multiplicity of ways in which Islamic dress codes are being adopted by Muslim women
in Britain reflects ‘how people want to be seen rather than how others define them’. Tarlo
(2010: 13) maintains that the ‘category of the visibly Muslim is self-chosen’, which is
demonstrative of the fact that women are actively employing agency and action to express
the diverse strands of Islamic identities; in choosing to go ‘visibly public’, women adopt
Islamic dress codes for various personal reasons which nonetheless, mark them as ‘visibly
Muslim’ publicly (Tarlo, 2010: 75). Tarlo’s (2010) study remains relevant to my research as
it exemplifies how Islamic dress codes are being negotiated by young Muslim women in
order to express and affirm their Islamic identities in Britain.
Similarly, in my study, respondents dress in a variety of ways that spell religious
adherence/affiliations in varying degrees. Such nuances depict agency and choice in women
consciously choosing how to dress, hence projecting specific messages about ‘Muslimness’
in Britain. Indeed, Lewis’ (2007: 423-441) study, read from post-colonial perspectives and
social inclusion debates in Britain, focuses on how dress informs ‘bodies which come to be
read as Muslim’. Veiling therefore remains a product of a ‘spatial system’, whereby its uses
have evolved historically (Lewis, 2007). Spatialised processes, historically and
geographically located, impact on women’s Muslim identities; the ‘veil’ must therefore also
be seen as an ‘item of clothing and not just a sign of religious allegiance’. Taking fashion
retail as focus, Lewis (2007) addresses the multiplicity of meanings espoused by young
women as they choose to adopt any form of Islamic dress style. Perceiving ‘Muslim
woman’ with the veil does not therefore automatically suggest that she is oppressed, at the
mercy of patriarchal cultures but signifies trendy attitudes to Islamic dress codes, thereby
highlighting ‘revivalist’ Islamic identities. As Tarlo (2010: 5) also maintains, to ‘understand
the significance of hijab today we need to move beyond debates about whether it is
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liberating or oppressive towards a focus both on its form and on the diversity of meanings
attributed to it and activities generated around it’.
At the time of interview, the majority of respondents wore jeans and tops (‘English
clothes’), five respondents wore jeans, tops and the hijab, one respondent wore the salwar
kameez with the hijab, one respondent wore just the salwar kameez while two respondents
wore the jilbab with the hijab. In this sample, no respondent wore the burka or the niqab.
This said, in my sample, a minority (eight respondents) did wear the hijab, with one
respondent wearing it and removing it according to place and space. All participants claim
that a woman should have the choice to wear the hijab if she wishes to. Respondents who do
not wear the hijab explain that women who do adopt it do it out of ‘strength’, ‘choice’,
‘independence’ or to affirm their Muslim identities.
Concepts around the hijab and female modesty rely on personal and subjective
understandings of female modesty in Islam. As Sonia affirms:
‘I’m still covered and I remember reading women have to cover their heads and
underneath that line there’s another line saying that men should also cover up so
the question is: cover up what?’ (Sonia).
Despite this ‘personal’ facet of modesty in Islam, the hijab today remains a ‘symbol’
spurring political contention. Indeed, the issue of Islamic dress codes has generated some
controversies in Europe. For instance, in Britain, the secondary school student Shabina
Begum claiming her right to wear the jilbab at school (June 2004), and the school teacher
assistant Aishah Azmi demanding her right to wear the niqab during lessons in Britain
(October 2006) reflect that young British Muslim women are expecting that their religious
convictions be recognised and accommodated within British educational establishments. In
France, the ban on headscarves in public (March 2004) and more recently, the burka ban
(2010) in French public spaces have also raised considerable debates about the rights of
Muslims to express their religious beliefs in European contexts. The veil has therefore
generated debates about the political position of Muslims in Europe, the demand for
religious rights in being able to freely practise one’s religious beliefs (here female modesty)
and women’s rights to choice (to adopt the hijab), as members and citizens of democratic
states. Nonetheless, counter arguments about the veil suggest that it epitomises the symbol
of women’s oppression. I therefore asked participants about their views on the hijab and
why they think young women are increasingly adopting the hijab on university campuses
and workplaces in Britain.
‘I’ve done it after these political events as well...I think it’s in part for religious
reasons, the way I was taught to wear the hijab ‘oh just cover your head cause you
have reached a certain age now’ and you started high school, cover your head...I
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didn’t start off from a religious perspective, Islam says ‘you have to cover your
head now, wear the hijab’’ (Nazia).
For some respondents, the hijab is adopted and used to affirm a Muslim identity
following ‘political’ events. Nazia differentiates between the cultural, religious and political
perspectives that wearing the hijab entails. Indeed, being told to wear it by her Pakistani
parents was purely from a South Asian cultural perspective, while wearing it out of choice
after September 11 denotes a political statement of an Islamic identity, hence demarcating a
shift in Nazia’s values. As Haleema and Yasmin suggest, awareness about Islam has been
raised positively by young British Muslims, who are constructing new views and
understandings of their faith:
‘For something new to happen there’s always a trigger for it so September 11 was
certainly the trigger for it and more and more Muslims are converting to Islam
because it’s made people think and made people go read the literature, triggered a
thought-process so I think that’s the reason why Muslim women are taking up the
hijab’ (Haleema).
‘A lot of people who maybe were a bit more liberal have had to question their faith
and think well I do have a name that sounds Muslim and I have some beliefs but
why am I having so much grief about it? So from my experience and knowing
people, they’ve had to go back and look at their faith with a more critical eye and
people have actually found more sense in it and say oh well I should take it
seriously and if I’m gonna do it, I might as well do it properly then and I think
that’s why you find more girls wearing the headscarf’ (Yasmin).
Indeed, the choice to wear the hijab demonstrates, as Afshar et al., (2005: 29) claim, is a
‘political act’ resuming in an act of resistance on the part of young women, which is
reflective of ‘political Islamism’ (Ali, 1992: 114). In fact, far from depicting the picture of
the modestly dressed Muslim girl, the hijab becomes a representation of an Islamic symbol
used to publicly affirm a politicised religious identity, an approach that young women find
liberating and empowering. Alia suggests that the veil has been brought into the limelight by
comments made by MP Jack Straw who stated: the niqab is a visible statement of separation
and of difference (BBC News Online October 2006).
‘Definitely to do more with identity rather than a clash…I mean when women were
wearing veils long before any of this politics that came into it…you know when Jack
Straw made his comment about veils, it’s not that it separates but it’s showing who
you are’ (Alia).
However, Alia, who does not wear the hijab, disagrees and thinks that Muslim
women are not concerned about ‘separating’ themselves from the rest of society, but are
portraying an Islamic identity by making it visible through the hijab. Likewise, Farha sees it
as a minority in a ‘western’ context, which feels ‘threatened’ and hence, feels the need to
190
state their differences publicly. In so doing, they affirm independence and choice, defending
their decisions to wear the veil:
‘So many young women here do it as a symbol of identity and a symbol of
independence…trying to say that they are different from the rest of Western society,
like trying to prove something and I think people become more fanatical about their
beliefs when they’re a minority and it’s much more relaxed when you’re actually
not threatened. So they try and preserve their identity by being a bit extreme. That’s
what’s happening here, saying that they’re Muslims and they are different’ (Farha).
Sadia, who does not wear the hijab, respects her ‘educated’ friends who decide to wear it out
of ‘personal choice’; the hijab is not about oppression but an affirmation of a Muslim
identity post September 9/11, where being Muslim means being in ‘a category’:
‘I think it is an identity thing...and especially after the whole September 11
thing...the whole thing saying actually we are Muslims, we are proud and we can
wear the hijab and I think for people who want to do it, fair play to them...some
people are covered up and not allowed out of the house but I think a lot of young
women, educated, they do it out of personal belief, out of choice and that would be
independence as opposed to being oppressed... the girls I know who wear
hijab…their reasoning behind them is completely independence
They want to do it as they believe in it so I don’t think anyone has any right to
criticise...it’s another form of dress...again it’s public perception and the media
hype surrounding it…same with the Sikh turban or Jewish cross, one minute people
put you in a category, like British Muslim, and the next minute decategorise then
where’s the sense in that? How can you tell us not to be who we want to be?’
(Sadia). (Sadia’s emphasis)
Forcefully, Sadia denounces public perception as well as the role of the media, and
maintains that Muslims in Britain should have the ‘right’ to an autonomous decision of
deciding ‘who we want to be’ by adopting ‘another form of dress’. Tarlo’s (2010: 46-47)
study suggests that how the hijab is perceived by different individuals, Muslims and non-
Muslims, ‘shape and control’ the meanings associated with hijab; ‘such meanings are in turn
constantly re-framed by on-going political events and sensational media coverage of these’
(Tarlo, 2010: 46). Indeed, this reflects the inter-link between hijab, politics and identity.
Furthermore, contrasting the hijab to the Sikh turban and the Jewish cross, Sadia stresses
how easy it is to ‘categorise’ and ‘decategorise’ identities. However, Sabina highlights the
stigma that comes with the hijab, especially after September 9/11, where women who wear
the hijab are demonised as potential threats to British society:
‘You think head scarves you think she’s Muslim, she’s got a scarf on so she’s
probably got a gun underneath! So you cross to the other side of the road…
Although I don’t wear the hijab, after September 11, you walk down the street and
you think ‘My God, people are looking at me’ (Sabina).
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As a reaction to such issues, Mushirah, in wearing her hijab, hopes to break
stereotypes about Muslim women, hence creating a more positive image of women who
wear the hijab:
‘I’m not scum, and I want people to see that, it’s a mission, to be a good
representative and if anybody starts to do that well it’s purely because they want to
reaffirm their Islam, we are really tired of defending ourselves, it’s everyday life
like from people thinking you can’t speak English properly cause you’re wearing a
headscarf to opportunities that get missed because you wear it’ (Mushirah).
Nevertheless, some respondents, who do not wear the hijab, criticise the stereotypes
associated with women who choose to adopt the hijab as dress code. Indeed, women in my
study raise issues around the hijab and gendered conceptions of Muslimness by challenging
the notion of ‘she wears the hijab so she’s a good girl’. The hijab is used by women to gain
freedom and project particular images of themselves, whilst not necessarily adhering to
Islamic values. The adoption of the hijab, hence, does not necessarily suggest increased
piety, but outlines religiosity through the visual representation of a publicly articulated
Islamic identity. Rubina’s and Zainab’s concerns about girls wearing the hijab whilst having
‘boyfriends’ and ‘casual sex’ beg the question: Does wearing the hijab make you more
Muslim than I am?
‘You need to watch out for those who wear the scarf, they’re not innocent, in any
sense of the word they’re not, I thought they were until I went to college and the
girls in scarves do the worst things, people think they’re innocent as they wear
scarves and I’m like ‘No’, she’s the one with the boyfriend and gets up to loads of
things, they use it like that’ (Rubina).
‘I don’t disagree with anybody wearing it but some people wear the hijab but they
are going out and having casual sex’ (Zainab).
Nuzranah, who views herself as a ‘practising Muslim’, recounts her experiences at
university, where her not wearing the hijab sends the message that she is not Muslim:
‘One of the girls asked me, at the Islamic society, ‘are you Muslim?’ and I said yes
and she said ‘I thought you were Sikh’ and I said ‘why’ and she said ‘you don’t act
very Muslim as you don’t wear a scarf’ and I was like ‘believe it or not I do pray
and I don’t have a boyfriend’ and so in a way, I felt like I didn’t belong to the
Muslim society here on campus’ (Nuzranah).
The challenges faced by women like Nuzranah to profess a Muslim identity in Muslim
societies at university, without a hijab on, proves to be problematic. In fact, Dwyer’s work
(1999) focuses on the ways in which the hijab frames the construction of young women’s
Muslim identities through the diverse meanings which the hijab conveys. In the context of
hijab and its meanings around sexual propriety, religiosity and purity, Dwyer (1999: 18)
maintains that from her study, ‘the identities of those who did not wear the hijab were
constructed in opposition to these meanings’; in effect, women who wore the hijab were
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automatically perceived as respecting the ethos of sexual modesty and religiosity, as
opposed to women who did not wear the hijab. These findings epitomise Nuzranah’s
concerns that in choosing not to adopt the hijab, the perceptions she projects do not depict
her as someone who prays, but as someone who probably has a boyfriend. Moreover,
Fawzia expresses her frustration at women who wear the hijab while smoking shisha and
meeting guys at university:
‘Sometimes I think I’m better than them because I don’t drink and I don’t do shisha
but the main thing is not drinking cause a lot of people don’t do the drinking, it’s
the shisha thing...the hijabis, they’re sitting there with cake of make-up on and a
really tight scarf which exposes their entire neck and cleavage ...I’m being seen as
less modest because I’m not wearing a scarf and you, I can see every bit of your
body right now and they’re sitting there snuggled next to a guy having shisha-
where’s the modesty?’(Fawzia)
For Fawzia, the concept of female modesty is not signified through the hijab but through
behaviour. In this study, some respondents not wearing the hijab have expressed concerns
about those who wear the hijab with ‘skinny jeans and leggings’, hence defeating the
purpose of not attracting attention from the opposite sex. This issue of modesty is discussed
by Tarlo (2010: 40-41), who suggests that as women experiment by blending clothes they
consider to be ‘fashionable’, the ‘Muslim looks’ adopted by young British Muslim women
do not only rely on issues of modesty as prescribed by Islam. In fact, their notions of
dressing religiously also remain embedded within the use of colours, textures and patterns
which have ‘Islamic resonance’ as well as ‘cosmopolitan sensibilities’. Nevertheless, like
Fawzia, Sabina does not want to wear the hijab as she wears ‘skin tight’ jeans. Her choice
not to wear a headscarf is informed by how she interprets the meanings of ‘purdah’ (the
practice of ensuring the separation of women and men):
‘I could wear a scarf, but again, I could wear skin tight jeans. And in those jeans
there is no point in that kind of purdah, it’s not respect is it?’ (Sabina).
For Sabina, the hijab signifies just that: purdah, which is embedded within how she views
the concept of modesty in Islam. Her thoughts are further echoed by Rubina, who also chose
not to wear the hijab due to her adoption of jeans and tight tops. Rubina is exasperated at the
fact that some Muslim women wear see-through jilbabs, therefore revealing more flesh than
she does in wearing clothes, albeit jeans and tops:
‘I understand you need not show parts of your body but everything will show off the
shape of your body, I mean this one girl , she was wearing a jilbab and I’m thinking
to myself I can see her underwear, she was wearing blue knickers and her jilbab
was white! And the sunlight shown proper, see-through, and she wasn’t wearing
any clothes and I’m thinking ‘what are you doing?!’ She’s wearing a jilbab but I’m
wearing clothes! I’m the one covering!’ (Rubina).
193
Discourses around what constitutes female modesty for young women hence differ;
for some, modesty is about literally adopting an Islamic dress code (hijab, jilbab)
irrespective of material and colour, while for others, modesty is contextual and ‘relative’,
where one adapts to one’s current social climate. As Farha maintains:
‘Modesty, it’s all relative to the society where you live because let’s say, in
Pakistan, if I’m going out and I’m wearing a salwar kameez, or a top and jeans or
something, I’d be quite modestly dressed. The duppata is a big thing there, so I may
have a scarf around my neck and that would be fine, but my hair being covered or
not, it’s really not an issue, because nobody thinks that’s indecent and nobody is
going to stare at me because my hair is uncovered’ (Farha).
Indeed, denouncing women who wear the hijab as fashion statement, Aisha, who wears the
jilbab, suggests that non-Muslims get mixed messages when Muslim women wear the hijab
while going clubbing. For her, this is unacceptable:
‘Some wear it as fashion statement and there are people who have taken the hijab
off at university. I don’t blame people for questioning, she wears the hijab and she
doesn’t and people are confused but it makes people more aware of the religion,
people are going to ask you why do you wear it? And that’s your chance to actually
say why you wear it…you can’t just well go clubbing and so on and it’s really
embarrassing, someone said I see girls wearing shorts and the hijab and that’s
shocking, and he’s like are you just supposed to cover your hair?’ (Aisha)
As her words indicate, it is clear that her response raises the question: what does it really
mean to be Muslim in Britain? Young educated Muslim women in the UK are therefore
actively generating new meanings, interpretations and understandings of Islamic dress
codes; defining ‘new’ traditions in spatial modernities inform their choices and lifestyles. As
some of them decide to wear ‘shorts and the hijab’, meanings of Muslimness remain acutely
contested and constructed by Muslim women. As my study reveals, respondents are
deciphering meanings of the hijab and other Islamic dress codes such as the jilbab as they
explore educational or work settings. As respondents’ perceptions indicate, the hijab has
become a key contested signifier of Islamic identity on campus as women decide whether or
not to adopt it at university, and hence choose to publicly manifest an Islamic identity,
which Tarlo (2010) would identify as being ‘visibly Muslim’.
From my research, it is evident that respondents who do not adopt the hijab are
often viewed as being non-Muslim due to them not wearing a headscarf, as exemplified by
Nuzranah (quoted above). Also, some respondents, like Rubina, who chooses not to wear
the hijab and others who do wear the hijab, like Aisha, engage with discourses around
female modesty in Islam so as to contest notions around how and why the hijab is being
worn by Muslim women in Britain today. Indeed, Rubina critiques the fact that the hijab is
being worn with ‘blue knickers underneath a see-through white jilbab’, whilst Aisha
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maintains that the hijab, if worn as ‘fashion statement’ with ‘shorts’, sends mixed signals to
non-Muslims about the concept of hijab in Islam. As respondents reflect on their diverse
positionings on this issue of hijab, it is glaring that they are generating new gender identities
as they negotiate Islamic concepts around dress codes and decide how to navigate the notion
of hijab. Indeed, their negotiations of hijab illustrate the ways in which they manage
Muslimness as they explore educational and work settings. Such explorations and
negotiations might be important for these women at a later stage of their educational and
professional careers as they decide to go into employment in the future. Indeed, deciding
whether to manifest ‘public’ Islamic identities through hijab within the workplace may be
yet another interesting area of research leading to an understanding of how women’s gender
identities evolve as they negotiate Islam in Britain.
5.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter focused on how British South Asian Muslim women contest and
construct their identities in the context of their daily social experiences of higher education
and work. It extended the themes around Muslim women’s evolving gendered identities,
which I developed in Chapter Four. In this chapter, I looked at how the experiences of
higher education and work are opening up questions about identity in new ways for Muslim
women as they evaluate their own gendered identities, and the possible impacts this process
may have on their future life options. Indeed, as they reshape their identities and become
assertive in affirming these identities, respondents ultimately develop new attitudes towards
the meanings they attribute to marriage. Through my theoretical focus on how identities are
‘defined’ and ‘affirmed’ by respondents within contextual processes of expression and
performance, I have developed an analysis which has explored the ways in which research
participants ‘negotiate’ and manage Muslimness. More specifically, I argued that their
‘Muslimness’ is informed through relational boundaries, where religious identities are
perceived through racialised, ethnic, citizenship and gendered lenses. In navigating amongst
citizenship, ethnic and religious boundaries, respondents depict fluid, contextual and
subjective portrayals of their gender identities. Hence, ideas of Muslimness are constantly
being challenged, constructed and framed by young South Asian Muslim women in Britain.
Through such a dynamic process of negotiation, I have stressed that Muslimness is
constantly contested and constructed through an axis of racialised, ethnic and national
boundaries. In this analysis, I have illustrated that ambivalence in answering the question
‘who am I and why?’ has demonstrated that boundaries of identification for respondents
remain extremely flexible, hence deconstructing the notion of fixed categories when it
comes to the ‘definition’ and ‘affirmation’ of identities.
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First, I focused on how respondents choose to express their identities (by definition)
by looking at the terms (for example, ‘Asian’, ‘Muslim’, ‘British’, or all of these) they use
to do so. Through this analysis, I have shown that their ‘processes of identification’ indicate
intergenerational differences in the ways in which identities are affirmed among South
Asian Muslims, as young women demonstrate agency in deciding which identity to
prioritise, which one to embrace or which one to reject. Indeed, my study indicates that most
women employ hyphenated or hybrid terms (for example ‘British Pakistani’, ‘British
Muslim’) to define themselves, hence indicating the amount of choice they have in
‘expressing’ their identities. While some respondents identify with citizenship and ethnic
heritage, others prefer to affix their citizenship and religious identities. Also, as participants
navigate their ethnic, religious and citizenship identities, they critically engage with
discourses encompassing notions of ‘Britishness’, ‘whiteness’ and ‘Englishness’, and what
it implies to be ‘British’ and ‘non-white’ within the wider context of multicultural British
society. Through my discussions with them, it is obvious that respondents remain aware of
how racialised and politicised discourses around South Asian Muslim identities in Britain
influence the ways in which they reflect on their identities. More importantly, it is also
evident that participants, through their negotiations of such discourses, are asserting new
gender identities within the spaces (higher education/work) in which they evolve.
Moreover, as respondents explore educational and work settings, they underline
how ‘public perception’, through ‘labels and stereotypes’ considerably influences the ways
in which they construct their gender identities. As respondents negotiate different spaces
and encounter people from diverse backgrounds at university, their accounts highlight
inclusionary and exclusionary debates about how differences in skin colour, accents and
dress may lead to their identities being essentialised. In fact, they explain how dress codes
act as significant markers of identities within spaces such as university and work. As young
women reiterate their feelings about the ways in which dress codes (salwar kameez, hijab or
jilbab) aid to attribute ‘stereotypical’ notions around their ethnic, religious or citizenship
identities, their encounters at university lead them to re-negotiate their use of clothing
which, in respondents’ social contexts, convey meanings about respondents’ positionings.
For instance, although respondents’ experiences of negotiating identities demonstrate that
navigating boundaries is not a straight-forward process, some participants maintain that
wearing jeans may signify ‘British’ while salwar kameez may indicate ‘Asian’. Engaging
with these dichotomies is in effect leading young women to critically reflect on how they
construct and articulate their identities through clothing. Indeed, through their re-workings
of identities through dress codes, participants are exploring new gendered identities as they
strategically employ dress codes to signify particular strands of their gender identities.
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Second, I extended this discussion of respondents’ definition of identities by
looking at how they choose to perform (by affirmation) their identities. In this section, I
focused on how participants affirm their gender identities through this notion of
performance, which conveys choice and agency as women navigate their social contexts so
as to perform particular aspects of their identities. In particular, I addressed the ways in
which respondents are maintaining cultural and religious identities through practices such as
weddings, traditions such as language and food, and events such as Ramadan and Eid. In
fact, many respondents indicate that maintaining South Asian cultural and religious
traditions remains important to them, and intend to carry them on through to the next
generation. More importantly, from this analysis, it is apparent that even though participants
are ready to maintain cultural customary practices, nevertheless, they make a clear
distinction between what they perceive as ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ and hence, depict
intergenerational changes in the ways identities are understood and ultimately, performed
within British South Asian Muslim communities. For example, in discussing the impact
communities have on women’s modes of behaviour (social activities/ dress codes), as well
as reflecting on how weddings and marriage operate within British South Asian Muslim
communities, some respondents demonstrate that they exercise choice, control and agency
in navigating ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’ boundaries because of the independence gained from
education. Indeed, as respondents make this important distinction between ‘religion’ and
‘culture’, young women are re-negotiating their perceptions of gender identities by
formulating new understandings of what ethnic and religious traditions entail; as such, this
indicates an evolution in Muslim women’s gender identities.
Third, I explored how respondents manage Muslimness in the ways in which
respondents understand, interpret and frame Islam within the context of multicultural British
society. It is evident that for the majority of my participants, religious identity is given more
priority than ethnic and citizenship identity, although the latter are acknowledged as being
invariably intertwined with their religious identities. Nevertheless, such prioritisation
indicates the possibilities of emerging Islamic identities through the usage of the term
‘British Muslim’, as well as through the adoption of the hijab by educated Muslim women
in the UK. As respondents grapple with discourses of ‘what it means to be British Muslim’,
young women are evaluating their Islamic identities at university and work. For example, as
they manage Muslimness, women indicate acute agency in how they understand issues
around female modesty in Islam, a process which undoubtedly raises debates about what the
hijab signifies for these young women. Indeed, the hijab becomes a key contested signifier
of Islamic identity within spaces such as the university campus. For instance, for Abida, her
hijab ‘is’ her ‘Muslimness’, although she wears jeans simultaneously, whilst for Sabina, not
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wearing the hijab is how she expresses her ‘respect’ for Islam as she highlights the
inappropriateness of wearing the hijab with jeans. Respondents portray an array of views,
out of which it is clear that the hijab has come to signify a ‘visual’ representation of one’s
Islamic identity; so much so that as some respondents reiterate, not wearing headscarves
leads fellow students to assume that they are not Muslims, but are from non-Muslim South
Asian backgrounds.
These issues have raised debates about the meanings of Muslimness for young
British South Asian Muslim women, as well as indicated that Muslim women in Britain are
increasingly critiquing the ways in which Islam must be understood, approached and
interpreted, hence generating highly individualistic notions of Muslimness. As such, through
their negotiations of higher education and work, respondents indicate that they are
generating new gender identities as they contest and construct Muslimness within these new
spaces. In essence, the last part of this discussion has reinforced that Muslimness cannot be
‘assumed’ to be a fixed category, but must be seen as a relational and contextual notion
informing young women’s daily lives. As respondents experience new settings such as
higher education and work, they generate spaces to contest and construct new gender
identities which influence other life options, such as marriage. In the following chapter, I
explore questions around the contingent notions of Muslimness, with a particular focus on




Framing marriage: the British South Asian Muslim context
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I explore how British South Asian Muslim women navigate and re-
negotiate the institution, the practice and the act of marriage in Britain. I argue that through
the spaces of higher education and employment, respondents are generating new
understandings of marriage and as such, develop new gendered identities. Through this
analysis, I focus on how respondents frame marriage through negotiation processes which
help them explore boundaries in marriage and in so doing, generate new gendered
relationships. Here, I use the term ‘frame’ as it demonstrates that Muslim women are
critically and intentionally setting boundaries to satisfy their ‘Islamic’ and ‘Western’ ideals
of how and why they understand marriage as they do. This chapter extends the theme of
negotiation of identities I introduced in Chapter Four. Ultimately, in this chapter, I reveal
the ways in which religious identity impacts on participants as they navigate ideals of
marriage.
I focus on marriage as an institution, practice and act, where these remain tied by
the gender relationships within them. As I reiterated in Chapter Two, feminists have
highlighted the subordination of women to men in spaces such as the home (Oakley, 1974)
and the labour market (Walby; 1997; Adkins, 1995). For the purpose of my study, I focus
specifically, here, on how feminists have theorised gender relationships within marriage.
Existing feminist literature on marriage and gender relations have reinforced the inferior
position and subordination of the wife to her husband within matrimony, which is both a
public (social institution) and a private (personal relationship) institution. As Dryden (1999:
9) puts it ‘marriage is a socially organised institution that is fundamentally about gender,
and gender relations in this society are not currently equal’. Tracing the historical, political
and legal status of a wife in the ‘marriage contract’, Pateman’s Sexual Contract (1988)
exposed the unequal gender relationship between spouses where wives, rendered
economically dependent on husbands, are ‘owned’ and enslaved sexually, by the latter
within a system supported by patriarchy. Others, like Delphy and Leonard (1992) have
illustrated gender inequalities within the household by looking at how wives’ ‘unpaid
labour’, characterised by childcare and domestic work at home, undermines equal gender
relationships between spouses within the family unit. Nevertheless, as wives acquire
economic independence, they also face the ‘second shift’ as they shoulder dual
responsibilities at work and at home (Hochschild, 1989). By this, Hochschild (1989)
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indicates how working mothers, after a day’s work out of the home, come home to face
more work (housework, children’s care), hence the ‘second shift’. In this chapter, I
endeavour to uncover respondents’ attitudes towards the institution of marriage, the
responsibilities that come with it, as well as the equal gender relationships they hope to
achieve as they express their expectations of marriage.
In relation to South Asian Muslim marriages in the UK, as I illustrated in the
literature review (Chapter Two), researchers (Basit, 1997; Bradby, 1999; Werbner, 2004;
Charsley and Shaw, 2006) have outlined the religious and cultural significance attributed to
marriage. Writing on gender and patriarchy in the South Asian household, Bhopal (1997: 4)
states “Asian women may be oppressed in the family, by the form of marriage they
participate in”. In particular, Bhopal (1997) highlights the customary practice of the
arranged marriage as being a site of patriarchal oppression for women. Furthermore, in
conjunction with arranged matches, the occurrence of forced marriages remits into question
women’s rights to ‘free choice’ in marriage (Times Online, 2005). In the light of such
debates, I analyse respondents’ dispositions towards these practices as young women
produce their own narratives of what ‘choice’ in marriage entails. As far as the legality of
marriage is concerned for South Asian Muslims in Britain, research by Pearl and Menski
(1998) has shown that British Muslims negotiate two legal systems in matters of marriage
and divorce by navigating Islamic and English law. This concept is epitomised through the
‘Angrezi (English) Shari’a law’, which is a fusion of both laws. Nonetheless, as respondents
navigate Islamic marriage in Britain, it also implies that talaq (divorce by female
repudiation) and polygamy, although illegal in English jurisprudence, remain a concern for
Muslim women as these are part of the legal fabric constituting marriage laws in Shari’a
law.
I develop my argument by focusing on marriage on three levels. First, I argue that
marriage is a significant institution in South Asian communities but it is undergoing change
as women have scope to negotiate constructions and contestations of marriage. As the
institution of marriage in twenty-first century Britain, a European context, evolves, Muslim
women’s attitudes towards marriage, as well as gendered marital expectations ultimately
alter. My analysis illustrates how respondents produce diverse meanings of marriage as
compared to their parents, thereby creating intergenerational differences which influence the
institution of marriage. Through this process, I also demonstrate that Muslim women set
themselves apart from mainstream British society; they see themselves as different from
non-Muslim society and through this discourse of difference, I highlight how participants
generate individual and contextual meanings of marriage.
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Second, I consider the process where Muslim women re-negotiate the practice of
marriage. By ‘practice’, I refer to the marital gender relationship respondents hope to
achieve with future husbands as they navigate to transform expected gendered norms which
are embedded in cultural and religious ideals set by their communities. In particular, on a
first level, I examine women’s negotiations of pre-marital relationships as they review
gendered boundaries of appropriate modes of behaviour, which South Asian Muslim
womanhood is expected to uphold prior to marriage. On a second level, I assess how ‘new’
gendered expectations of marriage on the part of respondents influences marital
relationships as women demand equality in the household; specifically, I evaluate women’s
responses to domestic work and their living arrangements. Through this analysis, I illustrate
the struggles unmarried women may face as they attempt to challenge fixed gendered roles
in marriage. Indeed, by looking at married respondents’ experiences of marriage, it is
possible to compare unmarried respondents’ marital expectations to married women’s
marital realities. On a third level, I demonstrate how women are negotiating ‘choice’ of
marriage partners; I precisely reflect on customary practices such as ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’
marriages, where the difficulty of making a clear distinction between them highlights the
problematic issue of consent in marriages arranged by families. I also extend the theme of
arranged marriage by briefly reviewing women’s perceptions of cousin and transnational
marriages. Here, I want to stress that these levels of analysis remain inter-related as the
practice of marriage is constantly negotiated through respondents’ agency to effectively
challenge and construct new gendered identities in marriage.
Third, I look at how the act of marriage, which signifies the style of ceremony
respondents adopt, remains a marker which women utilise to further negotiate, and frame
‘Islamic marriage’ in Britain. In fact, in navigating ‘nikah’ and ‘registry’, the focus placed
on the ceremony becomes a symbol of other negotiations involved in the marriage process.
For instance, on one level, I analyse how respondents navigate Islamic law and English law
as they consider marriage as Muslims, as well as British citizens. On a second level, I focus
on women’s negotiations of the nikah’s stipulations from Shari’a law; I argue that
respondents are aiming for a discourse of gender equality within the Islamic marriage as
they contest talaq and polygamy, Islamic principles essentially deemed to be patriarchal in
nature by feminists. In essence, I aim to show whether British South Asian Muslim women
are re-working Islamic ideals of marriage by actively evaluating the possibilities and the
limitations of such negotiations. Indeed, does the nikah truly provide women with scopes to
contest patriarchy so as to safeguard gender equality in marriage? As young women
navigate educational and employment spaces, do their negotiations influence the ways in
which they understand marriage and gendered marital roles?
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At the time of interview, twenty three respondents were single; one respondent was
engaged twice and another engaged once but they both broke off their engagements. One
respondent was engaged and one respondent was in a relationship. Five respondents were
married, two of whom had transnational marriages to Pakistani nationals. Out of the five
married respondents, four women were in their late 20s (28-30 years of age) and one
respondent was 26 years old. Four of them married after their university education and were
already in full-time employment at the time of their marriage, except for one respondent,
who married and was expecting a child whilst still in medical school. Indeed, my research
sample demonstrates that women prefer gaining educational qualifications and job prospects
before thinking about marriage; they are pushing the gendered expectations (from
communities and families) that they should marry in their early twenties. ‘Sorting out a
career first (before marriage)’ is a common wish and strategy of the women I interviewed,
hence explaining why the majority of young women in this research were not married at the
time of interview.
6.2 MARRIAGE AS INSTITUTION
Researchers have shown how marriage, as an institution, has lost popularity in the
Western world. Clulow and Mattinson (1989: 4) argue that the institution of marriage has
now become a ‘private’ act where the meaning of marriage as an institution is ‘privatised’.
Consequently, the focus shifts from marriage being seen as a public institution (social) to
become a more ‘private’ relationship between wives and husbands based on ‘romantic love’
(personal) (Gillis, 1986). The dichotomy public versus private has influenced the foundation
of the marital institution whereby couples seemingly benefit from more agency and
individuality to ‘define’ marriage in the contemporary world; cohabitation as a precursor or
alternative to marriage is one of the factors threatening marriage as an institution as more
people opt to cohabit rather than marry (Wilson et al., 1995; Lewis, 2001; Haskey, 2001).
Nevertheless, even though the foundation of marriage is increasingly declining, the
institution under state law in Britain is still recognised and validated through a legal
contract, a document which has often been described by respondents in my research as ‘a
piece of paper’. For them, this ‘piece of paper’ outlines a more public and formal definition
of marriage as opposed to the relationship between married partners, hence further
reinforcing the notion of marriage as separately epitomising on one level, an
institutional/legal sphere and on a second level, the gender relationship which exists
between married couples.
In this section, I investigate whether respondents consider marriage to be an
‘important’ institution in British Muslim communities. As Basit (1997: 72) maintains, the
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institution of marriage in Islam is viewed as a “fundamental unit in Muslim society”, where
defined gendered roles of the wife as a homemaker and husband as the breadwinner remain
the Islamic precepts which Muslim wives and husbands must aspire to achieve in their
marriages. Relying on this hypothesis, I examine whether women feel that marriage, as an
institution, remains a primordial concern for both Muslim women and men in their
communities; this will throw light on the extent to which marriage is valued in their
communities. Specifically, I ask if this has changed for this group of women in further
education.
6.2.1 ‘It’s just a piece of paper for them’: British South Asian Muslim women’s
perceptions of marriage in Britain
The majority of respondents highlight that marriage has undergone huge
transformations as an institution in the UK. However, my research shows that marriage in
the lives of young British South Asian Muslims in Britain remains a fundamental institution
forming the basis of their communities. A common theme which also emanates from my
findings is that respondents think that marriage has entirely different meanings for non-
Muslims and non-Asians in British society; specifically they refer to white British society to
demonstrate the opposing values held by each group. According to respondents, marriage
has become ‘trivial’ in British society as increasingly, relationships do not necessarily
culminate in marriage and divorce makes it easier for people to get out of marriage.
Cohabitation before marriage is also perceived as an alternative and acceptable route to
marriage, hence creating more options for non-Muslims.
For Sabina, ‘westerners’, meaning people who are not of South Asian descent in
Britain, regard marriage as an institution which ‘ties down’ individuals:
‘Westerners, like non-Asians, think that once they’re married, they’re tied down but
that isn’t always a bad thing because they’ve made the commitment. But there’s no
stigma attached to divorce for them. I think there still is in the Asian community for
Muslims, like you’ll be blamed and looked down upon but for Westerners they get
out of it easily while we make more effort’ (Sabina).
Sabina reflects on how ‘westerners’ do not face ‘stigma’ in cases of marital breakdown.
Subtly, this demonstrates that the institution of marriage in her community still maintains
rigid boundaries over how individuals value marriage. She condemns, nevertheless, the
negative approach that South Asian communities have in relation to divorce, whereby the
stigma associated with being divorced leads them to work through difficulties rather than
face vilification from their communities.
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‘There’s a new trend and because people are rushing into things, divorce rates are
higher…there’s more people getting separated so marriage is not what it used to be,
not for non-Asians anyway’ (Alia).
‘Before marriage was essential, a normal part of life whereas now, it’s not that
fundamental in British society, if you get married fine, if not, that’s ok too...and
divorce as well, with people getting married so many times but for British Asians
it’s still an important part of your lifestyle just because the way our society is but
for others, it’s not’ (Bushra).
As Alia and Bushra suggest, marriage has become optional in British society. They explain
the shift by mentioning that divorce rates are getting higher, hence creating chances for
people to re-marry and ‘trivialising’ the concept of marriage as a result. Comparing the
differences within ethnic groups, young women obviously indicate the significance that
marriage still has in their communities. This therefore ensures that South Asians in Britain
will ultimately contemplate marriage; for them, marriage seems to be a necessity, and not an
option.
‘My friend, like she is not Asian, got pregnant at 19 and she doesn’t want the
marriage thing but wants to find the right person to support her and that’s what
people look for now, it’s more about you connect with someone and then it’s more a
relationship, more romantic as opposed to the practicality of marriage...it’s sad
because it takes away the sanctity of marriage and because of that, they don’t have
any restriction on pre-marital sex’ (Fawzia).
‘I think it’s not the same pressure it used to be...you meet somebody and you’re
supposed to get married and then live with him as opposed to now, everybody lives
together before, it’s the relationship focus, not marriage, that’s western society’
(Sadia).
Fawzia and Sadia raise the point that ‘relationship’ and ‘marriage’ are two separate and
distinctive phenomenon nowadays. Indeed, people in Britain are more concerned with
building up ‘romantic’ relationships (couple based) as opposed to the formal
institutionalisation of two people being legally tied into one entity which is recognised by
the state. Furthermore, as Sadia suggests, in ‘western society’, more effort is put on the
individual rather than the social aspects of a couple deciding to share a life together. Fawzia
and Sadia consider pre-marital sexual relationships, as well as having children out of
wedlock as not being issues considered taboo in contemporary British society, hence leading
to the question of whether marriage is still needed. However for Haleema, the erosion of
marriage as a viable concept explains the ‘break down’ of British society:
‘I think marriage is so important in upholding a stable society and British society is
breaking down because this concept of marriage is not there anymore, the family
values are eroding, especially among the non-Asian, white, Caucasian, there are so
many problems like teenage pregnancy and single-parent families… all because
marriage as an institution is being lost and it is wrong’ (Haleema).
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Critiquing the issues such as teenage pregnancy and single parenthood, Haleema
strongly believes that marriage is what contributes to the stability of society. More
importantly, the quotes from Fatimah and Shazia below reveal that young women believe
that the shift to secularism in Britain explains why marriage is no longer regarded as
important. Indeed, Islam promotes marriage and condemns pre-marital sexual relationships,
hence explaining why young South Asian Muslims in Britain differentiate between
themselves and ‘white, Caucasians’, as Haleema put it.
‘In the UK, it’s the lack of belief...marriage in Islam is a big part and if you’re not
married, you’re missing out so that’s the difference’ (Fatimah).
The ‘lack of belief’, uttered by Fatimah, further underlines the religious aspect attributed to
marriage by respondents; marriage is for them a religious institution, more so than a social
institution, or even a legal institution which stipulates contractual terms, as Shazia below
reinforces, ‘like signing a piece of paper’:
‘In the white community, everyone is getting on because Britain is affected as they
are not really into religion. To a lot of them it’s just like signing a paper, one of my
friends’ parents, they’re married and they wanted her to get married but then she
wasn’t that religious, so she just started living with her boyfriend. Obviously her
parents, Catholics, said ‘You have to get married’ but she’s like ‘No, it’s just a
piece of paper’. So different for the younger generation…and they’re just living
happily now so it’s possible, it’s common. I think marriage came from religion but
they’re getting away from religion and they have kids out of marriage. But with
Asians, the educated people, they’re in their studies, but marriage is still involved in
their life’ (Shazia).
Making a stark comparison between ‘non-Asians’ and ‘Asians’, Shazia reinforces
that for the Muslim community, marriage remains inextricably linked to religion, where
having children out of wedlock is not envisaged by any Muslim, not even ‘educated’ ones.
Hence, for some respondents, marriage as ‘sacred’ institution is no longer evident in non-
Muslim British society. Historically, marriage in the west, a Christian sacrament, relied on
the consent of couples to live together, whereby vows were made contractual by authority of
the Church (Ingram, 1981; Goody, 1983; Mansfield and Collard, 1998). Nowadays, as
Shazia suggests, the younger generations in Britain do not perceive the ‘sanctity’ of
marriage to be significant. The evolution of the perception of marriage from religious to
secular institution bound by the laws of the state, not only depicts the dynamic nature of the
perception of marriage, but also portrays that generational changes influence how younger
generations negotiate the idea of marriage.
As demonstrated in these quotes, marriage in the lives of young British South Asian
Muslims in Britain remains a fundamental institution forming the basis of their
communities; they do not perceive this as also being the case for their non-Muslim British
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counterparts, although their comments seem to echo the British Conservative Party’s
concept that marriage remains important for society. Respondents were therefore asked
whether they feel that there are gender differences in the ways that marriage, as an
institution, is perceived or rated in importance by young Muslims in British South Asian
communities. I asked this question so as to find out whether Muslim girls face greater
pressure from families/communities to get married, hence providing understandings of how
gendered identities remain linked to the institution of marriage within South Asian
communities; for instance, does culture or religion support gender discrimination when it
comes to women and marriage? Do young women therefore think that there are inter-
generational changes (based on ethnic traditions) in the ways women consider marriage,
compared to their mothers or grandmothers? From my study, I have noted the cultural
assumptions surrounding the effect of community and parental expectations around when
and how women should marry, and the gendered expectations around the gender roles in
marriage. In the following section, I focus on these issues in order to assess the value
respondents attribute to marriage.
6.2.2 Gendered differences: the importance of marriage in British South Asian Muslim
communities
The majority of participants think that Muslim women and men in British Muslim
South Asian communities perceive marriage to be ‘important’; with four of them stating that
marriage is part of the ‘Islamic code’. Gender barriers, supported by cultural traditions that
women and men should be treated differently, are evident when it comes to how
communities perceive Muslim women and men, and marital obligations. Nevertheless, the
majority of respondents suggest that marriage remains an ‘important’ institution for both
Muslim women and men in their respective communities.
‘You have to get married, we grow up knowing that…the white girls grow up saying
‘I want to be an airplane pilot’ and we grow up, different, thinking ‘when I grow up
I’m gonna marry him or her’, it is an expectation and it is part of the Islamic code
to have a wife or a husband’ (Sanaa).
Sanaa compares herself to ‘white girls’, demarcating her South Asian ethnic and Muslim
community as ‘different’; the former are raised to consider other life options such as
education and work, as opposed to girls and boys in her community, who ‘have to get
married’. Marriage is seen as an obligation and also a religious duty that every Muslim has
to partake in. However, Sadia perceives the religious duty attributed to marriage as being
increasingly ‘cultural’, again drawing on the fluid boundaries that link culture and religion
in British South Asian communities:
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‘A lot of it is cultural...cause Islam always says, the other half of the religion is
marriage but it’s not much the religious thing but the cultural…they don’t really
look at the Islamic part of it...they see ‘oh God, you’re past 23 years old, why are
you not married!?’ (Sadia)
Marriage, for some young women like Sadia, is mostly considered for cultural rather than
religious reasons. Indeed, illustrating how matches are arranged, Sanaa reiterates that levels
of religiosity seldom determine the choice of marriage partners that parents or communities
consider.
‘I think marriage, they do it more in the cultural ways, more so that the girls do...for
them it’s age, it depends how modern you are or how open-minded you are, for guys
if parents say marry this girl they usually do, the traditional, so the culture is there
but different for boys and girls’ (Nazia).
As for Nazia, the gendered cultural differences that operate in Muslim women’s and men’s
negotiations of marriage must be understood as oppositional; for girls, age remains the
cultural marker whereby if a Muslim girl is ‘modern and open-minded’, age would and
should not be an impediment to marriage. For Muslim boys, who are more ‘traditional’,
choice of marriage partner is left to their parents. Therefore, gender differences are
manifested through age (for girls) and choice of marriage partner (for boys), hence
explaining why girls have to cope with more pressure when it comes to marriage. This in
effect deconstructs the stereotypical images of Asian girls as always falling victims to
arranged marriages; indeed, it appears that Muslim boys also face the parental pressures
associated with arranged marriages in South Asian Muslim communities. This said, some
respondents nonetheless do not think that any pressure is exerted on Muslim men to marry;
it is more acceptable for them to marry someone belonging to a different ethnic or even
religious community:
‘If any of them, boys, wanted to marry outside the culture and religion it would be a
lot easier for them to have their partners accepted in the community than it would
be for women. Definitely’ (Alia)
‘Parents’ influence is on both girls and boys, it comes earlier for girls but there’s
equal pressure, like my brother isn’t really keen and I’m the youngest but he says he
can get married at 35 if he wants to but I feel there is pressure on both’ (Fawzia).
However, for Fawzia, the pressure that young Muslims face to get married is ‘equal’ for
both genders, although it is probably easier for a man to marry at 35 years of age, hence
showing that there is always room for them to negotiate. In the following section, I go on to
explore whether marriage, as an institution, generates intergenerational gendered
expectations for the young Muslim women I interviewed; this is important as it throws light
on how different gendered expectations may influence the very nature of the institution of
marriage in British South Asian communities.
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The majority of respondents believe that communities encourage marriage so as to
promote cultural continuity and identity in British South Asian Muslim societies. Marrying
‘in or out’ of communities becomes an area of contention for young Muslim women as they
adapt or resist cultural codes of ‘having to settle down’. Indeed, parents rely on local
communities’ ideals of marriage whilst young women are developing autonomous
perspectives of how they wish married life to be. However, the communities’ influence is
decreasing as it is becoming more popular for women to marry ‘out’ of their families or
communities, due to mindsets evolving.
‘Things are changing now with time… it’s just once upon a time it was about family
ties but in my family, there have been so many people marrying outside the family
that it’s now a bit more easily accepted’ (Alia).
‘Parents are supportive of careers but there’s still social pressure to get married
and they get it from society… relatives who keep asking ‘is your daughter married?
How old is she?’ So they feel guilty, they think they are not doing the right thing by
you… I’m still single, they feel they are to blame and they haven’t done the right
thing by introducing me to people and they feel responsible…the community is on
their back’ (Farha).
Unlike Alia’s response, Farha believes that parents still face enquiries from communities
(‘social pressure’) as to how their daughters are progressing on the marriage front; marriage
is hence a public, and not a private or individual matter that is left to women to decide.
Farha’s experiences probably differ from Alia’s as Farha maintains that her parents have
tried to arrange a few matches, most of which she turned down. As such, Farha claims that
her parents feel pressure to find someone whom she could envisage marrying. As her words
suggest, feelings such as ‘guilt’ and ‘blame’ depict how powerful communities can be when
it comes to social norms such as marriage. Furthermore, supporting the ‘family structure by
keeping the community happy’ (Sadia) highlights how marriage strengthens cultural bonds
amongst South Asian ethic communities.
‘My younger cousin’s mother-in-law said ‘How old are you?’ and she thought I was
younger than my cousin because she got married and had a baby and therefore I
must be younger and I was of lowest status because I was not married, the only way
you’re really recognised and valued is when you’re married with a baby and I’ve
been studying and that’s not recognised, so I feel like I need to marry as I want to
look more mature and that’s not right, I want to earn money, travel and see more
than curry houses’ (Sanaa).
‘Marriage in the community... doesn’t matter if you don’t speak to each other or
sleep together as long as you’re married and my dad wants us to get married and
that’s the last of his duties and I don’t think he really cares about me or wants me to
happy, he’s thinking ‘she’s 25 now and what are people thinking? You’re treated
like an outcast’ (Sanaa).
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Sanaa’s quote highlights a key theme in my research as it demonstrates how respondents are
actively negotiating marriage. As she explores her educational path, marriage gets delayed.
As Sanaa maintains, her education is not valued and it is assumed she is younger than her
married cousin due to her single status; she is thus viewed as a social pariah by other women
in her family and her ‘lower status’ or ‘outcast’ status is reflective of how significant
marriage is as an institution largely contributing to Muslim women’s gendered identities.
Sanaa’s use of powerful terms such as ‘lower’ and ‘outcast’ to define the status of
unmarried women in the community highlights the pressure which participants may have to
handle. Indeed, marriage in the community brings status, respect and recognition to Muslim
women. Whether a couple lives together happily and healthily or not, according to Sanaa, is
not the primary concern of family or community. However, she is breaking cultural moulds
demonstrating that young women’s priorities have evolved, as they increasingly reflect
individual choices rather than communal wishes.
Furthermore, Lubaina and Sonia stress the gender bias that obviously operates in
British Muslim communities when it comes to marriage and extra-marital relationships:
‘Men take the biggest advantage of marriage to mess about with other women. They
would go with two women at the same time, marry whom mum wants and then go
out with a girlfriend, it’s happening…the community influences that view. They let
men get away with it. If that was a woman, they wouldn’t let her get away with it.
They’d stone her, no doubt’ (Lubaina)
‘Muslim men get away with more…can you imagine a Muslim woman getting
married and having a boyfriend? I’m talking about British Muslim men here, they
get married abroad and they come back and they’ve got girlfriends and they do it
under their parents’ faces, it’s really sad and the wives, half of the time they’re not
in the country, it’s so common it’s unbelievable’ (Sonia).
These quotes demonstrate the perceived gender inequalities, even for educated women like
my respondents. Denouncing the common illicit relationships that some married Muslim
men indulge in, Lubaina maintains that Muslim women would never be allowed such
behaviour, while Sonia draws on the problematic circumstances that arranged transnational
marriages create as the absence of transnational wives from the sub-continent further
encourages Muslim men to have girlfriends. By using the word ‘stone’, Lubaina refers to the
practice of stoning women to death, as stipulated by Shari’a law as a punishment against
adultery; again, the imagery she chooses remains a powerful indicator demonstrating the
community’s attitudes to married women who would attempt extra-marital relationships.
Drawing on how prominent this problem is, Sonia and Lubaina both condemn the
communities’ leniency on such gender disparity in how marriage is valued; culture in the
community allows for men’s extra-marital affairs, while daughters are ‘protected’ and must
‘settle down’. The underlying social fabric that is being referred to in these communities is a
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patriarchal system where men are given ‘freedom’ to threaten the institution of marriage as
long as women ‘honour’ and conform to its principles.
Nevertheless, respondents reiterate that even though communities expect them to
marry, they are ready to some extent, to challenge parental expectations so as to fulfill their
individual notions of marriage. In this process, young women are re-defining the institution
of marriage in their communities. Here, I briefly outline how respondents negotiate
intergenerational expectations of marriage and what impacts these have on respondents’
perceptions of marriage.
‘Expectations… a good character, there should be mutual attraction, even more
than religion cause you have to go to bed with them but what they (parents) want
for us is Mr. perfect, house, car, good education, good family background, money,
and he’ll have to be Pakistani but for me, he has to be Islamic...my expectations
used to be really high but now they’ve changed because I’m more educated in
Islam’ (Aisha).
As Aisha highlights, views about potential marriage partners differ intergenerationally; most
young women’s concerns rest with Islamic principles around marriage as well as physical
attraction between partners, while parents still value status, economic prospects and
ethnicity as being most important when it comes to their daughters’ marriage options. These
indicate acute differences in daughters’ versus parents’ expectations of marriage. Indeed,
most young women acknowledge that the expectations of marriage held by themselves, as
compared to their mothers or even grandmothers, differ. Nevertheless, respondents maintain
that the expectations may have been the same but their mothers’ were never met due to
either cultural traditions or the inability for women to have the independence to express their
wishes prior to marriage. Fawzia explains:
‘We had a talk about marriage and mum said ‘try and get on with him as a
relationship partner’…my parents, they’re not friends...they’re partners but my dad
makes the decisions and my mum doesn’t have an input in anything. She said to me
just make sure that he’s your friend and that he understands and respects you and
that is paramount to me, so we do have the same expectations, but she didn’t find
them and she said I hope this doesn’t happen to you’ (Fawzia).
Fawzia highlights that the relationship between her parents mirrored more the notion of
partnership rather than friendship between married couples; the commitment between
couples was more business-like as opposed to having deeper emotional involvement and
equal status which modern couples aspire to. From this examination, it is clear that there are
intergenerational differences in how daughters and parents regard the institution of marriage
and the gender relationships within it. This generation of young South Asian Muslim
women is therefore very much aware and keen to maintain control over their marriage
expectations. This point mirrors what Yasmin previously reiterated about how women are
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marrying at a later stage (after education) and consequently, how this leads them to develop
different expectations from men as far as marriage is concerned (Chapter Four, page 131).
With educational and financial independence, women find themselves in positions
which allow them to exert authority over marriage options. As I argued in Chapter Four,
educational and paid employment experiences provide participants with space to configure
new gendered identities. As such, daughters have the independence to resist imposed
cultural codes so as to affirm individual choices and meanings of what marriage, as an
institution, entails, hence redefining British Muslim marriages in their communities.
Respondents also highlight that there is an average age for women to marry, thereby
highlighting the fact that they often possibly feel the pressure to ‘settle down’. Nevertheless,
with young women pushing the age of marriage to their late twenties and going into higher
education/work instead, they are formulating ‘new’ and alternative cultural ‘traditions’,
where marriage is still viewed as important, but is delayed until young women feel ‘ready’
and ‘stable’ enough to get married. This is important as it shows how women are negotiating
potential avenues to make marriage not the only life option, but part of a wider plan which
they navigate for the future.
In the next section, I look further at women’s attitudes as they negotiate the practice
of marriage, and ultimately the gendered relationships which remain integral to these
negotiation processes. The analysis comprises three levels. Firstly, I focus on how
respondents perceive pre-marital relationships as they critically reflect on how these could
affect marital choices. Secondly, I review how women develop alternative expectations of
gender equality in marriage as they aim to challenge fixed gendered notions of South Asian
womanhood within the family unit; I particularly concentrate on respondents’ expectations
and experiences of juggling work and domestic chores, as well as sharing their households
with their in-laws. Thirdly, I analyse how ‘choice’ of marriage partner becomes an axis for
negotiating choices in marriage; more specifically, I reflect on the practice of ‘arranged’ and
‘forced’ marriages in British South Asian Muslim communities, and the ways in which these
customs provide scope and space for respondents to navigate gendered identities. Linked to
these themes, I also explore some of the challenges faced by women as they attempt to alter
gender norms so as to promote gender equality in the household, which ultimately, alters the
meanings of what marriage, as an institution, stands for in their communities.
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6.3 RE-NEGOTIATING THE PRACTICE OF MARRIAGE
6.3.1 Negotiating pre-marital relationships: ‘Boyfriends’, pre-marital sex and
cohabitation
Previous research (Basit, 1997; Bhopal, 1997) has highlighted that young British
South Asian Muslim women are encouraged to maintain sexual purity before marriage,
whereby girls engaging into pre-marital relationships prove to be a ‘dishonour’ to the
reputation of families and communities. My research shows similar trends, where the
majority of Muslim women I spoke to are still upholding community norms which
safeguard the institution of marriage in their societies. Most have not had relationships
(boyfriends) at university, claiming that having a relationship before marriage is not
acceptable to them personally, as well as to their families. However, a minority admits they
have ‘dated’ although they consider it to be ‘un-Islamic’; nevertheless, ‘dating’ for them is
always considered in conjunction with the possibility of marriage, where they hope to marry
their partners. Therefore, in negotiating the unbending rules of not having any relationship
before marriage, some respondents are navigating their ways around the practice of
marriage in their communities. Only two respondents were in a relationship at the time of
interviewing. Among those who were married, only two respondents profess that their
husbands had been long-time boyfriends from their university years, albeit having had to
keep them secret until their engagements:
‘I was 17 when I met him. I couldn’t tell them I had met somebody now and ask
them to trust me for the next several years, I am not going to do anything…so we
met just at university, in secret, it was very difficult’ (Sabina).
Pre-marital relationships in South Asian Muslim communities are condemned, whereby
young Muslim women have to navigate amidst individual and communal views imposed by
cultural expectations or standards; within such processes, they develop moralising
discourses about dating, virginity before marriage, as well as issues around the cohabitation
of the sexes before marriage. Their views, as well as actions, remain deeply embedded
within Islamic ideals that encourage minimum physical interaction between the sexes.
Although going to university and living away from home, young women are undeniably
upholding religious and cultural ideals. More importantly, their convictions are about
personal choice, and are not merely informed by parental restrictions. Here, I stress the
transition taking place due to women’s negotiations of religious and cultural boundaries
associated with the practice of marriage; Muslim women will date but their actions act as a
precursor to marriage. This demonstrates that there is some transformation to the institution
of marriage, as understood by respondents’ parents. As Saeema says:
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‘The time I have a boyfriend will be when I’m ready to settle down, so I don’t want
a boyfriend for the fun of experimenting like people do here, that’s not Islamic, it
will have to be with the intention of marriage’ (Saeema).
‘If I meet anyone, they’d rather I don’t hide it and I could sort something out with
them. They wouldn’t like to cast him as boyfriend, like the western way you see.
Neither would I because I wouldn’t want to be labeled to have been with anyone
without marrying them. So, they’d let me get to know them but at the same time
they’d like to meet the family. So in a controlled environment they’d let me. It’s just
keeping my own self respect within society and I agree with that’ (Zainab).
As Saeema and Zainab maintain, having a ‘boyfriend’ is only acceptable if marriage is
being seriously considered. The very notion of ‘boyfriend’ is also deconstructed by young
women, who emphasise the fact that the kind of relationship they are after is different from
the ‘western’ notion of ‘being in a relationship’. In their cases, family and community will
be involved in the process of Muslim girls starting relationships. Below, Haleema underlines
how Islamic guidelines govern women’s attitudes towards relationships and marriage; the
concept of ‘halal (permissible) dating’ which allows space for young Muslim women living
in the ‘west’ to explore:
‘Islam doesn’t say you can’t fall in love but some British Muslims or some western
Muslims go about things the wrong way, like in the west…the way it’s done here, I
don’t agree with going clubbing or going on a holiday abroad together alone, not
appropriate, if you want to get to know the person, Islam sets a criteria, as long as
you have a chaperone with you. Have them in the area so if you go to a restaurant,
your elder brother could be sat somewhere so getting to know the person, no illicit
relationships, having a boyfriend and dating him like what normally goes on in the
western culture no, needs to be halal dating’ (Haleema).
More than half of my research sample maintains that due to their religious
convictions, pre-marital sexual activities are ‘not acceptable’ and ‘wrong’, with the
exception of a few, who maintain that this issue is ‘personal’ and not necessarily an
‘absolute’. It is clear that for respondents, the issue is about re-negotiating appropriate moral
and sexual behaviour through the boundaries they set for themselves.
‘If you go by the religious rule of not having sex before marriage then you really
shouldn’t be doing anything before marriage. Religiously, the system is supposed to
be you get married fairly young and you don’t really experiment…women are
getting married later now. So you study, have a career, that’s all part of Western
society and then saying, you can’t actually have the rest...you have to wait until you
get married… those two are really difficult things to combine, practically. Virginity
is an important Islamic code but is not an absolute, not here and now’ (Farha).
Thinking practically, Farha argues that in a ‘western’ context, it is extremely difficult to
fully embrace Islamic ideals such as virginity before marriage while other facets such as
women’s independence to have careers and education are encouraged. If the latter is
embraced by women, so should the former. Indeed, contextualising the ‘Islamic system’,
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Farha highlights the pressure that young Muslims face. She questions whether it is fair for
women to be unable to benefit from all the independence that British society may offer.
However, for women who are in relationships, limitations they set themselves indicate how
they cope with these double standards. For instance, the term ‘boyfriend’ and what this
indicates in the British context (physical relationship) remains inappropriate for some
respondents who are in relationships. As Mushirah states:
‘I have a boyfriend, I don’t like the word, I don’t think dating is fine cause
Islamically it’s not but my relationship is not physical, we go out for coffee but I
would not call that a full on girlfriend boyfriend relationship but we are committed
spiritually to each other, the rest has to wait’ (Mushirah).
In essence, even though Mushirah ‘dates’, she decides to set limits to her relationship by not
being sexually involved with her partner, even though marriage has been discussed between
them. In being ‘spiritually committed’, Mushirah explores the boundaries of romantic love.
Furthermore, Asma states:
‘I find it difficult to say I’m religious because people find out I’ve got a boyfriend,
it’s like ‘How can you do that?’ They don’t really know what kind of relationship
we have. But people judge me on that. But I would never have premarital sex, which
is normal in the west. Some people would be like you can’t hold hands but we do
have a physical relationship, but again, in my boundary’ (Asma).
Asma is also in a relationship. Due to her relationship, she feels that her religious beliefs and
convictions are judged, even questioned by other Muslims. This said, Asma maintains that
she respects the limitations set by Islam; her physical relationship is not of a sexual nature
and in compromising, Asma is happy to keep a balance between Islamic and ‘western’
concepts. In this study, only two unmarried respondents admit to having had pre-marital sex
at university. Indeed, Nazia goes on to explain the dilemmas that young women may face,
hence raising questions around whether it is viable to fully respect Islamic codes in the
British context:
‘I’m saying no pre-marital sex if you are cohabiting, just to know each other then
that’s fine. I can say it so easily now, but if you are in that environment, how much
self-control does a person actually have? With education, marriage gets delayed
and you’ve got to make life decision. Do you want to get married because you don’t
want pre-marital sex? Or have a relationship but wait till you get married?’ (Nazia)
Education, in delaying marriage, opens up new spaces for Muslim women, which
consequently lead them to evaluate their positions as Muslim women. More importantly,
Nazia’s comment about ‘making life decisions’ indicate that women will potentially be
forced to adapt to the social changes facing South Asian women in Britain.
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When asked whether they think that pre-marital sex is common in South Asian
Muslim communities in Britain, some respondents suggest that it is on the rise, albeit
remaining taboo in their communities:
‘There’s a lot of pre-marital sex among British Muslims, I mean getting pregnant
and a lot of abortions, the statistics are rising, I’ve had friends go through that, it’s
quite common’ (Nadia).
‘I went to an all girls’ Muslim school and it was happening even then, with girls
who were about 12, 13 years old...and that’s due to the fact that a lot of families can
be very narrow-minded and keep such a tight hold on their daughters, so university,
just imagine’ (Haleema).
Due to Islamic ideals of minimum physical contact before marriage, as expected,
most young women in this study do not agree with the idea of cohabitation before marriage;
among them, those who are single, engaged or in a relationship would not personally
envisage cohabiting before marriage either. However, a few women remain open to the idea,
as long as it is done ‘away from the community’; un-married couples living together would
‘bring shame on the family’ and young women specified that their parents could never
know:
‘I can see why people would want to live with their partners before wanting to
commit to marriage because marriage is such a big commitment…and you might
think you know somebody until you’ve lived with them…whether I would consider
doing it…it’s a difficult question. If I was at home I wouldn’t do it as it would reflect
on my parents…shame on the family. Away from home, if I had to do it, I would…
secretive, like living a lie’ (Alia).
‘The tradition is you can’t do that before marriage, it’s easier in a way when you
live with someone you know instead of living with housemates, like a randomer!
Doesn’t make any sense! I’m actually living in hospital accommodation with other
people, males sometimes! Technically that’s not Islamic either but it seems so
normal whereas living with a partner isn’t; I’m engaged and will never be allowed
to live with my fiancé!’ (Bushra)
Bushra, reflecting on the inability to cohabit with men before marriage, highlights the irony
of her current situation. Her living arrangements mean that she is sharing with colleagues,
males or females, which is regarded as acceptable by her parents and her community.
However, official status such as engagements or being in a serious relationship will not gain
the approval of the South Asian community in cases where couples decide to live together
before marriage. This demonstrates the highly contradictive situations that young women
find themselves in whilst navigating between Islamic and British ideals. In so doing,
participants are making choices to engage in a process of re-negotiation of marriage.
Consequently, this influences gendered notions of Muslim womanhood, as well as the
practice of marriage as they decide to get involved, albeit within boundaries, in pre-marital
relationships. In the following section, I examine how respondents question and challenge
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gendered norms about marriage by focusing on their marital expectations about gender
equality in marriage.
6.3.2 Gender equality in marital expectations: challenging ‘traditional’ norms
British South Asian Muslim women are contesting expected gender norms that
unmarried women in their communities have to uphold. Their determination to ensure that
their individual expectations are met is reflected through their willingness to live
independently from the extended family unit, have agency in who they marry (choice of
marriage partners), as well as promoting a more equal relationship between spouses. Among
married women in this research (five), two of them were still residing with their in-laws
whilst the rest had their own households. All unmarried women, and those who were
engaged or were in relationships, admit that they would not want to live with their in-laws
when they get married, although it is widely expected that they move in with their husband’s
family after marriage. They explain why they do not wish to follow the traditional pattern;
as expectations change, consequently, gender roles alter significantly to empower women
with new lifestyle patterns. First, I focus on unmarried women’s gender roles expectations
in the household and second, I briefly reiterate the challenges faced by married respondents
as they evaluate gendered relationships in their marriages.
Muslim women are contributing in changing their lifestyle by being involved in
promoting ideals of future marriage options. In this study, among the unmarried women, the
majority claim that they all have expectations that they would like to discuss with potential
partners when the time to get married comes; only one respondent maintains that she is not
concerned with how her marriage plans pan out in the future. As Lubaina maintains:
‘I don’t have any expectations of marriage…if my parents give me a list of guys, I
would consider and then get to know the person, love is not important when you
decide to marry, in a marriage, you do your thing, I’ll do my thing. I’m supposed to
do things Islamically...I think I’d be very British, not British but very modern in the
context that I wouldn’t want him to restrict me in any way. I wouldn’t listen,
knowing me. And then that would cause problems probably’ (Lubaina).
Indeed, Lubaina is ready to marry somebody her parents choose as love in a marriage is not
a significant issue for her personally. Interestingly, however, Lubaina expects, albeit subtly,
that she is left with her independence and if not, is aware that this could be problematic.
Juxtaposing ‘Islam’ versus ‘British’, compromises in a marriage will be made due to her
Islamic convictions that Muslim wives have duties expected of them not by culture, but by
religion. Claiming that she will be ‘modern’, Lubaina expresses her wish for independence
in a marriage as she decides ‘to do my thing’. Indeed, the majority of respondents profess
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that they expect to be perceived as having ‘equal’ status within a marriage, where both
partners contribute financially and emotionally into the marriage:
‘Somebody who is my equal, to take care of the bills together and I want to travel
before I have kids and this doesn’t happen in a Pakistani community as all they
want is for you to have kids’ (Mushirah).
‘I will expect that both of us contribute to the marriage, to the house, to the
financial things, being parents and doing things together’ (Sanaa).
Mushirah’s and Sanaa’s beliefs in a marital relationship which fulfills individual
needs such as having the freedom to travel and have children in one’s own time, as well as
share the financial costs of maintaining a household are echoed by most respondents. So as
to be in a position to achieve such goals, Nazia highlights the importance that education has
on women’s expectations in marriage. Indeed, without education, it is impossible to expect
equality in a marriage. Nazia denounces young Muslim women who are made to marry in
their mid teens as without education, women cannot bargain for a more equitable lifestyle:
‘At 16, they (parents) want you to marry but you’ve got nothing to give, you just
know how to cook and clean, you’re not educated, you don’t have standards, so you
can’t demand ‘I want this’...so my relationship, would be completely equal, I would
work, my husband would work. I iron his clothes if he irons mine’ (Nazia).
Saeema reflects on how the household becomes the site of contestation where women
challenge constructed gendered roles so as to encourage gender equality within the family
unit. As she points out, daughters who get married are expected to live with their in-laws so
as to fulfill the gender norm expected of them:
‘I would never agree to living with the in-laws… in-laws see it as gaining a slave,
not a wife for your husband but someone to look after them and their daughters, to
maintain the house and I’m not willing to do that…it’s not my responsibility... I’m
not going to wash every dish after they finish eating or cook, that’s the expectation
they have. His mum wants this and he doesn’t stick up for you and he sides with his
mother, classic… if you live with the in-laws, then you accept that you are marrying
the family, it’s not only what the husband wants, it’s what the rest wants’ (Saeema).
Comparatively, Bhopal (1997) also draws on how living arrangements after
marriage influence women’s lives; gender discrimination against daughters-in-law is evident
as women, especially those who are not educated, face their husbands’ families on a daily
basis. As a result, they experience what she terms ‘private patriarchy’ in the household,
where without education, women remain subdued and excluded (Bhopal, 1997: 152). In
fact, Sadia expresses this idea by saying that women ‘marry the family’, whereby
responsibilities sum up to cooking and cleaning for the family, roles which Muslim women
nowadays are not prepared to fulfill any longer. Marriage for them would epitomise a more
nuclear type, equitable approach to a couple deciding to live together to start a family,
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where responsibility and commitment rest with each other rather than extending to the larger
extended family:
‘I’m not going to go home and do all the washing, it’s got to be 50-50 and have
some compromise. And living with the in-laws that would be a big issue…so many
marriages mess up because of the in-laws, they wreck everything and I’ve seen the
damage they cause’ (Shazia).
Shazia expresses frustration at the older generations’ expectations of female members in
South Asian communities; she is determined to break cultural traditions and adopt a more
egalitarian approach to married life. As her words show, the influence of in-laws on a
couple’s life cannot be ignored. Young women’s awareness to potential crisis caused by in-
laws results in them wanting to have their own household so as to avoid clashes due to huge
differences in women’s notions of their roles or responsibilities of marriage. Indeed,
unmarried respondents strongly maintain and hope that they will be successful in
implementing equal or adequate household involvement from future husbands, hence
demonstrating potential cultural changes in gender roles within South Asian communities.
Respondents like Tasneem do emphasise that an almost equal relationship, albeit
compromising in certain logical circumstances, is necessary so as to ‘get rid’ of the gender
bias that cultural traditions entail:
‘I’d like to have that equal role as much as possible…I accept that it’s not going to
be 100 percent same and you have to compromise and say they have to go for work
and if they’re a higher level, it would be stupid to say ‘no you’re not taking that job
because my job is there, get rid of that cultural inequality against women’
(Tasneem).
Furthermore, a common argument expressed by some women highlights that there
are intergenerational differences in how gender roles are perceived and practised:
‘It’s about wanting to be an equal as a woman and be able to go into work and I’d
like him to respect that. I didn’t go into this career or education to just then sit at
home and breed like women before did. These are not what my intentions were. I’d
like to be able to do both and I do have those expectations. I can have children and
have a career’ (Hanah).
To be more explicit, Hanah confidently stresses that her ‘intentions’ are not to ‘sit at home
and breed’; marriage and motherhood are not considered her life’s destiny. As a highly
educated woman determined to be an ‘equal’ with her prospective partner, she will demand
that her expectations are met in the future. With more women going into higher education
and juggling careers, marriage partners are finding themselves having to ‘help’ out in the
household. For instance, Alia states:
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‘My younger married female cousins have comfortable relationships, they work well
that’s nice to see, that’s how I want to end up. But it can get incredibly frustrating
with the older generation in the ways women are treated’ (Alia).
It is clear that women’s exposure of the intergenerational changes taking place enables them
to critically reflect on what they expect from marriage. As Muslim men become more active
in the household, Muslim women’s roles are altered, bringing about gendered cultural shifts
in marriage perceptions as they decide to juggle career and home responsibilities.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that most respondents, however, express the
wish to either take time off work or go part-time whenever they decide to start raising a
family. They would then want their husbands to provide for them financially and hence,
expect to go back to the ‘traditional’ gender pattern that their communities consider to be
valuable. Indeed, young women demonstrate how much agency or leverage they possess in
deciding when and when not to take up employment. Although the majority of respondents’
mothers in this research never worked and looked after them as children, respondents
suggest that what makes them different from women of the previous generation is that they
have choices and options to re-negotiate their gendered stances as life circumstances, such
as motherhood, alter their lifestyles. Nevertheless, participants are actually making quite
traditional choices. As Saeema and Shazia reiterate:
‘I just want to keep working, and he can keep his job when I have kids, I’d like to
take the time out for sure’ (Saeema).
‘I would want him to allow me to do whatever I choose to do, whether I will work or
not because I believe that the husband should be able to provide for you cause if I
had kids, I wouldn’t want to work’ (Shazia).
Women can hence ‘choose’ to make informed decisions and conscious, independent career
moves that fit around family life; husbands are expected to accept respondents’ choices in
‘whatever I choose to do’. As I discussed in Chapter Four, financial independence for young
British South Asian Muslim women remains extremely important in aiding them to form
new gendered identities. However, it is as important for prospective partners to be
financially stable. As Shazia reiterates, although she demands the freedom to be
independent, she still believes that it is a husband’s duty to provide for his family; Shazia
does not find any contradiction in such a view. Similarly, Fawzia reiterates that she thinks
‘traditionally’ and will encourage her marriage partner to become the ‘principal’
breadwinner; albeit the woman working out of choice (‘her own decision’):
‘Roles in the marriage quite traditional, the guy should be earning more than the
woman and hopefully I’ll be a doctor so will be earning so he should be earning
equal or more. I think it’s natural in a man to be the principal bread-earner...if the
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woman does then it’s her own decision and then kids, I would want to be at home as
I’d want to bring them up myself and my partner must also be involved’ (Fawzia).
Although unmarried respondents’ aspirations for gender equality in South Asian
Muslim marriages remain potent, from my study, it is also evident that there is an obvious
gap between women’s hopes of acquiring their own households (nuclear family set-up), as
well as equal gender status they aspire to within a marriage. The realities of essentially
achieving such aims appear to be difficult. To support this argument, I look at married
respondents’ narratives of how their lived experiences of married life affect their gendered
identities as married women. For instance, Sabina, who lives with her in-laws and has now
been married for two years, highlights the difficulties involved in convincing them to accept
the couple’s wishes to set up their own household. As the daughter-in-law, she is expected
to accept this lifestyle as her husband, the only son, is expected to look after his parents.
Marriage, for her, has not brought the independence she wished for and even though Sabina
does not agree with her current living arrangements, they are considered a ‘natural’
progression by her family and community:
‘I didn’t agree with staying with my in-laws but it just naturally happened…we did
think we would eventually move out…but the more we spend time at home the more
we realise that his parents do want us to live that traditional joint family system
that’s their lifestyle. The only way we can move is if they go back to Pakistan,
you’re hostage…He’s the only boy and they won’t accept anything from their
daughters, but will expect their son to do everything for them. I’d expect the same
from my sons and my daughters…that’s the shift and I’ll let them free to decide how
to live’ (Sabina).
Describing the situation as ‘hostage’, Sabina expresses her concerns, even sadness, as she
claims that only her in-laws decision to leave Britain could mean her having power and
agency to have and manage her own household. However, interestingly, she maintains that
she would expect equal commitment from her children, daughter and son, irrespective of
gender, when the time comes. This indicates that women of Sabina’s generation are keen to
promote equal gender status for daughters and sons when it comes to fulfilling duties such
as looking after their parents. Also, Sabina’s quote highlights that she will not enforce any
lifestyle pattern on her children in letting them ‘free to decide how to live’. Others, like
Sonia, condemn the continuity of such cultural traditions. Sonia relates her experiences of
living with her in-laws as ‘ill-treatment’:
‘At home I had that privacy and freedom to live but with my in-laws it’s totally
different. I get up at half past seven everyday and I finish at around half six and I
get home from work at seven and then I have to cook for everyone, about 13
members in the family living in two houses, all in-laws. That’s what a daughter-in-
law is supposed to do and no one helps me, not even his sisters. I have to wash up
everything and the men do nothing, and my husband is maybe the best one out of
them, he won’t do a thing even though I’m being ill-treated…and I’ve known him
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for seven years before we got married…some of them eat at 8 and I basically have
to be on call…that’s culture for you’ (Sonia).
Sonia’s case is reflective of the unexpected challenges faced by educated Muslim
women in the domestic sphere brought about by marriage; as a daughter living in her
parental home, Sonia was allowed ‘privacy’ and ‘freedom’. Alternatively, achieving gender
equality in her extended family set-up proves to be impossible as Sonia is expected to
handle the ‘second shift’ (Hochschild, 1989). After work, Sonia explains how she rushes
home daily so as to have dinner ready for the whole of her extended family, comprising
thirteen family members altogether:
‘If I could move out I would move out today but I just can’t afford it and they know
it. They won’t help and they could as they’re a wealthy business family. We have to
go out to have time alone but I still have to cook before so my expectations...well I
didn’t expect that and I am really unhappy’ (Sonia).
Underlying patriarchal customs promote gender segregated roles within South Asian
households, which Sabina and Sonia denote, is extremely difficult to challenge once a
married couple settles in with the extended family. Bhopal’s (1997) research on South Asian
households and women’s unequal gender status within the family unit has very clearly also
illustrated the patriarchal nature of how domestic chores are distributed. Through Sonia’s
experiences, my study also demonstrates that within the family unit, the role of daughters-
in-law are very defined and controlled, as opposed to daughters (husbands’ sisters), who
relinquish household chores to the former once they move in with their husbands.
‘From a Pakistani, cultural point of view marriage is important to both, for guys
they need somebody around the house, another slave, doing the cooking and fulfil
their sexual needs, that’s the attitude even though we live here in the West’
(Mushirah).
‘Muslim men want somebody who’s at home…brings up the children and doesn’t
complain, the community expects that, I’m out working and it’s not viewed as ideal
as my husband would have preferred me in the house, proper Muslim wife but I
earn more for the family, he’s not from here and he couldn’t, his culture is totally
different to mine and he is different, it’s too late now’ (Rahila).
As some women portray, it is about ‘gaining a slave’ for the family, obliterating her
personality or individuality in the process. In this study, therefore, unsurprisingly, all
respondents speak against the traditional gender roles (steeped in culture) expected from
them in a marriage. They would prefer a more equitable distribution of household chores.
For Mushirah and Rahila, ‘Pakistani’ values such as the fulfillment of traditional female
roles (cleaning, cooking) heavily influence women’s marriage perspectives, which
consequently reflect on their experiences of marriage. Indeed, Rahila, who married a
Pakistani national, expresses regrets in not having a home environment whereby household
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chores are shared equally. Rahila, in suggesting that ‘it is too late now’, seems to find it
problematic to establish a more equal relationship in marriage; in fact, Rahila puts it down
to the existing cultural differences (Pakistani versus British) within her household.
Nonetheless, she has challenged the traditional notions of the ‘proper Muslim wife’ so as to
have a career alongside her married life, although her position is not viewed as ‘ideal’ by
her husband and her community. Muslim men’s wishes that wives remain homemakers are
encouraged and valued by the community, which hence acts as a powerful voice dictating
gendered ‘traditional’ roles that women are expected to perform.
In this section, I have shown that respondents are challenging traditional gender
norms in marriage. These include changes in their marital expectations around issues such
as promoting equal gender status and roles within marriage, being able to negotiate work
options with their partners as participants consider raising a family, as well as embracing the
possibilities of living independently from their in-laws after marriage. However, it is also
evident that there are discrepancies between unmarried respondents’ expectations of
marriage and married respondents’ realities of married lives. This demonstrates that the
challenges faced by women remain potent as they decide to break away from cultural
expectations generated by family and community. In the next section, I explore how women
are re-negotiating the practice of marriage by looking at how respondents navigate ‘choice’
of marriage partner, within the broader context of families’ and communities’ involvement
in practices such as arranged marriages. This further sheds light on respondents’ agency and
strategies employed as they navigate marriage options.
6.3.3 Negotiating ‘choice’: why I do or don’t mind an arranged marriage
In negotiating and challenging gendered cultural expectations expected from
Muslim women in British South Asian Muslim communities, another factor that respondents
hope to have an input in relates to having the choice of marriage partner. Indeed, Mushirah,
a confident educated Muslim woman of Pakistani origin ‘dating’ a Muslim man, also of
Pakistani origin, highlights that she will not be able to marry the person she loves. The
person she wishes to marry is of a different caste and due to her family’s objections,
Mushirah will eventually conform to her parents’ wishes of her marrying somebody of
similar status, origin and creed, thereby pushing her to consider an arranged marriage.
Indeed, in the advent of families choosing potential marriage partners for daughters, shared
cultural (ethnic origin/caste belonging) and religious norms form the basis of these arranged
matches in South Asian communities; marriage, Islam and ethnicity in South Asian
communities remain hence inter-linked, where families intend to find prospective partners
sharing the same religion, ethnic background and caste.
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I thus asked respondents whether ethnicity and religion matter to them if they have
the option to personally choose their partners so as to firstly, examine the degrees of
involvement participants have in navigating choice of marriage partners and secondly,
understand whether respondents are breaking gendered cultural norms by resisting cultural
practices such as arranged matches. From my findings, I found that respondents are actively
negotiating their options, increasingly relying on a Muslim identity to break stereotypes that
are preventing them from expressing more individual wishes (for instance ‘marrying out’ of
their ethnic group/rejecting caste differences) when it comes to choice of marriage partner.
From my study, four married British Muslim women were of Pakistani origin; two
of them married Pakistani nationals, and the remaining two married British Pakistanis. One
respondent, of mixed ethnic heritage (Pakistani and Indian) also married a British Pakistani.
In essence, they all married men of South Asian backgrounds. All married respondents
maintain that a similar ethnic background remains important when women consider
marriage options, despite certain nuances in their opinions. However, the significant point
remains that the majority of women in this research consider religion to be much more
important than ethnic background when choosing a partner. Only one respondent suggests
that ‘him being Muslim would be nice, but would not be absolute, he has to be Pakistani
though, like British’ (Sanaa). For her, ethnic background and citizenship take priority over
Islam, as opposed to the others:
‘The guy will have to be Muslim. That’s a definite. It’s a personal choice…to have
kids where nothing could confuse them. And as a Muslim, I believe that you have to
marry another Muslim. I don’t care if he is Pakistani, Bengali, white’ (Saeema).
‘Ethnicity not really but Muslim of course, that’s my religious belief cause children
will follow the religion of their father and to make sure that that is a priority, and in
Islam you’re supposed to increase your own ummah so for me to have secular kids,
doesn’t make sense’ (Fatimah).
For Saeema and Fatimah, marrying a Muslim is a ‘definite’ as they believe that the next
generation needs to be left not with their cultural, but Islamic heritage. So as to shield her
children from secularist notions, for Fatimah, this strategy of spreading the word of Islam
remains a ‘priority’. In essence, marrying a Muslim ensures the continuity of the Muslim
faith in a ‘secular’ context where respondents strongly feel it is a religious duty to ‘increase
your own ummah’ so as to partake in the expansion of a universal Islamic identity. In
essence, Fatimah is convinced that through marriage, Islamic identities can be maintained
and affirmed.
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Faiza has been married twice.1 She recounts the differences in parental opinion by
comparing her two marriages. Her arranged marriage to a British Pakistani failed, while her
love marriage to a British Bengali is a success:
‘My dad is a fairly liberal man and if I’m happy, he’s happy now but before
ethnicity was important to him...my first marriage was to a British Pakistani,
arranged cause they look in your own community and didn’t work out so they see
that it’s not a definite, but second one a love marriage, and he’s Muslim, that’s the
most important thing now’ (Faiza).
As Faiza strongly believes, cases like hers prove, particularly to the older generation, that
shared ethnicity does not necessarily render marriages easier. Indeed, the majority of
unmarried women in this research were not concerned with ethnic background when talking
about important criteria that would define marriage partners, claiming that religion takes
precedence over ethnicity. This reinforces the argument I formulated in Chapter Five about
respondents prioritising an Islamic identity over other social identities. Nevertheless, among
them, some claim that their parents would still expect them to marry within their own ethnic
group, whereby it would be extremely difficult for them to convince the older generation to
‘accept’ their choices. However, more than half of the research sample suggests that there
has been a shift in parental perceptions. Such divergent views are illustrated in the quotes
below:
‘For our parents to accept, it will have to be a Pakistani but if I had the choice and
I could marry any Muslim I wanted, I wouldn’t necessarily go for the Pakistani
Muslim, but that would never be accepted in my family, so I need to think Pakistani’
(Saeema).
Saeema explains how her choices are limited; she is given the freedom to choose a marriage
partner but he undoubtedly needs to be of similar ethnic background for her family to
‘accept’ the match. On an individual level, ethnicity would not be important for Saeema.
However, pressure from the family will obviously influence her choice of partner. Women
are being granted the ‘choice’ by parents to pick a partner but ultimately, their ‘choice’ is
constrained as ethnicity, in cases like Saeema’s, remains an absolute she needs to consider.
In contrast, Zainab explains:
‘My parents have already said if you find anybody, as long as he’s Muslim, no
matter what ethnic background, we’d let you marry them cause that’s the true way
for Muslims’ (Zainab).
Unlike Saeema, Zainab thinks that for her parents, Islam is becoming more
prominent than South Asian culture as their understandings of Islam become less cultural.
Two respondents think that partners need not belong to the same ethnic group specifically
(Pakistani, Indian or Bangladeshi), but need to be ‘Asian Muslim’ when marriage options
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are considered. As Bushra (Indian origin, engaged to British Pakistani) and Abida claim, the
specificity of ethnic background does not have to go as far as Pakistani, Indian or
Bangladeshi; marrying someone of South Asian origin is considered good enough, as long
as the person is Muslim:
‘Yeah he would have to be Muslim, but my fiancé is of Pakistani origin…the parents
had no problem at all there. Everyone gets on …he’s Asian and Muslim and that’s
fine for me’ (Bushra).
‘He would have to be Asian and Muslim, he wouldn’t have to be Pakistani…Indian,
Gujarati Muslim, it would be fine’ (Abida).
However, among unmarried participants, some regard ethnicity as still being important
when considering marriage:
‘Cultural similarities do help, if you want to transfer these to the next generation
and you will understand each other better so ethnicity is really important, so he has
to be Pakistani’ (Tasneem).
For Tasneem, maintaining cultural continuity through marriage is evident, whereby ensuring
that the next generation embraces cultural tradition remains a significant factor for young
women. In essence, as some respondents ‘choose’ to reject commonality of ethnicity in
marriage, others are determined to embrace it. Even though views are different among
respondents, it is clear that participants are actively engaging with the possible options
around choice of marriage partner, hence demonstrating agency in their willingness to make
decisions based on their very own positionings towards the importance of shared ethnicity
and religion in marriage.
I therefore go on to look at the concept of ‘choice’ in marriage, more specifically
the arranged marriage, so as to grasp how respondents firstly, engage in active negotiations
when it comes to the degree of agency women have in ‘choice’ of marriage partner and
secondly, deconstruct the practice of ‘arranged marriage’ by critically differentiating the
various degrees of arranged marriage as ‘choice’ is negotiated in marriage. I also briefly
explore women’s positions on the relating issues of ‘cousin marriage’ and ‘transnational
marriage’ as these remain inter-linked themes which have come up during my interviews.
All respondents are from cultural backgrounds where arranged marriages are still
‘commonly’ practised. I therefore asked them about their perspectives on arranged
marriages in British South Asian Muslim communities, and the impact they have on Muslim
women’s options as they consider marriage partners. As Bradby (1999) claims, the nature of
how marriages are contracted in ethnic groups reveals how gendered roles/expectations are
manifested. Bhopal’s (1997) study of arranged marriages in South Asian communities in
Britain suggests that the practice must be viewed as a manifestation of unequal gender
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relationships, and as a patriarchal expression of male dominance within minority cultures.
Her study focuses on arranged marriages as ‘traditional’ practices kept alive to perpetuate
the culture of minority groups in the UK. More importantly, she maintains that educated
women in her research sample reject the practice of arranged marriage as opposed to non-
educated respondents.
In comparison, my study demonstrates the opposite, whereby most research
participants maintain that arranged marriages are ‘ok’, and would consider them as an
option if ‘force’ is not adopted by parents at any time during the marriage process (from
proposal to marriage). They hence remain acutely aware that matches should not be ‘forced’
upon them; women should be able to ‘agree’ without ‘pressure’ and be allowed to ‘make
informed decisions’. Moreover, most women also express their concerns about transnational
arranged marriages, whereby only a few respondents maintain that they do not mind
marrying ‘someone from back home’. A minority of respondents disagrees with the tradition
of arranged marriage altogether, while some believe that an arranged marriage has positive
as well as negative points. Among married participants, three respondents had love
marriages and two had arranged marriages.
‘Arranged marriages, I don’t see a huge problem with them. It is parents
facilitating the process of you finding the person, you’re looking for someone and
they know that so they’re helping you. So it’s already approved and that’s all I
need, my parents’ approval, they said if you don’t like it, we’re not going to force
you. I would prefer to meet someone myself cause you meet them in a more natural
environment rather than the set up with the girl’s family and boy’s family and the
tea’ (Fawzia).
Respondents like Fawzia demonstrate freedom and agency in leaving their options open.
Indeed, although she would prefer to meet someone unaided and experience a more ‘natural’
meeting, having the choice to consider an arranged marriage leads to better communication
between her and her parents in terms of the latter approving of potential partners. More
importantly, she values the leeway given to her by her family to negotiate her options.
Indeed, Bhopal (2008) suggests that arranged marriages are nowadays often seen as
‘introductions’ in which women have greater agency and choice to decide whether they
would consider a proposal. For Shabana, who had an arranged marriage, love is possible in
an arranged match, even without having met the person beforehand:
‘When I grew older I realised that you can fall in love with your husband even
though you meet just before marriage, it’s possible, I did, you need to be open, I
know this idea for westerners seems crazy…If your husband is nice then it’s a waste
of time to find someone else, you learn as you go’ (Shabana).
Breaking ‘western’ pre-requisites of needing to ‘get to know the person’ before marriage,
Shabana’s views also reflect the possibility of agency, whereby women rely on practicality
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as opposed to romanticism, prior to marriage. Similarly, Shaw and Charsley (2006) have
documented that love after marriage remains a significant trait within the arranged marriage
concept.
However, other respondents explain why they feel comfortable with arranged
marriages:
‘I won’t be looking. I’d want my parents to look. If I choose someone, and I
anything goes wrong, my parents would say like you chose him, you went out with
him, and I will be alone…if they pick someone, it goes terribly wrong… I can blame
them. I don’t want them to turn on me, so why not agree with them anyway’
(Lubaina).
‘I will expect my mum to pick someone…because they know my values so I’d expect
my mum and dad to choose someone for me. That’s their culture and I embrace it.
They have given me a choice, though. They have said that you could go down the
British line, pick someone you find. Obviously, they know I won’t go to the extreme
level’ (Abida).
Lubaina and Abida not only accept arranged marriages as viable options, but also expect
their parents to fully decide on their future marriage partners, albeit for different reasons. In
strategically granting families an absolute right in choosing their daughters’ marriage
partners, women show they are aware of the risks involved if they decide to choose their
own path in marriage; Lubaina, in conforming to gendered expectations, has someone to
‘blame’ if her marriage fails in the future. In a sense, relying on her family’s support seems
to be more important than having the ‘choice’ to marry someone she individually picks.
Portraying a negative view of marriage, Lubaina fears that a love marriage gone wrong will
involve her family’s loss of support. Subtly, Lubaina is resolved to ‘agree’ with her parents’
choice so as not to disrupt established family patterns. This indicates that women can feel
compelled to passively accept traditional concepts so as to gain the family’s trust or
approval. On the other hand, although Abida is given the choice to decide, she
wholeheartedly leaves it to her parents to decide on her prospects, hence demonstrating that
although empowered, young women still trust their parents in marriage matters; to ‘choose’
someone herself is equated to ‘going down the British line’ and being ‘extreme’, whereby
Abida much prefers to ‘embrace’ her parents’ ‘culture’ instead.
Rejecting practicality and ‘security’, and disagreeing with Shabana, Farha’s notion
of marriage is based on love and attraction developed on an individual, more personal level:
‘I don’t like that you’re set up and you judge the other person from the minute you
see them and you will be ticking boxes …when you meet people on your own, you’re
not thinking of them like that. You really get to know the person without judging…so
this practice got its inherent defects. People who marry for security, the system
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would work…otherwise if you’re after love, you can’t have an arranged marriage
and I believe you should only marry for love’ (Farha).
Indeed, Farha broke two engagements following two arranged matches as she is against the
‘unnatural’ dimension an arranged marriage brings between two people.
‘There have been love marriages in the family but they’re segregated because of
that but now people are understanding, instead of loving somebody and then going
on to commit adultery because they couldn’t get married is worse than getting
married, from an Islamic perspective that’s allowed and if this happens to me I’m
going to fight’ (Fatimah).
In Fatimah’s family, love marriages are stigmatised and arranged marriages are viewed as
having more value than the former. However, Fatimah criticises this concept and is resolved
to ensure that she does not face a situation where she is confronted with a loveless marriage;
loveless marriages, for her, will lead to adultery, a sin in Islam. Islam therefore acts as
potential weapon to ‘fight’ any pressure used to conform to family ideals which are bounded
by cultural conventions. As for Nazia, arranged marriages infringe on women’s rights:
‘In my culture, arranged marriage, you’ve compromised your life straight out as
you don’t even know the guy. Your parents have decided and it’s not your approval.
If you chose, it’s a good thing. My cousins have studied but even they had to have it
and I can’t deal with that. How can you marry somebody you don’t know? My
parents’ had one but it worked because my mum wanted to be a housewife but in my
context, I’m so broad-minded, I find it so bizarre, it works because the wife submits
and the husband takes over control, it’s patriarchy, everything the girl wants she
suppresses and she follows her husband’s footsteps’ (Nazia).
Denouncing the patriarchal nature of the custom, Nazia’s comments mirror Bhopal’s (1997:
149-50) argument that arranged marriages remain deeply rooted within ‘private’ patriarchal
structures which are encouraged by South Asian households; the custom is supported and
enforced by the ‘biraderi’ (Shaw & Charsley, 2006), where gendered expectations of
‘agreeing’ to a match, in Nazia’s words, ‘compromising’, remain significant. For Nazia, the
‘context’ she lives in does not allow for such customs. Unlike some other participants in this
research who profess scope for educated women to negotiate in an arranged marriage
situation, Nazia maintains that her independence clashes with the practice, which acts as hub
for ‘patriarchal control’. Nazia is not ready to ‘submit’ to any man, not even to a husband.
Fulfilling her individual expectations outside marriage is given priority over the
community’s expectations of what they expect from her as a wife. As Yasmin agrees,
parental pressure to accept matches usually infringe on what daughters expect in a marriage:
‘Oh absolutely I’d like to choose...there are people who have approached me since I
finished graduating so I’m considering them but my mum is like why are you not
already saying yes but I need to see if I get on with that person because when
parents get involved, they have their own agendas, they put what they want their
child to have first, not what the two people want, marriage is about two people
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making their life together , not about the mum telling the son what she should be
asking for’ (Yasmin).
Indeed, Yasmin is determined not to rush in with any offer of marriage as
developing a relationship with the person first is primordial; marriage ‘is about two people’,
and not about the ‘mum’ or the ‘son’. Resisting parental ‘agendas’ reveal generational
tension in marital re-negotiations. This said, other respondents maintain that arranged
matches can be both positive and negative:
‘I think some of them tend to work out like my parents, primary example and some
of them have gone disastrously wrong, like my first marriage, it’s a pot of luck and
if it works out, it works out well and if it doesn’t then it can ruin the rest of your life
basically’ (Faiza).
‘It’s got advantages and disadvantages and I had an arranged marriage and if
something goes wrong I wouldn’t blame my parents, but if I had a love marriage
and it didn’t work out they would say ‘we told you so’ but because it’s an arranged
marriage they can’t say anything but obviously parents know best I suppose cause
they’ve experienced a lot and seen a lot’ (Rahila).
Based on their experiences, Faiza and Rahila both had arranged marriages and reiterate that
there are potential risks to them being successful. Faiza’s arranged marriage failed, whilst
Rahila has expressed unhappiness with her current marital experiences; nevertheless, they
both seem to maintain that arranged marriages should still be considered by women. Rahila
also highlights that if love marriages do not work, parents will automatically blame
daughters for their decisions, a fear expressed earlier by Lubaina. Indeed, parental reactions
may therefore influence young women’s moves when it comes to considering love
marriages as opposed to arranged marriages.
Nevertheless, Bushra and Sonia reflect on how parental attitudes to arranged
marriage are rapidly changing in British South Asian communities:
‘Before it was strict among Asians, like the boy and girl hardly know each other, it
was mainly about the two families, now they’re talking to each other on the phone,
texting, chatting and meeting up and the families are fine, so evolution in how it’s
done’ (Bushra)..
‘A lot of change now with arranged marriage…a lot of parents say to their children
is there anybody? They’re more open to love marriages’ (Sonia).
As young Muslim women become more assertive in their choice of marriage partner,
opportunities to ‘get to know’ potential future husbands are redefining the nature of such
marriages; women seem to negotiate the cultural custom of arranged marriage on their
terms. This is actually revealing in the fact that arranged marriages will be considered, while
transnational marriages do not seem to appeal to women I interviewed:
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‘Everybody knows that that’s the big NO…God forbid my parents would ever say:
We’ve got a guy from India whom we would like you to meet…that’s off limit and
they know it’ (Alia).
For Alia, the boundaries her parents have to respect are clear when it comes to her
marriage. In not wanting an Indian partner, Alia expresses her wish to have an affinity with
her prospective husband along similar class and background. Nazia explains the continuity
of this cultural custom as a reaction to how ‘westernised’ second/third generation of South
Asian migrants are becoming; more importantly, her words signify that parents will
strategically take measures to ‘oppress’ children if the latter ‘become’ ‘western’:
‘They bring in the culture from Pakistan in arranging such marriages... it’s their
culture which is being westernised here and parents here don’t want their kids to
lose it...so it is protective mechanism, the more western you try to become, the more
oppressive your parents will be, so if you resist it, you have power’ (Nazia).
Indeed, the older generation insists on maintaining ‘the culture’. Nevertheless, as young
women contest such notions, resistance on their part brings about new formulations of
culture. As shown, respondents do not necessarily reject or obliterate cultural heritage, but
are keen to embrace a more fluid, up-to-date notion of South Asian Muslimness.
Among unmarried women, only two respondents suggest that they ‘do not mind’
transnational arranged marriages, as opposed to the majority, who believes that they are
problematic. However, my findings do not correlate with Shaw’s and Charsley’s (2006)
sample, which found that British Pakistani women prefer husbands from the subcontinent as
they are more responsive to cultural and religious adherence, as opposed to British Pakistani
men. For Rashida, a transnational marriage is not an issue; on the contrary, suggesting that
divorce is higher among couples who were both raised here, Rashida questions the fact that
having the choice does not always lead to better marriages. Habibah and Abida also raise
key concerns:
‘I don’t mind because I speak both languages, don’t mind whether he’s British or
Pakistani, but the girls here, they want to get married to British guys but the divorce
level is really high in them, they end up getting married to a Pakistani guy anyway
so you might as well just go for it the first time’ (Rashida).
‘They need to be aware of how this society works and I can’t have someone from
abroad and just expect me to behave like how they would expect their wives to
behave in Bangladesh which is they have to stay at home... I’m fine with somebody
coming from abroad but I won’t change my ways’ (Habibah).
‘I don’t think it’s right as differences clash, a woman here goes ‘I’m off to work’,
and he’s like ‘why are you going to work, that’s my job, people will talk’. But she’ll
say ‘No, I want to be independent, this is the way I’ve always done it. It wouldn’t
work, a woman who’s been brought up here, educated means she will go into a
career and then a man comes along and takes all that away, this is the west you
know, they can’t do that’ (Abida).
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Nevertheless, young women show their concerns towards such matches. Habibah is open to
the idea of marrying someone from Bangladesh, as long as he does not infringe on her
independence, a right that British women in the West benefit from. Opposing cultural
differences, Eastern versus ‘Western’ ideals of womanhood, Abida agrees with Habibah, but
is not convinced that such marriages work as gendered expectations remain at diverging
ends. Consequently, Abida fears that her identity as an ‘educated’ woman is put at risk
through such matches; for her, hence, cultural compatibility remains extremely significant.
‘A lot of the girls agree to marry someone from Pakistan and they’ll apply for their
visa and get their stay and it is helping the family out but once they get their stay,
they can divorce them. I know two people in my family who have done this and now
they’re divorced but the guys are British citizens now, so I won’t ever agree to it’
(Saeema).
Saeema underlines another issue with transnational marriages; marriage and
migration remain inextricably linked, as Shaw’s and Charsley (2006) study has widely
documented how familial links are maintained through transnational marriage arrangements.
Saeema denounces this principle, used by families to ‘help’ each other and maintaining tight
cultural links between them. Her concerns are justified in her not only personally knowing
members of her family who are today divorced due to transnational marriages, but also
highlights the potential risks which women face if they agree to such matches. Young
women like Saeema are therefore not ready to approve of this practice and demonstrate their
unwillingness to view marriage merely along migratory purposes. Indeed, having a right to
choice of marriage partners when negotiating the practice of marriage appears to be a
general concern for research participants. Nevertheless, like I argued in the previous
discussion, unmarried respondents’ expectations remain somewhat different from their
realities. Indeed, processes of ‘choice’ are not straightforward. As this section has
demonstrated, choice of marriage partners is informed by negotiations around future
partners’ ethnic background, allegiance to Islam, as well as educational levels. These remain
significant factors which participants have to consider as they negotiate ‘choice’ in
marriage. In the next section I extend these themes by focusing on cousin marriages in
British South Asian Muslim communities.
6.3.4 ‘I won’t marry my cousin’
Previous studies have shown that in British South Asian Muslim communities
arranged transnational marriages are often consanguineous marriages (between first cousins)
used to strengthen kinship networks between families residing in the home country and the
country of adoption (Shaw, 2000; Shaw and Charsley, 2006). More recently, the media has
been paying attention to why cousins marry in British South Asian Muslim communities so
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as to expose the health risks (genetic defects) associated with marrying consanguineously
(Dispatches, Channel 4 Documentary, August 2010), and also raise the point that cousin
marriages act as barriers for effective integration of ethnic minority groups (The Sunday
Times, March 2010). I hence asked respondents about their positions on cousin marriages,
and why they think such practices are viewed as taboo by the rest of British society. From
my research sample, ten respondents’ parents are first cousins; they are all of Pakistani
origin. No married women in this research had a cousin marriage but among them, only
three participants maintain that cousin marriages can in effect be considered, while the rest
disagrees with the practice, regarding it as ‘backwards’. Basit’s (1997: 83) study showed
similar trends, with only a few of her respondents thinking that marrying a cousin could be
‘advantageous’ in terms of providing security to women.
‘Cousin marriages, it’s fine, it’s allowed in our religion, it’s allowed in our culture,
my parents were cousins but people see that as problematic as it’s just what their
society values and this has come back from history, traditionally been that way for
the West, like aristocratic families…but they forget it’ (Faiza).
Faiza criticises British ‘western’ society for ‘forgetting’ that cousin marriages were
once part of their social fabric; for her, culture and religion dictate social practices where
within Islam traditions, it is not technically wrong to marry a cousin. However, in my
research sample, most educated women have expressed their concerns about cousin
marriages, even though the practice is still considered by some women nowadays. As
Shazia’s words indicate below, the next generation is keen to maintain the tradition,
whereby education does not seem to be making a huge difference in changing mindsets:
‘Cousin marriages are plain wrong. My parents are cousins, but I’m against it. But
the next generation, the girls I know, they’re still considering getting their kids
married off to each other and they’ve been to uni. It’s about keeping it in the family
and that’s backwards’ (Shazia).
For Bushra, of Indian origin, cousin marriage is a ‘Pakistani’ custom and is hence an
‘ethnic’, not an Islamic custom:
‘A lot of Pakistani families, they only get married within the family and it’s
absolutely ridiculous and they don’t understand the problems that arise from it. It’s
more of a Pakistani thing…I don’t think Indians do it. It’s not an Islamic thing that
you have to do but it’s not sinful either, it’s completely allowed, but it’s not a
religious thing that says that it’s good if you do’ (Bushra).
Faiza and Bushra both draw on the dubious status that cousin marriages hold in Islam; they
are permitted but they are not absolutes. The fact that women are aware that the practice is
not religious provides them with arguments to challenge the older generations’ perspectives
on cousin marriages. Nevertheless, some respondents find the practice to be positive, albeit
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upon certain conditions. For instance, Haleema maintains that cousin marriages can be
considered as long as they are not transnational marriages:
‘I’ve experienced it first time with my parents, it was love first and then arranged so
I think that way is ok but in terms of the way it happens is if they’re living on
different sides of the world and I’m over here and there’s a cousin back home, show
her a few photographs and I don’t agree with that... I’ve seen so many marriages
that break down because of cultural differences, so there are nuances in cousin
marriages’ (Haleema).
Indeed, talking about love cousin marriages, she reiterates that it is important that
partners ‘love’ first, before agreeing to the match as ‘cultural differences’ between partners
may ruin a marriage. Indeed, young women are developing individualistic notions of such
‘traditional’ practices, suiting their needs and demands. Cousin marriages are generally
arranged marriages. However, this research demonstrates that participants are ready to
consider arranged marriages but remain wary of cousin marriages. All single respondents
are adamant that they will not marry their cousins. Three respondents had proposals from
first cousins; Farha was engaged to her cousin for six months but decided to break it off,
while Sadia and Sanaa turned down two offers. The majority of respondents claim that they
do not agree with cousin marriages due to them having ‘brotherly’ relationships with their
cousins, as well as the huge potential medical risks involved as far as children are
concerned.
Saeema expresses frustration, to the point of disgust, when reflecting on the
practice. As she maintains:
‘They happen all the time. I don’t agree with cousin marriages but my parents are
cousins… cousins have married, and three of their kids have passed away but they
just don’t listen… it’s honour, izzat, like they’ll say ‘this family is going to look back
on us, and the community, we want to keep that good name’…cultural not
religious…they’ll say ‘you’re going to go to hell because you’re not doing this’ and
I say ‘where in the Qur’an does it mention that!?’ It’s like you making your own
religion then’
It’s decided before they’re even born, they grow up together and it’s sick. It’s that
messed up mentality where for fifteen years of your life, this guy is your brother,
next two years, you can’t speak to him, and then he’s your husband, it’s disgusting
(Saeema).
For her, the South Asian societal concept of ‘izzat’ is undermining young people’s lives,
whereby Islam is used to threaten them so as to ensure that they are made to accept the
practice on the basis of religion. Clearly, women are making choices and re-negotiating the
transnational arranged marriage practice, where they reveal an agency to erect certain
boundaries which will largely affect the nature of marriage in their communities. As this
section reveals, respondents maintain that they would not agree to a cousin marriage;
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clearly, respondents are demarcating arranged marriage from cousin marriage, where it is
obvious that there are limits to them agreeing to an arranged match by their families. It
appears that participants are successful in this approach as married women in my research
did not have cousin marriages, whilst two respondents categorically disregarded their offers
whilst one broke off her engagement to a cousin. Indeed, this confirms that they are
evaluating their ‘choice’ of marriage partner within the arranged marriage process by
evaluating boundaries. In the last part of this section, I discuss the significance of consent in
marriage, which remains integral to the arranged marriage practice. In effect, I explore the
notions around consent in order to show how respondents erect and maintain boundaries
within the marriage process, thereby further illustrating their negotiations of the practice of
marriage within South Asian Muslim communities in Britain.
6.3.5 Grey areas: ‘arranged’ versus ‘forced’ marriage
Studies of arranged marriages have focused on ethnicity, ‘race’ and migrant
populations in Britain, where the relevance and significance of such practices as a
substantial method to ensure cultural continuity within ethnic groups remains prevalent
(Afshar, 1989; Alibhai-Brown, 1993, Lewis, 1994; Shaw, 1994; Ballard, 1994; Bhopal,
1997; Labi, 2003). More importantly, the issue of ‘forced’ marriages in the UK has been the
object of growing concern for the government for the last decade. The term ‘forced’
marriage, meaning arranged marriage in which consent is apparently absent, remains a
somewhat complex issue. As Alia highlights, perceptions have been tainted by the confusion
made between ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ marriages in Britain:
‘It’s about what people understand by arranged marriages and forced
marriages…so if by arranged marriage we mean the introduction of boy and girl
there’s nothing wrong with it. It’s just a means of meeting somebody…at the end of
the day the decision is with the girl. For me arranged marriage in British context it
could be a friend saying let’s go out for dinner, I know this guy and you could click
so that is similar, like a helping hand! And it’s done by everyone but they don’t
realise it’ (Alia).
Ironically, for her, girls are empowered as they remain decision makers in the process. She
draws parallels between arranged marriages in a western context, which is no different from
people of other ethnic groups (non-South Asian) ‘setting up’ common friends. Alia therefore
denounces the stereotypical stigmas associated with arranged marriages, which have been
essentialised by British society, as documented by Alibhai-Brown (1993). In fact, the Home
Office report (2000) distinguishes ‘forced’ from ‘arranged’ marriages on the basis of
consent. It defines ‘arranged’ marriages as “consent given and sought by both parties”. It
describes ‘forced’ marriages as “conducted without the full consent of both parties”, which
can involve “emotional pressure to force someone to accept the arrangement”. Nowadays, in
234
the UK, it is a legal offence to ‘force’ someone into a marriage and legislation prosecutes
parents who attempt to do so (BBC News Online, November 2008). More recently, the case
of a teenage British Muslim girl ‘sold’ by her father into an arranged transnational marriage
in Pakistan for ten thousand pounds in exchange for the future husband obtaining British
citizenship has sparked controversy, where it is being suggested that the school curriculum
in Britain will have to mandatorily address the forced marriage issue so as to raise
awareness among young women (BBC News Online, February 2011).
My research participants acknowledge differences between arranged and forced
marriages and for them, consent also accounts for the differences between the two. None of
them are ready to accept a ‘forced’ marriage as opposed to an ‘arranged marriage’.
Similarly, Basit (1997: 75) found that her participants did not find the arranged marriage to
be ‘an unreasonable or oppressive custom’ as long as consent was obtained from the young
people concerned. My previous research (Abdool Raman, 2005) conducted on South Asian
educated women in Mauritius demonstrate that women also make a distinction between
forced and arranged marriages. However, Macey and Beckett (2001) use the term ‘forced
arranged’ marriage to demonstrate the fluidity of the two concepts, which is more
appropriate to define ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ marriages as one practice involving the use of
physical or non-physical force. Ahsan (1995) also suggests that there is growing evidence in
Britain of women’s suppression in these marriages as this practice, whether called ‘forced’
or ‘arranged’, involves the exertion of varying kinds of pressure and harassment. An
‘arranged’ marriage can be a ‘forced’ marriage when someone is ‘obliged’ and ‘coerced’ to
say ‘yes’ to an engagement due to ethnic, patriarchal, traditional and cultural ‘values’ of
one’s community in which they do not have free choices to make their own decisions. It is
hence important to question the suitability of the Home Office’s distinction between
arranged and forced marriages, and develop a new language that could further investigate
the issue of consent and choice in arranged marriages. Indeed, Anitha and Gill (2009) also
explore the distinction between ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ marriage by focusing on British
legal and policy discourses, where they state that: ‘the difference between arranged and
forced marriage continues to be framed in binary terms and hinges on the concept of
consent’ (Anitha and Gill, 2009: 1).
Previous research (Gangoli et al., 2006; Samad and Eade, 2002; Bredal, 2005)
demonstrates that British South Asian women are negotiating the grey areas around consent
in marriage. In so doing, they negotiate community/family concerns as well as assess their
individual perspectives on the consequences of agreeing or refusing a marriage proposal.
This leads them to re-work established gendered norms (daughters having to agree to
arrange marriage) through their navigations of choice and constraint. Likewise, my
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respondents also portray a clear awareness of firstly, whether arranged and forced marriage
should be distinguished from each other, and secondly, how problematic it is to inherently
rely on consent to demarcate these practices, if ever it is possible to totally differentiate
between them:
‘Forced for me is having no choice in the matter whatsoever…just that fact that it’s
not your choice and you haven’t made an informed decision… it’s not your decision
to say yes or no as the parents have made this decision for you’ (Alia).
‘They are completely different. Arranged marriages, there’s nothing forced about
them generally. They are just simply an introduction from the family rather than
through friends or yourself…that’s the only difference, getting you to meet someone
and asking you to decide…like a month or so should be enough’ (Farha).
Shabana highlights the subtlety in her experiences of having had an arranged marriage,
which could have easily turned into a forced marriage, hence demonstrating the slippery
slope that links the two:
‘Arranged marriage is how I got married...there was one guy in my family and I
said no, my parents said no but my sister was pressing my mum and in the meantime
the guy got engaged to someone else and my sister said she was going to talk to him
and if that had happened, that would have been a forced marriage...no choice...it’s
about choice and the choice they give you and in my case, I had the choice’
(Shabana).
Many participants also point out that without consent, a marriage is not Islamically
valid as ‘Islam gives one the right to freely choose a partner’ (Haleema). As Sadia states,
‘you need an explicit consent, that’s an arranged marriage, and that’s ok in Islam’. Indeed,
Pearl and Menski (1998), writing on British Muslim marriages from a legal perspective,
have always emphasised the importance of consent in the Islamic marriage. As Bushra
explains:
‘A forced marriage is not allowed in Islam because you have to agree, and if you
have a forced marriage, it doesn’t count anymore. It’s about intentions, everything
is in Islam, if in your heart you don’t want to marry the guy and if you say it just to
please anybody else but you don’t mean it, then God knows that’ (Bushra).
Nevertheless, some participants maintain they personally know someone among their
extended family or friends who have been forced to get married, revealing that the
occurrence of forced marriages in South Asian Muslim communities in Britain remains
significant. Respondents express their awareness that a grey area or a ‘fine line’ separates
the two, where consent remains a complicated issue to rate or define. For Shazia, even
forced marriages can be sub-divided into ‘types’, which goes back to the idea of grey areas
and varying degrees as consent is negotiated in marriage:
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‘There are different types of forced marriages. There’s one where they’re dragging
them physically, then there’s when they are emotionally blackmailing you.
Emotional blackmail is a type of pressure…arranged can come from so much
pressure. My housemate, they’re forcing her. She’s got her boyfriend and her family
won’t accept him’ but I’m like ‘you’ve got a choice’ but they’re threatening to kill
themselves and this is happening next door, right here’ (Shazia).
She reiterates the impact that ‘emotional blackmail’ may have on young women’s decisions
to go through with an arranged marriage through coerced consent. Even if one thinks one
has a choice, the difficulty of young women taking formal actions against their families
remains an issue. In saying that ‘this is happening next door’, Shazia reflects on her
housemate’s current situation; the latter is being forced into an arranged marriage whilst she
is in a committed relationship with her ‘boyfriend’, a situation which her family will not
accept. If she refuses to go ahead with the marriage, her parents’ have threatened to ‘kill
themselves’. This demonstrates the challenges faced by women to resist emotional
blackmail and affirm a right to ‘choice’.
Interestingly, in Lubaina’s case, an arranged match potentially becomes ‘forced’
when her power to decide whether the match suits her or not is taken away from her; ‘you’re
forcing your view on me because you’re not asking me’:
‘There’s a very fine line between arranged marriages and forced marriages. I had a
proposal and she didn’t ask me, she’d already made her mind up that he wasn’t the
right guy and I thought that’s really towards forced. You’re forcing your view on
me because you’re not asking me whether I like him or not. When I said no to her
about one of my relatives she wanted me to agree, she said ‘No doubt they’ll think
that you’ve got a secret relationship going on, that’s why you said no, your
reputation will be questioned’ How can you ever win?’ (Lubaina).
Whilst deciding not to go ahead with another proposal which her mother hoped she would
say yes to, Lubaina’s decision is rebuked on the grounds of honour, remitted into question
through the potentiality of ‘secret relationships’. Women may hence find themselves in
delicate situations, almost trapped or manipulated to say yes or no to arranged matches.
Consent, for Lubaina, must not therefore echo double standards on the part of parents but
should be a constant or fixed notion that reflects a categorical ‘yes’ or ‘no’ from women.
The issue of force and consent has previously been addressed by feminists in relation to
sexuality and domination. These studies help illuminate notions of choice and consent in
forced and arranged marriages. For instance, Jeffreys (1993) links the ‘construction of
consent’ to the politics of sexuality in coercive sex and marital rapes. In these cases, the
notion of consent based on equality and free will is not valid as both are acts of male sexual
dominance which are supported by social institutions such as marriage. Through dominance,
the notion of coercion as a strategy used in disempowering women is carried out through the
use of manipulation or emotional pressure (Phillips, 2000: 15-19). More relevant to my
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study, Anitha and Gill (2009: 168-171) similarly link coercion and consent within the
arranged and forced marriage concepts. They interrogate the distinction made between
coercion and consent in marriage as per British Courts, where ‘grey areas’ nevertheless, are
not theoretically or legally helpful enough to acknowledge that consent remains constructed
in discourses of ‘power imbalances and gendered norms’ that women face within South
Asian communities. As they point out, social expectations engender the emotional pressure
perpetuated at women, and the grey area between arranged and forced marriage ‘may slip
onto the other: arranged may become forced but forced is always different from arranged’
(Anitha and Gill, 2009: 171).
This said, two respondents, Rashida and Nazia, in this study believe that there is no
difference between a ‘forced’ and an ‘arranged’ marriage:
‘Even in arranged marriages if you say no, your parents may just say tough and will
that be classed as a forced marriage? Is there a difference? I don’t think so. I think
it’s the same’ (Rashida).
‘Arranged marriages are modified versions of forced marriages because the only
difference between the two is pictures are shown, you can speak to the guy whereas
a forced marriage, it’s just so simple: you are forced to get married. You are
manipulated by your parents so that you do what they want you to do. I don’t think
it is about choice. My cousin had an arranged marriage but the only difference in
that being a forced marriage was that in her arranged marriage, she was asked
whether she wanted to marry the guy but what I don’t understand is why do you
ask? Technically, she couldn’t exactly say no. An arranged marriage is a forced
marriage in disguise...same…because you can’t distinguish between the two; an
arranged marriage is a nicer way of saying forced marriage’ (Nazia).
Nazia is strongest in her condemnation of arranged and forced marriages, which for
her remain essentially the ‘same’. Throughout her responses, Nazia has consistently re-
affirmed how patriarchy operates in South Asian households, which is indicative of the fact
that Nazia, although from a middle-class background, has personally experienced patriarchal
control at home when she imparted the struggles she faced to not only go to university, but
to also live away from home, an issue I discussed earlier (Chapter Four). From the
beginning, Nazia made it clear that if she did not go down the educational route, she would
have been ‘forced’ into an ‘arranged’ marriage. As a strategy, Nazia has found it easier to
live independently, in spite of her parents’ disapproval. For her, ‘forced’ and ‘arranged’
marriages remain patriarchal ‘cultural’ institutions in which women are trapped within the
private sphere. Her thoughts echo Anitha and Gill’s (2009: 172) argument which suggests
that although ‘reluctant’ consent and ‘psychological pressures’ are legally recognised as
coercion to marry, the ‘patriarchal structures remain unexplored beneath this facade of an
individual ultimately free to choose and to change her mind’. Indeed, women feel obliged to
conform to such marriages; as Nazia reiterates, ‘she could not technically say no’. In such
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familial spheres, women’s ‘consent’ to participate in ‘traditional’ practices is encompassed
within patriarchy. This is reflected in women’s negotiations of arranged matches, which are
embedded in a cultural context of coercion, established throughout their gendered
experiences (Phillips, 2000). Women hence learn to ‘accept’ marital customs which operate
within a culture of patriarchal force where ‘free’ choices remain limited.
This section has therefore demonstrated that whilst respondents negotiate the
practice of marriage, significant issues are considered by participants. First, they re-
negotiate pre-marital relationships as they develop their own personal ways to maintain
boundaries which are in accordance with their Islamic faith (for instance, limited physical
relationship with their partner before marriage). Second, they are ready to challenge the
gendered cultural norms of a daughter-in-law having to reside with her in-laws after
marriage as they demonstrate their unwillingness to support the extended family pattern
which is considered the norm in South Asian Muslim communities. Also, they reiterate that
they would promote a more equitable distribution of household chores by contesting the
traditional female role of ‘homemaker’ within their household, while, in contradiction to
such an approach, respondents intend to revert to these roles once they start raising a family.
In essence, participants maintain that it is important for them to have options to alter their
lifestyles (negotiate employment) when they get married. However, I have also illustrated
some of the challenges involved as respondents negotiate marriage. Indeed, this is brought
into focus through married respondents’ experiences of marriage as it is evident that there is
a gulf between unmarried respondents’ expectations of marriage and the marital realities of
married respondents. Third, respondents have shown how their attitudes towards ‘choice’ of
marriage partner are embedded within issues around ethnicity, Islam and the customary
cultural tradition of arranged marriage. Their navigations of whom to choose as a life
partner reflect that decisions are informed by degrees of negotiating choice and consent in
marriage; for example, arranged marriage as a concept could be considered whilst cousin
marriage is rejected by most respondents. As far as forced marriage is concerned, all
participants voice against it as most of them view it as being different to an arranged
marriage in the sense that consent to marry is clearly absent as the match is being arranged.
In the final section of this chapter, I look at how the nikah, a religious contract in Islamic
law, informs Muslim women’s perspectives of marriage, and their choices when it comes to
framing Islamic marriage in Britain. This provides us with a clearer perspective on
respondents’ positionings of marriage as they navigate Islamic and British perspectives.
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6.4 FRAMING ISLAMIC MARRIAGE
In this final section, I explore the ways in which respondents are negotiating the
‘act’ of marriage and consequently, how they outline the contours of the Islamic marriage in
Britain; their views signal their negotiation processes as they evaluate Islamic and English
perspectives of marriage. This analysis provides an insight into how respondents, through
contestations and constructions of Islam and marriage, exercise agency as they consider
marriage in Islamic and English law. In navigating between the nikah and registry, they
embrace two separate legal systems (Shari’a law and English law), which intersect as
processes of negotiation take place. Precisely, I stress the gendered implications for women
as such negotiations of marriage occur, as well as evaluate the possibilities and limitations
respondents experience through their re-workings of marriage. Pearl and Menski (1998)
have previously researched the legal intersection of these two systems and documented the
compromises made, as well as the controversies experienced by British Muslims so as to
satisfy both; a religious nikah in Britain is not legally recognised unless it is registered by
the state (Bradney, 2000). Consequently, this gives rise to the blended concept of ‘Angrezi
(English) Shari’a law’, where Muslims navigate to sustain affinities between Islamic and
English law (Pearl and Menski, 1998).
Nonetheless, it is also possible that Muslims get ‘stuck’ in between ‘Islamic’ and
‘British’ systems as marriage and divorce laws diverge considerably; I therefore interrogate
this opposition to analyse women’s positions within it. In negotiating Islamic principles
such as nikah, talaq and polygamy in Britain, I suggest that Muslim women are actively
setting boundaries as they evaluate the possibilities and limitations of fully embracing
Islamic ideals of marriage. My respondents portray a range of positionings as they contest
the ideals of the Islamic marriage and its stipulations. More specifically, they actively
engage in discourses of gender equality, hence raising the question of patriarchy as the
contradictions of nikah, talaq and polygamy become evident through their contestations. El
Sadaawi (1981: 214-15) uses the term ‘Islamic patriarchy’ to indicate that ‘cultural’ and
‘religious’ patriarchy are intertwined in matters of talaq and polygamy, whereby male
supremacy remains apparent in the Islamic marriage. The question remains: does the nikah
safeguard women’s aspirations of gender equality? In Britain, as the opposition ‘Islamic’
versus ‘Western’ is heightened because participants are having to make ‘choices’, the
challenges involved in making their choices illustrate the tensions that exist in framing
Islamic marriage.
240
6.4.1 Nikah in Britain
I started by asking participants whether the nikah and the civil registry were equally
important to them, and why, so as to firstly, evaluate the significance they attribute to each
legal system and secondly, assess the extent to which the nikah constitutes an important
element in shaping respondents’ religious identities. Women’s views vary, depending on
their religious inclinations. All married respondents have had their nikahs registered; only
one does not believe that the registry was necessary as for her, marriage in the British
context has lost popularity as cohabitation has become the norm in British society:
‘The registry is just paperwork to say that you are married, and practically it’s not
even needed here. I could just say I’m cohabiting and it wouldn’t mean anything.
There are some financial advantages to being married, that’s it’ (Sabina).
Two respondents had transnational marriages and got married in Pakistan, whereby their
status as being legally married is recognised in the UK:
‘I’ve brought him over, it’s classed as a marriage so I don’t have to marry him here
and I signed everything there and I made an application to the British embassy and
that makes our marriage British, it’s definitely the religious aspect, the nikah is
more important than the English version’ (Rahila).
However, all unmarried respondents maintain that they would do both the nikah and
the registry. Nevertheless, although the nikah, like the civil registry, is a contract under
Islamic law, only three respondents pinpoint the similarity between the two, as opposed to
the rest of respondents, who make a distinct difference between them; religious versus
secular ceremonies, whereby the registry usually stands as a formality for them. Indeed,
Farha suggests that:
‘The nikah is religious but it’s a contract. It’s got no vows, you’re not making
promises; you’re signing a document in black and white. In Islamic states, it’s civil
so already part of a legal system, girls need to realise this here as well, but it’s only
different as they are not integrated into one’ (Farha).
Farha explains the similarity between the two from a legal perspective. As a lawyer, Farha
reiterates that one should not make any difference as the nature of both is contractual. Due
to the absence of ‘vows’ and ‘promises’, Farha concentrates on the civil nature of the nikah,
which connotes a more legal, as opposed to religious, view of the nikah. Interestingly, for
Fatimah, who also views the nikah as a ‘legal document’, not proceeding with the registry in
England would mean that she is not fulfilling her Islamic faith; not only do both stem out of
contractual principles, it is a duty in Islam to adapt to the laws of the country:
‘If it’s the law then I will do it and you have to get registered, it’s more political, it’s
a legal document that you have to sign, by nature they’re the same, nikah is the
legal document in Islam, but registration is a legal document according to the
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country that you’re in and if you’re living in that country then it is obligatory on
you to accept their laws, that’s what Islam says, so you have to do both’ (Fatimah).
This therefore demonstrates that for some participants, there is no contradiction, hence
opposition, between the two.
‘The nikah gives me the right to stipulate what I want and he has to respect it if
agreed. I would ask that I should be allowed to work after marriage and earn my
own money. I’ll write it in the nikah, it’s my right’ (Lubaina).
Lubaina does not formally use the word ‘contract’ when she talks about the nikah. However,
the principle she puts forward to claim a right to financial independence in a marriage
contract emphasises what Farha and Fatimah argue earlier; the nikah can also be presumed
to a legal document. Nevertheless, the majority of participants in this research state that the
nikah would be more ‘important’ to them if they had to choose; hence portraying the
centrality that Islam has within women’s attitudes towards marriage. Ahsan’s (1995) study
of educated Muslims in Britain has demonstrated that for them, the nikah has more
relevance, although they realise the importance of a civil marriage legally. In my study, only
a few women maintain that the nikah and the civil registry are ‘equally important’ to them,
although for the majority, the nikah would still come first if they had to choose. Clearly,
religion influences women’s understandings of marriage, defining marriage as a ‘sacred’ as
opposed to ‘secular’ or ‘western’ institution, as highlighted by the quotes below:
‘They are both important but if there was a choice then the nikah would come first,
but for now, equally important’ (Faiza).
‘In terms of making it halal, the nikah is important but because I’m British I think
they would be equally important, so make them equal, have the same number of
guests and have the same effort put into it but the nikah would always come first for
me, it’s the sacred aspect of it’ (Haleema).
‘The nikah is what would make me think ‘I’m married’...signing the registry,
wouldn’t mean ‘I’m married’. If you are religious, then nothing comes before that
whereas if you’re too western, like secular, then probably an English wedding
would be just fine’ (Nazia).
Indeed, respondents do recognise their British identity, hence the importance of
having the registry, albeit symbolically. Nonetheless, Nazia highlights that perspectives will
differ as one needs to balance religious versus secular. However, Hanah maintains, the
importance she attributes to the nikah must be understood within her current ‘context’,
which is ‘western’. Therefore, for her, both remain inextricably linked:
‘The registry, extremely important, my nikah would be important so both of them
and I couldn’t pick one... I do honestly believe both as one is my religion and the
other is the society where I live, my context is western’ (Hanah).
Only two respondents claim that the registry would be of more significance to them:
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‘Registry would be more important…if he is Muslim I would do the nikah, otherwise
no...What’s in State law, that’s it, secular principle this is what counts here’
(Sanaa).
‘I would do both but I would do the nikah more for my parents. The document you
sign in England I find that to be more worthy cause with your nikah, the guy could
quite simply just say talaq and you’re divorced... English papers it’s more official
and you’ve got to do more so as to be divorced from someone, it looks more
serious’ (Rubina).
Sanaa and Rubina profess a more ‘secular’ approach to marriage. The ‘official’ legal
attributions remain attractive to Rubina as she highlights the problems that may arise from
Muslim divorces. Indeed, this seems to be a concern for some young women in this
research. Among participants, only a minority recognises the importance of ensuring that
one is legally married in Britain so as to counter such difficulties. The registry, for Sanaa
and Rubina, acts as proof that they are married and more importantly, acts as security
against divorce in their communities. By ‘divorce’, Muslim women refer to talaq (Islamic
divorce), the tradition that provides Muslim husbands with the right to divorce their wives
through repudiation. In the next section, I concentrate on respondents’ perspectives on talaq
into more detail as this analysis reveals firstly, their awareness of the controversy of talaq,
and secondly, reflects respondents’ views on how they perceive gender status and rights
between wives and husbands in Islam.
6.4.2 Talaq: perspectives on female repudiation
As indicated by respondents like Rubina, divorce for young Muslim women appears
to be an area of contention when it comes to women’s rights in Islamic law. Talaq, known
as female repudiation, is also not recognised as legally valid in British jurisdiction (Bano,
1999). The thorny issue, however, remains that for Muslim women, talaq can only be given,
(and accepted in the case of women asking for it), by husbands for it to be valid under
Islamic law (Doi, 1992; Dahl, 1997). The gender bias is hence evident as Islamic divorce
laws appear to be in favour of men, thereby promoting patriarchy which leaves women
powerless (Mernissi, 1993; Moghissi, 1999). In British law, both wives and husbands have
equal rights to ask, and be granted a divorce, as opposed to Islamic law. Pearl and Menski’s
(1998) study has demonstrated that it is therefore possible that Muslim women get ‘stuck’ in
between legal systems as they negotiate divorce with their husbands; the latter may refuse to
give talaq, hence obliging his wife to Islamically stay married to him, even though she is
granted a legal divorce in English law.
I thus asked respondents about their opinions on talaq, and whether they consider
Muslim husbands to have the inherent right to repudiate their wives in Islam. This analysis
throws light on whether respondents convey as much significance to the Muslim talaq as
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they do the nikah. Undoubtedly, the former raises vital questions around firstly, Muslim
women’s human rights in Britain and secondly, whether they are aware of the legal
problems which may arise in cases where they want to satisfy both legal systems to feel
divorced. My findings show that most respondents agree that it is a male right to repudiate
their wives in Islam. However, half of my respondents suggest that talaq in this way is only
valid when done ‘properly’ as ‘prescribed by Islam’, which is, for husbands to pronounce
talaq over a period of time of reflection, provide maintenance for the wife, as well as
establish pregnancy:
‘He has to mean it. There are different interpretations and which one do you go by?
The wife has the right to ask for a divorce as well, if you say talaq once and you
give time out, there is a period of four months where you can separate to reflect,
Islam goes against being hasty whereas in other religions such as Christianity there
is no divorce, that’s one extreme but Islam gives you the opportunity. The reasons
why these cases arise are because the husband and the wife don’t know their rights’
(Haleema).
‘If a woman asks for it then the man should give it, she has the right to divorce and
he should agree, if he doesn’t give it, then she has the option of going to an imam
and divorcing him, it takes longer but God has given her that option but it’s true, a
man has more of a right, he does have that power to give that whenever he wants
and the reason why the man has it is because men are calmer and more restricted
than women, women are more free with their tongue and could divorce their
husbands everyday, but I don’t think a man should exercise his right’ (Rahila).
Haleema and Rahila both regard talaq as a husband’s inherent Islamic right. However, their
differences in opinions reflect how the power relationship between a Muslim wife and
husband is understood, accepted and interpreted. Both agree that the wife has a right to
divorce but Rahila seems to fully rely on women’s biology to explain why they are not
given the same right as men. In citing the hadith, Rahila supports the patriarchal concept
where a ‘man has more of a right’ than his wife to initiate, as well as to consent to
separation. Nevertheless, Haleema maintains that talaq is ‘progressive’ as Islam gives both
men and women the option of divorce, as opposed to Christianity. However, problems arise
as ‘rights’ are not properly respected by spouses.
‘Why should I not have my rights? My husband obviously has. If he can find it so
easy to walk away, and I’m left with nothing then I don’t think that’s fair. So, I
would do the registry because it’s security for me, English law is security for me’
(Asma).
Clearly, for Asma, English law would grant her an equal footing with her husband
in divorce matters. Women like Asma rely on British law as ‘security’ in the advent that she
is repudiated (Islamically divorced) by her husband. This shows that even though most
respondents have maintained that the nikah will always have precedence over the civil
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registration, as far as talaq is concerned, divorce in English law appears to be fairer and
quicker than the Islamic tradition.
‘No right to do that (talaq)...if anybody does that I’d be like ‘I don’t know what
you’re on about, we’re still married unless you give me divorce papers’, British,
legal papers is the marriage, so I would not accept ‘I divorce you, I divorce you, I
divorce you’ (Sanaa).
Indeed, for most participants, except from Sanaa who is categorical that English laws takes
priority over both nikah and talaq, accepting divorce in English law as their primary option
will make more sense.
‘For me...divorce would mean going down the courts...it’s weird! Like the marriage
is the nikah and the divorce I think the English way, I would want my freedom as
soon as I could…need to ensure the certificate is legal so that women are not
trapped as husbands might refuse you to give you the talaq if you ask for it so then
you will just have to get divorced the English way and be done with it’ (Sadia).
‘The difficulty is that you value nikah more but when it comes to divorce, you’d go
for the British way because Islamically you have to go to the Muslim Council so I
guess you do the registration and in that way have the Islamic divorce but if it
doesn’t happen, it doesn’t happen’ (Tasneem).
As these quotes illustrate, the Islamic divorce for Sadia and Tasneem would be regarded as a
bonus, although in theory, Islamically, without a talaq from husbands, Muslim women will
not be permitted to re-marry under Islamic law. Indeed, as Sadia mentions, following the
tradition that a Muslim wife is only granted divorce if her husband consents to it, in effect,
husbands may refuse to ‘give talaq’ and as such, oblige her to stay married Islamically.
Therefore, divorce in English law would suffice for these respondents.
Moreover, some participants maintain that talaq remains an ‘abused’ right, although
they still regard talaq as legitimate:
‘I’ve seen women whose blokes have refused to give them the flipping talaq, talaq is
abused…for me, say for example I got the religious divorce and then he was
refusing to sign the divorce papers and then I met somebody else without having
had the legal divorce, I would Islamically marry him, even though it would be
bigamy if you think about it! But because the religious marriage is more important
to me, then the religious divorce would too’ (Alia).
‘Legally it’s posing a huge problem…happening to my friend. She wants a divorce,
but he won’t give it. He’s gone and got married again, and she can’t get married
and she’s British. She’s stuck, she’s quite religious and in my eyes and hers, the
talaq is divorce, but it’s just the way that it’s done…it’s not fair’(Shazia).
Alia explains why talaq is the more important concept; like the nikah, the Islamic divorce
for her would have more value, despite the fact that she acknowledges that it is ‘abused’ by
Muslim men. More importantly, she would be technically committing bigamy (albeit seen as
cohabitation under English law but marriage under Muslim law) if she decides to re-marry
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without obtaining a formal divorce under English law, demonstrating how contradictive the
issue of divorce is for young British South Asian Muslim women. Shazia echoes Alia’s
concerns as she reiterates that women are ‘stuck’ in between legal systems. Nevertheless,
she accepts that religiously, talaq is crucial for married women who wish to get re-married,
therefore tilting the onus of power upon the Muslim husband.
To others, however, female repudiation is not considered Islamic and some women
strongly believe that this method of divorce is questionable and should therefore be made
obsolete:
‘This is a traditional cultural practice and it shouldn’t be practised
anymore...there’s a human way to do it. I think it’s being abused as the wife doesn’t
have that right to exercise, it doesn’t mean to say you can abuse that right’ (Nazia).
‘The notion that a man will give you a divorce three times, to me, I’m sorry that’s
bullocks, I don’t believe in that, there’s a more humanistic approach and that’s
what I value’ (Hanah).
Farha, at the time of interview, was practising law in Pakistan (Lahore) as part of her work
experience. As an expert on family law, Farha maintains that Muslim women should be
given the option to the ‘right of divorce’ on a document which is legally recognised by state
law; in the case of Pakistan, the nikah is considered legal and is therefore easier to
implement, as opposed to the UK, where Muslim women are not immune to talaq if they
marry under Islamic law:
‘Everyone who is getting married, I advise them to get the right of divorce in the
nikhanama. It’s just a little box you have to tick. It’s an option in the contract. The
actual talaq doesn’t have to be written but religiously speaking, you have to give
notice that you are giving talaq, and 90 days later, the divorce comes through…they
can’t just give talaq and walk away, it’s wrong, and here in Britain, if this is done
on the Nikah certificate, it would protect women’ (Farha).
As a solution to bridge two divergent legal systems, Farha maintains that on Nikah
certificates (where some are legally recognised as valid if the imam has state approval to
legally officiate marriage), the right of divorce could be included as an ‘option’ as this could
provide women with protection.
‘I think you should have equal rights and as easy to divorce each other...my friend
married her cousin, but he wouldn’t let her work and she’s a dentist! She wanted a
divorce and it is so hard, she’s been trying for the past three years and she needs
the Islamic divorce to move on. If they had a box here, it could be so easy, but
people won’t tick it purely because it looks bad on your family, again same old
culture and honour’ (Fawzia).
Fawzia’s account is a common scenario that respondents in this research illustrate, where
the difficulty rests either with husbands repudiating their wives, or husbands refusing to
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consent to divorce in cases where wives demand it. Fawzia is not convinced that a ‘tick box’
would be sufficient to eradicate legal discrepancies; ‘culture’ and ‘honour’ (izzat) will
irrevocably prevent women from signing as this act could pre-empt conflicts at the very
beginning of the marriage. Indeed, as discussed in previous chapters, it is expected of
daughters to adhere to gendered cultural norms and behaviour as families’ and communities’
reputation depends on women’s success of upholding community norms.
Ten respondents explicitly express the thought that the rule around talaq is ‘unfair’
and that Islam should have provided women and men with ‘equal’ power to divorce each
other; interestingly, Mernissi (1987) suggests that divorce by repudiation was done by both
genders in the days of early Islam, whereby women gradually lost their rights to do so. Here,
respondents question the irrationality of such power imbalance; consequently, Nadia and
Mushirah reflect on the Islamic principle that if spouses want to re-marry in a case where
talaq has been given without due consideration, the wife has to in effect, marry another man
before she is Islamically allowed to re-marry her ex-husband:
‘Women should have the same right, talaq, they can ask for it and he has to
agree…but women can’t give it and for a man to have that much control is scary,
one moment of anger he can divorce even if he doesn’t mean it, then you need to get
married to somebody else and sleep with them if you want to get married to the
person again’ (Nadia).
‘Men think they are powerful and the guy who said it literally regretted it because
he said it and wanted to take it back and the wife said no I have to marry someone
else before I can marry you now, no sense at all’ (Mushirah).
Nadia and Mushirah both maintain that the nikah remains their priority; however, they
remain aware of the patriarchal nature of Islamic jurisdiction. Indeed, they perceive divorce
laws in Islam to be unfair to women as husbands have too much ‘power’ and ‘control’ over
wives.
As a response to the nature of such complicated debates, I asked research
participants whether they believe that Islam provides women and men with equal rights and
status, more specifically within marriage. The majority of British Muslim women think that
women and men benefit from equal rights and status in Islam, and that this equality must be
mirrored in the Muslim marriage:
‘In Islam, yes but the culture interferes and it looks like women have no rights, the
West going on about how oppressed women are, we have to get the gift from the
husband, which is consequent. In Islam your husband has got to provide for you and
all the money that you earn is your own money. Is that what they call oppression?’
(Shazia).
‘It’s a man’s right to provide and a woman’s right to look after the family, if I want
something for my house; my husband has to provide it for me. And no questions
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asked. I can spend freely of his money however I want to. I think some people, a bit
of a modern day thing, think, you’re not entitled to his money because in return you
look after his kids. He has a right over you but you have a right over him in that
whatever you need he provides for you, rights are equal but different,
complementary’ (Sabina).
Respondents suggest that equality in a Muslim marriage must be understood on the basis
that roles are ‘complementary’ as opposed to ‘same’. The dichotomy ‘culture’ versus
‘religion’ is again raised, where culture is used to misrepresent religious ideals. This hinders
the equal ethos that Islam promotes between husband and wife. Indeed, ‘western’ notions of
Muslim women’s oppression are criticised as Shazia defines the responsibilities a Muslim
husband must honour.
‘Different rights have been given to the man and the woman but they are equal even
though they’re different. When I earn, if my husband is struggling to pay the bills,
it’s not my duty, it’s a favour upon him to contribute, my money is my money’
(Haleema).
Interestingly, in a ‘modern’ context where women expect an almost equal
contribution from partners as far as housework is concerned (discussed in section 6.3 of this
chapter), respondents forcefully affirm that their financial contribution towards the
household would be ‘bestowed as a favour’; in essence, they do not feel any formal
obligation to financially contribute to the household. As Haleema states: ‘my money is my
money’. This research has shown that British South Asian Muslim women strive for
financial independence through educational achievements and employment (Chapter Four).
However, they intend to apply Islamic principles to their financial status when it comes to
marriage. Indeed, contributing ‘halfway’ to the income household does not appear to be a
strategy that young Muslim women would wholeheartedly embrace.
‘Sex in the Muslim marriage… some people get married to someone they don’t want
to and the husband wants it every night but it is rape. But then I was reading up,
and sex in Islam means that a husband has a right to ask his wife to have sex
because it’s part of marriage. If not, there are risks to adultery. And the wife has the
same right and her husband is not allowed to say no…so it works both ways, no
woman demands it but the woman does have the right to also have it so is it rape?’
(Nadia)
Nadia is the only respondent who exemplifies the nature of rights and status of spouses in
Islam through a discourse of sexuality. The Muslim wife and husband both have equal rights
to demand sex from each other in Islam as this acts as safeguard from adultery (Doi, 1992).
Nonetheless, Nadia reflects on the concept of marital rape, which for her, does not and
cannot exist in the Muslim marriage as technically speaking, both partners have equal rights
to having their sexual needs fulfilled. Recently, a senior Muslim cleric, head of the Shari’a
Council in Britain, caused controversy as he stated that ‘rape is impossible in a marriage’
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(The Independent UK, October 2010). Again, this demonstrates the stark opposition of
Islamic versus British ideals. In Europe, marital rape is a crime, where non-consensual sex
with one’s spouse determines ‘rape’. In marital rapes, consent, constructed through sexual
domination and coercion, has led feminists (Jeffreys, 1993; Phillips 2000) to suggest that
women endure ‘coercive sex’, where they submit to patriarchal violence in marriages.
Nonetheless, Nadia defines ‘rape’ and consent as being contextual; in a Muslim marriage,
even though the wife does not ‘consent’ to sex, her Islamic duty dictates that she has to
fulfill her husband’s sexual needs as it is his right to demand it. Indeed, sexual abstinence
must not exceed a hundred and twenty days, where the validity and success of the Islamic
marriage is not only based on the sexual relationship between spouses, but is also reflective
of the unequal gender relationship between them (Sabbah, 1984; Bouhdiba, 1985).
This said, a few respondents explicitly claim that in Islam, men have more rights,
and greater status over women:
‘A woman’s ticket to heaven is through her husband…I don’t agree but it’s like that,
doing everything for your husband and when he comes back, not to bother him with
your own problems and if he says something to you don’t argue back and say sorry
even though it’s not your fault, then he’ll have more respect for you.
Islam is more in favour of men...no equal rights, doesn’t matter how educated you
are and I’m saying that because of the way Islam is, a man will always be superior
to a woman regardless of his status, of his education or what job he does, it will
never change...culturally things have changed, like British women think ‘we want to
be equal’ in status, even higher to their men but Islamically men will always be
higher than women’ (Rahila).
For Rahila, the notion of women’s rights and status in Islam is fixed, and rooted within
patriarchal interpretations. Even though she ‘does not agree’ with such concepts, Rahila is
convinced, even resigned, to accept that she depends on her husband, Islamically, to achieve
status and ‘respect’ as a Muslim wife. As she maintains, a woman’s educational
achievements will not obliterate patriarchy in Islam, as based upon her own personal
experiences. Rahila has a higher level of education than her husband, who came to the UK
after they married in Pakistan. She has expressed unhappiness with her married life as her
husband, without higher education, is unable to relate to her on the same level, or have
better employment prospects in Britain. He would prefer for her not to work but Rahila is
unwilling to compromise her standard of living so as to ‘stay home’, which according to her,
is prescribed by Islam. More importantly, Rahila does not essentially believe that Muslim
women in Britain could ever inherently have equal ‘status’ and ‘rights’, even though they
are exposed to more egalitarian concepts espoused by British society. Discourses about
women’s rights for participants are therefore deeply embedded within subjective Islamic
notions of power relationships between Muslim women and men, and ultimately between
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wives and husbands. Indeed, as my study demonstrates, respondents portray individual
notions about gender relationships within a Muslim marriage, thereby denoting
independence of thought in assessing and interpreting discourses around gender rights in
Islam. I extend this theme of gender equality and status within Islam in the following section
by looking at women’s perspectives on polygamy; this sheds further light on how
respondents engage with the concept of spousal rights within the Islamic marriage.
6.4.3 Contradictions of polygamy: negotiating possibilities and limitations
Along with divorce, polygamy is another area where respondents emphasise the
glaring inequality between wives and husbands in Islam. As Sonia reiterates, her Islamic
rights could never be equated to that of her husband as far as marriage is concerned:
‘Say my situation was that I couldn’t have babies (infertile) and my husband could,
Islamically he can go get married with my consent and say I give consent and I
share my husband...now turn the scenario around, he can’t have kids and I can, why
doesn’t Islam allow me to obtain his consent to get married again? I can’t have
another man so do they have equal rights?’ (Sonia).
‘It is a right, it’s not in this country but according to Muslim law and obviously a
man made up that law, what woman would write that law, saying that she has to
share her husband with another woman?’ (Sanaa)
Polygamy in Islam has been widely criticised by feminists (Mayer, 1999; Afkhami, 1999) as
an inherent ‘cultural patriarchal custom’, which presupposes the position of the Muslim
wife’s status as ‘inferior’ to that of her husband (Engineer, 1994: 52); in return for the care
provided by her husband, the wife is expected to obey and surrender to her husband (Doi,
1992). Nonetheless, as Sanaa puts it in her interview, ‘what woman would write that law?’
thereby explicitly denouncing the patriarchal nature of polygamous laws in Islam. In the
context of Muslim women’s status and rights in the Islamic marriage, I asked respondents if
they believe in Islamic polygamy, and whether they would agree to a polygamous marriage.
The majority of respondents think that Muslim men, in theory, have the right to four wives,
although they personally would never agree to such a marriage and would prefer divorce
instead. Among them, however, three respondents maintain that they understand how
polygamy could work if conditions were met, within special circumstances:
‘I don’t like the idea but if you’re going to bring a second wife, it means she has to
be more pious than the first one. They have got the right and I can understand why,
one woman marrying four men, who’s going to know whose kid he is, I would agree
to it if there are valid reasons like fancying somebody else cause men are like that
and if they’re travelling more, then it’s allowed and you can work something out but
treat them equally, so these conditions are steady, and without them your marriage
would not work, if people follow the correct way of polygamy then I think it is ok’
(Fatimah).
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‘People see it as negative. But if you look behind the concept, look at British society
today, western society, millions of cases where the husband is cheating or the wife,
affairs but polygamy prevents that. How is being adulterous ok and being
polygamous, in a halal or good relationship not be ok? If a man and his wife cannot
have children, it’s not fair that he loves her but he doesn’t want to divorce her so he
needs to get married to another woman to have children, it’s status for the second
woman as well, so it’s lenient that way, if there are valid reasons for it, then I don’t
mind’ (Haleema).
Fatimah and Haleema illustrate why polygamy can be considered; seen as a positive
arrangement, young women understand this practice to be valuable in response to the state
of marriage in the ‘western’ world where marriages break down due to extra-marital affairs.
Polygamy is hence considered a better option than engaging in adultery, which in Islam is a
sin. In a British context, the concept of polygamy is re-worked by respondents, who are
convinced that polygamy is an Islamically ‘appropriate’ solution to the contemporary
challenges posed by British marriages. In an attempt to preserve marriage as an institution,
women are strategically re-thinking marital choices as they frame the Islamic marriage in
their context.
Historically a pre-Islamic Arabian custom, it is believed that polygamy in Islam and
the allowance of just four wives was a progressive move that the Prophet Mohammad
introduced as a response to the decadence of Arabian men who owned as many wives,
concubines and slaves as they wished (Eposito, 1982; Doi, 1992; Singh, 1992). In that
context, it was not patriarchal rule but an improvement of women’s status and rights. In fact,
for those participants who are strongly opposed to polygamy, they understand the practice of
polygamy as being ‘contextual’ and ‘cultural’, and hence, part of the social fabric of
Arabian society:
‘There was a time and place for that back then…take things into context, there was
heck of a lot of women compared to men, there were wars. In this day and age,
there is absolutely no need for it and they must be able to treat them equally…and
you can’t help the affections of the heart…so it’s an absolute no. I find that very
undignified’ (Alia).
‘Awful…I don’t believe in it. At that time, 1400 years ago, it was a polygamist
society, it was cultural, and so were many other societies …then restricting it to
four was big, a progressive move and they would have probably fainted on the spot
if it were reduced to just one’ (Farha).
For respondents like Alia, her current context does not allow for polygamy, notwithstanding
the fact that to respect the strict conditions of polygamy remains impossible to fulfill.
Moreover, for Alia, being part of a polygamous marriage is ‘undignified’ for women, hence
showing how divergent views can be. Farha agrees with Alia and highlights that Islam did
not bring about polygamy. Perceiving the Islamic polygamous rules as ‘progressive’, Farha
understands this aspect of the Islamic marriage as being historically informed, a purely
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social phenomenon with no religious ties. This explains why some women are able to
categorically reject this practice altogether.
Nonetheless, more than half of my respondents claim that they personally know
people (family or family friends) who live in polygamous marriages in British South Asian
Muslim communities.
‘Personally, I would never marry a man who is already married to someone but I
know Islamically it’s right but the thought of sharing my man…but it’s happening in
the community, it’s easy they don’t register anything, especially divorced women
get remarried as second wives and they’re young’ (Saeema).
‘Why should he go and get married just because he wants a new wife...or a younger
wife...but it’s happening a lot more now. I know men that have gone over and got
married again to a younger bride, brought her here, and they’re like 16-20, have
kids, so easily done even if it’s not legal here, they just don’t register the nikah and
no one would ever know’ (Habibah).
Indeed, if members of British Muslim communities perceive the nikah under Muslim law to
be more valid than any legal registration, it is easier for men to firstly, attempt polygamous
marriages and secondly, encourage under-age transnational polygamous marriages in
Britain. As Paul and Menski (1998) have suggested, if a nikah has not been legally
registered, women cannot be protected by English law as there is no record that they have
ever been married under English jurisprudence. This remits into question the status of
Muslim woman, as well as her rights to gender equality within the Islamic marriage. In fact,
raising the link between transnational marriages and polygamy, Habibah and Saeema
explain that men particularly prefer ‘younger’ brides so as to have children. This is
reflective of Poulter’s (1998) study of transnational arranged marriages involving ‘younger’
or under-age partners where nikahs are conducted by proxy after obtaining ‘consent’, as
allowed by Islamic law. Nevertheless, according to Pearl and Menski (1998), the occurrence
of such nikahs is rare in Britain as under-age marriages below the age of 16 is prohibited
under English jurisprudence, irrespective of one’s religious laws. However, if Muslims
choose to rely entirely on Islamic law and not register the nikah then, as Habibah points out,
it is ‘easily done even if it’s not legal’, thereby giving rise to polygamous transnational
arranged marriages. Through such legal loop holes, Muslims women’s status and gender
rights appear to be non-existent.
From my research sample, two respondents are daughters of polygamous marriages
and have shared their first-hand experiences of polygamy with me:
‘I’m saying no now but you never know…it depends on how much you love the
person. If you got forced to marry that person then that’s different, it’s me you care
about but you were forced, especially if it’s a relation, it is difficult to leave a family
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member, my mum is a second wife, it’s taken us years to get comfortable with this
situation...my dad didn’t divorce his cousin and he’s married to her nikah wise, he
was forced but was in love with my mum, but my mum is the registered wife here, so
the first wife never had a registered marriage, it’s a strange situation
My dad does everything for them and the same with us as Islamically he has to, we
now live about ten minutes away from each other, we work because we don’t live
together. Men having second wives, it’s so common but I want a marriage that’s
normal, where you have one wife and your own kids, polygamy is not normal’
(Nadia).
Nadia has expressed the hardship her family has experienced due to the polygamous
arrangements she grew up in. Indeed, her personal experiences reflect how forced marriages
and cousin marriages arranged by families may in effect give rise to polygamy. Ironically,
partners ‘in love’, who cannot marry find space to live their relationship the ‘halal’ way,
which would be acceptable in their community. So as to marry someone of her choice,
Nadia’s mother negotiates and adopts Islamic principles. As a Muslim husband, Nadia’s
father has to ‘treat his wives equally’ and therefore spends alternate nights with both his
families. However, Nadia is adamant that polygamy is not ‘normal’ married life and has no
intention to enter into any polygamous arrangement; for her, the notion of a ‘normal’
marriage revolves around a couple living together, proving that respondents are contesting
the very concept of Islamic polygamy.
At the time of interview, Aisha had just turned down an offer of marriage from a
man who already had a wife:
‘Yes they do have the right; my dad has three wives so he put us through a lot of
grief. My mother is the first wife and the second and third one, they’re in Pakistan
and he goes back four or five times a year but he just goes to the third one. In Islam
you have to treat them equally and he will pay for that on the Day of Judgment,
we’re nine children, my mum, the second wife and my dad are all first cousins, it’s
such a mess.
My mum always says make sure you put it down in your mahr that I’m going to
state that I don’t want polygamy, people write 20 000 pounds in their mahr. I don’t
want the money. But if I say to my husband I don’t want polygamy, he does not have
a right over me at all. I was actually proposed by a brother here at uni who was
considering polygamy, he already had a wife, I said no and he proposed to one of
my friends on my uni course and she said yes and they will have a nikah, it’s
common you won’t believe it’ (Aisha).
Reviewing her own experiences of polygamy as negative, Aisha will claim the right to
refuse polygamy as ‘mahr’, the bridal gift which Muslim husbands offer their brides once
the nikah is performed. For her, the right to say no to polygamy is worth more than
monetary value, demonstrating the extent to which Aisha is against polygamy. More
importantly, her experiences reveal that young Muslims in Britain are actively negotiating
and entering into polygamous marriages; university campuses seem to be a space where
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educated British South Asian Muslims negotiate marriage proposals with people of their
own status, educational levels and Islamic ideals. In cases where women intentionally enter
into polygamous arrangements, it appears that patriarchy is not an issue as long as they
personally believe that polygamy is a ‘right’ granted to the Muslim husband. However, for
women like Aisha, consent to polygamy from the wife (‘if I say to my husband I don’t want
polygamy, he does not have a right over me at all’) will determine whether the husband
should be granted his ‘right’ to polygamy. Again, women’s choice and consent to the
nikah’s stipulations, whether patriarchal in their eyes or not, remains the determining factor
reinforcing their rights and status as Muslim women.
6.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has focused on how Muslim women are re-negotiating the institution,
practice and act of marriage in Britain. I have shown that marriage remains a significant
aspect of respondents’ gendered identities. Indeed, my findings demonstrate that for
respondents, marriage remains a fundamental institution integral to their faith as marriage
remains a religious duty prescribed by Islam. In their case, marital gender relationships,
embedded within Islam, is still linked to the institutional aspect of marriage as marriage for
them not only signifies a relationship with a partner but is also reflective of an adherence to
a religious institution. Indeed, the value attributed to the institution of marriage in Islam is
understood by how respondents, along Islamic guidelines, respect boundaries so as not to
transgress the limits set by Islam as far as pre-marital relationships are concerned.
Moreover, respondents demonstrate an awareness of gender rights as prescribed within the
Islamic marriage; for example, participants highlight that they do not have an obligation, as
wives, to financially contribute to the household. Also, women reiterate how the issue of
consent in Islam remains imperative for a nikah to be valid, hence showing how respondents
are navigating the marriage process.
Furthermore, engaging with Islamic and British perspectives on marriage reveals
the extent to which participants contest and construct the meaning of Islamic marriage in the
British context; respondents’ evaluation of gender rights in Islam in the light of issues
around talaq and polygamy illustrates that women develop gendered identities in trying to
engage with an ethos of equal gender rights within the Islamic marriage. This examination
has hence explored the ways in which negotiation processes reflect participants’ agency and
choices in shaping relational, contextual and individual meanings of what marriage entails;
in so doing, they attempt to frame marriage by setting boundaries in how they express
‘Islamic’ and ‘Western’ ideals of marriage by navigating between Islamic and British
values, which can in effect, be at opposing ends. More importantly, this chapter indicates
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that Muslim women are adopting a discourse of gender equality in marriage in order to
ensure that their expectations of marriage are met. However, in comparing married
respondents’ experiences of marriage and unmarried respondents’ expectations of marriage,
it is clear that the realities faced by married respondents are very different from unmarried
women’s expectations of marriage.
In assessing the importance that marriage has, as an institution, in respondents’
lives, I have, first, demonstrated that even though it remains a vital religious institution for
British South Asian Muslim communities, the nature of the institution is evolving as
participants contest and construct new gendered identities in marriage. Women exemplify
their positionings by setting themselves as ‘different’ from non-Muslim society with regards
to the value they attribute to the institution of marriage. According to respondents, marriage
for non-Muslims is representative of ‘just a piece of paper’. This analysis has also suggested
that institutional changes in marriage within South Asian communities are brought about by
the intergenerational differences in gendered expectations which respondents develop as a
result of being educated and financially independent (as opposed to women of the previous
generation). As such, respondents maintain that although there is a gender bias in how much
pressure young Muslim women and men experience from their communities to marry,
women, who are expected to marry earlier than men, are resisting these cultural codes by
choosing educational and career paths above marriage; in fact, respondents, as compared to
their mothers, go above the expected age to marry as they take time to navigate marriage
options.
Second, I have emphasised how respondents are re-negotiating the practice of
marriage by re-working more equal gendered relationships within marriage. For example,
participants’ narratives of new gendered expectations as far as domestic chores and living
arrangements are concerned are reflective of the extent to which they are contesting fixed
notions of South Asian Muslim womanhood in their communities; nevertheless, married
respondents’ experiences portray the difficulties they face to break stereotypical depictions
of gendered female roles as they find themselves shouldering the double burden of work at
home and outside the home. This analysis has also stressed how Muslim women navigate
‘choice’ in pre-marital relationships and maintain ‘appropriate’ gendered boundaries which
inform the very nature of them having ‘boyfriends’; as such, their navigations are reflective
of how they re-negotiate relationship boundaries prior to marriage. I have also critically
reviewed women’s negotiations of choice in the marriage process by particularly
highlighting how they rate consent in ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ marriages as they struggle to
negotiate more agency so as to be able to ‘choose’ marriage partners. I have, through this
analysis, highlighted that the theme underlying my discussions remains patriarchy. Indeed,
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challenging cultural practices such as cousin and transnational marriages are illustrative of
how ethnicity, religion and patriarchy remain at the forefront of respondents’ contestations
of marriage.
Finally, I have examined women’s negotiations of the ‘act’ of marriage by assessing
how two legal systems, the nikah and registry, are understood and rated in importance by
respondents. I have argued that marriage ceremonies reveal how women negotiate Islamic
and British principles simultaneously, as well as navigate the possibilities and limitations of
the Islamic marriage as these two opposing legal systems intersect. Such negotiation
processes throw light on the gendered implications for respondents as they engage in
discourses of gender equality when it comes to talaq and polygamy. Clearly, respondents
stress the patriarchal nature of these two practices infringing on Muslim women’s rights and
status. Indeed, as respondents rely on Islamic law to provide scopes for gender equality
between Muslim spouses, the controversies emanating from my discussions around nikah,
talaq and polygamy do not appear to be necessarily fulfilling or safeguarding Muslim
women’s aspirations of gender equality in marriage. So, the challenges faced by
respondents, especially in matters around talaq, remain potent; nonetheless, as a response to
the difficulties that talaq may pose for Muslim wives, participants explain that English law
provides them with equal rights to divorce. As such, respondents have highlighted the
importance of being legally married (civil) in Britain in order to have this security in place if
ever divorce needs to be considered in the future.
As far as polygamy is concerned, in context, some women still perceive polygamy
to be a ‘viable’ option to preserve the institution of marriage in being the solution against
adultery and a strategy to marry, albeit Islamically, for ‘love’. This shows that although
respondents do not perceive it as an ideal arrangement, some are ready to engage with it in
order to navigate their marriage options. More importantly, respondents’ articulations of
contested and constructed negotiations of marriage indicate that experiences and
expectations remain highly individualistic. For instance, Farha is confident that Islamic
principles such as talaq and polygamy remain historical and cultural Arabian practices
which have no relevance for Muslim women living in the twenty first century. Others, like
Nazia and Hanah, maintain that such practices are ‘backward’ and have no place in the UK.
As for Rahila, she feels that there is little room for change as she believes that Islamic law,
although rooted in patriarchy, is set in stone, where ‘a woman’s ticket to heaven is through
her husband’. The multiplicity of views expressed by participants is only indicative of their
active negotiations of marriage. Ultimately, it is also reflective of the re-workings of
gendered relationships respondents bring about in the Islamic marriage, as well as the
individualistic expectations and notions respondents portray as they navigate their options of
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marriage. As young women negotiate higher educational and employment spaces, they
develop greater independence to navigate marriage. Indeed, they have already asserted
independence from their parents in their choices of studying and working. Due to financial
independence, they will be in a position to consider divorce in cases where marriages do not
work out. Nevertheless, even though respondents’ negotiations demonstrate greater
independence to navigate marriage, the challenges they face remain tangible.
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1 Faiza was born in Britain and is of Pakistani origin. Her first marriage was arranged to a British





In this thesis, I explore the enduring significance of marriage as the preferred form
of social/sexual relationships for young and educated South Asian Muslim women in
Britain. I contend that the relationship between women’s participatory rates in education and
their agency does not only demonstrate the future positive impacts education has upon
young women’s lives in terms of financial independence and employment careers. I also
argue that choices gained in exploring education and work also influence other life options
such as marriage. Increased agency and independence gained from education and work
influence women’s expectations and perceptions of marriage. In this study, I have attempted
to reflect on why marriage is still important for these young women. The crucial point I
emphasise is that although these educated young women are not rejecting the institution of
marriage, they are nevertheless navigating and resisting dominant communal ethno-religious
understandings through their re-workings of marriage within British South Asian Muslim
communities. Marriage then becomes the key site within which young women challenge
cultural and religious gendered norms so as to embrace and perform new gender identities as
new femininities and notions of South Asian Muslim womanhood are generated.
Through empirical research with thirty educated British South Asian Muslim
women, I attempted to answer three questions:
1. As young British South Asian Muslim women negotiate spaces like higher education and
employment, are new gendered identities generated?
2. To what extent do British South Asian Muslim women develop new understandings of
marriage through their experiences of higher education and employment?
3. How are such understandings shaping the negotiations of marriage expectations by
British South Asian Muslim women?
Chapter Two presented the theoretical debates relevant to frame my research. I
began by demonstrating that the link between education and marriage within British South
Asian Muslim communities remains potent. Existing literature has focussed on the
educational and employment aspirations of young British South Asian Muslim women but
not much attention has been paid to the ways in which the new spaces of education and
work have impacted on young women’s negotiations and expectations of marriage. I also
argued that South Asian women’s positionings within educational and employment fields
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have been portrayed within racialised discourses, thereby encouraging stereotypical
depictions of young women as leaving school post compulsory education so as to marry.
This poses questions such as are young women’s options or choices of continuing their
educational paths affected by marriage? Are they actively navigating their options so as to
consider both education (and the potential outcome of employment) as well as marriage? In
so doing, are their gender identities evolving? As young women draw on the motivational
factors leading them towards education and employment careers, it is clear that these early
negotiations will impact upon their future negotiations of marriage; as agency and
independence are exercised upon the marriage process, issues such as choice of marriage
partner, the decision of when to marry, as well as whether to work after marriage become
axes along which young women contest and construct new gender identities as they explore
new avenues.
I also discussed the ways in which postmodern and post-colonial feminist theories
inform my analysis of British South Asian Muslim women’s negotiation and articulation of
their varying experiences and gendered identities. I have relied on concepts of ‘difference’
and performativity within feminist theory so as to foreground my analysis of British South
Asian Muslim women’s negotiations of education, employment and marriage. Firstly, I
examined how women’s experiences of gendered identities could be understood through the
concept of ‘difference’ and I acknowledged the significance which discourses of culture,
ethnicity and ‘race’ have in assessing the positions of South Asian Muslim women, and their
re-negotiations of gendered identities as they explore higher education and the labour
market. I suggested that it is important to go beyond essentialist and racialised discourses
(embedded within discourses on ethnicity and religion) so as to acknowledge the diversity
of women’s social experiences, subjectivities and gender identities (Afshar and Maynard,
1994). As Brah (1993) asserts, the construction of ethnic minority women’s identities
remains embedded within racialised discourses which inform women’s narratives of identity
as being unstable and unfixed.
Secondly, in focusing on Butler’s (1990) notion of gender identity as performance
and Brah’s (1996) concept of culture (and the enactment of cultural identities) as ‘reiterative
performance’, I argued that the language of performativity remains useful in informing and
defining educated British South Asian Muslim women’s re-workings of gender identities
within the spaces of education, employment and marriage. I claimed that through increased
agency and independence gained within the new educational and employment spaces, young
women are empowered to generate and hence ‘perform’ new gendered identities.
Nevertheless, I also highlighted the fact that the performance of gendered identities is also
embedded within social, cultural and political constructs. My analysis of educated British
260
South Asian Muslim women’s gendered identities was therefore informed by these two
feminist theoretical frameworks, where I contended that first, gendered identities remain
embedded within the notion of performance and second, gendered identities are also
informed through the diverse experiences of women, hence through ‘difference’.
Third, I argued that marriage and the family remain gendered organisations within
which women contest and construct new gendered identities as women exercise greater
independence over the marriage process. As young women enter the new spaces of higher
education and employment, increased independence lead them to re-assess notions of
marriage and the family unit, and the gendered relationships within it. As women formulate
new expectations of marriage and family, they develop and affirm new gender identities. I
also suggested that educated British South Asian Muslim women still view marriage as
crucial to their ethnic and religious identities, even though alternatives to marriage (for
example, cohabitation) are becoming more and more popular in Britain. As such, marriage
acts as an important social institution aiding in the maintenance of ethno-religious identities,
hence shaping British South Asian Muslim women’s gendered identities. For instance,
young women illustrate their navigations of marriage and the affirmation of new gender
identities as they actively negotiate consent, agency and choice within the arranged marriage
process, thus demonstrating an evolution in their perceptions and expectations of marriage.
Finally, in highlighting that young women navigate two intertwining legal frameworks –
Islamic law and English law, I suggested that women’s attempts to actively re-work notions
of marriage are opening up wider possibilities for the re-definition of the institution of the
Islamic marriage within British South Asian Muslim communities. Indeed, the discussions I
raised about the status of divorce and polygamy in South Asian Muslim women’s lives
remain important areas of research as they indicate how women are grappling and re-
interpreting ideals of the Islamic marriage in Britain.
In Chapter Three, I reflected on the methodological approaches I utilised in this
research. Yorkshire and Lancashire were chosen as significant locations of British South
Asian Muslims. I used snowballing as the main recruitment strategy on university campuses
(Leeds, Bradford and Manchester) as well as through South Asian women’s organisations in
Leeds. In terms of recruiting strategy, I have reflected on the limitations of this
methodology. Firstly, most university students I interviewed were part of Islamic Student
Societies and hence, reflect a particular segment of South Asian Muslim university students
who were readier to affirm their Islamic identities through for instance, the hijab, attending
talks on Islam, as well as organising Islamic events on campus. Secondly, as far as
respondents who were in paid employment at the time of interviewing are concerned, my
sample did not include women graduates who chose not to go into employment; indeed, all
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single respondents were in employment (paid and voluntary), and all married respondents
were in full-time paid employment at the time of interview. These parameters clearly shaped
my research findings but also reflected a practical approach to gaining a sample of relevant
interviewees. As for the methodological tools I used, qualitative individual interviews
enabled me to obtain in-depth narratives from respondents, while participant observation
aided my understanding of Muslim women’s social contexts as they negotiated social spaces
such as university settings. I grounded my research within feminist methodologies
informing my study; in particular, feminist standpoint theory and the feminist politics of
difference were useful in their recognition that gendered identities and knowledge
production remain fluid and contextual. This concept supports the argument I emphasised
throughout this thesis: women’s differing experiences shape their diverse gendered
identities. In addition, I acknowledged that the research process is embedded within
relationships of power between the researcher and the researched. I hence discussed my
positionality in the study, suggesting that my position as an ‘insider/outsider’ has influenced
the research process. For instance, the ways in which research participants presented
themselves during the interviews were influenced by their perceptions of the researcher,
hence impacting on the research process and data collection. Boundaries of ‘sameness’ and
‘difference’ (through dress code, educational level and language) between researcher and
researched indicated that participants made decisions about how to ‘perform’ and relate their
experiences in the interviews.
The first empirical chapter (Chapter Four) looked at how British South Asian
Muslim women are exploring boundaries as they navigate educational and employment
settings. I argued that women’s early negotiations with family in order to embrace
educational aims are indicative of the ways in which women are exercising independence
over their life options; their early negotiations prefigure later negotiations about marriage.
More explicitly, their early negotiations could be seen as an evidence of their alternative
futures in the sense that they would be more likely to act as independent participants within
the marriage process. The interesting finding from this chapter demonstrates that all young
women, although coming from diverse socio-economic and educational backgrounds, have
to engage with family negotiations in order to pursue educational and ultimately, work
careers. Indeed, for some, the decision is about going to university at all while for others,
navigations revolve around whether they would live home or away during their university
years. Therefore, in pushing gendered boundaries, young women are producing new gender
identities as they challenge parental and community attitudes towards higher education and
employment within British South Asian Muslim communities. Chapter Four provided a
framework for understanding how gendered attitudes towards marriage are changing, and
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how these changes are impacting on young women’s lives. In particular, the routes and the
motivational factors leading respondents to choose to go to university and into employment
suggest that financial independence and career prospects are leading women to have greater
agency and choice in issues such as when to get married and who to get married to. Not only
is marriage being delayed but also, women, through independence and experience gained at
university and work (for instance, living independently, earning, being involved in student
societies), demonstrate active negotiations as they navigate marriage options and generate
new expectations of marriage.
In Chapter Five, I argued that British South Asian Muslim women are managing
Muslimness through their negotiations of higher education and employment. As they assert
themselves, they develop new gender identities that impact on other future life options such
as marriage. In actively and consciously contesting and constructing notions of Muslimness,
women are resisting essentialised depictions or stereotypes of Islam in Britain post 9/11 and
7/7. I contended that for respondents, Muslimness is explored through an array of other
social identities, notably, citizenship, ethnic, and racialised categories which inform their
views and meanings of Islam. Consequently, I showed how women express (define) and
perform (affirm) their identities within spatial environments such as university, the
workplace and home. Indeed, women choose to define and affirm their social identities in
the terms (such as ‘Asian’, ‘Pakistani’, ‘British Muslim’ or ‘British Pakistani’) they use,
through language and food, as well as through dress codes, which remain significant factors
aiding educated British South Asian Muslim women to navigate across their multiple but
nonetheless, fluid identities. In this chapter, I stressed that religious identity is prioritised
over other social identities. I illustrated this by suggesting that the hijab is increasingly
being worn by young Muslim women today as an expression of Islamic identity, while the
term ‘British Muslim’ is utilised by respondents to show that Islam is given priority over
ethnic identity. Chapter Five therefore explored how spaces of higher education and
employment lead British South Asian Muslim women to generate new gender identities
within the context of higher education and employment.
In Chapter Six, I examined how Muslim women are re-negotiating marriage in
British South Asian Muslim communities. As women navigate marriage, they are framing or
outlining the boundaries of marriage in three ways. Firstly, I argued that they are navigating
marriage as institution, secondly, as practice (gender relationships in marriage) and thirdly,
through the act (style of ceremony-‘nikah’ versus registry) of marriage. In essence, I
contended that through their re-workings of marriage, young Muslim women are altering
gendered marital roles within the institution of marriage in their communities, as well as
generating new expectations of marriage. Furthermore, I reiterated that by maintaining that
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their positionings on marriage remain ‘different’ as compared to non-Muslims in Britain,
respondents are generating their very own understandings of what marriage entails for
British South Asian Muslim women. For example, their perceptions and negotiations of pre-
marital relationships, and notions around sexual purity and prescribed modes of behaviour
for women in their communities shape the ways in which they negotiate the gendered
boundaries around marriage. As young women become assertive in their new gender
identities, respondents formulate new gendered expectations of marriage and marital
relationships as they demand gender equality in the household (for example domestic work
and living arrangements). However, in comparing unmarried respondents’ expectations of
marriage to married women’s experiences of marriage, I exposed the apparent discrepancies
which exist between marital expectations and marital realities, thereby denoting that
respondents’ challenges in their quests for gender equality and status in marriage remain
potent. In addition, as women negotiate ‘choice’ of marriage partners by evaluating
practices such as ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ marriages, I have emphasised that it is problematic
to make a clear distinction between ‘arranged’ and ‘forced’ because of the difficulty in
rating consent in marriages arranged by families.
Finally, I argued that the style of marriage ceremony respondents choose to adopt
demonstrate how women are further negotiating and framing marriage in Britain. In
navigating ‘nikah’ and ‘registry’, I highlighted the ways in which young women are further
negotiating the marriage process. On one level, I examined how respondents navigate
Islamic law and English law as they consider marriage as Muslims, as well as British
citizens. On a second level, I focused on women’s negotiations of the nikah’s stipulations
from Shari’a law by focusing on their contestations of talaq and polygamy. Through this
analysis, I reflected on how respondents navigate issues around gender rights and the status
of Muslim women within marriage. This chapter has revealed how British South Asian
Muslim women are re-working Islamic ideals of marriage as they assess the possibilities and
the limitations of such negotiations.
This thesis has attempted to uncover how British South Asian Muslim women are
negotiating education and employment so as to develop new gender identities and new
meanings of marriage. This research has contributed to the existing literature on South
Asian Muslims in Britain in a number of ways. Firstly, this study examined how women,
within the spaces of higher education and employment, are exercising greater agency so as
to make autonomous decisions about their life options in order to generate new gender
identities. Building on previous studies which concentrated on the motivational factors
pushing young women to enter into higher education and employment (Ahmad, 2001;
Ahmad et al., 2003; Bagguley and Hussain, 2008; Dwyer and Shah, 2009), this study not
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only reveals the positive impacts which higher education and work have on women’s lives,
but also highlights the strategies employed by these women as they resist and challenge
family and community expectations. As educated and independent British South Asian
Muslim women negotiate educational and employment careers, they generate new gender
identities as they challenge and alter the cultural and religious expected gendered norms of
South Asian Muslim womanhood within their communities. Indeed, this study demonstrates
that young women’s negotiations with family reflect how educational and socio-economic
backgrounds, social class, as well as choice of university institutions remain prominent and
determining factors aiding women to successfully embark upon their educational and
employment careers. Hence, in reaching compromises with family, young women find the
new spaces of education and work to be conducive to the formulation of new gender
identities.
Secondly, this study has evaluated how the independence gained through the new
spaces of higher education and employment, lead young British South Asian Muslim
women to formulate new understandings and expectations of marriage (as institution,
practice and act). As they navigate Islamic and British ideals of marriage, young women
actively negotiate intertwining legal systems so as to re-work their meanings of marriage. In
taking marriage to be the crux of women’s negotiations, this thesis reveals marriage to be
the focal sphere within which women choose to enforce newfound agency. In engaging with
the existing literature on marriage in British South Asian Muslim communities (Basit, 1997;
Bhopal, 1997/2009; Bradby, 1999; Macey and Beckett, 2001; Shaw, 2001; Shaw and
Charsley, 2006; Gangoli et al., 2006), I reinforced the significance which marriage has in
contributing to women’s ethnic and religious identities. Nevertheless, the main point I
underlined remains that while most of these educated young South Asian Muslim women
are not actively resisting or refusing to consider marriage, many of them are attempting to
re-work or re-interpret dominant ethno-religious understandings of marriage.
In highlighting the debates about the legal aspects delineating South Asian Muslim
marriages in the UK and in reviewing previous work conducted on the socio-cultural and
religious aspects of the Islamic marriage in Britain (Poulter, 1986; Pearl and Menski,
1979/1998; Ahsan, 1995; Bano, 1999), I also evaluated young women’s positionings as they
negotiate intertwining legal systems (Islamic and British laws) so as to develop new
perceptions and expectations of marriage through the axes of consent and choice. This study
reinforces how British South Asian Muslim women’s navigations between Islamic and
British ideals of marriage exhibit the possibilities (gained through education) of
reinterpreting Islamic precepts on marriage so as to embrace a discourse of gender equality
in marriage within South Asian Muslim communities in Britain. It is hence possible for
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young women to actively engage with discourses embracing the notion of equality within
the Islamic marriage so as to produce new gender identities. As Brown (2006) previously
showed, young Muslim women in Britain are utilising their knowledge gained through
education so as to personally grapple with Islamic literature (the Qur’an, Sunna and
Hadiths) in order to build a new framework which embraces gender rights as being
egalitarian in Islam. Similarly, in my study, I have demonstrated that respondents are
building on such theoretical discourses, and are eloquently grappling with these concepts in
order to contest and construct new expectations of marriage as they re-work the gendered
boundaries around talaq (Islamic divorce) and polygamy within the Islamic marriage.
The study of British South Asian Muslim women’s negotiations of education,
employment and marriage offers a platform for further research. Further studies could look
at how women’s educational careers may be affected once universities start to charge higher
tuition fees for university degrees; indeed, will women find it harder to make the choice to
continue on their educational paths when it is much more expensive, and will they be seen
as carrying debt, and thus, be more of a burden for a future husband? Also, given some of
the contradictions between the responses of married and unmarried women discussed here,
it would be interesting to consider a longitudinal study on this cohort of British South Asian
Muslim women graduates to find out whether their expectations of achieving professional
careers, as well as altering gendered norms of marriage within their communities, were met.
As for the intersection of legal frameworks (Islamic and British) and the controversies of
merging both, this thesis has demonstrated some of the pitfalls young women face as they
negotiate marriage through two sets of laws.
Further research could usefully reflect on the recent policy debates raised by Dr
Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, in 2008, about Shari’a law in the UK and the
possibilities of adopting certain aspects of Shari’a law in Britain (BBC News Online,
February 2008). This vision has animated national debates in the UK, where Dr Williams
raised the point that Muslim communities in Britain could, for instance, be provided with
scope to legislate marriage according to Islamic legal jurisdiction. In effect, if this were the
case, British South Asian Muslim women’s understandings and experiences of marriage in
Britain would be grounded within different frameworks and discourses, where Muslim
women’s gender identities could be influenced in diverse ways. Further research could
therefore examine what young Muslim women think of these debates, and how they position
themselves within such discourses. This study has demonstrated the importance of new
spaces for research, such as the university campus, in shaping British South Asian Muslim
identities in the UK. Hopkins (2010: 157), in looking at how Muslim identities evolve on
British university campuses, focuses on how the specific ‘social and spatial relations’ that
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Muslim students experience on university campuses inform contestations and constructions
of their identities. My own research provides further examples of this, including the
significance of key university spaces like Islamic societies as well as other spaces of
interaction for students. Further studies could specifically extend knowledge on British
South Asian Muslim women’s identities by examining women’s gender identities within
geographies of university campuses in more depth, as more women decide to enter into
higher education in the future. As this thesis has demonstrated, it is spaces like higher
education and employment which are leading British South Asian Muslim women to assert





1. Research questions about young British South Asian Muslim women and marriage
What defines the young British Muslim woman currently in higher education or recently
graduated from university?
Who? Age? Ethnicity? Single/married/engaged/cohabiting with partner? With children? Relying
on family (nuclear or extended) for financial support while in full-time/part-time education?
Living at home or away from home? Working part time while studying?
What does marriage mean to the young British Muslim woman in multicultural Britain?
A civil contract: legal partnership implying marital rights for spouses enforced by the state? A
social institution that encourages love, support, mutual help and companionship between
couples? A religious and legal contract (nikah): a contract/pledge before God? (Allah)A duty for
every Muslim: marriage as a religious duty with specific gendered roles for women and men? An
institution that legitimises sexual relationships and the procreation of children? Do young women
take it for granted that they will marry? Are marital roles encouraged by the Prophet in Islam
equal/ complementary? Do women think that traditional gendered Islamic roles in marriage have
to be maintained or should they be modified to better fit the needs of modern British society?
What are the implications for young women in marrying twice (Islamic and civil secular)?
Is it always necessary to do both? Is one able to choose between one of them? Which marriage
ceremony has more significance or precedence over the other? Which one is given more
importance and more validity within the community and why? How are negotiations and
compromises between the two forms of marriage reached and established within the angrezi
shari’a (Islamic English law)?
How does gender affect perceptions/experiences of marriage in British Muslim communities?
Impact of gender differences in the approach to marriage norms and ideals in Muslim
communities? How do gender differences and perceptions encourage the socialisation of Muslim
women in particular ways that encourage women to remain the keepers of traditions? How are
Muslim communities’ social and religious expectations different for women and men? Why? To
what extent do young women conform to such norms and what are the consequences of not
following them?
What role does one’s family/kin or community have in shaping values and ideals about marriage?
Analysis of how Muslim families educate and socialise young women in matters of marriage. To
what extent do family members influence them in choice of partners? Are they given choice in
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whether to get married or not? Are arranged marriages common within the family? Are they
cousin marriages/transnational marriages and why? Do families pressurise young women to
marry as soon as possible? To what extent/Why do kinship networks help to maintain cultural
values or ideals about the Islamic marriage in Britain?
2. Research questions about young British South Asian Muslim women’s identities and
meanings of Muslimness and Britishness
How does one choose an identity and why? What are the implications of being both? Or
actively/consciously trying to be all of them (hybridity)? Does religious identity have precedence
over ethnic and national identity or vice-versa? Why? Analysis of how different identities interact
with one another to form new identities. What are the roles of kinship networks, friendship
networks, religious groups, community organisations or university support groups might play in
reinforcing certain identities?
How does gender influence identity formation and the politics of difference in young Muslim
women?
How do young women relate to the wider Muslim community in terms of gender differences? Do
young women think that there may be differences between identities formed in young women and
young men and why do they think they exist? How far does being a woman and a Muslim impact
on young women’s consciousness? What do young women think about how the rest of their
community and British white society socially construct the politics of difference (between
Muslims and non-Muslims in the UK)?
In what ways does the Muslim community or the family help to reinforce cultural/religious/ethnic
identity?
How do different social groups/institutions such as the family, youth groups, Islamic
schools/centres/societies inform young women’s decisions to adopt particular identities? Is there
a specific identity that cuts across social or economic class? What factors (cultural or social)
contribute to reinforce certain traits of ethnic identity to draw the difference between South Asian
Muslim traditions and European traditions? Are specific dress codes (like traditional Muslim
Asian dresses or headscarves-hijab) significant identity markers that young Muslim women have
to respect so as to be identified, both culturally and religiously, as Muslim?
How do young women negotiate between two cultures?
What strategies do young women use to negotiate between Islam and Europe? What do they
consciously reject or embrace from both cultures and why? How does social context shape their
choices? Is the home (personal space) different from public space (university/workplace etc)?
What efforts are made or what actions are taken to negotiate between them and is it a
straightforward process? Do they at times feel ‘torn’ between two cultures in trying to integrate
or assimilate?
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How have traditional and cultural notions on ethnic identities evolved from the first to the second
generation of South Asian Muslims in Britain?
How do the previous generations (parents/grandparents, especially women within the family)
negotiate between identities? Is there more resistance on their part to embrace and identify with
the West? What differences exist between previous and new generation in terms of developing
new identities? Does the previous generation struggle to maintain ‘traditional’ and ‘cultural’
Islamic values in an age of rapid social change and what effects does this have on young Muslim
women?
3. Research questions about gendered social/cultural expectations of Islamic marriage and
identity within South Asian Muslim communities in Britain
What role does Islam play in shaping young women’s ideals of womanhood and marriage in
British South Asian Muslim communities?
How important is religion in young women’s daily lives? Do they at times question the orthodox
or ‘traditional’ portrayals of womanhood in Islam? Why? To what extent do young women
actively engage with Islamic principles and whether Islam is constructed not only as the need to
believe in God (faith-iman) but as a legitimised code for regulating women’s lives? How does the
socialisation of young women construct particular cultural and religious expectations of Muslim
women from their communities and why women conform?
How do young women regard gender roles and relationship within the Islamic marriage?
Do young women believe that Islam encourages or hinders equal gender relationships between
men and women, or between husbands and wives or vice-versa? Should they both benefit from
equal status and power relations within the household and why or how? How do young women
perceive Islamic rules on divorce (talaq) and polygamous Muslim marriages in the UK? Should
female (wife) repudiation still be recognised within Muslim communities and why? Should
Muslim women be given more options to contract their own marriages and how/why?
How relevant are the teachings of the Qur’an and Islamic marriage legislation (Shari’a) for
young Muslim women living in Britain today?
What roles do the teachings and regulations of the Qur’an play in young women’s upbringing
and lives? Do the strict Quranic rules always apply? How are they enforced and contested? What
measures are taken to ensure women adhere to the communities’ religious expectations? How
does the application of the Shari’a on the Islamic marriage differ within British South Asian
Muslim communities and their country of origin? How is the nikah viewed today by Muslim
women living in Britain and its importance versus the secular British civil marriage?
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To what extent could the values surrounding the nikah be reconciled with European notions of
marriage, or to new forms of marriage such as civil partnerships or cohabitation?
How do young Muslim women regard more European partnerships such as cohabitation? How is
cohabitation before marriage regarded in Muslim communities in the UK? Do young men and
women have the same options to decide whether to cohabit with their partners before marriage?
Are there possibilities that young women would cohabit with a boyfriend/partner before
marriage? Do the Islamic values of the nikah, especially those around sexual purity and virginity
prevent young women from cohabiting with a partner? How is pre-marital sex regarded by young
Muslim women in a liberal society that normalises the ideal free love and sexual relationships?
How do young women balance the idea of love and duty (Islamic) if they are in a relationship? To
what extent do young women respect and negotiate with the ‘traditional’ ideals enshrined in the
Qur’an and hadiths?
4. Research questions about education/paid employment and young British South Asian
Muslim women’s choices in respect to marriage
To what extent are young Muslim women able to enter into higher education at an age where
marriage is usually contemplated as is encouraged by Islamic teachings?
How far do young Muslim women need to negotiate with family members to enter into higher
education or are they encouraged to pursue their interests freely? Are they financially supported
by their family while studying? Are they studying out of choice or obligation? Would they prefer
marriage instead or are they able to do both simultaneously? What strategies do young women
use in cases where they are not supported by their families to study and what are the incentives
encouraging them to enter into higher education? Do young women think that it is easier for
young men rather than for women to enter into higher education and why?
How is the pursuit of higher education by women reconciled to the more traditional notions of
womanhood (marriage and motherhood) encouraged or prescribed by Islam?
To what extent does education alter or reinforce ‘traditional/cultural’ views young women have
about Islam and marriage? How far do university life and university campuses as social spaces
create specific contexts where young women navigate between traditionalism (prescribed Islamic
rules) and modernity (European liberal notions)? How is religious or cultural identity
maintained by young Muslim women on campus? For instance, is there a specific dress code to
be respected when they are in public spaces such as university? To what extent do young women
behave differently at university and at home?
How do young women view marriage as an infringement upon educational advancement/career
aspirations and why?
To what extent do young women think that marriage may be an infringement on young women’s
options to study? How far do young women think that marriage, if imposed by family, constrains
women’s abilities to enter into higher education? Do they think they will be considering being
just career oriented once they complete their courses at university or will marriage be given
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precedence over career? Will juggling both career and marriage be an option for young women
and do they believe they will have a choice in the matter?
To what extent do education and paid employment affect young women’s decisions to marry or
lead them to choose alternatives to marriage?
Has education affected any plans to marry? Level to which education changes young women’s
perceptions of what they really want as opposed to what is expected of them from the rest of the
community. To what extent are young women considering alternatives to marriage such as career
options/advancement/pursuing independent and personal goals?
To what extent do education and employment give young women more scope and independence
to develop multiple (hybrid) identities as they negotiate between ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’
definitions/ideals of marriage?
To what extent do young educated Muslim women perceive themselves to be different from or
similar to other women who are not studying/ have not studied? How and why? In what ways do
young women navigate between different identities to form new ones through the education
process? To what extent does education provide women with more independence to engage with
religious ideals and form new opinions on what marriage is and should be? How far do they
think they will have the options of living independently after their courses are finished? How far
is living alone or sharing accommodation/a flat (once the courses are finished and they start





Education and employment: options of young British Muslim women
1. Age/ Occupation-what does your work involve? / Status/ Siblings-what
do they do?
2. How is/was university life like? What particular activities/social groups
were you involved in?
3. How important would you say education is to you? Are most women in
your family educated?
4. Were you supported and encouraged by your family to enter into higher
education or work?
5. Do you think your mum and dad have been equally influential in your
aspirations or in what you wanted to do? Has there been anyone else in
your family or community who has influenced you in your goals?
6. Do you think Muslim women and Muslim men in Britain have equal
chances to go to university and work?
7. Did your grandmother and mother, or women in their generation, have the
same opportunities to study or work? How so? What about men of their
generation?
8. Do you think that education or employment influence marriage prospects
for women? How so?
Identities of young British Muslim women
1. How would you define yourself?
2. How does the previous generation differ from your generation? Do you think British
Muslims have kept traditions or customs?
3. Do you think that the term ‘British Muslim’ existed some 40-50 years ago?
4. Do you think there is a clash between traditions and modernity in Muslim
communities in Britain?
5. How do you think the Muslim community helps to maintain cultural or religious
traditions in Britain?
Meanings of marriage for young British Muslim women
1. How do you view marriage in Britain nowadays?
2. What are your own expectations about marriage? Do they differ from your parents’/
Have they changed intergenerationally?
3. Does religion influence your views on marriage?
4. Do you think marriage is equally important for young Muslim women and men, as
compared to other groups?
5. In the British community, arranged marriages, particularly cousin marriages are
viewed as taboo. Why do you think that is?
6. Do you have any concerns about such marriages?
7. What about forced marriages?
8. Are the nikah and the civil registration equally important to you?
9. What do you think about cohabitation before marriage?
10. What are your views on pre-marital relationships and premarital sex?
11. Could you tell me about your past experiences of relationships?
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12. Do you think women and men (wives and husbands) benefit from equal status and
rights in Islam?
13. In your family and community, are wives and husbands given the same rights in the
household?
14. How do you feel about the status of Muslim women in relation to wife repudiation
(talaq)?
15. What are your views on Muslim polygamous marriages?





Theme One: Education and Work
School experiences
Higher education and locality
Higher education and choice
Career choice
University and life experience
Higher education and living arrangements/ ‘moving away from home’
Involvement in social groups
Islamic Societies at university (ISOC)
Emphasis on traditional subjects/careers
Importance of higher education
Importance of work
Higher education and family background
Higher education and siblings’ support
Higher education and access to younger siblings
Educated women in the family
Mothers’ input in daughters’ education
Fathers’ input in daughters’ education
Reasons for parental support
Higher education/work and husbands’ support
Parents’ trust in daughters
Higher education and family constraints
Barriers to go into higher education
Differences in ‘Asian’ v/s ‘Western’ upbringing and education
Younger generations’ attitudes to higher education
Intergenerational differences/changes of women’s opportunities to education and work
Intergenerational differences/changes of men’s opportunities to education and work
Women’s peers who have not studied and lifestyle
Higher education and work v/s marriage
Independence v/s marriage
Higher education and marriage plans/prospects
Higher education and gender differences
Higher education and community beliefs
Higher education and women’s independence
Higher education and financial security
Higher education and evolution of identities
Work and social class









Religious identity and pride




Identity and pressure to conform
Migration and integration
Migration and older generation
Who am I?
What makes me British?
What makes me Pakistani/Indian/Bangladeshi?
What makes me Muslim?
Situational/contextual identities







Public perception of ethnic/religious/cultural identities
Identity stereotyping and older generation
Older generations’ expressions of identities
Younger generations’ expressions of identities
Intergenerational perceptions of identity for older v/s younger generations
Intergenerational clashes between older v/s younger generations
Having ‘different’ lives
University and ‘British side’
Home and ‘traditional side’










Perceptions of marriage in Britain
Change in marriage perceptions in Britain
Marriage as partnership
Choice of marriage partner
Meanings of marriage for young women
Expectations of marriage for young women
Marriage: a piece of paper in Britain





Marriage and parental expectations
Marriage and divorce rates
Choice in marriage and higher education
Marriage and in-laws
Marriage and community expectations
Marrying ‘in’ and ‘out’
Marriage and social status
Social class and marriage options/choices
Dating
Engagements
Views on love marriage
Experiences of love marriage
Views on arranged marriage
Experiences of arranged marriage
Arranged marriage and choice/consent
Arranged marriage and evolution
Love marriage v/s arranged marriage
Forced marriage
Forced marriage in Britain
Forced marriage and education
Distinction between arranged and forced marriage
Grey area in arranged v/s forced marriage
Views on transnational marriage
Experiences of transnational marriage
Transnational marriage and culture
Views on cousin marriage
Experiences of cousin marriage
Cousin marriage and Islam
Cousin marriage and love
Meaning of the nikah
Meaning of civil registration
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Importance of the nikah
Importance of civil registration
Reasons for doing nikah and civil registration
Priority of the nikah over civil registration








Pre-marital sex and women’s views
Pre-marital sex and community
Pre-marital sex and younger generations
Boyfriends and relationships
Women’s relationships: reputation and parents
Divorce in South Asian Muslim communities
Women’s views on divorce
Theme Four: Islam






Why wear the hijab?
Hijab and culture
Hijab and the ‘good Muslim girl’ view
Hijab as tool




Expressions of Islam: Younger v/s Older generations








Marriage and conversion to Islam
Sunni-Shia inter-marriage
Islam and Sexuality
Women’s status in Islam
Men and Islam
Wives’ rights in Islam
Women’s views on mahr
Equal rights/status in Islam
Islam and women’s ‘liberation’
Stereotype of ‘oppressed’ Muslim women
Religion v/s Culture
Religion as justification to patriarchy/culture
Divorce in Islam
Women’s views on female repudiation
Legal difficulties of Islamic divorce/English divorce
Importance of Islamic divorce







Shari’a law in the UK
Shari’a law and stereotypes
Theme Five: Gender
Stereotype of the ‘educated girl’
‘Proper Muslim girl’
Behaviour codes for women
Gender and clothing
Women’s clothing and community codes
Men in the community
‘Shame in the family’
Gender and marriage
Gender and community constraints
Gender and household roles
Gender roles and older generation’s expectations
Gender differences and dating
Gender and virginity before marriage
Gender and transnational marriage
Intergenerational changes in gender roles (household)
Women’s position in the family
Women’s experiences of roles in the family
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Women and honour
Gender and higher education
Older generation’s reactions to girls’ v/s boys’ educational achievements
An educated wife: a ‘liability’? / Women and ‘too much education’
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APPENDIX FIVE
Coded Theme: Higher Education
This is an example of how I coded the theme ‘Higher Education’ using the software Nvivo8;




APPENDIX SEVEN – Mind Maps
Mind Map 1: Thesis Outline.
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Mind Map 2: Higher Education/Employment/Identity (Chapter Four).
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287 Mind Map 3: Identities/Muslimness (Chapter Five).
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288 Mind Map 4: Marriage (Chapter Six).
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APPENDIX EIGHT
Consent to participate in a research study
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM
Title: Young British South Asian Muslim women: marriage and identity
Supervisor: Dr Claire Dwyer, Lecturer, Department of Geography, UCL. Tel: 0207 679
5526; Email: c.dwyer@geog.ac.uk.
Researcher: Samia Abdool Raman, PhD student, UCL. Tel: 07973512771; Email:
s.raman@ucl.ac.uk
Purpose
You are being asked to participate in a research study. I hope to gain an understanding
how young Muslim women in Britain view marriage and identity. I also aim to
understand the ways in which education and employment prospects influence young
women’s aspirations for the future. I am interested in how young women perceive
marriage in their community, and in British society at large. I am also particularly
interested in how Islamic values shape marriage patterns in British Muslim
communities, and how this may impact on ethnic practices and identities.
This project is intended to produce information for a doctoral thesis.
Procedures
If you decide to volunteer, you will be asked to participate in a number of ways in this
nine-month study:
 You will be asked to attend an informal group discussion. During this time, group
members may actively talk abut their perceptions, views and experiences of
marriage and identity and education. With all the group members’ permission, I
will tape record the discussion.
 You will be asked to participate in an in-depth interview during which time I will
ask you about your experiences or views on marriage in your community and your
marriage options. I will also ask you about your views on Muslim marriages, and the
relevance or importance of religion and culture in your daily life, and your
community at large. In addition, I will ask you about your educational aims and
career aspirations, and how you think these may influence your future goals. I will
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also ask you how these factors have influenced your sense of self. The interview will
take approximately two to two and a half hours. With your permission, I will tape
record your interview.
Risks
There are no risks to you for participation in this study.
Participant’s Initials:
Benefits
There are no direct benefits to you for participation in this study but you will have an
opportunity to reflect on your experiences of higher education, your future hopes and
concerns, as well as your marriage options. The project will also contribute to debates
on the ways in which young South Asian Muslim women are negotiating marriage and
educational avenues in Britain.
Confidentiality
Any information you give will be held as strictly confidential. Your name or any
identifying characteristics will not be used in any way. I will not give this information to
anyone.
Costs/Compensation
There is no cost to you beyond the time and effort that is required in completing the
procedure described above.
Right to Refuse or Withdraw
You may refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to participate, you may change
your mind about being in the study and withdraw after the survey has started. Your
refusal to participate will not affect you in any way. During the interview and focus
groups you may decline to answer any questions that make you feel
uncomfortable.
Do you want to be contacted with findings from the study?








If you have any questions, please ask me.
Consent
Your signature will indicate that you have decided to volunteer as a research participant
and that you have read and understood the information provided above.
Signature of participant date
Signature of researcher date




PhD Research study: British South Asian
Muslim women, marriage and identities in
Britain
Volunteers needed!!!
The study involves young British South Asian Muslim
women and their perceptions, experiences or views on
marriage, identities and Islam in multicultural Britain.
The research is anonymous and strictly confidential. The
data is used solely for the PhD thesis.
All that is required is an informal interview, more like
a conversation but really fun! :)
We could have it over coffee or lunch.
If you are interested to participate and voice out your
opinions, then this is your chance!!! If you think of
anyone who would be happy to participate, I would
appreciate if you would forward this email.







Angrezi Shari’a: Term used to define the fusion of Shari’a and English law
Biradari: Group of kin playing significant role in maintaining social relations within a community
Burka: An all-enveloping loose body length cloak, including a head scarf covering
Duppata: Scarf worn around the neck accompanying the salwar kameez
Hadith and Sunna: Islamic principles based on the deeds and actions of Prophet Mohammad
Hijab: Headscarf covering the hair, ears and neck
Imam: Worship leader of mosque or Muslim community
Izzat: Concept of honour in South Asian communities
Jilbab: An all-enveloping loose body length cloak
Mahr: Bridal gift (Islamic marriage)
Nikah: Islamic marriage
Nikah-Nama: Islamic marriage certificate
Niqab: An all-enveloping loose body length cloak, including a head covering scarf and a face
cover, exposing just the eyes
Mahr: Bridal gift as stipulated in Islamic law
Purdah: Concept of seclusion of women in private spaces
Shari’a: Islamic law/Muslim Personal Law
Salwar Kameez: Outfit comprising trousers and top, originating from South Asia
Qur’an: Holy text enshrining Islamic religious precepts and law
Rishta: Match
Rukhsati: Bride-leaving ceremony (from parents’ to husband’s house)
Talaq: Islamic divorce
Ulama: Islamic jurists
Ummah: Concept of universal Muslim community
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